

CHAPTER 7

A WHOLE LOT OF SUBSTANCE OR A WHOLE LOT OF RHETORIC?

A PERSPECTIVE ON A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO SECURITY CHALLENGES

Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

The Department [of Defense] supports institutionalizing whole-of-government approaches to addressing national security challenges. The desired end state is for U.S. Government national security partners to develop plans and conduct operations from a shared perspective.

*Quadrennial Defense Roles
and Missions Review Report, 2009*¹

INTRODUCTION

In the U.S. Government, the “whole of government” mantra is firmly embedded in official rhetoric as the idea-*du-jour*. Moreover, as the quote above indicates, in the national security realm particularly, it is officially considered a bedrock principle.

Indeed, the Obama administration—building on themes developed previously by the Bush and Clinton administrations²—explicitly incorporates a whole of government (WoG) approach in the *National Security Strategy* issued in May of 2010.³ In the administration’s conceptualization, a WoG approach in the national security sphere essentially involves, among other things, greater coordination across government agencies, and a marked expansion of diplomatic and civilian devel-

opment capabilities. Military and civilian institutions are, the strategy insists, to “complement each other and operate seamlessly.”⁴

The purpose of this chapter is to briefly trace the application of the WoG approach to security issues, highlight a few of its strengths and weaknesses, and examine the potential unintended consequences. It will argue that while a WoG approach certainly has its merits, it is not – and never will be – a panacea. Moreover, this chapter contends that in some instances a unilateral approach, that is, one that wholly or primarily relies upon a particular agency, is the preferred or only practical alternative. The chapter will also suggest that when extended to the domestic context, a WoG approach strategy may be unsettling, and even counterproductive, to the Nation’s long-term strategic and political interests.

Finally, this chapter advocates considering a WoG approach as just one tool in the smart power toolbox. It argues that as such, a WoG approach is most effective when selectively employed, and not as a default in all circumstances.

IRREGULAR WAR AND THE RISE OF THE WoG APPROACH

As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) recently observed, for “well over a decade, there has been widespread concern that the U.S. government lacks appropriate civilian ‘tools’ to carry out state-building tasks in post conflict situations.”⁵ Operations in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere were cited as examples of situations where it fell to America’s armed forces to perform a variety of state-building tasks “such as creating justice systems, assisting police, and promoting governance.”⁶

The February 2011 report points out:

The military was called upon to perform such missions not only for its extensive resources but also because no other U.S. government agency could match the military's superior planning and organizational capabilities. In addition, because of its manpower, the military carried out most of the U.S. humanitarian and nation-building contribution, *even though some believed that civilians might be better suited to carry out such tasks, especially those tasks involving cooperation with humanitarian NGOs [nongovernmental organizations].*⁷

Still, the current impetus for a WoG approach is much traceable to reconstruction and stability issues arising out of the irregular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Defined by the Pentagon as a "violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s),"⁸ irregular war was exactly what the Department of Defense (DoD) found itself fighting after toppling the Baathist government of Iraq, and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

The DoD may have anticipated security issues, but it seems clear that it nevertheless expected that once the conventional fight ended, the task of physically reconstructing the country and rebuilding its economic societal institutions—essential elements of strategic victory in irregular war—would be the responsibility of other government agencies and the international community.

Things, however, did not work out that way. According to analyst Gordon Adams, although "whole of government" was among the "buzz words" that arose in direct response to the post-major combat operations stage in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DoD found itself:

frustrated by the absence of a significant, flexible, well-funded civilian capacity at the State Department and USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], able to take responsibility for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization after U.S. combat operations concluded.⁹

That, it seems, was enough for the DoD to take matters into its own hands.

DoD authorities responded by attempting a rather significant re-orientation of the armed forces to fill the perceived post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization capability gap. In late-2005, the DoD issued a directive entitled *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR)*.¹⁰ Designed to support President Bush's National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44,¹¹ this watershed policy document (designated Department of Defense Directive [DoDD] 3000.05) declared that stability operations are a "core U.S. military mission" and one that, according to the directive, was to be "given a priority comparable to combat operations."¹²

That document was followed in 2008 by the Army's own *Stability Operations* manual which implemented the DoD policy.¹³ The Army's manual contained an explicit definition of the WoG approach, describing it rather amorphously as an "approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal."¹⁴

In accord with DoDD 3000.05, the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) did not use WoG approach terminology, but said as much in declaring that:

The Department of Defense cannot meet today's complex challenges alone. Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. Government to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad.¹⁵

These sentiments were echoed in the 2009 *Quadrennial Defense Roles and Missions Review Report*¹⁶ wherein the DoD affirms its support for the "maturation of whole-of-government approaches to national security problems," adding that any solution such an approach produces will "be based on employing integrated flexible, mutually-supporting interagency capabilities."¹⁷ For its part, the 2010 QDR is replete with specific references to the WoG approach.¹⁸

