A Convenient Untruth: Fact and Fantasy in the Doctrine of Odious Debts

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The previous regime [in Iraq] accumulated a heavy burden of foreign debts to states which financed the tyrant's wars against his people first, and then against our neighbors. The foreign loans helped him build a huge military apparatus and manufacture weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons which he used against the Iraqi people in Halabja. The loans supported his system of oppression and paid for his palaces and prisons during the war against Iran when Iraq's oil revenue was extremely low....

There is a strong basis in international legal principle and precedent to define these debts as being “odious” and thus not legally enforceable. This legal doctrine of odious debt was formulated in the 1920s by Alexander Sack, a former Russian Minister working as a legal professor in the Sorbonne University in Paris. He published the most extensive and important works on the treatment of state debts in the event of regime change.¹

Widely different views have been expressed about the appropriate treatment of Iraq’s Saddam-era debts. Some have argued that all of this debt, in view of its provenance, should be classified as odious and cancelled outright. Lend to a despot, they say, and you should expect repayment only from the despot. If a country manages to free itself from the incubus of an odious regime, the citizenry should not be forced to carry the burden of that regime’s immoral extravagances for generations to come.²

INTRODUCTION

History has been kind to Alexander Nahum Sack³—kinder than life was, and kind rather than accurate. Unknown for much of his life and the half century that followed it, he has, in the years since the 2003 United States incursion into Iraq, emerged as an international academic superstar. In 1927, while lecturing in Paris, Sack published a treatise in French on the effect of state transformations on public debt: Les Effets des transformations des Etats sur leurs dettes publiques et autres obligations financières (Les Effets). Sack proposed that, following a state succession,⁴ a new sovereign government could renege on the odious debts of the previous sovereign. According to Sack, odious debts were those (a) incurred without the consent of the people (by a “despotic” regime); (b) from which no benefits accrued to the people; and (c) when the creditors had knowledge of the foregoing.⁵ Sack’s treatise, which was never translated into English, has been discovered and placed at the center of a heated academic and policy debate—much of it in English—over the law of odious debts. His hitherto obscure theory has been dis-


4. Sack drew a sharp distinction between the political transformation of a state, which caused no change in the status of the previous regime’s debts, and a territorial change in the state, which might allow the partition or even invalidation of the debts of the prior state attributable to that territory. A.N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÈRES 46–61 (1927) [hereinafter SACK, LES EFFETS]; see also Anna Gelpern, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391, 405 (2005) (noting the “high bar” for proving a state succession).

5. The sovereign borrower had the burden of demonstrating the three conditions. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at 157–63.
cussed in the pages of *The New Yorker, Le Monde, and The Times*, not to mention dozens of other news sources, policy briefs, academic essays, and blogs.\(^6\)

In particular, Sack’s three-part definition has found favor with the contemporary proponents of an odious debts doctrine. Among debt forgiveness circles, Sack is described in one of several ways, which this Article refers to as the Sackian myths: Sack is called a former Minister to Tsar Nicholas II or a former tsarist minister; a Russian jurist or a professor of law in Paris; and the preeminent legal scholar on public debts, the originator of the odious debts doctrine, or a leading scholar of international law. Sack’s name has become so ubiquitous in the literature that one sees references to the “Sackian view” of odious debts,\(^7\) and one modern writer described him as the “crowned prince” of advocates of the legal principle of odious debts.\(^8\) Sack’s theory is the starting point for almost every discussion of the odious debts problem today; until recently, his contemporaries writing on the subject merited nary a mention.\(^9\)

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Why has the odious debts movement invested such weight in the resume of one hitherto obscure legal scholar? And further, how and why did Sack’s iconic status arrive so suddenly and with so little biographical information about the man? Scholars typically achieve iconic status—of the sort where they are invoked by name as a source of authority—only after years of discussion and debate about their work.  

The answer lies partly in a quirk of customary international law. Sack’s prominence—particularly his status as a minister in the tsarist government—lends authority to his doctrine of odious debts and buttresses the claims of its proponents that such a doctrine exists as part of customary international law. The “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists” which include the writings of prominent scholars in international law—are among the secondary sources of authority that customary international law recognizes, and thus Sack’s eminence is directly linked to a desire to validate his doctrine of odious debts.

