limit myself to the most obvious suggestions; many more will occur to all.

In this regard we may learn much from the recent similar survey made of our colleagues of the medical profession. The Report of the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care is a mine of most important information, a great deal of which is directly worth while for our own study in relation to our own problems. The violent adverse reaction of the medical profession to the Report is, I fear, but an indication of what we too may expect from the rank and file of the bar; although anyone interested in improving conditions in the administration of justice must be hardened to expect such outbursts. Nevertheless we can see certain errors which perhaps we may avoid. This Committee was financed by outside sources, the great advantage of which was perhaps offset by the conviction of many that a thesis must be and was proved and that arguments were being sought for this thesis. The Report may suggest to us profitable lines of inquiry while enabling us to avoid the suspicions with which it was viewed.

8. Medical Care for the American People. The Final Report of The Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, 1932, together with other publications of the Committee. Cf. also the Final Report of the Committee on Medical Education (1928) which seems to have been more favorably received by the medical profession.

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ADVANCE SPECIFICATIONS OF DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL CASES

Balance in Favor of Prosecution in Early Seventeenth Century Has Swung Today Decidedly in Favor of Accused—Steps to Remedy Patent Inequalities Which Hamper Administration of Justice — Advance Specifications of Defense as a Means of Thwarting Perjured and Surprise Defenses — Notice of Intention to Offer Alibi Evidence in Michigan and Ohio—Insanity—Other Defenses, etc.

BY GORDON DEAN
Instructor in Law and Assistant to Dean, Duke University Law School

A SPORTSMANLIKE spectator demands a contest in which the participants are not too unevenly matched, and to some extent the history of criminal procedure is characterized by judicial and legislative innovations designed to accomplish a balance of handicaps and advantages between the prosecuting agency and the accused.

Perhaps the most sweeping attempt to secure this balance came about in the century following the English Civil War. Prior thereto an accused was secretly confined before trial without opportunity to prepare a defense; he was given no intimation of the evidence or witnesses to be used against him; he was not permitted counsel, either prior to or at trial; there was no guarantee of confrontation of witnesses; confessions of accomplices were regarded as specially cogent evidence; and the trial was an unequal battle between a battery of prosecution counsel (each one of which would devote himself to a particular segment of the case) on the one side, and the privilege-shorn suspect on the other.

A wide-spread revulsion was inevitable and we find much evidence of the balancing process which resulted, in the bills of rights of American commonwealths. If one were simply to list, without further description, the rights of the accused at the various stages of American criminal procedure today, the list would be an imposing one. While most of these guarantees whether legislatively or otherwise enunciated, would seem to be privileges which should be accorded in any civilized community, others are either less fundamental manifestations of the vagaries of the public mood or the work of defense lawyers in the lawmaking bodies who are unduly solicitous for the rights of accused persons.

Today the balance is decidedly in favor of the accused. He is no longer the pitiful combatant of the
early 17th century who stood shackled before his persecutors. His bonds have been loosed and a weapon has been placed in his hands. It is unfortunate that in speaking of the American trial one finds himself resorting to the terminology of a bygone contest, a terminology which does not confront one accustomed to the continental criminal procedure which, despite its many unfair incidents, bears little resemblance to a game—more to an earnest investigation into guilt or innocence.  

One of the most patent inequalities is bound up with the so-called right of the accused to reveal the prosecution’s case, including the right to a copy of the indictment with the charge adequately set forth, a bill of particulars, the right to names of witnesses appearing before the grand jury, the right (if prosecution be commenced by preliminary hearing) to have the state’s case presented in prima facie form (and in some jurisdictions in full), with no counter obligation upon the accused to reveal the nature of his defense unless it be by way of abatement; but rather, a privilege to remain silent, except for an uninformative plea of “not guilty” until the waning hours of the trial when the surprise defense may be dramatically ushered in to do the state more good than harm. The American trial has an air about it, a verbiage which cannot fail to strike the European observer as the language of a law which maintains an attitude of surprise. The German case is the same. The defendant says “I am innocent,” and the prosecution says “I am not satisfied.” The American is “innocent until proved guilty,” while the German is “guilty until proved innocent.” The American practice is one of procedure, the German of evidence. The American is more lenient in one sense; the German is more lenient in another. The American is the same in all senses.
resulted on that score in Detroit... Proceeding and police officials of this County are firmly convinced that the present Michigan Insanity Statute is a step in the right direction and that it prevents many miscarriages of justice."