In the meantime, however, the Army and the Marine Corps also issued their counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, *Field Manual* (FM) 3-24, which became the "bible" for operations in Iraq and later Afghanistan.¹⁹ A multifaceted document subject to a myriad of interpretations, it was popularly imagined as a kinder, gentler way of achieving success in COIN situations by eschewing violence against insurgents in favor of a population-centric strategy aimed at winning "hearts and minds," much through nation-building and reconstruction efforts. Journalist Steve Coll described it thusly in the *New Yorker*:

[Popular] among sections of the country's liberal-minded intelligentsia. This was warfare for northeastern graduate students—complex, blended with politics, designed to build countries rather than destroy them, and fashioned to minimize violence. It was a doctrine with particular appeal to people who would never own a gun.²⁰

It is also a doctrine that, on the face of it, is perfectly suited to a WoG approach. In fact, it devotes an entire chapter to integrating civilian and military efforts.²¹ Nevertheless, the doctrine makes it clear that nation-building tasks are essential for COIN success and, if necessary, the military must endeavor to accomplish them even in the absence of civilian partners. That circumstance occurred. For example, commanders were obliged to turn to their “in-house counsel” (uniformed military lawyers called Judge Advocates or “JAGs”) for even such activities as rule of law reconstitution—a task that would appear to be better conducted by civilian personnel.²²

Unsurprisingly, therefore, when DoDD 3000.05 was re-issued in 2009, the DoD acknowledged the importance of civilian partners, but reiterated that the DoD must be prepared to take the “lead” in such activities as establishing civil security and civil control, restoring essential services, repairing, and protecting critical infrastructure, and delivering humanitarian assistance until it is feasible for another agency to take over.²³

THE MERITS OF A WoG APPROACH

Taken at face value, the notion of exploiting all the government’s potential in the service of national security is eminently reasonable and wise. Plainly, national defense is the most basic rationale for government. Our own Constitution cites “provide for the common defence” as one of the key responsibilities of government.²⁴ Accordingly, the judicious bringing to bear of government’s full range of capabilities is consistent with the fundamentals of good government and wise defense policy.

Perhaps most important—but not often discussed—are the merits of the military *not* doing many of the nation-building and reconstruction tasks. Among other things, if not engaged in nation-building, the military could concentrate on its institutional responsibility for national defense, particularly with respect to existential threats which nation-building and reconstruction do not address.²⁵

After all, the role of the armed forces is, as the Supreme Court put it, “to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.”²⁶ Moreover, the Court points out that “[t]o the extent that those responsible for performance of this primary function are diverted from it . . . the basic fighting purpose of armies is not served.”²⁷ Therefore, when the armed forces divert resources and—of even greater concern—*focus*, to the conduct of operations not intrinsic to warfighting, their ability to conduct bona fide combat operations inevitably degrades.

There are, however, other important factors favoring a WoG approach. As talented as military personnel are, it seems obvious that the more facets of the U.S. Government that can be brought to bear, the more likely there will be an injection of an authentic expertise when the task is not a traditionally military one. On the other hand, while the armed forces may have manpower and resources to address many nation-building tasks, that does not necessarily mean that they possess the range and depth of experience required to solve the convoluted problems arising in civil society.

As just one example, consider that the military is instinctively authoritarian and, as the Supreme Court has drily observed, “the army is not a deliberative body,” rather “it is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society.” How could such

an organization have the experience and mindset to establish courts and legislatures where the essence of their function is deliberation?

In addition, there is another important consideration, which is the psychological impact on the host nation of a foreign military leading these efforts. Many in America's military seem blissfully unaware of the image they may unintentionally present when they serve as the "face" of the United States in nation-building endeavors. One can only imagine what the residents of a failed nation think when they see people in uniforms—not civilian officials—as the ones who are the main representatives of the United States in the reestablishment of their society's institutions, to include those expected to exercise civilian control of the armed forces.²⁸ Regrettably, the population may assume, for example, that it is military direction (as opposed to civilian leadership) that leads to success in the modern world. This could have unwanted political consequences over time if the electorate comes to perceive the armed forces as preferable to civilian leadership.

Closer to home, there are other benefits to removing the armed forces from the conduct of nation-building activities not directly involving physical security or military operations against insurgents. Specifically, the long-term involvement in such activities in Iraq and Afghanistan may be causing a subtle but troubling change in the perspective of members of America's armed forces. In 2006, historian Douglas Porch—citing the work of British historian Hew Strachan—made this melancholy observation:

Politicians who engage in nation building endeavors, especially those with a counterinsurgency dimen-

sion must be prepared to deal with the political and military professional fallout. This includes the evolution of a stab-in-the-back as a guiding principle of civil-military relations and its leaching into domestic politics—that is, the belief that, in modern counterinsurgency warfare, win or lose, the military ends up feeling betrayed by the civilians.²⁹

We may be beginning to see this phenomenon, much because of the way operations have been conducted in current wars. As this writer has observed elsewhere:

Given responsibility not only for security, but also for governance, education, and economic development in wide swaths of territory in Iraq and Afghanistan, a generation of US officers has become accustomed to being ‘warrior kings’.³⁰

As such, there is a real risk that even after their nation-building duties in contingency areas end, military officers may want to arrogate to themselves decision-making that democracies leave to civilians.