It turns out that much of Sack’s contemporary identity was made up, but not by him. After a brief background discussion on the resurrection of Sack by the odious debts movement, this Article sets out the three Sackian mythologies told by the contemporary odious debts literature.
and then juxtaposes the results of historical investigation with each of the stories. The Sackian myths do not stand up to scrutiny. The legend of Sack has been an untruth that conveniently bolsters the validity of the odious debts doctrine; the reality is less convenient, but (we hope) more interesting.

I. IRAQ AND THE RESURGENCE OF ODIOUS DEBTS

After languishing in obscurity for the better part of a century, the doctrine of odious debts was given new life after the United States toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime. The doctrine is controversial because it proposes an exception to the general rule of public international law that debts incurred by one government are inherited by the subsequent government. The theory is that states never die. Instead, the state exists separately from its government, and because governments contract debts as agents of the state, new governments necessarily inherit the debts of the old.13

Rarely have states asserted exceptions to this strict rule of succession. When they did, the assertions were generally based on a theory that there was discontinuity between the old and new states, or that the debts were hostile to the new government.14 The Soviets disavowed any obligation to pay the debts of the Tsar. Communist China refused to pay debts incurred by their Imperial predecessors in the early twentieth century. The Islamic revolutionary government in Iran viewed as odious debts incurred by the Shah to purchase arms.15 For the most part, these assertions were tackled in the realm of diplomacy and politics, involving meetings among finance ministers and bankers in swank hotels in London and Paris. When the odious debts issue was raised with Iraq, however, the chessboard had changed and both the pieces and strategies were different. There were still high-level meetings in Paris, London, and elsewhere, and politics still trumped law. But today, sovereign borrowers increasingly waive their sovereign immunity in domestic courts to appear credible to lenders (typically, agreeing to be sued in the two


15. King, supra note 9, at 634.
jurisdictions that are seen as most respectful of creditor rights—the United States and the United Kingdom). So in 2003, Iraq faced the prospect of creditors seeking to collect—some in domestic courts in the United States—on billions of dollars in unpaid Saddam-era debt.16

Many in the higher echelons of the U.S. administration did not savor the prospect of Saddam’s creditors using the U.S. courts to attach Iraq’s oil revenues to pay Saddam’s bills (after all, those revenue streams were supposed to pay for the war). Paul Wolfowitz testified before the Senate that the Iraqi people should not have to pay for the guns, palaces, and (nonexistent) weapons of mass destruction of Saddam Hussein—asserting, in words of a different sort, an odious debts justification for debt forgiveness.17 At the other end of the political spectrum, NGOs and activist groups, concerned with the overwhelming debt burdens in the developing world, were eager to back any legal strategy that the Bush administration might advocate with Iraq, hoping that a similar strategy could be extended to unburden states that did not have the powerful political allies that the new state in Iraq did. Suddenly, there was a chorus of voices from the far ends of both sides of the political spectrum—the Cato Institute and Oxfam pushing the same agenda—asserting that many of Saddam’s debts should not have to be paid because they were “odious.”18 And the unlikely jurist at the center of the chorus was Alexander Nahum Sack.19

As of early 2008, the debate over the doctrine of odious debts continues. Apart from multiple conferences addressing the topic and new academic articles, the official sector has taken up the doctrine. With funding from the Norwegian government, both the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World

16. For discussion of odious debt claims in the context of the U.S. incursion into Iraq, see Jai Damle, The Odious Debt Doctrine After Iraq, 70 LAW & CONTEM. PROBS. (forthcoming 2007).


19. See, e.g., Khalfan et al., supra note 9, at 14.
Bank have released reports on the topic and both contain invocations of Alexander Sack as the originator of the doctrine.20

II. THE THREE SACKIAN MYTHOLOGIES

A. From Tsarist Minister to Revolutionary Hero

Modern commentators often refer to Sack as having been a tsarist minister,21 a myth with twofold significance. First, it gives Sack status in the government of a major power, which is relevant to modern assertions that Sack’s views from the early 1900s are an authoritative source of public international law at the time. As a tsarist minister, Sack would have had first-hand knowledge of how states viewed odious debts at the time, and indeed, may have been in a position to shape state policy on odious debts. Second, it shows that Sack was personally familiar with the issue of odious debts because he worked for the sovereign whose debts were repudiated by the Bolsheviks in 1918. The Bolsheviks described these debts as belonging to the government of the “Tsar, the landowners, and the bourgeoisie.”22 The repudiation was intended to deal a “first blow” to international capital and to strengthen the government of the proletariat against its exploiters.23

