THE DYNAMIC IMPACT OF PERIODIC REVIEW ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS

COSETTE D. CREAMER*

BETH A. SIMMONS**

I

INTRODUCTION

A large body of scholarly literature seeks to explain why states voluntarily commit themselves to legal regimes designed to monitor implementation of international human rights standards.1 Dozens of human rights treaties have been promulgated over the past six decades and some have gained near-universal adherence. Yet the consequences of these international commitments for human rights practices are hotly contested. Some argue that international law has contributed very little to improving rights.2 Others claim that international human rights law has failed to help the people who need it the most.3 Many allege that United Nations (UN) enforcement has been an utter failure, and that UN treaty bodies constitute a bloated, toothless bureaucracy that is unable to contribute much to rights protections.

It is time to bring evidence to bear on this debate about the value of UN oversight of international human rights law. Studies on the effects of treaty ratification are now plentiful. But none of these systematically examines one of the main consequences of human rights treaty ratification: the obligatory self-reporting process.4 All major UN human rights treaties have established bodies

4. There are a small number of case studies on the influence of reporting to various treaty bodies, but to date they have been few in number, limited in geographic scope, and generally inconclusive about the connection between reporting and rights outcomes. Ronagh McQuigg, How Effective is the United
of experts to oversee treaty implementation. States parties are obligated to self-report to these bodies of putative experts. Critics uniformly point out that these bodies cannot enforce their recommendations. This is true. However, it does not necessarily follow that they are useless or without effect.

Why would rights outcomes be influenced by self-reporting? Self-reporting creates at least three possible channels of influence that do not involve traditional notions of external enforcement. Critically, reporting to treaty monitoring bodies initiates a dialogue with international experts that can have important consequences. This dialogue can contribute to socialization of domestic elites and bureaucrats responsible for human rights practices. It may also set in motion domestic bureaucratic routines to gather, authenticate, and analyze information that might not have occurred in the absence of the obligation to report. It is even possible that reporting helps to develop an autonomous capacity to self-monitor and self-enforce.

While self-reporting may impact rights outcomes through these three pathways, this article focuses on how self-reporting and external review provides information for domestic audiences and an opportunity to mobilize around issues of concern. Thus, it may be useful to recast self-reporting not simply as a procedural obligation that supports traditional external enforcement, but as an opportunity for a variety of domestic audiences to hold their governments accountable to their international human rights commitments.

This article uses the case of women’s rights to assess the value of self-reporting and the discussion it stimulates. Each state party is obligated under the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) to turn in periodic reports on the status of their implementation for review by the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CmEDAW). Non-state actors are also active in this process; they turn in shadow reports that contain information on implementation to the CmEDAW. The Committee responds to the reports it receives, and provides guidance and recommendations on next steps. Governments are asked—indeed encouraged and obligated—to

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6. Specialized agencies and INGOs often assist governments who may need technical or data help in reporting to the CEDAW, contributing to improved capacity to collect and report data. See, e.g., _WOMEN’S HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CEDAW_ (World Health Organization ed., 2007).


respond to these questions and recommendations. In this way treaty ratification initiates an iterative and ongoing “constructive dialogue” between a government and the international human rights regime about progress—or lack thereof—on treaty implementation.

Plenty of states have ratified CEDAW, but they have quite heterogeneous laws and traditions in place, making women’s rights a fertile case for the influence of external review. Several studies conclude that ratification of CEDAW is, in fact, associated with improved outcomes for a range of women’s rights, although many are careful to note that positive effects are highly conditional. None of this research examines the effects of self-reporting. Women’s rights organizations clearly use the treaty to focus their demands for specific policies and to bolster legal cases. The CEDAW is therefore a case in which the domestic political reverberations of state-to-expert dialogue is plausible.

This article shows that self-reporting has a significant positive effect on women’s rights. This paper explores three clusters of evidence for the domestic mobilization mechanism: information provision through domestic civil society organizations; publicity and critique through the domestic media; and parliamentary attention, debate, and implementation of recommendations. This is the first study to present positive evidence on the effects of self-reporting on rights and to describe the mechanisms that link Geneva treaty bodies with local politics.

Part II summarizes the treaty-based periodic review process and the claims made about this system’s (un)importance. Drawing from an original dataset, this article then describes patterns in the frequency and quality of states’ reporting under CEDAW, and presents evidence that poor reporting is more connected to a lack of state capacity than to a disregard for women’s rights. Part III theorizes one primary channel through which reporting influences women’s rights practices: via domestic political awareness and mobilization. Part IV presents systematic evidence on the likely effect of reporting and engagement with the


CmEDAW on women’s rights, while Part V presents evidence supporting a domestic mobilization mechanism in Latin America. Part VI concludes. These results are the first to show systematically that self-reporting likely has positive consequences. They suggest that the international community should not think of self-reporting as a hard enforcement mechanism, but rather as an opportunity for domestic stakeholders to mold their own futures in the shadow of international law.

II
STATE REPORTING ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS

A. Historical Context

Public international law has long been recognized as a highly decentralized system that treads a delicate line between voluntary participation and enforceable obligations. The more stringent the demands made on states, it has long been feared, the less willing they will be to obligate themselves to a legal agreement. While self-reporting requirements have been fairly common in a range of modern treaties, they only developed gradually in the realm of international human rights law. Early efforts to encourage reporting on the implementation of international human rights norms were largely reflected in hortatory resolutions requesting information, emanating from the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations. As early as 1947, the General Assembly recommended that the Secretary-General request member states to report annually to ECOSOC, who would in turn report to the General Assembly on steps taken to give effect to recommendations made by the General Assembly on matters falling within the Council’s competence. This resolution was intended to include the principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which had no explicit provisions for implementation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, few states responded to such a general exhortation. ECOSOC thus postponed systematic review and instead perused the few reports it received on an ad hoc basis. Five years later, the submission of official state reports remained a rarity, and so the Council decided to discontinue the system of self-reporting entirely.

The first resolution calling for systematic state self-reporting on human rights was passed by the ECOSOC in 1956. This resolution requested UN members to transmit reports to the Secretary General every three years and described ways in which they were implementing principles of the UDHR. John Humphrey, then

serving as Rapporteur of the International Committee on Human Rights, would later report that 41 states responded as requested in the first round of reporting, and sixty-seven responded in the second round, between 1957 and 1959. But Cold War rhetoric and a perfunctory review by the Human Rights Commission rendered the exercise ineffective.\footnote{Humphrey, supra note 15.} Self-reporting received a boost six years later, when non-governmental organizations with consultative status in the ECOSOC were invited to submit their views and observations to the Council. As the ECOSOC resolution put it, “to meet the objectives set by the Commission . . . and to promote respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, a greater number of reports are required and more information should be given therein concerning the problems or difficulties which have been or may be encountered . . . .”\footnote{Economic and Social Council Res. 888B (XXXIV) (July 24, 1962), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/759/95/IMG/NR075995.pdf?OpenElement [https://perma.cc/5ZQQ-PKRH].} The system of shadow reporting—or the submission of alternative reports—by civil society organizations was thereby created.

State and institutional cooperation remained elusive. In 1965, ECOSOC invited states to participate in a three-year cycle of reporting on specific rights areas, including civil and political rights, economic and social rights, and freedom of information.\footnote{Economic and Social Council Res. 1074C (XXXIX) (July 28, 1965), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NR0/760/97/IMG/NR076097.pdf?OpenElement [http://perma.cc/74DU-ADNX].} This process routed state reports through the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, which generally failed to read them—an outcome John Humphrey referred to as “a political victory won by governments who do not favour the international enforcement of human rights.”\footnote{Humphrey, supra note 15, at 442.} And yet, rights advocates knew they were not in a position to do much more than request state information. Despite his frustrations, Humphreys concluded that “[o]f the various techniques, reporting is the one with which the international community has had the most and probably the most successful experience . . . . In a situation where, as today, governments seem to be unwilling to vest international supervisory bodies with adequate powers to deal with complaints, reporting may indeed, even for these rights, be the most practical means of implementation.”\footnote{Humphrey, supra note 15, at 438–39.}

Self-reporting as part of a consent-based treaty obligation was another possible route to enhance implementation. This approach would build on an explicit legal commitment and engage expert implementation committees rather than the politicized and government-composed bodies of the United Nations. However, the early treaties that dealt with women’s rights had practically no implementation provisions. The Convention on the Political Rights of Women

(1952), the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1957), and the Convention on Consent to Marriage (1962) all contain interstate dispute settlement through the International Court of Justice—provisions that have proved practically irrelevant when it comes to women’s rights—but no reporting requirements. In the fashion of the day, ECOSOC and the UNGA passed resolutions requesting and recommending state parties to report on implementation, and in 1963 extended this request to all UN members. But until the CEDAW, no treaty on women’s rights or issues contained an obligation for parties to self-report.