In 1929 the Criminal Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association drafted an alibi defense statute containing virtually the same language as the Michigan statute, and secured its enactment. It has been said that the abuses of the alibi defense were so great that the legislature met in 1931 to deprive section 13444-20 of any force and effect, as it is difficult to conceive how any alibi testimony in a criminal case would not tend to disrupt the court to the extent that it was difficult to prove the truth of the alibi testimony, but the supreme court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

In spite of the able sponsorship of State Attorney-General John J. Bennett, Jr., Judge Charles C. Knott, Jr., and Thomas S. Rice, vigorous associate editor of The Panel, the New York legislature has three times voted down a similar statute in that state. In 1926, the Section of Criminal Procedure of the California Bar Association recommended the adoption of such a statute, but the efforts of this committee, the district attorneys of the state, and the California Crime Commission were unavailing when the legislature met in 1931.

The attorney general's office has recommended to

the present federal congress the adoption of such a statute.

Under both the Michigan and Ohio statutes, alibi is not raised by a separate plea, but by specification under the general issue. Both statutes provide that in the event defendant fails to submit advance notice, the court may in its discretion exclude alibi evidence. This grant of discretion seems a wise insertion both from the standpoint of the prosecution and the accused. Without such a penalty the requirement of the special plea would be a most ineffective gesture. While the cases will be rare in which the court should permit proof of an unannounced alibi, occasionally a defendant will be called upon, in a tardy prosecution, to recall and substantiate his presence at a given place on a night some years previous. When such a case arises the discretion may be exercised as so as not to penalize a defendant who has not had time to refresh his memory.

Insanity

With such unsolved fundamental problems in the insanity field as the bases for criminal responsibility, the adequacy of insanity tests, the need for the creation of agencies for pre-trial psychiatric examinations, and the ultimate disposition of the mentally unsound, only the most superficial surface-scratching can be accomplished by tinkering with such purely mechanical innovations as the special plea of insanity. Our contribution is rendered all the more slight when it is realized that, contrary to popular opinion, the insanity defense is raised in comparatively few cases.

However, by requiring advance notice of intention to present an insanity defense, some of the surprise element will be eliminated, and feigned insanity may be discouraged. California statistics indicate that such a requirement will not necessarily result in fewer such pleas although that has apparently been the result in Michigan.

In Alabama, California, Ohio, Washington, Wisconsin, and Indiana, the defense of insanity at the time of the offense must be raised by a special plea, and unless it is so raised, no evidence of insanity may be presented at the trial. Louisiana had a similar statute, but in 1932 the section of the Code containing the provision for a special plea was amended and re-enacted omitting any reference to such a plea.

In Colorado and Michigan insanity must be raised by a specification under the general issue. Unless so raised it cannot be shown under "not guilty" in

the former state, and may be excluded by the judge in the latter.

In New York and Nebraska the defendant may make a special plea of insanity, but evidence of insanity is nevertheless admissible under the general issue, rather impotent provision, it would seem. While three other states, Maine, Maryland, and New Hampshire, make no requirement with reference to special pleas in insanity cases, their statutes appear to contemplate such pleas, and such pleas would not be rejected as they have been in other states.

The Code of Criminal Procedure of the American Law Institute contains a provision, similar to that in Michigan and Colorado requiring a specification in advance of trial. Ani the Missouri Crime Survey and the Wickersham Commission contain recommendations approving such a statute.

Other Defenses

It is submitted that the specification of defense should be extended to all defenses, leaving as the scope of the plea of "not guilty" the questions whether or not the acts charged took place and whether the accused committed them. Hidden away in the voluminous report of the Wickersham Commission is this significant recommendation. The accused, who has participated in the commission of crime, is in a position to know the circumstances under which his acts were committed. The prosecution is not. If the defendant was not at the scene of the crime, he knows that fact, and he also knows something the prosecution may never know, namely, where he was at the time of its commission. If he is innocent because his conduct falls within some legal excuse or justification, he would not be prejudiced by a statutory compulsion to specify such excuse or justification. If he is guilty, no constitutional guarantee for the protection of the innocent should shield him.