Commentators likely take their characterization of Sack as a minister of the Tsar from an article by legal historian Michael Hoeflich, who de-


23. Id. at 510.
scribed Sack as “once a minister of Tsarist Russia and thence, after the October Revolution, a Parisian law professor.” In 1991, debt activist Patricia Adams echoed Hoeflich’s characterization, describing Sack as “a former minister of Tsarist Russia and, after the Russian Revolution, a professor of law in Paris,” in her influential book *Odious Debts: Loose Lending, Corruption, and the Third World’s Environmental Legacy.* Adams’s book became a key element of the post-Iraq odious debts debate and that, in turn, resulted in the rapid dissemination of the story of Sack as a tsarist minister. The characterization has since appeared in scores of newspaper stories, academic articles, anti-debt activist speeches, websites, and most prominently, in the Iraqi National Assembly in November 2004. The story of Sack as a revolutionary hero—the man who authored a doctrine that will save poor nations from crippling

24. Hoeflich, *supra* note 13, at 41. Hoeflich obtained the information that Sack was a tsarist minister from an inscription at the front of one of Sack’s books at the Squire library at Cambridge University, where Hoeflich was doing research at the time. E-mail from Michael Hoeflich to Mitu Gulati (Sept. 6, 2007, 09:58 EST) (on file with authors); see also infra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. The error, in what is one of the best pieces of work on state succession, appears to have been inadvertent. One of the authors (Gulati), along with Professor Gelpert of Rutgers University, went to the Squire library in September 2007 to look for the inscription that Hoeflich had seen. Unfortunately, the Squire library had changed locations since Hoeflich was doing his research there, and we were unable to look at the same books Hoeflich likely examined. Among all the books by Sack that we searched in the new Squire library, we found no books with inscriptions in them. In fact, the books by Sack that we looked at appeared to have almost never been touched. See also E-mail from David Wills, Head Librarian, Squire Library, to Mitu Gulati & Lauren Collins (Sept. 13, 2007, 05:50 EST) (on file with authors).


debt burdens—is not one that is told explicitly;\(^{27}\) it is implicit in the heroic status that he has achieved among the debt forgiveness crowd.\(^{28}\) The websites of organizations such as Probe International feature Sack’s name, as do the writings of anti-debt activists such as Patricia Adams.\(^{29}\)

**B. Russian Professor of Law in Paris**

Contemporary commentators generally refer to Sack as a law professor in Paris (he was elevated to a “professor at the Sorbonne” in the Iraqi National Assembly discussions), or a Russian émigré law profes-

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27. Other commentators have described Sack as a champion of creditors’ rights. See Günter Frankenberg & Rolf Knieper, *Legal Problems of the Overindebtedness of Developing Countries: The Current Relevance of the Doctrine of Odious Debts*, 12 J. Int’l. Soc. L. 415, 427 (1984) (noting that the French commentators of the 1920s, notably Jèze (1921) and Sack (1926), were at the extreme end of the spectrum in terms of their eagerness to protect creditor claims); see also Ben-Shahar & Gulati, supra note 7, at 109 n.11.

28. Howse comes closest to telling an explicit story of Sack as an anti-tsarist revolutionary hero. Howse invokes Sack’s status as a tsarist minister in the context of using the Soviet repudiation of the tsarist debt as an example of the invocation of an odious debts argument by a state. He writes:

Sack, who himself was a former minister in the tsarist regime, notes a particular Soviet doctrine that regards acts of previous governments as incurring personal obligations only, and not ones that bind the state. Nevertheless even for Sack, it could be argued that the repudiated debts were “odious” and therefore were unenforceable against the successor regime, given the evidence that tsarist Russia did not rule in the interests of its population.

Howse, supra note 9, at 18 (citations omitted).

