BOOK REVIEW

CONSTITUTIONAL PERILS—REAL AND OTHERWISE


Reviewed by Gene R. Nichol, Jr.*

What is the state of individual freedom in the United States today? How fully have the majestic promises of the Declaration of Independence been realized? No doubt Americans have experienced vast changes in the relationship between the individual and government over the past half century. The compassionate energy of Franklin Roosevelt, the terrors of cold war McCarthyism, the call to progress of the Kennedy brothers, the moral force of Martin Luther King Jr., the activism of the Warren Court and the Great Society, the abuses of Richard Nixon, the ambivalence of the Burger Court, and a first term of Ronald Reagan all have left their marks. By any standard, guarantees of liberty and equality have undergone major expansions. Yet constitutional protection is hardly a static process. New problems arise, old ones are resurrected. Even in the Orwellian year of 1984, all of our constitutional crises cannot be considered behind us.

Our Endangered Rights: The ACLU Report on Civil Liberties Today offers both an assessment of the present status of American freedom and an examination of perceived future battlegrounds over individual liberties. Edited by Norman Dorsen, the book is a collection of essays by noted constitutional authorities and civil liberties experts measuring the vitality of various constitutional guarantees. It offers a glimpse not only of the broad panoply of the rights we do enjoy, but

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3. OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS: THE ACLU REPORT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES TODAY (N. Dorsen ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS].

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also what Dorsen calls the "darker side" of the human rights equation in this country. Authors characterize the birthright of freedom for all Americans as "continually under siege," and the title of the work is said to sum up well the present situation. Past civil liberties victories are now "endangered" and future technological developments pose unforeseen perils to individual autonomy. The social agenda of the New Right, the use of executive authority by the Reagan administration, and continuing economic scarcity threaten traditional movements towards toleration and equality. In short, progress on the civil liberties front cannot be assured. As we approach the close of the twentieth century, efforts to secure fundamental freedoms in both legislative and judicial arenas must, if anything, be redoubled.

There is much that is good in Our Endangered Rights. In particular, Professor Emerson's chapter on academic freedom outlines significant applications of constitutional law to protect the rights of faculty members and students and, more recently, to assure a measure of curricular diversity. More importantly, he argues that government attempts to control information on national security grounds and the commercial exploitation of academic research constitute threats to true academic liberty that are at least as great as more direct means of control. The former serves to diminish the information needed by the public to participate in decision making, and the latter is at odds with the academic community's traditional commitment to the free and unskewed pursuit of knowledge. Norman Redlich carefully examines the mounting pressures placed on Madison's wall separating church and state in an era of renewed religious fundamentalism—pressures that have hardly decreased since publication of the book. Stanley N. Katz's concluding chapter lends a refreshing historical perspective to civil liberties struggles which, by their very fervor, tend to eschew relativism. By reminding us that future civil rights battles must be conducted without the support of a unified traditional New Deal political coalition, Katz makes clear that the issues of the eighties are not the

5. Id.
7. Id. at 194-200.
issues of the sixties. Accordingly, his chapter proves to be an effective counterweight to the often unbalanced tone of other selections.

The book, in a variety of ways, documents both the logical inconsistency and general undesirability of recent attempts to roll back long established constitutional guarantees. Measures to withdraw the jurisdiction of the federal courts or to legalize orchestrated school prayer, for example, get ample attention. But perhaps the strongest single feature ofOur Endangered Rights is its effort to signal flash points of future constitutional controversy that existing bodies of law are ill-suited to handle.

Professor Bender, for example, argues that although the Constitution has been interpreted to protect individual privacy in some particulars, "meaningful protection of informational privacy rights at present . . . largely depends upon the good faith and vigilance . . . of governmental and private agencies. . . ." Given the virtual explosion of technologies available to obtain and compile information, constitutional silence will become increasingly difficult to maintain. Further, as Morton Halperin argues, the traditional judicial deference accorded to presidential claims of national security may well insulate much mischief. Recent executive branch efforts to limit foreign travel, to bar foreign visitors, to stigmatize various publications, and to censor former government officials bode ill for a robust national debate on foreign affairs. John Shattuck makes an analogous point concerning executive authority and domestic affairs. Reagan administration moves to curtail civil rights enforcement and to alter existing civil rights policies through executive order have proven relatively impervious to attack. Finally, in a perceptive essay, Sylvia Law demonstrates


13. Bender, Privacy, in Our Endangered Rights, supra note 3, at 237, 251.


15. Id. at 290-92.


the inseparability of civil liberties and economic justice. Once fusion of the two concepts is accomplished, the need to recognize not only certain claims for subsistence but, at the other end of the spectrum, to render concentrations of economic power democratically accountable becomes clear.\textsuperscript{18} Law’s arguments remind us of the continuing validity of Franklin Roosevelt’s assertion that political equality can all too easily be rendered “meaningless in the face of economic inequality.”\textsuperscript{19} None of these flash points is apt to be brought under the umbrella of constitutional protection overnight. Each author, however, makes a strong case that presently asserted constitutional values cannot be indefinitely maintained if such important areas of friction are ignored.