Why were women’s rights treaties behind the reporting requirement curve? For several reasons that have been the subject of much feminist analysis, women’s rights had for many years not been seen as central to the main body of human rights. The CEDAW was a turning point in this regard. Two important moments in history supported global attention to women’s rights. First and most importantly, the women’s movement was at its height between 1965 and 1985, which gave impetus to the elaboration of women’s rights in international law.

25. States parties are required under the Convention of the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1950—not quite a human rights treaty, but considered at the time to deal with women’s issues) to communicate to the Secretary General of the UN the passage of laws relevant to the treaty. G.A. Res. 317 (IV), art. 21 (Dec. 2, 1949).
29. Note however that several ILO labor conventions that aim to protect female workers from discrimination do have a reporting requirement. The conventions include the Int’l Labor Organization [ILO], Convention 1958 (No. 111) Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (June 15, 1960); ILO, Convention 1951 (No.100) Equal Remuneration Convention (May 23, 1953); ILO, Convention 1981 (No. 156) Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention (Aug. 11, 1983); ILO, Convention 2000 (No. 183) Maternity Protection Convention (June 15, 2000). The ILO constitution does mandate annual reports, to be examined by both a committee of experts and the International Labor Conference itself; ILO Constitution art. 22.
31. Jane Jenson, Representation of Difference: The Varieties of French Feminism, in MAPPING THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: FEMINIST POLITICS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE NORTH (Mónica Threlfall ed., 1996); LEILA J. RUPP, WORLDS OF WOMEN: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S MOVEMENT (Princeton University Press 1997); VALENTINE M. MOGHADAM, GLOBALIZING WOMEN: TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST NETWORKS (Johns Hopkins University Press 2005). Women’s groups such as the Women’s International Democratic Federation urged ECOSOC that “Adoption of the single convention would place the States under the obligation to review existing legislation regarding women and indicate the shortcomings that exist in national legislation relative to the equality of women with men. It would thus enable the broad mobilization of public opinion around these problems.” Economic and Social Council, “Statement submitted by the Women’s International Democratic Federation, a non-governmental organization in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council.” E/CN.6/NGO/254, Jan. 11, 1974.
Secondly, détente was starting to overtake the Cold War freeze on the negotiation of new human rights treaties, and a reasonable degree of agreement existed between East and West on women’s rights. In early 1967, the United Nation’s’ Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) began drafting a non-binding Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (DEDAW), which was adopted by the General Assembly in November of that year. The ECOSOC and CSW worked on strategies for implementing the declaration over the next several years. In the hortatory tradition described above, one tactic was to ask states to submit reports on their implementation efforts voluntarily, but this request elicited very little cooperation. By the mid-1970s the CSW was drafting of a comprehensive and legally binding instrument, and by 1976 began to garner the comments of governments and specialized agencies. 1975 was declared the International Year of the Woman and opened the Decade of the Woman from 1976 to 1985, which helped to focus global attention on women’s issues. Thus, the CEDAW stood as the culmination of a series of multilateral negotiations on women’s issues after World War II.

Self-reporting requirements were very much a part of the discussions of the Working Group that drafted the CEDAW. An early Soviet draft did not contain a reporting requirement, directing only that the ECOSOC consider periodically whether the convention was being implemented. The Netherlands called for civil society participation in the reporting process “granting these organizations the function of correspondent. As correspondents they might play a role in channelling [sic] wishes and complaints towards an international forum,” such as the CSW. Canada suggested all reporting go through the CSW, in order to avoid

34. REHOF, supra note 32, at 7.
“conflict in implementation procedures” across treaties. Several countries anticipated today’s critique of reporting overlap, and called for simplifications. Women’s groups were strongly behind reporting; in fact the draft article on state reporting was the only provision mentioned explicitly in a crucial 1976 statement by a broad coalition of women’s NGOs sent to the Working Group. In the end, a proposal by Egypt, Nigeria, and Zaire to use language almost identical to that contained in the CERD was accepted. A series of working groups finalized the agreement throughout 1979, and the CEDAW, with Article 18 describing the obligation to report on implementation, opened for signature the next year.

B. Self-Reporting and the CEDAW

As this history suggests, the major international human rights treaties were meant to improve rights through enhanced accountability. CEDAW was the first women’s rights instrument to make self-reporting obligatory for states parties. By virtue of ratifying CEDAW, states must submit reports every four years on the legislative, judicial, administrative, or other measures adopted to give effect to their women’s rights obligations. Similar to self-reporting under the Covenants and the CERD, these reports are submitted to an oversight committee—the CmEDAW—comprised of independent experts nominated and elected by states parties. CmEDAW then considers these reports in the presence of government representatives, acknowledges progress made, and identifies areas for improvement. Finally, oversight committees issue a set of concluding observations containing non-binding recommendations for legislative reforms and other efforts that a government should undertake to address shortcomings. This entire process is known as periodic review. All state reports, reports received from other intergovernmental and civil society organizations, and CmEDAW recommendations are made public.

In contrast to early resolutions exhorting states to voluntarily report to ECOSOC or the UNGA, periodic review was intended to encourage treaty implementation and compliance, with the “main responsibility for the international monitoring of national implementation . . . entrusted to the UN

39. For Austria, Brazil, and Canada, see Comm’n on the Status of Women on Its Twenty-Fifth Session, supra note 35, Austria, ¶¶ 108–110.
human rights treaty bodies.” Because reporting is a mandatory obligation, the report and review process is “the key mechanism established at the universal level to monitor the implementation of treaty obligations by contracting states.” In the case of CEDAW, implementation oversight was initially weaker than that of other major human rights treaties. For example, the CmEDAW did not move to Geneva and receive the administrative support of the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights like the other human rights treaty bodies until 2008. Several analysts have concluded that initially at least, CEDAW’s system of implementation oversight was probably weaker than that of the two core Covenants.

The system of self-reporting as a whole continues to be criticized as inadequate, ineffective, and even “in crisis.” Some observers point to the professional inadequacies of the expert committees. Others note that states—even resource rich, democratic ones—ignore what they are told to do by experts. Moreover, there is a growing sense among critics that the system as a whole is breaking under its own unwieldy weight. As the number of treaties has grown, so too have the treaty bodies to which states are expected to report. One result may be reporting fatigue. Late and non-reporting is not uncommon, although CEDAW holds a slightly better record than a number of other treaty regimes, which is surprising in light of the weaker initial administrative support for the CmEDAW.

Of the 188 states party to the CEDAW in 2016, only five countries had still not submitted their initial report. Between 1982—when the first report was due—and 2016, the average length of delay in report submission was 3.7 years. The Committee recently has begun to encourage submission of long overdue reports.

48. Hafner-Burton, supra note 3, at 102.
49. McQuigg, supra note 4.
50. Posner, supra note 2; Hafner-Burton, supra note 3, at 99.
52. Dominica, Kiribati, Micronesia, San Marino, and São Tomé and Príncipe.
53. The length of time reports are overdue includes those instances where the Committee has indicated in its concluding observations on the prior report that a revised date of submission (usually in the near future) is permitted. In addition to extending due dates and consolidating reports, the Committee often reviews within one session two separate reports submitted by a government. These represent methods through which the Committee has attempted to address both systematic late reporting and its own increased workload, deviating from the periodicity mandated in the Convention.
reports by reviewing implementation progress even in the absence of a state report. For instance, although Dominica never submitted its initial report due in 1982, the Committee issued concluding observations in 2009 based on an in-person dialogue with Dominican government representatives.\textsuperscript{54} In this way, states are encouraged to participate in a dialogue with the CmEDAW even if they fail to report.

Figure 1 illustrates the record of state reporting to the CmEDAW since the treaty entered into force. Between 1982—when the Committee received its first reports—and 2014, governments have submitted a total of 621 implementation reports. Report submission has increased steadily over the years in tandem with growing treaty membership. Of these, 229 reports were considered consolidated or combined reports due to delayed submission; in such cases, one report counts for two (up to four) reports due. Many states have submitted six to eight reports. However, many states seem unable to meet their obligation to go beyond an initial or second report.

The ultimate goal is to understand the consequences of state reporting, but it is critical to understand why states report—or fail to—in the first place. What factors increase the probability a state will turn in a report to the CmEDAW in any given year?