29. Patricia Adams, *Iraq's Odious Debts: The Odious Debt Doctrine and Iraq after Saddam*, Address Before International Conference on Iraq and Debt Relief (Mar. 16, 2004), available at http://www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/index.cfm?DSP=content&ContentID=9892. But, as Adams acknowledges, there is an inherent tension in the story of Sack’s transformation from tsarist to revolutionary:

Professor Sack was no radical. He had been a minister in the Tsarist regime and had seen the Bolshevik repudiation of the Tsarist debt. He believed that government debts should be repaid when a new government came to power. Otherwise, he said, chaos would reign in relations between nations and international trade and finance would break down.

But he also believed there was one exception to this rule. Sack believed that debts not created in the interests of the state should not be bound to this general rule.

Some debts, he said, are odious.

ADAMS, supra note 25, at 166. Adams later argues that Sack’s intent in developing the doctrine, and in particular in putting the onus on successor governments to prove odiousness, was to prevent “abuse [of the doctrine] by self-serving interpretation,” thus suggesting that Sack was trying to develop a method for identifying truly odious debts so that repudiation would occur only in worthy cases. Id. Despite stating that Sack was no radical, and acknowledging that his doctrine of odious debts is quite conservative—which might seem to disqualify Sack as a hero of the somewhat radical debt forgiveness movement—Adams continues to lionize Sack in her writing.
sor in Paris. These commentators are presumably relying on the fact that Les Effets was published in French in Paris, and the title page of the volume, which describes Sack as “ancien professeur agrégé a la faculté de droit de l’université de Petrograd” (a former professor “agréé” of the faculty of law at the University of St. Petersburg). It is rarely mentioned that Sack also taught at two American law schools, New York University (NYU) and Northwestern, and was a staff attorney at the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). These references to Sack’s tenure in Paris or status as a Russian émigré seem designed to enhance Sack’s status, not to mention that an association with two European countries makes Sack seem more worldly and, well, international.

The Russo-Parisian myth raises several additional questions about the meaning of the doctrine and whether Sack would have compromised his ideas in any way to please his French audience. The Soviet repudiation of the Tsar’s debt was a major political issue in 1920s France. In 1923, French citizens were owed nine billion gold francs on the face value of their tsarist bonds, and the arrears on payments added four hundred million gold francs each year. Resentment about the default was particularly high because many French bondholders thought they had been defrauded, as the Russian government (assisted by the French government) had allegedly bribed the French press to paint an unreal-
sonably rosy picture of the stability of the Russian regime.\textsuperscript{34} It did not help matters that France was facing financial crisis in the late 1920s.\textsuperscript{35}

When Sack published \textit{Les Effets} in 1927, he was one of many Russian refugees fleeing the Soviet regime who alighted in Paris. France was a favored destination for Russian refugees at the time, particularly for ex-tsarists. But jobs were scarce and by the late 1920s, anti-refugee sentiments had bubbled to the surface.\textsuperscript{36} As a professor at the university, Sack was likely doing better than many of his fellow refugees.

This particular historical context raises the question whether Sack’s doctrine of odious debts was consistent with his other writings on the subject, or whether his somewhat precarious position as an émigré in France may have influenced the way Sack presented his doctrine of odious debts. On the one hand, Sack might have been inspired to make a strong statement against the Soviet repudiation, thereby pleasing what he may have perceived as the popular audience for his book (the masses of French bondholders). On the other hand, as there was a debate among French intellectuals about the propriety of the Soviet repudiation, Sack may have wanted to finesse his opinion on the subject, hoping not to alienate either faction.

\textbf{C. The Pre-Eminent Scholar on Public Debts and State Succession; a Scholar of International Law; the Originator of the Doctrine of Odious Debts}

Modern scholars and activists appear to assume that Sack was a scholar of international law, and, to varying degrees, that he was pre-eminent. Sack is often described as the “preeminent” or “an eminent” scholar of public debts and state succession of his time,\textsuperscript{37} which is crucial for establishing his credibility as a publicist and the legitimacy of

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{35} E.g., Stephen A. Schuker, \textit{The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan} (1976).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
relying on his 1927 work as a source of customary international law. The origin of Sack’s reputation as the preeminent scholar in the field may be Ernst Feilchenfeld’s 1931 treatise, Public Debts and State Succession, in which he called Les Effets a “remarkable” and “profound” work.38 Sack is also characterized as the originator of the odious debts doctrine, that is, as the one who first formally articulated it as a doctrine.39 His work on the topic is described as “seminal,” “the first,” and “original.”40