A disturbing manifestation of what might be an emerging mindset is found in an October 2010 article written by Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Milburn that was published in the prestigious military journal, *Joint Force Quarterly*.³¹ Milburn made the unprecedented argument that military officers have the obligation to disobey even *lawful* orders if they subjectively decide that such orders are “likely to harm the *institution writ large*—the Nation, military, and subordinates—in a manner not clearly outweighed by its likely benefits.”³² While the notion of disobedience of lawful orders is an anathema to most officers, it is nevertheless true, as journalist David Wood observes, that many uniformed officers today are chafing for a

“bigger role in [the] policy decisions” that historically have been the province of civilian decisionmakers.³³

Importantly for a WoG approach analysis, Wood maintains that the “current unrest among midcareer officers is new” and reasons that:

today’s majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels grew up in counterinsurgency warfare, leading men into combat as young platoon leaders and having to create new ways of operating in dangerously complex political and social environments never imagined by their elders.³⁴

As such, it may be that traditional – and *critical* – concepts of appropriate civil-military relations are under stress at least to some degree because of the nation-building tasks which military officers have had to perform in the absence of civilian capability that a WoG approach might otherwise provide.

In short, a WoG approach that displaces reliance upon the armed forces as the principle agent of nation-building and post-conflict reconstitution may well serve the interests of the targeted nation by better portraying the role of civilians in a democracy, serve the interests of the U.S. armed forces by allowing greater focus on its quintessential warfighting responsibilities, and also serve American society itself by ameliorating burgeoning civil-military tensions. Nevertheless, implementing a WoG approach effectively involves substantial challenges.

WoG APPROACH CHALLENGES

Although Congress has grappled with the idea of building civilian capability for nation-building for most of the decade, numerous difficulties still ex-

ist to implementing a WoG approach—not the least of which are inadequate resourcing and authority.³⁵ In 2004 the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created within the State Department with a mission statement that would seem ideally suited to relieving the military of much of its current responsibility. S/CRS is supposed to:

lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.³⁶

The centerpiece of the S/CRS effort is the Civilian Response Corps (CRC). Drawing experts from eight Federal departments or agencies, the CRC is a “group of civilian federal employees who are specially trained and equipped to deploy rapidly to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance to countries in crisis or emerging from conflict.”³⁷ Although Secretary of State Hillary Clinton applauds the fact that in just 2 years the ranks have grown to over 1,000 civilian responders, the reality is that only 250-300 can deploy at any given time.³⁸

It is difficult to understand how such a relatively small group—not much larger than a couple of companies of soldiers—could possibly obviate the need for substantial military involvement to accomplish the same tasks. After all, Iraq³⁹ and Afghanistan⁴⁰ are both nations of more than 29,000,000 people. Even with reserves—which Congress has not funded—the whole CRC was never contemplated to number more than a few thousand persons.

According to the S/CRS, “many analysts have expressed doubt about S/CRS ability and capacity to carry out its mission.”⁴¹ Some of that doubt is blamed on a “perceived lack of funding by Congress,” but there are also misgivings about an “anti-operational social culture in the State Department.”⁴² There seems to be real difficulty with a program that depends upon large numbers of highly-expert civilians *voluntarily* agreeing to serve in austere and dangerous circumstances. This appears to be an impediment, with troubling and perhaps intractable implications for future operations.

As evidence of this issue, consider a 2007 *New York Times* article reporting that many diplomats and Foreign Service employees of the State Department refused assignments to Iraq.⁴³ Steve Kashkett, vice president of the American Foreign Service Association, insisted that “there remain legitimate questions about the ability of unarmed civilian diplomats to carry out a reconstruction and democracy-building mission in the middle of an active war zone.”⁴⁴

As a result, the *Times* says that those employees who did agree to deploy “tended to be younger, more entry-level types, and not experienced, seasoned diplomats.”⁴⁵ The former head of S/CRS recognizes the problem and admitted in a March 2010 interview that “the State Department must shed the ‘risk-averse culture’ it adopted in the mid-1980s.”⁴⁶ He added, “Obviously, you cannot ignore risk, but we need to be willing to manage risk rather than simply avoid it.”⁴⁷