From the standpoint of saving time and expense in the prosecution of criminal cases, the requirement of advance notice of defense would be fully justified. If a defendant wishes to raise the defense of entrapment, for instance, a defense which by its very nature admits compulsion to specify such excuse or justification. If he is guilty no constitutional guarantee for the protection of the innocent should shield him.

Where the defense is based upon a promise of

40. Md. v. Alexander, 4 People v. 26 Har. 25 (1852); People v. Joyce, 295 N. Y. 108, 134 N. E. 596 (1921).
46. The same procedure. Report, Wickersham Commission, vol. 6, p. 34.
48. It is not suggested here that legislation be enacted making the immunity made by enforcement officers in consideration that the defendant either give information concerning accomplices or the whereabouts of loot, or in consideration that he turn state's evidence, no unfairness would result from requiring advance notice of such defense. The defense is essentially one in abatement.

6. The same is true of other defenses, but particularly true of condonation. While this defense is definitely limited it makes its appearance in jurisdictions where statutes have been enacted which call for a dismissal of the case where in rape and seduction the parties later marry, and in adultery where the prosecution is not instituted upon the complaint of the aggrieved spouse. Since the perfect example of condonation is the grant of executive clemency through pardon, and since pardon had to be raised by a special plea at common law, it should not be regarded as a novel suggestion; that condonation in its less perfect form be the subject of advance specification.

Most defenses unlike alibi which is exceedingly hard to refute at the last moment, and unlike immunity which may possibly be classed as one in abatement, are defenses which are not usually difficult to refute, and which go to the merits. But even assuming that the cases where the surprise element hinders effective prosecution are the exception rather than the rule it would seem that whatever slight inconvenience may result to the accused from advance specifications is outweighed by the slight advantage accorded the prosecution by virtue of which defenses may be tested in advance of trial.

Obviously any attempt to confine defendants to one defense only would be unreasonable and unfair and would immediately be labelled unconstitutional, at least where consistent defenses are preferred. But to require that defenses be announced in advance of trial does not deprive a defendant of such defenses. He may select any defenses applicable to his situation. No defense is made unavailable to him unless by his own choice he discards it through failure to specify. But if the failure to specify such defenses in advance of trial is to work a forfeiture of the right to introduce evidence tending to establish such defenses, will not counsel make a practice of enumerating all defenses in their specifications? This hardly seems a likely prospect, but if it becomes such, there are methods of correcting such an abuse. Statutes might be enacted prohibiting the enumeration of inconsistent defenses in the specification. But the most effective counter-irritant might be supplied by giving to the prosecutor if he needs a grant of power in this respect the right to comment upon the fact that defenses specified were not established by evidence at the trial, or that the defenses offered were inconsistent. To pre-
sent to the jury a long list of the defenses specified and to then proceed to ridicule the list would be far more damaging than any restriction on pleading inconsistent defenses. A jury is rightfully suspicious of a man who claims an alibi and who offers evidence of self-defense.

Any change in the procedural law which disturbs the existing alignment of handicaps and advantages, however unbalanced it may now be, between accused and prosecutor, is certain to be met with cries of unconstitutionality, and it would therefore seem appropriate to anticipate such objections.

In 1927 California created a new plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity." By statute it was provided that if such plea were used alone, the defendant thereby admitted the commission of the offense charge, and if the plea of "not guilty" were used alone, the defendant was conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time of the offense charged. If the defendant joined with the insanity plea another plea, he was first to be tried as if he had entered the other plea only, and for purposes of such trial was presumed sane, following which a separate trial was provided on the insanity issue.

In the first case involving the constitutionality of the statute, People v. Hickman, the defendant entered only the insanity plea and upon a finding of sanity, was sentenced. He urged upon appeal that having been confined to the insanity issue he had been denied due process and equal protection of the laws under the 14th amendment. The court held that he had had ample opportunity to choose appropriate pleas and that he was not therefore deprived of anything which he could not have availed himself of.