Despite these strengths, however, Our Endangered Rights ultimately provides something less than its advertised claim: “a lucid review of the state of American freedom.”\textsuperscript{20} In no small part its shortcomings result from defects common to much liberal discourse. Accordingly, they merit attention.

I. ON LIBERAL HYPERBOLE

It is not uncommon in constitutional scholarship to attempt to make things more complicated than they are.\textsuperscript{21} It is not uncommon in politics to attempt to make things more simple than they are. Much of Our Endangered Rights, although under the rubric of constitutional analysis, follows the latter theme.

Consider a few examples. Much has been written\textsuperscript{22}—no doubt too much\textsuperscript{23}—concerning the antidemocratic nature of judicial review. However one feels about that debate, it is difficult to deny, for example, that the judicial enforcement of nontextual substantive rights against popularly elected branches of government is at odds with democratic theory. Professor Neuborne, nevertheless, dismisses such claims by arguing that “allowing judges to check . . . a powerful transient minority in the name of an existing consensus concerning individual rights is

\textsuperscript{18} Law, Economic Justice, in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 134, 134-59.
\textsuperscript{19} Address before the Democratic Convention (June 27, 1936).
\textsuperscript{20} This claim appeared on the cover of the paperback edition.
\textsuperscript{21} See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY passim (1978) (discussing the philosophies of individual rights, and criticizing the “ruling theory of law” as espoused by Jeremy Bentham).
\textsuperscript{22} See generally, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693, 704-06 (1976).
\textsuperscript{23} See generally Nichol, Giving Substance Its Due (Book Review), 93 Yale L.J. 171 (1983).
hardly a serious challenge to democratic political theory."24 One
could, of course, counter Neuborne's claim by pointing to persuasive
arguments that either there is no discernible consensus on individual
rights to instruct the bulk of modern constitutional decisions, or that
the judiciary is particularly ill-suited to discover it.25 It is perhaps sim-
pler, however, to point out a subsequent paragraph of Professor
Neuborne's: "We turn to judges to define and enforce individual rights
not because no real choices are necessary, but precisely because hard
choices cannot be avoided."26 True enough. But choices are hard pre-
cisely because they are not rooted in societal consensus. Further, it is
my guess that Neuborne would be among the last to advocate that the
judiciary wait for broad popular agreement before protecting, for ex-
ample, the rights of Nazis to march in Skokie or poor women to obtain
government funding for abortions. Rather, arguments for an activist
modern judiciary based upon perceived consensus boil down to the un-
realistic and ethnocentric claim that the bulk of the country sees the
world through the eyes of the political left.

Professors Estrich and Kerr's attack on the gender cases, on the
other hand, is overblown. *Michael M. v. Superior Court,*27 sustainting
the constitutionality of a California gender-biased statutory rape law, is
indeed a regrettable step backwards in the Supreme Court's treatment
of sex discrimination. The decision's shortcoming is surely not that
"the non-physiological consequences of pregnancy—the 'punishment'
of pregnancy itself as well as the additional constraints that punishment
may place on female sexuality—are socially created, as much the pro-
duct of governmental action as the criminal sanction imposed on
Michael M."28 There may be a multitude of causes leading to a teen-
age girl's fear of pregnancy, but government is not on the list. Nor does
it further the understanding of privacy analysis to characterize the

24. Neuborne, *The Supreme Court and the Judicial Process,* in OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS,
*supra* note 3, at 27, 28.
*supra* note 3, at 27, 41.
Estrich and Kerr correctly recognize that Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (male-only draft
registration), Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (affirming California statutory
rape law which imposed criminal liability only on men), and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974) (upholding state disability scheme excluding pregnancy coverage), reflect a lingering judi-
cicial acceptance of separate spheres for male and female. Surprisingly, however, they criticize
cases denying custody to lesbian parents because such rulings "devalue the importance and diffi-
culty of the nurturing activity that has been assigned to women." Estrich & Kerr, *supra,* at 127.
Lingerings are apparently widespread.
troubling case of *Harris v. McRae* as granting to states the power “to assert control over the reproductive lives” of poor women. Labelling sensitive human rights disputes as something other than what they are may indeed ease the decisionmaking process. I doubt, however, that it leads to better results. Unfortunately, *Our Endangered Rights* is replete with such hyperbole.