Other government employees seem to carry a rather robustly different sense of entitlement when serving in war zones, and this can complicate a WoG approach. For example, a 2008 audit found that Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents were improperly

paid millions of dollars in overtime while on 90 days of temporary duty in Iraq.⁴⁸ This investigation found that the agents billed the government on average \$45,000 overtime pay, often for simply watching movies, exercising, or even attending parties.⁴⁹

Civilians clearly want to be well paid if they work in dangerous areas. Journalist Nathan Hodge writes that when anthropologists, hired to conduct analysis of the “human terrain” in Iraq and Afghanistan, were converted from “well-compensated contractor status” to government employee status, “around a third of the program’s deployed workforce quit.”⁵⁰

Besides manning issues, recent reports from Afghanistan about program execution are not encouraging.⁵¹ Critics insist that S/CRS remains poorly funded and is often ignored.⁵² Consequently, reporter Spencer Ackerman says that in Afghanistan “American diplomacy and development work in conflict areas remains largely a military job.”⁵³ He says that U.S. soldiers — not American civilians — “politic with local potentates on reconstruction projects.”⁵⁴ Thinking beyond the specific difficulties with S/CRS, the issue may become this: Can a WoG approach work at all in the U.S. Government?

Analyst Todd Moss has his doubts. The former State Department official acknowledges that a WoG approach may work in other nations, but has reservations about its prospects in the United States. Moss says:

in the United States — with its sprawling federal structure and huge agency staffs and budget—just getting everyone around one table is perhaps too much to ask. The interagency process in any country is a strain. [Managing those tensions is actually what policymaking is all about.] Yet the process can become convolut-

ed and bogged down when the scale is out of whack. Simply put: when you have too many people at the table, nothing gets done.⁵⁵

It may be that a WoG approach can suffer from a form of the same malady as that which debilitated American corporations late in the last century, that is, over-diversification. Many companies acquired widely-diverse businesses and put them under the umbrella of a single conglomerate, apparently thinking that the mutual support of the whole would be stronger and more profitable than the individual parts. One can readily see how such thinking would resonate with WoG approach goals. Unfortunately, it often does not work.

Notwithstanding what might be called a “whole of business” approach, the *Economist* observes that the idea “went out of fashion in the 1980s and 1990s . . . when companies began to see again the virtues of ‘sticking to their knitting’.”⁵⁶ Sometimes, it seems, a single-focused entity is better at a specific task than an assemblage of actors with assorted backgrounds. Conglomerates that did succeed were ones that expanded but did not stray far from their core competencies. The chief executive of Bombardier, a Canadian manufacturing firm that acquired new businesses, did so by ensuring that “each new sector we entered shares certain fundamental similarities.”⁵⁷

This may mean that a WoG approach may need modification, or at least clarification. Not every security issue needs—or profits from—the application of all the tools in the proverbial toolbox. In some circumstances, a WoG approach may be exactly the wrong strategy; not every agency has the requisite core competencies to add value to the resolution of a particu-

lar national security issue. If it is necessary to have a bumper sticker for such a more nuanced approach, then smart power may be it.

THE BETTER CONCEPTUALIZATION FOR THE WAY AHEAD?

Secretary Clinton's articulation of smart power shows it is related to, but not exactly coterminous with, a WoG approach. Although she does not claim to have invented the smart power term, in her 2009 confirmation testimony she defined it as using the "range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural" to address international issues.⁵⁸ It does not seek to bring every tool to bear in every instance; rather, smart power is about "picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation."⁵⁹ Importantly, Clinton says that under a smart power approach, "diplomacy will be the vanguard of foreign policy."⁶⁰

To be sure, Clinton is not foreswearing a WoG approach; however, she does seem to conceive it differently than has previously been the case. Writing in the November/December 2010 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Secretary Clinton elaborated on her smart power concept and its distinct emphasis on *civilian* power:⁶¹

By drawing on the pool of talent that already exists in U.S. federal agencies and at overseas posts, the United States can build a global civilian service of the same caliber and flexibility as the U.S. military.⁶²

In addition to its civilian focus, there is much about the particulars of smart power worth noting carefully. As already observed, it recognizes that sometimes

“picking the right tool” suffices. If the number of participants can be minimized, the hazards of navigating the interagency coordination process that concerned Mr. Moss might diminish.⁶³ Moreover, it suggests that there can be affirmative benefits of discrete approaches by separate government agencies. Consider the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) experience.