\textsuperscript{54} The Committee first notifies the states party that in the absence of a report, it will proceed with a consideration of the implementation of the Convention on a set date.
Figure 1: Report Submission by Year.\textsuperscript{55}

Figure 2 presents the expected probability of reporting as each explanatory variable changes, based on a pooled logistic odds regression.\textsuperscript{56} The figure shows how (holding other traits constant) different state characteristics are associated with a higher probability that a state reports in a given year. The evidence for the importance of capacity is strong. The richer and larger a polity, the more likely it is to report in a given year. GDP per capita and total population (both logged) are strongly and positively correlated with reporting. Small, resource strapped states likely lack the capacity to meet their periodic treaty obligations to report.\textsuperscript{57}

There is also some evidence that reporting is, at least initially, correlated with strong buy-in to the human rights treaty system in general. The higher percentage of major human rights treaties a state has ratified, the more likely it is to turn in its CEDAW reports, though this relationship is substantively not large. As Figure 2 demonstrates, a hypothetical doubling of the percentage of human rights

\textsuperscript{55} Disaggregated by Report Number (whether the report was the first submitted by a state party, the second, etc.).

\textsuperscript{56} Logistic regression is a type of regression involving a limited (categorical) dependent or dummy variable. Pooling involves combining observations by state and by year in order to analyze average effects over a period of time.

\textsuperscript{57} There is a similarity between this and a finding in the literature that smaller firms are most likely non-compliers with self-reporting to regulatory agencies. See, e.g., John Brehm & James T. Hamilton \textit{Noncompliance in Environmental Reporting: Are Violators Ignorant, or Evasive, of the Law?}, 40 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 444 (1996).
treaties ratified by a government (from 26 to 52%) only increases its probability of report submission by 2.5%. That being said, ratification of the CEDAW Optional Protocol (OP), which establishes the individual communication’s procedure for the treaty, is not strongly correlated with a higher likelihood of reporting. Granted, the OP did not enter into force until 2000.

Figure 2: Likelihood of Reporting to CmEDAW.\(^{58}\)

In contrast to the Convention against Torture (CAT), under which the existence of a National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) strongly correlates with greater likelihood of reporting,\(^{59}\) countries with an NHRI are neither more nor less likely to report to CmEDAW. Perhaps this type of human and institutional resource is not as central to the women’s rights context; what matters

\(^{58}\) Simulated estimates of probability of report submission. Circles represent the expected effect on the probability of report submission in a given year as GDP per capita, Total Population, Polity IV Scores (level of democracy), Women’s Political Empowerment Index (V-Dem), and Human Rights Treaties Ratified (percentage of all major human rights treaties) in the previous year changes from its 25th to 75th quartile, and all other variables are held constant at their means. For Muslim Law, Catholic, Ratification of the Optional Protocol, and National Human Rights Institution (NHRI), the circle represents the expected probability of reporting as these variables change from 0 to 1, and all other variables are held constant at their means. The lines are 95% confidence intervals. When the circles and lines are solid, there is at least a 95% confidence of a positive or negative effect on the probability of reporting. Otherwise, circles and lines are dotted. For traditional results of the pooled logistics odds regression see Supplementary Materials, infra note 62, at 3.

\(^{59}\) Cosette Creamer & Beth A Simmons, Ratification, Reporting and Rights: Quality of Participation in the Convention Against Torture, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 579 (2015).
instead may be the existence of a National Mechanism on Gender Equality (NMGE).60 Interestingly, democracies or countries that provide greater rights protections are not any more or less likely to report to CmEDAW. And states with legal systems entailing some elements of Islamic law are generally as—if not more—likely than other states to report.61

Critics of the periodic review process are right about a number of its limitations. States often neglect to turn in their reports on time—if at all. Moreover, many reports celebrate the positive steps taken to improve women’s rights and fail to mention any shortcomings. However, many do explicitly recognize implementation shortcomings, particularly when such shortcomings can be attributed to lack of resources.

To evaluate report quality and responsiveness under CEDAW, we read all 621 reports submitted to the CmEDAW from 1982 to 2014 and coded each along four dimensions: three related to report quality (implementation, compliance, and data), and one concerning responsiveness. A report’s quality score, an index of the three quality measures, is based on the state’s willingness to recognize shortcomings in implementation or compliance, and to provide gender-disaggregated data. A report’s responsiveness score is based on how well it engages with the Committee’s previous concluding observations.62

To be sure, a report’s quality or responsiveness score does not measure the accuracy of the information provided, rather it measures the extent to which it explicitly addresses shortcomings in implementation of and compliance with the treaty’s terms. A higher quality score represents more self-critical reports. Examining report quality permits evaluation of the quality of states’ engagement with the periodic review process, not just as a procedural obligation, but as an opportunity for government officials and their constituents to learn about and become socialized into the women’s rights regime.

Figure 3 displays the average quality and responsiveness scores of reports submitted, by year. While the quality of reports submitted to CmEDAW has improved over the years,63 there has not been that much improvement since the

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60. NMGEs include those bodies and institutions within different branches of the State (legislative, executive and judicial branches) as well as independent, accountability and advisory bodies that, together, are recognized as ‘national mechanisms for gender equality’ by all stakeholders. This could be in the form of a Ministry on Women or Gender Equality, a gender equality ombudsperson, a parliamentary committee, an inter-ministerial body, or multi-stakeholder advisory body. See U.N. WOMEN, Directory of National Mechanisms for Gender Equality (Sept. 2010), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/documents/NatMech-Sept-2010-Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6YU-F7SY].

61. Perhaps understandably, more Catholic societies are less likely—though not significantly—to report. Yet a bit surprisingly, neither the proportion of women in parliament nor the proportion of states reporting in the region (regional reporting density) increases a state’s reporting likelihood (results not reported).

62. For the coding scheme and description of the coding process see Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, Supplementary Materials to The Dynamic Impact of Periodic Review on Women’s Rights 14–17 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Supplementary Materials].

63. This observation is at least partially consistent with Kathryn Sikkink’s observation on the
mid to late 1990s. What has improved dramatically, however, is responsiveness
to CmEDAW’s concluding observations (for second or later reports), suggesting
increased engagement with the periodic review process and Committee
recommendations. The CmEDAW has increasingly provided more detailed and
concrete recommendations, which appears to have facilitated this greater
responsiveness.

Figure 3: Average CEDAW Report Quality and Responsiveness, by Year.\textsuperscript{64}

III

THEORY: SELF-REPORTING AND REVIEW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS

Does the reporting process facilitate improved women’s rights practices and
increased treaty compliance? Hafner-Burton represents the informal consensus
among commentators when she writes that “the reports often don’t seem to lead
to results that matter.”\textsuperscript{65} Even members of the CmEDAW have surprisingly little
to tell us about the impact of the Committee on actual state practices.\textsuperscript{66}

Thus, the central question is whether reporting matters to treaty
implementation and respect for women’s rights. This study proposes that it does,
primarily because of the dynamics underlying the reporting process itself. Many

\textsuperscript{64} See Appendix B on authors’ websites for coding guidelines.

\textsuperscript{65} HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 3, at 100.

\textsuperscript{66} H.B. SCHÖPP-SCHILLING & C. FLINTERMAN, THE CIRCLE OF EMPOWERMENT: TWENTY-FIVE
theories of compliance with international law rely implicitly on the availability of information about government activities and legal obligations, particularly to domestic publics. For example, the knowledge that one’s government is publicly committed to comply with a human rights treaty may raise domestic groups’ expectations that they can demand compliance with such treaties. Xinyuan Dai argues that information produced by international bodies informs domestic audiences about the activities of their governments and whether a government has complied with its international legal obligations. This information allows domestic constituencies to apply electoral pressure on their government in order to hold them accountable.

The very event of reporting serves to stimulate attention, discussion, and perhaps even participation in the process of report drafting. By mobilizing and empowering groups inside and outside of government, reporting can have a catalytic effect in promoting internal policy reform. The Committee’s concluding recommendations provide domestic constituencies with information needed to apply electoral and other forms of political pressure to encourage substantive compliance. Such information facilitates evaluation of a state’s treaty compliance, which helps domestic audiences to focus pressure on the government to perform better. Even when states are less than forthright, their reports provide a focal point for non-state actors to assess and criticize the information provided. As Jacqui True has written of the international reporting process, “[O]rganizing of women’s groups for the purpose of international reporting and global conferencing has consequently, often unintentionally, increased the effectiveness of women’s lobbying of local and national governments.”


68. A growing number of experimental studies provide micro-level data to supplement the largely observational literature connecting international obligations with enhanced compliance expectations. Adam S. Chilton, The Influence of International Human Rights Agreements on Public Opinion: An Experimental Study, 15 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 112 (2014). Chilton finds some evidence that attitudes in the general population shift against domestic solitary confinement practices when informed that they may violate international legal obligations. Attitudes about the appropriateness of torture specifically have been shown to be influenced by international legal obligations, particularly when it is believed that third parties may enforce obligations. Geoffrey P.R. Wallace, International Law and Public Attitudes Toward Torture: An Experimental Study, 67 INT’L ORG. 105 (2013). These observations—that international legal obligations raise expectations of compliance, that reporting provides new information about the progress of compliance, and that authoritative third parties enhance these effects—all suggest that self-reporting to treaty bodies may be important for mobilizing publics and improving human rights practices on the ground.