III. THE LESS CONVENIENT STORY

Few of the Sackian myths withstand scrutiny. Sack, a Russian Jew, was just twenty-seven years old when the virulently anti-Semitic Tsar Nicholas II was deposed, yet contemporary commentators have raised him to the rank of a precocious tsarist minister. Sack spent the majority of his professional career in the United States, and yet his modern admirers know him as a Russian jurist living in Paris. Sack is thought today to have authored a revolutionary doctrine. Instead, Sack’s work was censored by the Bolsheviks and he was a fierce and consistent defender of the rights of creditors and the notion that successor governments cannot lightly shrug off the burden of state debts.

Yet it was not Sack who misrepresented his biography. His biographies in Who’s Who and the Dictionary of American Jewry, his obituary in the New York Times, the applications he submitted to the Guggen-
heim Foundation, the New York Bar, and the DOJ, and numerous resumes are remarkably consistent and almost completely verifiable.41

Here are the broad outlines of Sack’s life, as pieced together from his resumes, letters, and personal papers. Aleksandr Naumovich Zak was born in Moscow in 1890. His father was a doctor and professor of medicine at Moscow University.42 He graduated from gymnasium (high school) in 1908 and studied economics at St. Petersburg University for one year before returning to Moscow to earn a degree from the law faculty and become a member of the bar in 1911.43 For the next three years, he engaged in further study in a variety of locations and published several scholarly articles.44 From 1914 to 1916 he fought for the Russian army on the front in World War I. In September 1917, he was back in

41. Sack claims only a few liberties, for example, by eliding the critical parts of book reviews when he provides prospective employers with typed excerpts of the reviews of Les Effets. We found two other deviations from strict truth. First, Sack allows himself to be called an “ancien professeur agrégé” on the title page of Les Effets. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at title page. The rank of professeur agrégé is quite rare, as the professor must pass a series of advanced exams. There is no evidence that Sack achieved that title in France, or a similar rank in Russia. Second, on his New York bar application, Sack omits that he served on two government committees after the revolution. Questionnaire and Statement of Applicant, Alexander Nahum Sack, Filed in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York (Sept. 22, 1937), at questions 12, 13 (on file with authors).

42. In an autobiography Sack wrote for Erwin Griswold in preparation for his case before the AALS, Sack notes that his father, Naoum Basil Sack, was “Doctor of Medicine, Professor of Medicine at Moscow University, Councillor of State in (old) Russian Government Service.” Alexander Sack, Autobiographical Note (on file with authors). See also Faculty Biography for use of New York University Bureau of Public Information, Summer 1942 (on file with authors) (noting that father was a professor of medicine at Moscow University and a “Councillor of State (before the Revol.”).

43. Questionnaire and Statement of Applicant, supra note 41, at questions 5, 7.

44. It is not entirely clear what Sack did from 1911 to 1914. His New York Bar application suggests that he may have practiced law. Id. at questions 12, 13. In 1929, however, he testified as an expert witness that he had never practiced law in Moscow. Transcript of Record, vol. 5, at 69, Perry v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 172 S.E. 527 (N.C. 1934) (on file with authors). His Guggenheim application indicates he was involved in special studies from 1912 to 1913, but it is not clear where. Fellowship Application Form of Alexander N. Sack, John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, at question 1 (application acknowledged Oct. 15, 1935) (on file with authors). The autobiography Sack wrote for Erwin Griswold indicates that he was studying in either Berlin, Munich, Paris, or London. Sack, Autobiographical Note, supra note 42. According to Sack’s curriculum vitae, he published five works in Russian during this time: The Peasant Land Bank, 1883–1910, economic, financial and statistical researches (1911); Methods of the Science of Finance and Financial Law (1913); Participation of Legislative Bodies in the Control and Supervision of State Banks in Russia and Abroad (1913); Germans and German Capital in Russian Industry (1914); Central Banks—Unions of Banks (1914). Alexander N. Sack, Curriculum Vitae (Northwestern Univ. Archives, Leon Green (1888–1972) Papers, 1929–1947, ser. 17/29, box 9, folder 2); see also SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at Principaux ouvrages du même auteur.
Petrograd, taking an oral examination to earn the degree of Magister, which entitled him to lecture as an assistant professor in the law faculty—something he could not have done in the tsarist regime because he was Jewish. Sack notes on his New York bar application that he was allowed to take the exam based on his previously published writings; he was not required to submit a thesis.45