AFRICOM might be considered one of the most aggressive models of at least a modified form of a WoG approach. Established in 2007, it represents an innovative effort by the DoD to address the varied needs of a multifaceted continent.⁶⁴ It sees itself as a “different kind of command” because it is fashioned with a:

much more integrated staff structure . . . that includes significant management and staff representation by the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other U.S. government agencies involved in Africa.⁶⁵

One of the most unique aspects of AFRICOM is its leadership arrangements. Unlike any other military organization, it designates a State Department ambassador as its “co-equal” deputy.⁶⁶ Notwithstanding the language of co-equality, AFRICOM makes it clear that the ambassador’s military counterpart—a Navy admiral—exercises command authority in the AFRICOM commander’s absence only because “U.S. law does not allow a State Department official to hold military command authority.”⁶⁷ Despite the absence of legal authority to command, AFRICOM says the “co-equal” State Department official nevertheless “directs” a variety of military activities, including disaster relief and, somewhat mysteriously, “security sector reform.”⁶⁸

The precise distinction between a civilian with authority to “direct” and a military officer empowered

to “command” is unexplained and puzzling. While no one questions the value of close working relationships with the Department of State, there is a point at which the intermingling in pursuit of an undifferentiated WoG approach becomes an unproductive infatuation that could dangerously confuse the military chain of command in a crisis. Even more importantly, it may send the wrong message about our diplomats around the globe whose legal status and safety depends upon the perception and reality that they are noncombatant civilians apart from our military forces.

According to a 2009 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, various stakeholders raised similar issues. They were concerned that AFRICOM “could blur traditional boundaries between diplomacy, development, and defense.”⁶⁹ Likewise, the S/CRS reports “mixed feelings” among many about AFRICOM:

While many at the State Department and USAID welcome the ability of DOD to leverage resources and to organize complex operations, there also is concern that the military may overestimate its capabilities as well as its diplomatic role, or pursue activities that are not a core part of its mandate.⁷⁰

Both the GAO and the S/CRS also report concerns that the size of the DoD “could dominate U.S. activities and relationships in Africa” to the detriment of foreign policy.⁷¹ Essentially, the apprehension was that the command might unproductively “militarize diplomacy and development” on the continent.⁷² In response, AFRICOM emphasized a WoG approach—with some success.⁷³ A subsequent GAO report showed AFRICOM made progress, but effective collaboration remains a daunting issue despite the re-

markable integration of representatives of some 27 agencies.⁷⁴

The best intentions can, nevertheless, create issues. For example, apparently AFRICOM originally saw as part of its mission the task to “improve accountable governance” of African states.⁷⁵ Exactly what that was supposed to mean remains unclear, but when the most fearsome military in the world starts talking about “improving” what it may decide is a sovereign nation’s accountability, it is no wonder that the command has yet to find a home in any country on the continent. The notion of Americans “improving” governments via a military command is an understandably alarming concept to many nations, especially in the shadow of U.S. “regime change” operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

No doubt it is a worthy aim of the United States to assist nations with bettering their governments, but this is a classic example of an area where America’s armed forces ought to steer clear, and a WoG approach is affirmatively counterproductive. Africa has an unfortunate history of militaries “improving” governments by crushing the existing ones in the name of reform. AFRICOM certainly would not do so, but the juxtaposition of an intent to “improve accountable governance” with a military command invites untoward perceptions. Such a task may be appropriate for diplomats and civilian agencies to facilitate, in concert with other nations, international bodies, and NGOs, but not our military.

Clearly, the case for a U.S. military command focused on Africa is a good one, but trying to mix the armed forces and all it implies with activities better carried out via a distinctly diplomatic or civilian entity is obviously problematic. In this instance it ap-

pears that smart power must suggest a disaggregation of the respective functions that might better serve U.S. interests than the present WoG approach formulation. Mating a military entity with a diplomatic function could too readily serve to create unnecessary suspicions about U.S. intentions.

AFRICOM is not, however, the only example of questionable utilization of WoG approach-style thinking (if not precise application of WoG approach terminology). Specifically, recent domestic counterterrorism efforts have employed a WoG approach. Despite what Harvard Law professor Jack Goldsmith calls “strong sub-constitutional norms against military involvement in homeland security,”⁷⁶ the powerful technical surveillance capabilities of the DoD National Security Agency (NSA) have increasingly been brought to bear domestically to ferret out terrorism threats, as well as to address growing risks to cyber security.

Unfortunately, to the extent a WoG approach involves the military in domestic security activities, history does not provide much encouragement. In the 1960s, for example, military intelligence officers, in the name of national security, were enlisted to collect personal information on tens of thousands of Americans who, in reality, “posed no real threat to national security.”⁷⁷ The military deployed – domestically – “more than 1,500 plainclothes agents to watch demonstrators, infiltrate organizations, and circulate blacklists.”⁷⁸ As a result of the ensuing furor, congressional oversight increased,⁷⁹ and legislation such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was enacted.⁸⁰