In People v. Davis, the defendant entered both a plea of "not guilty" and one of "not guilty by reason of insanity," and although he had ample opportunity to present insanity evidence at the second hearing his appeal was based upon the court's refusal to permit the introduction of insanity evidence at the first hearing. Following the reasoning in the Hickman Case, the court held that the procedure was valid if at some time he was permitted to have his insanity determined by the court.

In People v. Leong Fook and People v. Troche, the defendants entered pleas of "not guilty" and offered evidence of insanity under such pleas which was rejected by the court. In opinions which stress the procedural nature of the statutory change, and which rely heavily and unnecessarily upon the affirmative nature of the insanity defense, the court held that the legislature could constitutionally exclude evidence of insanity on a "not guilty" plea, where opportunity was given to choose a plea by which insanity could be raised.

In none of the cases was the court troubled particularly with the validity of that portion of the statute which simply required a defendant to choose the appropriate plea or forfeit the right to raise it at trial. Its real problem was whether insanity was such a vital inseparable factor in the determination of guilt as could not be detached from the guilt issue for determination in a separate hearing.

The first problem would seem to be a relatively simple one and yet a dictum of the Ohio court in a recent case leaves uncertain the disposition which will be made of the Ohio insanity law when a proper case is presented:

'We do not deem it necessary under this record to consider the refusal of the court under Section 13340-2, Ohio General Code (113 Ohio Laws 175) to permit testimony to be offered as to the insanity of the accused at the time of the commission of the offense, so as to go into the question of the force and effect as to the constitutionality of the provision establishing a conclusive presumption of sanity from the failure of the attorney to file a written plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Two of the members of this court, including the writer of this opinion, are convinced that an enactment which would deprive an insane person of a defense going to the very vitals of his case, because of non-action upon the part of his attorney, would necessarily be unconstitutional, upon the ground that it would deprive such insane person of due process of law.'

It is submitted that on the basis of the above reasoning, the Ohio statute is no more a deprivation of due process than a denial by a trial judge of a defendant's request to change a plea, entered by his attorney, from guilty to not guilty.

With the dictum in the above case may be compared the language of the Alabama Supreme Court in a case upholding the constitutionality of the statute of that state which provides for a separate insanity plea:

"The rule is well settled in this state that the action of the trial court in refusing to allow additional pleas to be filed after the time prescribed by law is not reversible on appeal (citing cases). We see no reason for making an exception in favor of the plea of 'not guilty by reason of insanity.' Section 7176 of the Code requires that this plea must be interposed at the time of arraignment, and failure to do so forfeits the right, and leaves the acceptance of the plea thereafter to the unreviewable discretion of the trial court. There is no merit in the suggestion that the enforcement of this rule of practice is a violation of his constitutional right 'to be heard by himself and counsel, or either.'"

The proposal for a more extended use of special pleas in criminal cases is not, however, complicated by any of the constitutional problems such as arose out of the California statute which provided for separate trials on separate pleas. The proposal involves no attempt to separately try the issue of self defense, for instance, and the other issues that may be raised today under the modern procedure would be a farce, for the elements constituting self defense are so interlinked with the other proof which would be adduced that a separate trial of the self defense issue would simply result in duplicate hearings. The proposal involves one trial only, but advance notice of the defenses which are to be raised therein.

Is due process violated when one is given the choice of any defenses suitable to his situation, but is permitted to assert them at trial only if preceded by a notice of such intention? In the Troche Case the court said:

"Due process of law is not limited to the due process of the settled usages of the past, but may include new methods of procedure unknown to the common law, provided they are in the interest of justice and for the protection of the rights of the accused."

61. Ibid.
63. supra, n. 91.
64. 294 Cal. 470, 268 Pac. 909, 270 Pac. 1117 (1928).
65. 91 Cal. App. 279, 270 Pac. 715 (1928).
66. Supra, n. 91.
68. 105 Cal. 64, 278 Pac. 928 (1928).
69. 106 Cal. 89, 117 Pac. 707 (1913).
70. Appeal dismissed 290 U. S. 614 (1934).
71. See Shepherd, "The Plea of Insanity under the 1927 Amendment to the California Penal Code," (1933) 3 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1, at p. 6 et seq.
harmony with the accepted underlying principles of such procedure and the traditions of the common law. They must be orderly and provide for reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard."