Sack left Russia permanently in 1921. He moved to Estonia—at that time, an independent country—where he advised the government on financial matters such as currency reform. He became a citizen of Estonia in 1922 and married his wife, Nina, in 1924. In 1925, the Sacks moved to Paris, where Sack taught at the Institute des Sciences Sociales et Politiques and the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Internationales while writing Les Effets. In 1928, he lectured at the school of International Law at The Hague, and in 1929, he appeared as an expert witness in London on behalf of Equitable Life Insurance. Sack’s work for Equitable Life brought him into contact with John W. Davis, who employed Sack in one of the Equitable Life cases his firm was litigating in New York.

In 1930, Northwestern University invited Sack to visit as a professor of international law for one year; the Sacks left Europe permanently and became citizens of the United States. Sack lectured at Northwestern for two years, and then moved to NYU, where he taught for the next eleven years. NYU terminated Sack in 1943, claiming that the financial exigencies of the war required them to drop the salary of one full-time professor. Sack, who believed he had been fired for writing a controversial letter to the New York Times, filed a complaint with the Association of American Law Schools (AALS), in which he was represented by Erwin Griswold—then a professor at Harvard Law School. After losing his position at NYU, Sack worked for the DOJ from 1943 to 1947, and then as a solo practitioner. By 1953, he and his wife were in a desperate financial situation; they were admitted as residents of the Andrew Freedman Home in the Bronx—a retirement home for the “formerly wealthy.” Sack died two years later.

45. Questionnaire and Statement of Applicant, supra note 41, at question 7.
46. Sack’s obituary tells us that he died at the Andrew Freedman Home in the Bronx, New York. Sack Obituary, supra note 3, at 27. The Freedman house was set up as a home for “the formerly wealthy.” Christopher Gray, Streetscapes/The Andrew Freedman Home: A Retirement Home Built for the Formerly Wealthy, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1999, Real Estate at 5. According to Jim Crocker, who directs the Freedman Home, Andrew Freedman established the home particularly for married couples who had formerly been wealthy, to save them from having arguments in their later years over the loss of their elevated financial and social status. Apparently, Mr. Freedman’s parents had argued about money when he was young and he wanted to protect others from that trauma. Interview by authors with Jim Crocker, Director, Freedman
Sack’s name is invoked today to conjure up the image of an éminence grise—a distinguished professor of international law puttering around an office stuffed with files of crumbling treaties. In real life, he was cantankerous, outspoken, querulous, and litigious, and he ended his days penniless. Researching the life of Alexander Sack is a bit like discovering that Che Guevara was a faithful reader of the Wall Street Journal; the myth is destroyed, but replaced by a man more nuanced, complex, human, and real.

A. Neither a Tsarist Minister nor a Revolutionary Hero

An examination of the details of Sack’s life reveals that none of the prevailing mythologies about Sack’s Russian experience are true: he was never a tsarist minister nor a sympathizer or fellow traveler with the Bolsheviks, and he firmly believed that the Bolshevik repudiation of the tsarist debt was legally indefensible.

It is certain that Sack never served as a minister to Tsar Nicholas II. Most importantly, Sack never claims this role for himself—not in the resume he submitted to obtain a job at Northwestern University, in his application to receive a Guggenheim Fellowship, in his sworn application to the New York Bar, in the dossier he submitted to the DOJ, in his application to the Andrew Freedman Home, in the biography he wrote for Erwin Griswold, or in his biography in Who’s Who in America.47 It is telling that he never claims to have held such a position—or even to have worked in a tsarist ministry—in his sworn submissions to the New York Bar and the DOJ. He submitted those documents in 1937 and 1943, and being Russian by birth, he probably would have been motivated to establish his anti-communist credentials by claiming an association with the Tsar or the pre-communist government.