Nevertheless, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11), NSA capabilities were used for domestic surveillance in contravention to FISA requirements. When this illegal activity was revealed, the NSA was

sued successfully, and on December 2010 was ordered to pay \$2.5 million in attorney fees and damages.⁸¹ Despite this experience, the NSA recently signed a first-of-its kind WoG approach-style agreement with the Department of Homeland Security to collaborate in protecting civilian infrastructure from cyber attacks.⁸² Although steps are being taken to protect privacy, civil liberty advocates remain skeptical.⁸³

All this is important because if such domestic WoG approaches to security strategies involving the military go awry, they could put in jeopardy vital government interests. The U.S. armed forces are an all-volunteer force (AVF) depending upon the affection and respect of the American people to ensure that sufficient high-quality recruits choose uniformed service. Currently, the military enjoys extremely high levels of public confidence⁸⁴ and respect,⁸⁵ and that contributes immeasurably to the military's ability to sustain itself.⁸⁶

If that confidence and respect is compromised by perceptions about illegal military involvement in activities that implicate civil liberties, the consequences for the AVF may be serious. Too many potential recruits may not want to involve themselves in a military organization that may appear to be improperly infringing upon the rights of citizens. Thus, as efficient as a WoG approach may be in this arena, on balance it may nevertheless be prudent as a matter of policy to develop the necessary capabilities fully independent of the armed forces.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

To be sure, a WoG approach should certainly be considered in devising solutions to the complex secu-

rity challenges of the 21st century. Yet it is those very complexities that counsel against the undifferentiated application of the concept. Clearly, the WoG approach should not devolve into an insistence—or assumption—that every entity of government has some role to play in every national security issue. As discussed, there are real merits in keeping certain activities separate and, in any event, some activities are inappropriate assignments for the armed forces. Hence, in smart power terms, a WoG approach is just an option among several, and one that may—or may not—be appropriate for a given situation.

Although it is largely beyond the scope of this chapter, some mention should be made as to the effectiveness of a WoG approach in its most common and controversial application in the national security arena: post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. It is an article of faith among purveyors of contemporary COIN theory that such WoG approach-oriented activities are indispensable to a population-centric strategy.⁸⁷ That strategy, encompassed in FM 3-24,⁸⁸ aims to win the loyalty of the populace to the central government the counterinsurgents are supporting by facilitating that government's nation-building programs.

Bernard Finel, a Senior Fellow and Director of Research at the American Security Project, points out that critics argue that a:

population-centric COIN [strategy] requires building responsive governmental structures, promoting economic growth, and eliminating endemic corruption—objectives that have almost never been successfully accomplished in the long, doleful history of international development.⁸⁹

Increasingly, experts like Finel argue that an *enemy*-centric approach is more effective and better suited to American interests. It unapologetically aims to neutralize the insurgents directly as a means to force “a negotiated solution” – a result Finel argues is “consistent with the vast majority of conflicts in history.”⁹⁰

In an interview coinciding with the release of his new book, *The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan*, former DoD official-turned-embedded-writer Bing West offers an unvarnished assessment. Asked about the effectiveness of billions spent on reconstruction, West says:

From [Afghan President] Karzai to the villagers, the response has been rational: take or steal every dollar the Americans are foolish enough to give away. In the US, the Great Society and the War on Poverty created a culture of entitlement and undercut individual responsibility. We exported that failed social philosophy to Afghanistan.⁹¹

Indeed, West is harshly dismissive of nation-building and the military’s role in it:

For 10 years, in Afghanistan, our new COIN doctrine has focused upon building a nation, and has not been successful. The COIN doctrine says our troops are expected to be nation-builders as well as warriors. I believe that is deeply flawed. Our military, despite the exhortations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, should not be a Peace Corps.⁹²

West’s view, albeit undiplomatically stated, seems to be consistent with the majority of Americans who now consider the war in Afghanistan as something the United States should “not be involved in.”⁹³ This writer has long believed that the armed forces should

focus on the all-important task of warfighting, and avoid a variety of deleterious effects that can arise when the military becomes enmeshed in nation-building and related tasks, as part of a WoG approach or otherwise.⁹⁴

Still, none of this is to say that a WoG approach is, per se, flawed. It ought to always be considered when addressing the multifaceted security issues of the 21st century. Again, filtering its utility through the smart power lens will likely find many opportunities where it can be profitably employed. It is the overly-mechanistic application of the concept of a WoG approach that can be the source of mischief and misdirection.

In the end, there is no substitute for wise contemplation of which situations can profit from a WoG approach, and which are most optimally addressed by another, single-entity tool. Such measured analysis of specific situations will ensure that the WoG approach methodology maintains substantive vitality and does not devolve into another exercise of empty pseudo-strategy. In that way, it can be a whole lot of substance, and not simply a whole lot of rhetoric.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7

1. *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report (QRM)*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2009, available from http://www.defense.gov/news/Jan2009/QRMFinalReport_v26Jan.pdf.

2. See Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 2, 2011, available from openocrs.com/document/RL32862/.

3. *National Security Strategy*, Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010, pp. 14-16, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Serafino, p. 1.