Examples abound, from Southeast Asia\textsuperscript{70} to South Asia\textsuperscript{71} to Nigeria.\textsuperscript{72} A formal report submission presents opposition parties or NGOs and other rights constituencies with a convenient and visible occasion for mobilization. Indeed, political activism may contribute to the quality of governmental reporting over time by helping to expose its shortcomings. If so, then even incomplete or inadequately analyzed official information is much better than none at all.

First, if the reporting cycle (the process over time of both submitting reports and receiving CmEDAW feedback and recommendations) can mobilize demands for better rights practices, we would expect to observe a positive relationship between a state’s participation in this process and improvements in its women’s rights practices. We do not expect this effect to be homogeneous across all states, but we do expect to see such a relationship if we have appropriately weighted for the effects of regime type on outcomes. Part IV evaluates this expectation.

Second, there should be some evidence consistent with the mobilization argument, especially under conditions for which the theory is clearest: a region of the world that has experienced democratic transitions during which governments must engage in balancing the tradeoff between expectations and information consequences involved in the reporting decision. Part V follows up with evidence on the mechanism of mobilization in Latin America—a region that fulfills these conditions—in the form of civil society shadow reporting, media reporting, and domestic legislative activity.

\section*{IV \hspace*{1em} EVIDENCE: REPORTING, REVIEW, AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS}

This part examines how the process of periodic review and the history of a government’s engagement with the CEDAW regime impact subsequent rights practices. Because the act of treaty ratification itself generates the expectation of report submission, this study focuses only on states parties to the CEDAW using panel data on CEDAW report submission and Committee review for 184 states parties between 1982 and 2014. By the beginning of 2014, only seven of these states parties had not completed even one reporting-and-review cycle, 101 had completed between two and four cycles, and forty-six had completed five or more cycles.

Figure 4 plots trends in average Women’s Political Empowerment scores by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{70} In Cambodia, for example, NGO-CEDAW’s role is to monitor and promote the implementation of CEDAW and to engage in advocacy following the publication of each NGO Shadow Report. See THE CAMBODIAN NGO COMMITTEE ON CEDAW, http://ngocedaw.org [https://perma.cc/4TDE-CJE7] (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
\item \textsuperscript{71} In South Asia, an organization explicitly focuses on building NGO capacity to report to CmEDAW. See CEDAW SOUTH ASIA, http://cedawsouthasia.org [https://perma.cc/PV6T-XSNR] (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
\item \textsuperscript{72} See, e.g., Int’l Fed’n for Human Rights, The Nigeria NGO Coalition Shadow Report to the CEDAW Committee (July 31, 2008), http://www.refworld.org/docid/48a0007a2.html [https://perma.cc/3N8V-SMFS].
\end{itemize}
reporting record. These trends demonstrate that countries with greater initial levels of women’s empowerment have gone through more periodic review cycles since CEDAW entered into force. That said, countries that engage relatively regularly in periodic review (specifically more than two report-and-review cycles) have experienced greater improvements over time in women’s empowerment than those who have never submitted a report (or did so only once).

Figure 4: Trends in Women’s Political Empowerment (V-Dem) by Reporting Group.

How can we isolate the causal effects of the report and review process on women’s rights? Self-reporting and periodic review is an ongoing and iterative process with potentially cumulative effects. It was never intended or designed to affect rights practices through a single report submission. Modeling the effects of a single-shot report is thus not the best approach to analyzing the dynamic nature of the review process.


74. Figure plots the average Women’s Political Empowerment score for (1) countries that had ratified CEDAW but not submitted any reports or had submitted only one report by 2014; (2) countries that had submitted 2–4 reports by 2014; (3) countries that had submitted 5+ reports by 2014. The index ranges from 0 to 1 and incorporates equally-weighted dimensions of fundamental civil liberties, women’s open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions.
of periodic review to the CmEDAW, since both the act of reporting and the evolving nature of the review process represent treatment variables of interest. Estimating the cumulative influence of the reporting and review process as a whole requires a different approach from conventional regression estimators for single-shot effects.

To attempt to adjust for the dynamic nature of periodic review, we fit a Marginal Structural Model (MSM). This approach entails two steps. First, we estimated a model for treatment—here, CmEDAW review—in each time period, conditional on time-varying confounders and past reporting history. Then, we fit a regression model for the outcome, given treatment and treatment history, by weighting each observation with the inverse of its treatment probabilities calculated in the first step. The parameters of this weighted regression model bring us closer than ordinary regression to causal analysis, assuming important causal variables were not omitted, though it does not completely overcome issues that arise due to selection into the self-reporting process based on unobservable factors. Given the paucity of viable solutions to that problem, however, this approach is a substantial improvement over traditional methods.

The weighting models estimating the probability of treatment (CmEDAW review at time $t$) include all potential confounders: covariates expected to influence both the decision to undergo periodic review and women's rights practices. As discussed within Part II, capacity (measured with logged GDP per capita and population, as collected by the World Bank) and engagement with the international human rights regime (proxied by the percentage of major human rights treaties ratified) strongly predict report submission. These variables likely affect women's rights outcomes as well, so this study includes them and a number of additional time-varying covariates in the weighting model: the degree of women's political empowerment in each country; a country's level of democracy; the existence of an NHRI; and ratification of CEDAW's Optional Protocol.

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75. This approach was developed by Robins et al., Marginal Structural Models and Causal Inference in Epidemiology, 11 Epidemiology 550 (2000). And it was recently introduced to political science by Matthew Blackwell, A Framework for Dynamic Causal Inference in Political Science, 57 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 1 (2013). These models are estimated using an Inverse Probability of Treatment Weighting (IPTW) estimator, which permits adjustment for intermediate confounders while avoiding bias from conditioning on a post-treatment variable.

76. Because the decision to engage in the report-and-review process is binary, the probability of undergoing review was estimated with a logit model and the parameter vector for the model with a pooled logistic regression, with country-year as the unit of analysis. This permits us first to estimate the probability, in each period, that the unit received the treatment history that it did.

77. Robins et al. show that this weighting scheme adjusts for confounding by observed and time-varying confounders. Supra note 75. Intuitively, weighting creates a hypothetical ‘super-population’ where the link between treatment and observable confounders is broken.

78. A measure of women’s empowerment is derived from an expert survey assessing the extent to which women can participate in formal political decision-making, and the extent to which women have opportunities to move freely and express their views (Varieties of Democracy Project).

79. Democracy captures the extent of participation in and competitiveness of states’ political systems over time (Polity IV Score).
Two non-time-varying covariates are also included in the model: Islamic law and predominantly Catholic countries. Governments with elements of Islamic law within their legal systems are slightly more likely to submit their CEDAW reports, but present special challenges for CEDAW adherence. Similarly, predominantly Catholic countries are slightly less likely to submit their reports, and the strong role of the Catholic religion within society may make governments more reticent in fully implementing CEDAW guarantees, particularly in the realm of reproductive and family rights.

In addition to these confounders, a set of treatment history variables is included within the weighting models; in this case a state’s history of CmEDAW periodic review. This permits us to estimate the average treatment effect of both the single-shot treatment of undergoing review and the history of a country’s engagement with the review process on a government’s women’s rights practices. These treatment history variables include: the total number of in-person CmEDAW reviews undertaken by a country by time $t$; whether the country had undergone review in the previous year; and the number of years since the last review. All weighting models include year fixed effects.

In a second step, we fit an inverse-probability weighted MSM to estimate the effects of CmEDAW review (the treatment) and the review process (treatment history variables) on women’s human rights practices at year $t+2$. Because we have few priors about precisely when we should expect the review process to affect women’s rights practices on the ground, we estimate its effects two years following review, as significant reforms of deficient legislation and practices often cannot occur instantaneously. Indeed, one of the primary conclusions of case studies on the effectiveness of the CmEDAW is that implementing Committee recommendations often takes several years.

There are potentially dozens of ways to measure women’s rights. One possibility is to test indicators that relate to specific articles of the CEDAW, such as a measure of women’s or girls’ education, health, or employment outcomes. Instead, this study tests broad measures of women’s political empowerment and fundamental civil rights (as developed by the Varieties of Democracy project), largely because the periodic review dialogues are broad-ranging and cover issues.