The likely source of the misapprehension of Sack’s role as a tsarist minister is the “biographical notice” that appears in a collection of international law lectures—including Sack’s lectures on the succession of public debt—sponsored by the Academy of International Law in Paris.48

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48. A.N. Sack, La Succession aux Dettes Publiques D’État, in RECUEIL DES COURS 1928 III TOME 23 DE LA COLLECTION 147 (1929). The separately published version of these lectures does
The biographical notice (written in French) lists, among Sack’s accomplishments, that he served in 1917 on the Ministry of Finance’s commission to reorganize Russian finances and as legal counsel to the Committee on Commercial Banking.49 Thus, while Sack was participating in the Russian government in 1917—although not as a minister—he was likely doing so under the auspices of the Provisional Government, not the Tsar or the Bolsheviks.50

Records of the Tsar’s government also suggest that Sack never served in a ministerial role. Had he been one of the Tsar’s ministers, he would likely have been the minister of finance since his expertise was on exchange rates, currency stabilization, and public finance. But the Tsar’s minister of finance from 1907 to 1913 was Vladmir Kokostov, followed by P.I. Bark from 1913 to 1917.51 Further, Sack’s youth and inexperience in 1917 most likely precluded his service as a tsarist minister. Sack was twenty-seven and had been a member of the bar in Moscow for only three years when the Tsar abdicated; he had also been fighting on the front until 1916. This leaves roughly one year in which he could have been a minister (from when he was demobilized in 1916 until March 2, 1917), but the post was occupied by another man.

49. In English, Sack writes that he was a “Member of Council, Ministry of Finance, Russia, 1917; Counsel, All-Russian Committee of Commercial Banks, 1917–1918.” Faculty Biography, supra note 42, at 2; see also Sack, Autobiographical Note, supra note 42.

50. Sack’s participation on the committees does not mean that he was a Bolshevik. To keep the government going, the Bolsheviks were forced to retain a bureaucracy of “‘old officials, inherited from the Tsar and from bourgeois society.’” 1 EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION 1917–1923, at 254 (Penguin Books 1966) (1950).

51. Kokostov was renowned for successfully balancing the budget after the political turbulence of 1904–1906. PETER GATRELL, RUSSIA’S FIRST WORLD WAR: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 133–34 (2005). Kokostov’s first term, when Russia was involved in its ill-fated war with Japan, was characterized by his attempt to finance the economy through borrowing, resulting in an enormous loan of 620 million rubles from France. The focus during his second term was more on economic recovery and reconstruction. On Kokostov’s economic policies, see VINCENT BARNETT, THE REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIAN ECONOMY 1890–1940: IDEAS, DEBATES AND ALTERNATIVES 38–40 (2004). See also L.N. Yurovsky, Problems of a Moneyless Economy, in MARKETS AND SOCIALISM 50 (Alec Nove & Ian D. Thatcher eds., 1994). The other prominent Minister of Finance around that period was Sergei Witte, who was minister from 1892 until 1903. See BARNETT, supra at 29; GATRELL, supra at 134. More broadly, Sack (or Zak)’s name is not mentioned in Barnett’s list of prominent thinkers on economic matters of the time, suggesting that the very young Sack and his early writings had not reached a position of prominence before the Tsar’s abdication. See BARNETT, supra at 25.
Finally, there is Sack’s Jewish heritage. Sack’s father probably benefited from one of the “great reforms” of Tsar Alexander II—a program of “selective integration” that allowed Jews to enter educational institutions, train for professions, and thereby gain the privilege of living “outside the Pale.” By the time Sack reached school age, however, Tsar Nicholas II had significantly rolled back these reforms, imposing severe limits on the numbers of Jewish students who could be admitted to gymnasia and universities. Sack would have been among a handful of Jewish students admitted to these institutions at the turn of the century, showing that he was a very promising student. Nevertheless, educated Jews were prohibited altogether from entering the civil service and joining university faculties. When Sack entered the work force in 1911, the only professions open to Jews were medicine and law, and even the bar imposed a quota on Jewish membership in the waning days of the tsarist regime. It was not until March 20, 1917, when the Provisional Government in St. Petersburg abolished all distinctions based on nationality, ethnicity, religion, or estate, that Sack could have pursued a government position or a career in academics.