6. *Ibid.*

7. Serafino, p. 4 (*italics added*).

8. *Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November 8, 2010, as amended through December 31, 2010, p. 189, available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/.

9. Dr. Gordon Adams, *Interagency and National Security Reform: The Road Ahead*, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Armed Services Committee, June 9, 2010, p. 52.

10. U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, November 28, 2005, available from www.usaid.gov/policy/cdie/sss06/sss_1_080106_dod.pdf (hereinafter DoDD 3000.05, 2005).

11. President George W. Bush, *National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, Washington, DC: White House, December 7, 2005, available from <http://crc.usaidallnet.gov/document/national-security-presidential-directive-44-nspd-44>.

12. DoDD 3000.05, 2005, para. 4.1.

13. *Ibid.*, para. 1-17. When the DoDD was reissued, the phrasing was recalibrated to say “the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct stability operations with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.” See note 23, para. 4a.

14. *Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2008, para. 1-17, available from usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/FM307/FM3-07.pdf.

15. *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 6, 2006, p. 83, available from www.defense.gov/qdr/report/report20060203.pdf.

16. QDRM, p. 31.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010, available from http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.

19. *Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, December 15, 2006; also designated as *Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, 1, Counterinsurgency*, December 15, 2006, available from www.scribd.com/doc/9137276/US-Army-Field-Manual-FM-324-Counterinsurgency.

20. Steve Coll, "The General's Dilemma," *The New Yorker*, September 8, 2008, available from www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/09/08/080908fa_fact_coll?currentPage=all.

21. FM 3-24, Chap. 2.

22. See, for example, *The JAG Corp and the Rule of Law Reform: Q & A with Brigadier General Thomas Ayres L'91*, Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Law School, September 21, 2010, available from www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/news/archives/2010/09/qa_with_brigadier_general_thomas_ayres_l91.html.

23. U.S. Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 *Stability Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, September 16, 2009, para. 4a (3), available from www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf.

24. U.S. Constitution, Preamble, Washington, DC.

25. *Parker v. Levy*, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974), available from supreme.justia.com/us/417/733/case.html.

26. U.S. *ex rel. Toth v. Quarles*, 350 U. S. 11,17 (1955) available from supreme.justia.com/us/350/11/case.html.

27. *Ibid.*

28. See for instance, Volker Franke, "The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations," *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2, Autumn/Winter 2006, pp. 5-25.

29. Douglas Porch, "Writing History in the 'End of History' Era—Reflections on Historians and the GWOT," *Journal of Military History*, October 2006, p. 1078.

30. Anna Mulrine, "Can Troops Get Too Much Love? Military Struggles with a Dark Side on Veterans Day," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 10, 2010, available from www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/1110/Can-troops-get-too-much-love-Military-struggles-with-a-dark-side-on-Veterans-Day.

31. Lieutenant Colonel Andrew R. Milburn, U.S. Marine Corps, "Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 59, 4th Quarter, October 2010, p. 101, available from www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-59/JFQ59_101-107_Milburn.pdf.

32. *Ibid.* (Italics in original).

33. David Wood, "Military Officers Chafe for Bigger Role in Policy Decisions," *Politics Daily*, October 4, 2010, available from www.politicsdaily.com/2010/10/04/military-officers-chafe-for-bigger-role-in-policy-decisions/.

34. *Ibid.*

35. See Serafino.

36. U.S. Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *About Us*, available from www.state.gov/s/crs/about/index.htm#mission.

37. *Ibid.*, at Civilian Response Corps, available from www.state.gov/s/crs/civilianresponsecorps/index.htm.

38. This is according to John E. Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. Department of State. See Greg Bruno, *Waiting on a Civilian Surge in Afghanistan*, Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, March 31, 2010, available from www.cfr.org/afghanistan/waiting-civilian-surge-afghanistan/p21785 (interview with the Hon. John E. Herbst).

39. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook - Iraq*, February 14, 2011, available from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html>.

40. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook - Afghanistan*, February 11, 2010, available from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>.

41. Serafino, p. 21.

42. *Ibid.*

43. Helene Cooper, "Many U.S. diplomats refuse to work in Iraq - Africa & Middle East," *New York Times*, February 7, 2007, available from www.nytimes.com/2007/02/08/world/africa/08iht-web.0208diplo.4516120.html.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid.*

46. Bruno.

47. *Ibid.*

48. "FBI Agents Billed \$45K Apiece for Iraq OT," Associated Press, December 18, 2008, available from www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28299590/ns/world_news-mideast/n_africa/.