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81. SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 221, 245–53.
82. Following Blackwell, supra note 75, and Stephen R. Cole & Miguel A. Hernán, *Constructing Inverse Probability Weights for Marginal Structural Models*, 15 AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 565 (2008), a preliminary model check was conducted based on the final distributions of the stabilized weights for each year. The stabilized weights’ means at each point in time are all close to one, with their upper bounds relatively low, indicating a set of fairly well-behaved weights was estimated. See Supplementary Materials, supra note 62, at 6.
83. For weighting model estimates see Supplementary Materials, supra note 62, at 5.
85. SIMMONS, supra note 1.
that differ by country and even by report.86

Figure 5: Estimated CmEDAW review treatment and treatment history effects.87

Figure 5 plots the estimated instantaneous and history effects of the review process along with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.88 The single, instantaneous effect of review at time $t$ on women’s political empowerment at time $t+2$ is statistically indistinguishable from 0. That is, there are essentially no effects on women’s political empowerment attributable to turning in one report. However, as Figure 5 demonstrates, increasing the number of times a country

86. For a discussion of V-Dem and its Women’s Political Empowerment Index, see Kevin L. Cope et al., Patterns of Disagreement in State Repression Measures, POL. SCI. RES. AND METHODS (forthcoming 2018). Aksel Sundström et al., Women’s Political Empowerment: A New Global Index, 1900–2012, (V-Dem Institute Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2015:19, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2704785## [https://perma.cc/3H2K-9JYD]. As a check, analyses using CIRI Women’s Economic and Political Rights measures were run. CIRI Women’s Economic Rights data include a series of sub-indicators relating to such matters as equal pay for equal work, the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband’s or male relative’s consent, and non-discrimination with respect to hiring, promotion, and working conditions. Political Rights include the right to vote, run for and hold public office, join political organizations, and petition government officials. See Supplementary Materials, supra note 62, at 10–13.

87. Circles represent estimated effect of undergoing a single review (compared to not undergoing review) at time $t$ and undergoing one additional review at time $t$, on Women's Political Empowerment score at $t+2$. Lines denote 95% cluster-bootstrapped confidence intervals. For outcome model coefficients and respective bootstrapped confidence intervals see Supplementary Materials, supra note 62, at 7–8.

88. All models include a linear time trend. Confidence intervals were obtained using a cluster bootstrap procedure for the entire two-stage weighting and MSM fitting procedure, clustering on country. The bootstrap was run for 20,000 iterations and took the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the bootstrapped distribution for the MSM parameter estimates.
previously engaged in CmEDAW review significantly increases the degree of Women’s Political Empowerment observed. We estimate that a country that receives one additional review throughout its history will, on average, have a women’s political empowerment score that is approximately 0.05 higher—a small but statistically significant effect.

How sensitive are these results to unobserved confounders? Figure 6 presents results for a sensitivity analysis procedure. This study assumes unobserved confounding where countries that receive review and countries that do not differ in their underlying potential Women’s Political Empowerment score by $\alpha$. This parameter denotes the amount of the difference in women’s political empowerment scores between treated (additional review) and untreated (no additional review) countries that can be explained by some unaccounted-for factor. The procedure varies $\alpha$ across a range of values and re-estimates the treatment history effect after adjusting for the assumed amount of unobserved confounding. $\alpha = 0$ denotes the original effect estimate. Positive values of $\alpha$ denote situations where treated countries have better women’s political empowerment scores than control, while negative values of $\alpha$ assume treated countries have worse women’s rights records.

The analysis demonstrates that for the estimated effect of review to no longer be significant at conventional levels ($p < 0.05$), countries undergoing an additional review would have to have systematically higher women’s political empowerment scores than countries that do not. Until $\alpha = 0.06$, a bit more than the treatment effect size, the estimated positive effect of reporting history remains statistically significant at $p < 0.05$. In other words, even if—due to unaccounted-for factors—countries undergoing an additional review had systematically better women’s political empowerment records by an amount slightly more than the effect size, it would still be possible to conclude with moderate confidence that review history has a positive effect on women’s political empowerment scores.

89. Blackwell, supra note 75.
To summarize, governments that engage in more dialogue with the CmEDAW are more likely to cumulatively provide greater women’s fundamental rights. The very fact of participating in the review process may be an opening for constructive engagement with the treaty monitoring body that promises small and incremental improvements in women’s political empowerment over time. This opening seems to have important consequences, even if the quality of initial reporting is not especially high. These findings support the conclusion that constructive dialogue with the CmEDAW, as an ongoing process made possible by iterative report submission and conversation, holds the potential to improve rights practices on the ground. In this respect, periodic review under CEDAW has continuous, albeit small, positive effects on women’s rights attributable to the cumulative reporting cycle.

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90. Dotted and dashed lines denote 90% and 95% cluster-bootstrapped confidence intervals respectively (20,000 iterations, clustering on country).
EVIDENCE OF THE MECHANISMS: WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA

What mechanisms lead to the positive effects associated with reporting? One hypothesis is that the review process mobilizes domestic demands for closer scrutiny of and improvement to laws and practices surrounding women’s rights. If reporting impacts implementation, some evidence of the impact should be found at the domestic level. Specifically, we look for: mobilization of domestic civil society around reporting in the form of shadow reports; discussion of the reporting process in local media; and evidence that legislators begin to take note and consider how to improve treaty implementation through legislation. Thus, if the reporting process stimulates domestic policy change from the bottom up, the following three key activities should be apparent: political mobilization, public discourse, and legislative attention.

For several reasons, this section focuses on Latin America. First, Latin American countries vary considerably in how regularly and promptly they engage in periodic review. Second, this is a region in which the strong influence of the Catholic Church within many countries makes women’s rights socially and politically salient. Combined with its history of relatively democratic institutions, active civil society, and meaningful press freedom, Latin America is a plausible candidate to investigate the potential for the periodic review process to focus public and political attention on women’s rights practices.

A. Mobilization: Civil Society Shadow Reporting

CEDAW ratification has had an influence on domestic politics by stimulating formation of women’s organizations, at least in some cases. In fact, memberships in women’s organizations increase post-ratification. This is because CEDAW helps to legitimize specific rights demands: those guaranteed by law. In addition, the CEDAW self-reporting procedure creates high-profile assessment opportunities. Women’s organizations—both local and transnational—take advantage of the reporting process to make these rights demands and hold their governments accountable for treaty implementation.

91. There is reason to believe that the domestic mechanisms discussed here have their counterparts in advanced democracies (see e.g., FRAUKE LISA SEIDENSTICKER, EXAMINATION OF STATE REPORTING BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: AN EXAMPLE OF FOLLOW-UP AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL BY NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS (DEU. 2005), https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/32911/ssoar-2005-seidensticker-Examination_of_state_reporting_by.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/Y3GU-24CA].

92. Even when controlling for country and year fixed effects, a time trend, and a lagged dependent variable, there is significant evidence that membership in women’s international non-governmental organizations grew in the first and second year after CEDAW ratification. SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 210–11.

93. Here, focus on non-governmental organization (NGO) shadow reporting is an example of mobilization of women’s groups, but it is important to recognize that international NGOs as well as Intergovernmental Organizations, such as the World Health Organization and the International Labor Organization, regularly take this opportunity to engage states on implementation steps. The point is not that domestic actors are the only ones to mobilize around reporting, but that the reporting regime in fact
When governments turn in their self-rendered reports, women’s groups regularly spring into action to correct, supplement, and criticize the official account of implementation progress. Indeed, the Committee has increasingly urged governments to consult with women’s civil society organizations (CSOs) when preparing their reports. The shadow reports of these CSOs constitute evidence that women’s groups have an active existence, are aware of CEDAW treaty obligations, and are motivated to monitor the implementation process. As such, they are a critical part of the conversation that links Geneva with domestic politics in states parties; they act as conduits for information flowing in both directions.

Figure 7 displays the average number of shadow reports per state report received by the CmEDAW between 2007 and 2014,\(^4\) broken down by report type. While there is noticeable variance across years, there is an unmistakable upward trend in shadow reporting since about 2010. But do these reports reflect domestic mobilization around the reporting process, or rather international groups reporting from afar? For the 182 state reports submitted between 2007 and 2014, CSOs provided the Committee with a total of 1,026 shadow reports, about a third of which (332) came from what can be considered a domestic CSO;\(^5\) National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) provided an alternative shadow report for only twenty-two of these 182 state reports. Moreover, domestic groups have contributed the most to the growth in reporting, especially since 2010. Interestingly, high-quality and responsive state reports were just about as likely to elicit shadow reporting as were low-quality and unresponsive official reports.\(^6\)

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\(^4\) The OHCHR has yet to make available online shadow reports received before 2007. These data are tentatively reliable, in as much as they represent what is available on the OHCHR site.

\(^5\) “Domestic CSOs” refer to organizations based in-country and that took primary responsibility for compiling the report, even if assisted by an international non-governmental organization (INGO). By contrast, “international CSOs” are not based in-country and operate on a (near-)global scale.