In a perhaps similar vein, the book too often treats difficult constitutional crises as if they were merely problems of motivation. Constitutional cases would be easily decided and civil liberties easily protected if we just all believed in freedom and progress, or so the theory goes. In short, you are either for the Constitution or against it.

This theme is reflected in a number of ways. First, the book frequently succumbs to a we/they world view. Ira Glasser, for example, argues that the future of civil liberties depends not on “what *they* do; what counts is what *we* do in response.” The New Right is consistently pictured as a modern-day version of Niebuhr’s “children of darkness.” That temptation may be compelling, but it also probably misreads the appeal of Reaganism to the American people. No doubt traditionally respected characteristics such as reliance on individual virtue and industry, fear of centralized government, and belief in the moral progress of society have much to do with the “new” conservatism. It ill serves liberalism to disregard completely such broadly shared sentiments.

Nor is it useful to ignore the genuine absence of consensus on many of the perplexing constitutional issues of the day. Persons of profound integrity and compassionate outlook can reasonably disagree, for example, on the propriety of “benign” racial preference or the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment albeit in good faith. Nor, in a broader sense, is it possible to maintain a clearly agreed-upon civil liberties agenda amid rising expectations of

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29. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). *Harris* upheld the Hyde amendment which restricted funding for medically necessary abortions. The Court subjected the statute, the impact of which fell exclusively on indigent pregnant women, to no more rigorous scrutiny than had been applied in cases presenting distinctions between economic interests.


31. I will limit myself to a single example: “By late 1980, [the New Right] had achieved substantial political power. Suddenly, no freedom seemed safe. Book banning became epidemic. Women's rights were threatened. Homosexuals were attacked. Voting rights were endangered. And ominous new laws to weaken the federal courts and to breach the separation of church and state were widely proposed.” Glasser, *Making Constitutional Rights Work*, *OUR ENDANGERED RIGHTS*, supra note 3, at 3, 17.

32. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).

civil and economic rights in an era of shrinking available resources.\textsuperscript{34} The explosion of constitutional protection ushered in by the Warren Court—through its very success—has rendered future progress in the guarantee of civil liberties a more formidable enterprise. On the one hand, a sizeable portion of American society has come to see itself as the victim of the Supreme Court. On the other hand, early victories often lead to subtler, more persistent problems. It was, for example, perhaps easier to announce \textit{Brown v. Board of Education}\textsuperscript{35} than to bring its promises to fruition. Brushing such problems aside, \textit{Our Endangered Rights} too often suggests that if we would all stop being bigots everything would be fine. In reality, of course, most of our present constitutional problems are sufficiently tenacious that they would likely remain even if bigotry and ill will were to depart suddenly. Forging human rights strategies despite these difficulties is the challenge of the next decade. Painting over complexities does little to further that process.

\section*{II. Constitutional Crossroads}

\textit{Our Endangered Rights} claims in major part to be an examination of "where we seem to be heading"\textsuperscript{36} in terms of civil liberties protection in the United States. Despite its often strident tone, an argument can be made that the book actually understates the extent to which we face a major constitutional crossroads in the remainder of this decade. One way or the other, the role of the United States Supreme Court in the protection of civil liberties is apt soon to undergo a substantial transformation. The impact of such a shift in judicial perspective on the rights we enjoy may well be significant.

Recent Supreme Court history bears this out. The Warren Court accomplished a significant change in the direction of constitutional decisionmaking. Landmark decisions such as \textit{Brown},\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Reynolds v. Sims},\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Engel v. Vitale},\textsuperscript{39} and \textit{Miranda v. Arizona}\textsuperscript{40} in effect resurrected an institution previously rendered silent by its battles with the New Deal and the revelations of legal realism. The reemergence was accomplished primarily on behalf of egalitarianism. Although its vision was not always articulated, the Warren Court at least behaved as if it

\begin{thebibliography}{40}
\bibitem{34} Professor Katz makes this observation in the concluding chapter. Katz, \textit{An Historical Perspective on Crises in Civil Liberties}, \textit{Our Endangered Rights} \textit{supra} note 3, at 311, 321-23.
\bibitem{35} 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
\bibitem{36} Dorsen, \textit{Introduction}, in \textit{Our Endangered Rights}, \textit{supra} note 3, at ix, ix.
\bibitem{37} 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
\bibitem{38} 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
\bibitem{39} 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
\bibitem{40} 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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had a clear view of its role in our system of government. Substantially 
broadening the participatory base of our democracy, the Warren Court 
shook the dust from old tools of judicial activism in an effort to accom-
plish more fully the goal of equal dignity for all. The result, in no 
small degree, was the development of an institution that viewed its pri-
mary responsibility as the protection of individual liberties against ma-
jority intrusion.