49. *Ibid.*

50. Nathan Hodge, *Armed Humanitarians: The Rise of the Nation Builders*, New York: Bloomsbury, 2011, p. 255.

51. See notes 89 and 90 and accompanying text.

52. Spencer Ackerman, "Reconstruction Chief Quits, Putting 'Civilian Surge' in Doubt," *Danger Room*, September 28, 2010, available from www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/09/reconstruction-chief-quits-putting-civilian-surge-in-doubt/#.

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.*

55. Todd Moss, *Too Big to Succeed? (W)Hole-of-Government Cannot Work for US Development Policy*, Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, October 5, 2010, available from blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2010/10/too-big-to-succeed-why-whole-of-government-cannot-work-for-u-s-development-policy.php.

56. "Idea: Diversification," *The Economist*, October 7, 2009, available from www.economist.com/node/14298922.

57. *Ibid.*

58. Secretary of the Department of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 13, 2009, available from www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/01/115196.htm.

59. *Ibid.*

60. *Ibid.*

61. Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Leading Through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development," *Foreign Affairs*, p. 13, available from <http://www.devex.com/en/news/leading-through-civilian-power-redefining-american/70521>.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

63. See Moss, and accompanying text.

64. See generally, Lauren Ploch, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 10, 2010, available from www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34003.pdf.

65. *About U.S. Africa Command*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, available from www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp.

66. See Biography, Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes, Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Africa Command, available from www.africom.mil/holmes.asp.

67. See Biography, Vice Admiral Robert T. Moeller, Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Africa Command, available from www.africom.mil/moeller.asp.

68. *Ibid.*

69. *Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. Africa Command*, GAO-09-181, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, February 2009, p. 3, available from www.gao.gov/new.items/d09181.pdf.

70. Ploch, p. 6.

71. *Ibid.*

72. *Ibid.*

73. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

74. *Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DoD's Efforts in Africa*, GAO-10-794, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, July 2010, www.gao.gov/new.items/d10794.pdf.

75. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM): *Questions and Answers*, Press Release, Embassy of the United States (Cameroon), U.S. Department of State, October 2, 2007, available from yaounde.usembassy.gov/u.s._africa_command_africom_questions_and_answers.html.

76. Jack Goldsmith, *The Cyberthreat, Government Network Operations, and the Fourth Amendment*, Washington, DC: Governance Studies at Brookings, December 8, 2010, p. 10, available from www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2010/1208_4th_amendment_goldsmith/1208_4th_amendment_goldsmith.pdf.

77. Stephan Dycus *et al.*, "The Military's Role in Homeland Security and Disaster Relief," *National Security Law*, 4th Ed., 2007, p. 960.

78. *Ibid.*

79. See Brit Snider, *Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Some Reflections on the Last 25 Years*, Durham, NC: Duke University, Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, 2003, available from www.law.duke.edu/lens/downloads/snider.pdf.

80. 50 U.S.C. §1801-1862, 2008.

81. Paul Elias, "Judge Orders Feds to Pay \$2.5 million in Wiretapping Case," *Washington Post*, December 21, 2010, available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/21/AR2010122105307.html.

82. *Joint Statement by Secretary Gates and Secretary Napolitano on Enhancing Coordination to Secure America's Cyber Networks*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, October 13, 2010, available from www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=13965.

83. William Matthews, "DoD to Protect Some Civilian Infrastructure," *Defense News*, October 18, 2010, p. 6.

84. Lydia Saad, "Congress Ranks Last in Confidence in Institutions," Gallup, Inc., July 22, 2010, available from www.gallup.com/poll/141512/Congress-Ranks-Last-Confidence-Institutions.aspx.

85. "Honesty/Ethics in Professions," November 19-21, 2010, Gallup, Inc., available from www.gallup.com/poll/1654/honesty-ethics-professions.aspx.

86. Cf. Dan Blottenberger, "All Branches Meet Military Recruiting Goals," *Stars & Stripes*, January 14, 2011, available from www.stripes.com/news/all-branches-meet-military-recruiting-goals-1.131869#.

87. See, for example, Octavian Manea, "Counterinsurgency as a Whole of Government Approach: Notes on the British Army Field Manual Weltanschauung," *Small Wars Journal*, January 24, 2011, available from <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/counterinsurgency-as-a-whole-of-government-approach>.

88. See FM 3-24, and accompanying text.

89. Bernard Finel, "A Substitute for Victory: Adopting a New Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs*, April 8, 2010, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66189/bernard-finel/a-substitute-for-victory.

90. *Ibid.*

91. Michael Few, "The Wrong War: An Interview with Bing West," *Small Wars Journal*, February 21, 2011, available from smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/679-few3.pdf.

92. *Ibid.*

93. CBS News Poll, February 11-14, 2011, reporting that 54 percent of Americans believe the United States should not be involved in the war in Afghanistan, *PollingReport.com*, available from www.pollingreport.com/afghani.htm.

94. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters*, Winter, 1992-93, p. 2, available from www.uwec.edu/sfpj/Origins.pdf.