A close examination of the shadow reports from Latin American countries indicates that domestic civil society actors are willing to point out the shortcomings in the state reports and explain to the CmEDAW exactly how their government has fallen short. For Argentina’s 2010 periodic review, for example, domestic CSOs contested Argentina’s implementation by revealing the inaction on the part of the government to use data to guide public policy pertaining to women’s health and trafficking. Many of the shadow reports emphasize the lack of effective implementation of laws and policies to improve women’s health and security. For example, domestic CSOs exposed the abuses of women in prisons at the hands of male prison staff, an issue scarcely noted in the Argentine state report. The CmEDAW itself takes such input seriously and often incorporates


this information into its recommendations.\textsuperscript{100} Shadow reports indicate mobilized women’s groups elsewhere in Latin America as well. In response to Brazil’s 2012 state report, anti-human trafficking groups exposed the continuing gaps in the country’s law to address domestic trafficking and prostitution of women.\textsuperscript{101} A broad coalition of women’s groups in Chile supplied information on the underreporting of violence and crime against women, and pointed to the government’s failure to implement laws on the books: including criminalizing femicide, advancing anti-trafficking awareness, and facilitating access to modern forms of contraception and other kinds of women’s reproductive health care.\textsuperscript{102} Neglect of violence against women, femicide, and disappearances of women and girls—in conjunction with the inadequate official response—was a central theme of Mexico’s National Citizens’ Observatory on Feminicide.\textsuperscript{103} In Uruguay, human rights organizations pressed the government to incorporate the CEDAW’s definition of discrimination against women, and to create national plans to achieve objectives from women’s access to justice to health care.\textsuperscript{104} Uruguay’s National Human Rights Institute sent the Committee a separate shadow report as well.\textsuperscript{105} During Venezuela’s seventh and eighth reviews (which were combined into one report in 2014), nine separate shadow reports were received—some from broad coalitions—covering topics from LGBTQ
rights to equal access to health care for women. In sum, shadow reports are authentic and critical domestic efforts to hold governments accountable for implementation of their obligations under CEDAW. These reports are the footprint that CSOs leave of their concerns about state implementation of women’s rights obligations. Some of these reports require considerable research, consultation, and collective action. As such, they represent the mobilization of groups and organizations to press governments for implementation and compliance.

B. Information: Coverage of Periodic Review in Domestic Media

To be meaningful domestically, there must be some public awareness of the existence of review and the issues it entails. To establish whether such public awareness exists, we searched the major local press outlets of fifteen Latin American countries for mention of the reporting-and-review process. Each news article was coded for whether it mentioned the focal state’s CEDAW obligations, the CmEDAW, and/or the reporting and review process specifically. If the constructive dialogue with the Committee is largely invisible to domestic publics, little to no reference to any of these topics in the local press should appear. But if such dialogue matters to domestic audiences, a spike in press references, followed by a somewhat higher degree of attention in the news to CEDAW and the CmEDAW during and after the review year should be apparent.

Media evidence collected is generally consistent with the hypothesis that the conversations initiated by the periodic review process between Latin American governments and the CmEDAW have had important reverberations in the local press, at least in Argentina and Mexico, and slightly less so in Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Figure 8 demonstrates strong evidence of a spike in attention by the local press in these countries to the review process, particularly during the year of in-person review (year 0).
Argentina has been incredibly diligent about submitting its CEDAW reports, with all seven reports due submitted within two years of the due date. Argentina also has a large private media sector, although the relationship between the press and both Kirchner administrations was particularly tense.
Searches of the two most influential national daily newspapers, Clarín and La Nación, generated strong evidence for domestic reverberation of the periodic review process. La Nación is considered to have a respectably center-right editorial position and is often viewed as the smart, conservative mainstream paper of Argentina.¹¹⁰ During the searchable period, this paper referenced CEDAW a total of twenty-five times, though only two of these articles referenced the CmEDAW. Much of this coverage is of the contentious 2007 ratification of CEDAW’s Optional Protocol. The protocol was strongly opposed by the Catholic Church, which viewed the individual communication procedure as a step toward the decriminalization of abortion.¹¹¹ Interestingly and contrary to expectation, none of the La Nación articles searched discuss the 2010 periodic review process.

In line with expectations, however, the relatively middle-of-the-road publication Clarín referenced CEDAW fifty-six times during the searchable period, fifteen of which discuss the periodic review process. Many of these articles cover the shadow reporting conducted by domestic civil society organizations,¹¹² but some are critical of the government’s lack of implementation of CEDAW obligations and Committee recommendations.¹¹³ For instance, an editorial in 1998 considered that four bills before the legislature intended to emphasize the self-determination of rape victims and to criminalize other types of sexual assaults fell far short of CmEDAW’s 1997 recommendations.¹¹⁴ In a society where the political influence of the Catholic Church is strong, the vast majority of articles on CEDAW and Committee recommendations unsurprisingly discuss those relating to family planning policies and the decriminalization of abortion.

Much of the Mexican media coverage is highly critical of the state of women’s rights in Mexico, and quite specific about the CmEDAW recommendations to improve. For example, El Universal covered the CmEDAW’s critical questioning of the Mexican representative during the periodic review of August 2006.¹¹⁵ Follow-up articles noted CmEDAW and other pressures on Mexico to address homicides and disappearances of women in Ciudad Juárez.¹¹⁶ Several articles followed the CmEDAW review of Mexico’s report in 2012, mentioning its specific recommendations to implement measures to protect female journalists from violence¹¹⁷ and to publicize the CEDAW by translating it into thirteen indigenous languages.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁰. See, e.g., Carlos Ares, El periódico conservador argentino ‘La Nación’ ha cumplido 115 años, EL PAÍS (Mex.), Jan. 6, 1985.
¹¹¹. Critican que se apruebe una ley que da luz verde a todo tipo de abortos, LA NACIÓN (Mex.), Nov. 16, 2006.
¹¹². La situación de la mujer en la Argentina, CLARÍN (Mex.), Aug. 7, 2002.
¹¹⁴. La mujer de hoy y sus problemas, CLARÍN (Mex.), Mar. 12, 1998.
¹¹⁵. Critican al país por la violencia de género, EL UNIVERSAL (Mex.), Aug. 18, 2006.
¹¹⁶. La ONU critica rezagos en el país para proteger a mujeres, EL UNIVERSAL (Mex.), Sept. 7, 2006.
¹¹⁸. Traducen para indígenas instrumentos para respeto a DH de mujeres, EL UNIVERSAL (Mex.),
Like Argentina, Chile has submitted all of its reports—most of relatively high quality—on or soon after the due date.119 Chile’s traditionally active press, closely tied to the country’s competitive political parties, has been reasonably attentive to this review process. The country’s most influential, center-right publication, El Mercurio (searchable from 2005-2015) has covered Committee recommendations in a relatively neutral tone. For instance, a couple of articles provide balanced coverage of CmEDAW’s lengthy questioning of the Director of the National Service for Women (SERNAM), Laura Albornoz, in 2006. Albornoz is quoted as stating “clearly and emphatically that legislating on abortion or decriminalization is not contemplated within the government program of President Bachelet.”120 As within a number of other countries in Latin America, press coverage tends to focus on the legal status of abortion and a country’s relationship with CEDAW.

Coverage of CmEDAW review in Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela is considerably less frequent. Publications within these countries, when discussing women’s rights, tend to reference Inter-American obligations rather than the UN regime. In Uruguay, the conservative El Pais and the center-left La Republica provided scattered coverage of CmEDAW reviews, largely in relation to other international obligations. In Venezuela, one of Caracas’ most influential dailies—El Nacional (searchable from 2002-2015)—only references CmEDAW review twice, but provides strong coverage of activities of the National Institute of Women (Inamujer) and local NGOs working toward gender equality.

Overall, the press in Latin American countries facilitates robust information and even debate about the reporting and review process. This suggests that a causal mechanism linking the reporting process to domestic information, awareness, and eventual mobilization varies across countries, but overall is highly plausible.

C. Political Attention: Self-Reporting in Legislative Debates

A number of CEDAW obligations—from criminalizing gender-based violence to prohibiting gender discrimination in public educational systems—depend on implementing legislation. The centrality of the legislature to ensuring treaty compliance has been recognized by the Committee itself. This section looks for evidence that legislatures are aware of CEDAW obligations and the CmEDAW itself. The iterative influence of the reporting process suggests that legislators should draw on the Committee’s recommendations soon after a country’s review and that these references should cumulate over time. To this end, examination of the content of legislative debates should reveal evidence that

119. Thus far, the Chilean government has appeared before the CmEDAW for periodic review four times (1995, 1999, 2006, 2012), typically led by the Director of the National Service for Women (SERNAM).
120. En Resumen, EL MERCURIO (Chile), Aug. 17, 2006; Poli Notas, EL MERCURIO (Chile), Dec. 2, 2006.
laws relating to women’s rights were nudged by the substance of CmDAW’s recommendations or concluding observations. The self-reporting process should link to legislative debates over gender-focused laws, constituting one pathway through which periodic self-reporting and review under CEDAW impacts women’s rights on the ground. We focus on Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay, four major Latin American countries for which a significant legislative history is available online.