The Burger Court has been less predictable.\textsuperscript{41} Its decisions have 
hardly reflected the levelling fervor of those of its predecessor. Still, its 
record is far from passive. The cornerstones of the Warren Court juris-
prudence remain firmly in place.\textsuperscript{42} New nontextual rights have been 
recognized.\textsuperscript{43} The electoral process has been aggressively supervised,\textsuperscript{44} 
and the Court has shown a surprising willingness to measure the pow-
ers of the legislative and executive branches.\textsuperscript{45} In short, the Burger 
Court has placed itself firmly within the activist tradition more com-
monly associated with its predecessor.

But its activism cannot be as readily ascribed to any particular 
view of the Constitution or of judicial authority. Unlike the Warren 
Court, the present Court is dominated by centrists. Neither William 
Rehnquist and Warren Burger on the one hand, nor William Brennan 
and Thurgood Marshall on the other can be considered the heart of the 
Burger Court. No particular ideology consistently prevails. The result 
has been a marked ambivalence in the civil liberties arena. The “root-
lessness”\textsuperscript{46} has manifested itself in two principal ways. First, the Court 
has repeatedly been unable to fashion majority opinions in major 
human rights cases.\textsuperscript{47} Second, when it has spoken, the Justices often

\textsuperscript{41} See generally The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn’t (V. 
Blasi ed. 1983).

\textsuperscript{42} Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court in id. at 198, 198-217.

\textsuperscript{43} See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); In re Griffiths, 413 

\textsuperscript{44} See, e.g., First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (protecting, on first amend-
ment grounds, a corporation’s right to make expenditures for the purpose of influencing referen-
dum voting); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (striking down various sections of 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, as violative of the first 
amendment).

\textsuperscript{45} See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (striking down provision of Immigration 
and Nationality Act that authorized one house of Congress to veto executive’s decision to suspend 
deportation of an alien); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (prohibiting the 
impersonation of federal minimum wage provisions on state entities as being violative of the tenth 
Act Amendments of 1970 establishing the 18-year-old vote in state and local elections).

\textsuperscript{46} Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in The Burger Court: The 
Counter-Revolution That Wasn’t, supra note 37, at 198, 210.

\textsuperscript{47} See, e.g., Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (three Justices on opinion of the 
Court and three concurring Justices) (removal of books from public school libraries); Clements v.
have tended to construct compromise doctrines rather than make the fundamental value choices necessitated by the dispute. The Court's decisions concerning the establishment clause, affirmative action, the rights of aliens, the right to privacy, and desegregation remedies provide fertile examples. Though the Court apparently has a strong concept of its power—witness the decision in *INS v. Chadha*—it has been unsure of its posture on civil liberties. Thus the Burger


Court has produced a strong activist record without promoting a clear vision of the role of the Supreme Court in protecting human rights.

The Burger Court era, however, rapidly draws to a close. Five members of the Court are in their late seventies. A major change of personnel almost surely awaits the next president. Moreover, it seems quite unlikely that the next series of justices will be ambivalent about the role of the Supreme Court in American government. Battle lines are clearly drawn. A Democratic president, following on the heels of six Republican appointees, would have felt heavy pressure to select justices in the egalitarian-activist tradition. For such a court, issues of economic justice, individual autonomy, racial and sexual discrimination, and constitutional accountability of the executive branch might have provided a fruitful agenda.

President Reagan's reelection seems to assure a quite different course. Depending upon the individuals chosen, a Reagan bench might be expected to move the Supreme Court in either of two directions. At the least, it appears likely that a strong majority employing a true philosophy of judicial restraint would be achieved. If the last Term is any indication, the Burger Court itself has taken a marked turn in this direction—pursuing deference to other institutions of government as the highest value in constitutional adjudication. Such a Court exacerbates the dangers to individual liberties presented by a strong executive or a Congress dominated by the New Right. A working majority of strong judicial conservatives, in short, would start the Court on a slow march toward inactivity. The eventual result would likely be the return of a sleepy federal judiciary similar to that presided over by Chief Justice Vinson after World War II.

A second course would be even more disturbing. New Justices in the Rehnquist mold could help comprise an activist Court seeking to


57. See, for example, Justice Rehnquist’s opinions in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass’n; 452 U.S. 264, 307-13 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (commerce clause not applica-
further conservative political values. Then not only would traditional civil liberties guarantees be called into question, but the constitutional protection of, for example, property interests and states's rights could be reinvigorated. In either case, history may well come to see the Burger Court as transitional—keeping alive the tools of activism until a new course is set for judicial authority. If that course incorporates either a heavy dose of political conservatism or an overriding predilection for judicial restraint, the civil rights battles of the next generation may well have to be fought without the assistance of, or even in direct opposition to, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In that unhappy event, our rights may be truly endangered.