The California cases construing the insanity statute of that state would seem to present ample argument for sustaining legislation extending the use of special pleas or specifications to other defenses.

The constitutional objection which might conceivably prevail against alibi statutes—such as those in Michigan and Ohio, is that the procedure in effect requires the defendant to be a witness against himself. The provision against self-incrimination exists in forty-six of the states including Michigan and Ohio. The wording of the guarantee is the same in both these states: "No person shall be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself." The alibi statutes differ from the insanity statutes in that in the former the defendant must not only specify his defense or forfeit the right to raise it at the trial, but he must also state when he was at the time the offense was committed. The statute thus compels the defendant who proposes to offer such a defense to furnish particulars concerning the evidence which will establish it. It may be argued that this is the equivalent, at least, of testimonial compulsion, the very thing which the constitutional provisions were designed to prevent. It is true that the privilege against self-incrimination has not been applied to criminal pleas or pleadings, but it is also true that no statutes have heretofore required of a defendant what the alibi statutes now require.

It is submitted, however, that the alibi statutes do not infringe on the privilege against self-incrimination. Rather, they set up a wholly reasonable rule of pleading which in no manner compels a defendant to be a witness against himself. The alibi statutes differ from the insanity statutes in that in the former the defendant must not only specify his defense or forfeit the right to raise it at the trial, but he must also state when he was at the time the offense was committed. The statute thus compels the defendant who proposes to offer such a defense to furnish particulars concerning the evidence which will establish it. It may be argued that this is the equivalent, at least, of testimonial compulsion, the very thing which the constitutional provisions were designed to prevent. It is true that the privilege against self-incrimination has not been applied to criminal pleas or pleadings, but it is also true that no statutes have heretofore required of a defendant what the alibi statutes now require.

There is slight likelihood that the privilege will be strained to invalidate such legislation as the alibi statutes.

In conclusion it may not be out of place to indicate some of the other proposals which have been urged in recent years to bring about a more equitable distribution of advantages between the state and the accused in criminal pleading. Three of these particularly bear mentioning. The first is a proposal to require a defendant to furnish in advance of trial the names of the witnesses he expects to call at the trial or upon failure to do so, forfeit the right to call them. The second is a proposal to require the defendant to submit a schedule of witnesses and a brief summary of what each will testify to. The third involves setting up in criminal cases approximately the same system of pleading as now prevails in civil cases under reformed procedure in which the scope of the general issue is limited, and the tender of a certain plea without more will constitute an admission of matters not denied in the plea, thus saving the state the necessity of proving admitted facts.

Each of the above proposals would undoubtedly result in an increasingly aggravated disturbance of the defendant's now favorable balance, and each would therefore be increasingly difficult to sustain under the due process clause. To speculate as to the reception which the judiciary will accord such legislation is beyond the scope of this article. The first proposal would seem to involve a harsh requirement. To make a defendant specify each witness he will use to establish his innocence would seem to call for needless particularization. The second proposal while subject to the same objection, would also be a clumsy implement at best, for no law can satisfactorily regulate the brevity of a summary of testimony, and such summaries would invariably disclose little of significance to the prosecutor. The third proposal, I fear, would lead immediately to a wild scramble to set up a system of pleading akin to that on the civil side which has been centuries in the making. In order to ascertain what is to be regarded as admitted, and what denied by each of the multitude of written defense pleadings that would be presented to the courts, we would call for thousands of appellate court adjudications and furnish unnecessary opportunities for delay in the administration of criminal justice. It would be a costly reform.

None of these objections apply to the proposal herein advanced that notice be given before trial of the defense to be presented. The most brief specification will be sufficiently informative. No counter pleadings are called for. The issues raised by the defense would be heard at one trial as under present procedure. But the perjured defense and the surprise defense, neither of which has any justification in a serious search into the blameworthiness of conduct, will be substantially thwarted.

88. id. 504.
89. Helter, "Adam, Is My Fig Leaf on Straight?" pp. 44-45.


For discussions of the privilege, see Wigmore, supra, §§250-2504. For detailed discussion of the privilege, see Wigmore, supra, §§250-2504. For a general statement, see Wigmore, supra, §§250-2504. For a general statement, see Wigmore, supra, §§250-2504. For a general statement, see Wigmore, supra, §§250-2504.