1. Argentina

Argentina roughly fits expectations for a state whose dialogue with the CmEDAW has made a mark on legislative activity. Figure 9 demonstrates that attention to CEDAW in the legislature has surged in three distinct swells following review, growing with each round of interaction with the CmEDAW. In two of three reporting years, there are references to the committee and/or its recommendations. In 2013, more than a quarter of all legislative sessions included at least one reference to CEDAW, and more than ten per cent of all sessions that year contained at least one mention of the Committee, its recommendations, or the review process itself.

![Figure 9: References to the CEDAW regime within Argentina’s legislature (2001-2016).](image)

121. Figure displays the percentage of all sessions held by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in a given year in which at least one legislator referenced the CEDAW regime, categorized by reference type:
Following its 2002 CEDAW review and 2004 follow-up, the new government undertook a number of legislative reforms to further implement CEDAW obligations and to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis on women. For example, in supporting the creation of a National Program for Sexual Health and Responsible Procreation, Senator Gomez de Bertone (Partido Justicialista) noted that despite the fact that CmEDAW had forgiven (se le perdonan) Argentina for many implementation deficiencies due to the economic crisis, it had strongly recommended the enactment of this bill.

Furthermore, legislators within both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies referenced CEDAW obligations (and the Committee’s General Recommendations) when discussing bills or programs. Legislators cited specific CEDAW provisions and CmEDAW General Recommendation 19 when discussing modification of the penal code to incorporate violence against women or femicide, the Comprehensive Law on the Prevention, Punishment and Elimination of Violence against Women in their Interpersonal Relations (2009) and its further implementation, and data collection for sexual crimes. Frequent references to specific CEDAW provisions and one reference to CmEDAW recommendations have also been made in debates over bills addressing sexual and reproductive health services, which was a specific focus

the treaty itself (CEDAW); the CmEDAW; or the periodic review process/recommendations. Horizontal dashed lines represent years in which Argentina either submitted a Report or the CmEDAW issued its concluding observations (Review).


124. República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Período 130°, 2a Reunión, 1a Sesión ordinaria (Mar. 14, 2012); República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Período 130°, 16a Reunión, 11a Sesión ordinaria (Oct. 3, 2012); República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Período 134°, 8a Reunión, 2a Sesión ordinaria (June 8, 2016); República Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Dirección de Taquigráficos, Período 130, 5a Reunión, Sesión ordinaria (Apr. 18, 2012).

125. República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Período 133°, 5a Reunión, 4a Sesión ordinaria (July 1, 2015).

126. República Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Dirección de Taquigráficos, Período 131, 8a Reunión, 6a Sesión ordinaria (July 3, 2013).

127. República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Período 131°, 6a Reunión, 2a Sesión ordinaria (Apr. 24, 2013); República Argentina, Cámara de Senadores de la Nación, Versión Taquigráfica, Período 131°, 12a Reunión, 6a Sesión ordinaria (July 3, 2013); República Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Dirección de Taquigráficos, Período 130, 11a Reunión, 8a Sesión
of the Committee’s concluding observations.128

2. Chile

Chile has a strong history of attention to the status of women in society.129 The government has been a reliable self-reporter that typically engages actively with the CmEDAW. Chile also elected its first female President in 2006, Michelle Bachelet of the center-left Socialist Party (Partido Socialista de Chile), who achieved gender parity within her first Cabinet.

Chile’s legislature has not been as explicitly tuned to the CmEDAW as has the executive, however. Chile’s legislative debates resemble Argentina’s, though without as obvious a cumulative effect over time. Although mentions of CEDAW in the legislature are not as frequent as is the case in Argentina, legislative attention does appear to increase slightly after every review year, with a fairly steady increase in legislative attention since 2011. In particular, mentions of review and/or recommendations have recently increased.

ordinaria (June 27, 2012); 127. República Argentina, Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, Dirección de Taquígrafos, Período 131, 6ª Reunión, 5ª Sesión ordinaria (June 5, 2013).


129. Chile has long focused on the status of women in society, having established as early as 1949 a Legal Office for Women, followed by the National Office for Women in 1951. However, in the 1970s, with the transition to military rule, a National Secretariat for Women formed mainly to promote the military regime’s ideology. When Chile transitioned to democracy in 1990, cultural debate over women’s issues had effectively been non-existent for 20 years. Nevertheless, on the heels of democratic transition, advances in the status of women were led by the National Office for Women’s Affairs (SERNAM), established in January 1991. SERNAM was a public agency whose Director held ministerial rank as a member of the Presidential Cabinet.
CEDAW has been brought into discussions relating to wage equality, the decriminalization of abortion, and the minimum age for marriage. The persistent wage and employment gap between women and men, despite women’s higher education levels, has been an area of concern for the Committee since Chile’s transition to democracy. In 2008 and again in 2012, Senators drew on CmEDAW’s recommendations to support legislation that modified the Labor Code to safeguard the right to equality in remuneration. The Committee has also consistently urged the Chilean legislature to amend laws relating to abortion

Figure 10: References to the CEDAW regime within Chile’s legislature (1999-2016).

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130. Figure 10 displays the percentage of all sessions held by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in a given year in which at least one legislator referenced the CEDAW regime, categorized by reference type: the treaty itself (CEDAW); the CmEDAW; or the periodic review process/recommendations. Horizontal dashed lines represent years in which Chile either submitted a Report or the CmEDAW issued its concluding observations (Review).
to permit pregnancy termination for therapeutic or health reasons. Controversial debates within the legislature during the 2000s over whether and how to decriminalize abortion ultimately led to the adoption of a law in 2017 to do so in instances of rape, danger to the life of the mother, or danger to the life of the fetus. The bill was initially introduced by President Bachelet, and justified with reference to CmEDAW’s (and other’s) recommendations. She reminded legislators “[o]ur country cannot avoid these recommendations by postponing a decision, nor can it continue to ignore the serious violation of rights that this situation poses.” These recommendations and the need for Chile to fulfill its international obligations were relied upon by deputies, particularly from the Socialist Party, supporting the proposed bill during its subsequent debate.

3. Mexico

Mexico exhibits precisely the pattern one might expect if the process of self-reporting and Committee review is salient in legislative activity. Mexican legislators have referred to CEDAW obligations and Committee recommendations when legislating on women’s rights more frequently than others in the region, particularly during the last decade. Yet in the first twenty years after ratifying CEDAW, discrimination and violence against women remained a persistent problem in Mexico. Following the democratic transition in 2000, the new government instituted constitutional reforms that prohibited gender discrimination and established the National Women's Institute (INMUJERES) in 2001. The following year, INMUJERES submitted thirty pieces of legislation on questions affecting women, including political participation, sexual harassment, social security, job discrimination and violence.

Despite these efforts, violence against women has remained a serious concern of the CmEDAW and featured prominently in their 2002, 2006, and 2012 reviews.


136. Mensage No. 1230-362, Mensage de S.E. La Presidenta de la Republica con el que Inicia un Proyecto de Ley que Regula la Despenalización de la Interrupción Voluntaria del embarazo en Tres Causales, Jan. 31, 2015 [hereinafter Mensage No 1230-362].


and concluding observations. These concerns did not go unnoticed by legislators in Mexico, particularly those from the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the minority Labor and Citizen’s Movement parties. In 2009, Deputy Humberto Dávila Esquivel (New Alliance Party) proposed a bill to harmonize the concept of family violence in the Federal Civil Code with CEDAW and the provisions of the General Law on Women’s Access to a Life Free of Violence. He mentioned the CmEDAW’s 2006 recommendations to do just this. However, the bill died almost immediately. Similarly, when speaking in favor of a call by the Commission for Gender Equality for three Mexican state congresses to criminalize the offence of femicide, Senator Angélica de la Peña Gómez (PRD) cited CmEDAW’s recommendations regarding this issue. More successfully, adopted reforms of the 2007 Law of Access of Women to a Life Free From Violence (Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia), proposed and supported by Senators Gloria Bautista Cuevas (PRD) and María Candelaria Ochoa Ávalos (Citizen’s Movement), relied on CmEDAW’s recommendations for how to strengthen this law. CmEDAW recommendations have also been drawn on to support gender-related reforms of


143. La Cámara de Senadores del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Versiones Estenográficas, Legislatura LXII, Año II, Sesión Ordinaria (Sept. 5, 2013).

144. Ley General de Acceso de las Mujeres a una Vida Libre de Violencia [LGAMVLV], Nueva Ley publicada en el Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 1-2-2007, últimas reformas DOF 17-12-2015 (Mex.).

145. La Cámara de Senadores del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Versiones Estenográficas, Legislatura LXII, Año III, Sesión Ordinaria (June 24, 2015).

146. La Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Diario de los Debates, Legislatura LXIII, Año I, Primer Período Ordinario, Número de Diario 13 (Oct. 8, 2015).
labor laws, health policies, and government institutions, among other topics.

![Figure 11: References to the CEDAW regime within Mexico's Congress (2000-2016).](image)


150. Figure displays the percentage of all sessions held by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in a given year in which at least one legislator referenced the CEDAW regime, categorized by reference type: the treaty itself (CEDAW); the CmEDAW; or the periodic review process/recommendations. Horizontal dashed lines represent years in which Mexico either submitted a Report or the CmEDAW issued its concluding observations (Review).
4. Uruguay

Uruguay was among the first Latin American countries to enfranchise women (in 1937), ratify CEDAW (1981), establish an office to deal with women’s concerns (1991),151 and sign on to CEDAW’s Optional Protocol (2001). Despite this strong political commitment to (international) women’s rights, legislative references to CEDAW are sparse and recently on the decline.

Even so, references to the CmEDAW and its recommendations have featured regularly in Uruguayan legislative discussions. For example, at least one Senator referenced CmEDAW’s 2002 recommendations153 when debating a bill

Figure 12: References to the CEDAW regime within Uruguay’s legislature (2000-2016).152

151. The National Institute for Family and Women’s Affairs was replaced in 2002 by the National Women’s Institute, created under the Ministry of Social Development, Law No. 17.866, Art. 6, to act as the governing body for gender policies, and is responsible, under Law No. 17930, Dec. 19, 2005, for fulfilling the state’s international obligations relating to non-discrimination on the basis of gender.

152. Figure displays the percentage of all sessions held by the Senate and House of Representatives in a given year in which at least one legislator referenced the CEDAW regime, categorized by reference type: the treaty itself (CEDAW); the CmEDAW; or the periodic review process/recommendations. Horizontal dashed lines represent years in which Uruguay either submitted a Report or the CmEDAW issued its concluding observations (Review).

defining gender discrimination and promoting equal opportunities and rights.\textsuperscript{154} CmEDAW’s 2002 concluding observations also made a number of specific recommendations, including repeal of a law mitigating rape charges when the person who committed the offense married the victim.\textsuperscript{155} The Committee’s “harsh criticism”\textsuperscript{156} sparked renewed discussion of Penal Code reform and a bill was introduced in the Senate the following year.\textsuperscript{157} During all subsequent discussions of the bill in the Senate\textsuperscript{158} and the Chamber of Deputies\textsuperscript{159} elimination of this provision was framed as necessary to respond to the Committee’s recommendation. The rape mitigation provision was repealed on December 29, 2005.\textsuperscript{160}

The low rate of political participation by women in Uruguay also caught the attention of the CmEDAW. During its 2008 review, one Committee member indicated that it was “lamentable that nearly 30 years after Uruguay’s accession to the Convention, so few women were involved in politics or occupied decision-making positions.”\textsuperscript{161} The Uruguay government representative cited cultural resistance to quotas,\textsuperscript{162} but also noted that the Committee’s recommendations “would undoubtedly help to raise awareness of Uruguay’s shortcomings in terms of women’s political . . . participation.”\textsuperscript{163} Legislators within both the Senate\textsuperscript{164} and

\begin{footnotesize}
154.  \textit{Diario de Sesiones}, camara de senadores XLVI (third period), session 1, Mar. 6, 2007; the bill became Law No. 18104, Mar. 6, 2007.


156.  \textit{Diario de Sesiones}, legislatura XLVI, first period, session 1, p. 81, Dec. 21, 2005.


163.  CEDAW/C/SR.857, supra note 162, ¶ 5.

\end{footnotesize}
the Chamber of Deputies explicitly drew on these recommendations when discussing a controversial bill to progressively implement gender quotas for government elections, which passed in 2009.

As a final example, the Committee again criticized Uruguay’s Civil Code and Code on Childhood and Adolescence, which set the minimum age for marriage for girls at twelve years, and recommended that the legislature raise the age to eighteen years. Senators referenced these recommendations when debating a bill to increase the minimum age of marriage, which eventually was raised to sixteen years. This age still fell below CEDAW’s requirement of eighteen years, leading the Committee to once more criticize Uruguay’s legislative implementation during its 2016 review. There is little doubt, however, that dialogue with the committee has raised the urgency of child marriage in the legislature.

VI
CONCLUSION

Criticisms of the reporting and review process of the various human rights treaty bodies are far more common than rigorous assessments of their actual consequences. While there are weaknesses in the reporting system, the evidence presented here is a striking contrast to received wisdom on state interactions with expert human rights treaty bodies. This study presents evidence to suggest that self-reporting and dialogue between state representatives and international experts indeed generates new ideas, advice, and domestic pressure for change in practice. The periodic review process may well have been important to making improvements in law and in practice to guarantee full political and economic rights for women in many societies (indeed, on average, as the quantitative analysis suggests). As anyone would expect, the effect on improved women’s rights guarantees is not massive, but it is all the more believable for its modest size.

Continued interactions are important to such improvements; modeling one-shot effects proved useless. The number and the density of reports and reviews are crucial to the process of rights improvements. This is certainly far more realistic a finding than to expect last year’s reporting cycle to yield one-shot improvements in women’s political and economic rights in the following year or

166. Law No. 18476, Apr. 3, 2009, provides for the equal political participation of women and men in elected bodies, although it was applied only once during the 2014 national elections.
so. Reporting and review histories have had a causal influence on the probability of improved women’s rights, in law and in practice. The effects of the CEDAW periodic review process are ongoing, albeit incremental, from internal report preparation to external dialogue to domestic engagement to preparation of the next report.

This article demonstrates three mutually reinforcing pathways through which the self-reporting process encourages domestic actors to demand and implement change. Domestic shadow reports are on the rise and indicate local CSOs follow the process closely and provide information that supplements and sometimes contradicts government reports. Media reports about the CEDAW spike during the reporting and review process, signifying the penetration of information about the Geneva process to local stakeholders. And finally, legislatures pay attention to the review process and specific CmEDAW recommendations do have an impact on the lawmaking process. Taken together, the evidence points to the catalytic role of self-reporting and review in putting important women’s rights issues on national agendas, thereby creating an occasion for their national discussion.

Mobilization around self-reporting does not exhaust the channels through which CEDAW may influence women’s rights. CEDAW may be consequential for its influence on a number of channels, from influencing donor’s development assistance policies to clarifying violations through the optional individual complaint process. States have quite heterogeneous experiences in their interactions with the CmEDAW, and no amount of dialogue can or should create homogeneous outcomes. The quality of interactions as well as the legal, cultural, and political context can be expected to produce quite different results across states.

The evidence supporting the contribution of constructive dialogue to rights improvements is reasonably strong. One reason is that the review process sparks shadow reporting and gains a domestic audience through the national media. Far from finding that no one pays attention to this process outside the halls of Geneva, in Latin America at least the review process literally piques the media’s—and potentially the public’s—interest. The national media in Latin America, for example, is replete with discussions and debates about what governments are telling the experts, how shadow reports shape the conversations, what CmEDAW has asked, and how governments have responded. There is plenty of official excuse-making going on, but a surprising amount of criticism as well. Legislators take up these themes in official sessions. These patterns are consistent with a theory that treaties matter because discussing human rights engages interested domestic publics, who are in a better position, armed with

legal rights and better information, to hold their governments accountable.

It might be useful to move away from conceptions of the treaty body reportand-review process as an strong enforcement measure, and instead to think of the whole process as more of a dialogue, or as Zwingel puts it, “a constant process of negotiating and re-negotiating norms.” Indeed, such a reporting regime may be quite a cost-effective way to improve law compliance. At least this study suggests it is making a noticeable contribution at the margins in the realm of women’s rights. Moreover, the strength of such a reporting-and-review process may not be tied to a specific treaty. Whether this study’s findings also hold in other international settings that involve similar processes, such as Universal Periodic Review before the UN Human Rights Council, requires further research.

Finally, the reporting regime is not a comprehensive solution to the world’s worst human rights abuses. Even though CEDAW ratification is now nearly universal, it has proved impossible to coerce a meaningful conversation out of unwilling states. Constructive dialogue only has effects when it actually takes place. That said, the results of this study suggest that the reporting and review system should be supported rather than disparaged. The critics who point out the problems of stretched resources and redundant processes have valid concerns. But a look at the evidence suggests that self-reporting and receiving recommendations has an important causal role to play in starting conversations that reverberate domestically and open up possibilities for change.

174. Zwingel, supra note 5, at 126.