While it is difficult to imagine how anyone whose education and career options had been so curtailed by the tsarist regime could be described as “tsarist,” it is also clear that Sack did not gain favor with the Bolsheviks after they came to power. Sack remained in St. Petersburg from 1917 until 1921 (roughly, for the duration of the Russian civil war), when he decamped for Estonia. During this time he served on

52. In today’s terms, Sack might have been described as culturally, but not religiously, Jewish. On the one hand, he identifies himself as Jewish and is listed in the dictionary of Jewish biography; on the other hand, he was married to a gentile. Sack wrote Erwin Griswold that, “though a religious man in a personal way, I have never been affiliated with any organized religion.” Letter from Sack to Griswold 4 (Feb. 13, 1944) (on file with authors). He quoted from the Old and New Testaments in several of his letters to Griswold. See, e.g., Letter from Sack to Griswold 3 (Aug. 5–6, 1944) (Eph. 6:11) (on file with authors); Letter from Sack to Griswold 4 (Mar. 4, 1944) (Psalm 35) (on file with authors); Letter from Sack to Griswold 3–4 (Jan. 9, 1944) (Psalm 94) (on file with authors); see also 3 WHO’S WHO IN AMERICAN JEWRY 912 (John Simons ed., 1938–1939) (biography of Alexander Sack); Alexander Sack, Archival Material, supra note 46 (application of Nina Sack indicating her religious affiliation).

54. Id. at 201–59.
55. Id. at 208–09.
56. Id. at 346–66.
57. Id. at 12.
58. After leaving Russia in 1921, Sack moved to Revel, Estonia, where he married Nina George Duguin and became an Estonian citizen. Alexander Sack, Archival Material, supra note 46 (copies of marriage certificate and Estonian citizenship papers). Sack published several articles
the two aforementioned government committees, continued lecturing at
the university, and published several articles. There is scant evidence
about Sack’s political alliances during this time in Paris, but we do
know that he became friendly with two prominent anti-Bolsheviks—
Peter Struve and Baron Boris E. Nolde—suggesting that he may at one
point have been allied with the Constitutional Democrat (Kadet) Party
or later, the White Russians. 59

Sack’s written work precipitated his disfavor with the Bolsheviks. In
the second preface to his 1923 book Restructuring of Sovereign Debits,
Sack writes that he had substantially completed the work in 1918 as part
of a comprehensive study of the “bankruptcy of the state of Russia,” 60
but that the original printing matrix for the work had been destroyed by
order of the Soviet Commissar of the Press. 61 Not coincidentally, Sack

on currency reform in the Baltic States and appears to have worked in the Finance Ministry,
writing memos to the Minister on matters such as the gold standard and the issuance of paper
money. Zak Archival Material from Bekmeteff Archives, Columbia University (on file with
authors). He was not the minister of finance in Estonia. E-mails from Central Bank of Estonia to

59. Before the revolution, both Baron Boris E. Nolde and Peter Struve were members of the
Constitutional Democratic Party. Struve fled Russia after the October Revolution and joined
forces with the White Russians, settling in Paris after 1920. See generally RICHARD PIPES,
STRUVE: LIBERAL ON THE LEFT, 1870–1905 (1970); RICHARD PIPES, STRUVE: LIBERAL ON THE
was a professor of international law and the legal advisor in the Tsar’s Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and briefly the vice minister of Foreign Affairs after the February revolution. After
resigning his post as vice minister, he remained active in the provisional government and, after
the October Revolution, continued lecturing in international law. In 1919, he emigrated to Paris.
See generally Peter Holquist, Dilemmas of a Progressive Administrator: Baron Boris Nolde, 7

In 1922, Struve was appointed to help review a dissertation that Sack submitted to the Russian
law faculty in Prague to receive a master’s degree in financial law. Sack’s dissertation was
rejected. G. Starodubtsev, Voprosy prepodavania mezhdunarodnogo prava v Protokolakh
Russkogo iuridicheskogo fakul’teta v Prage [Questions of Teaching International Law in
Protocols of Russian Law Faculty in Prague], 24 PRAVO I ZHIZN (1999) (citing to various
documents in the State Archive of the Russian Federation). Nolde favorably reviewed Les Effets
in a French journal. See infra note 122. In a 1927 letter, Sack thanks Struve for defending his
honor as a researcher in the Prague incident. Letter from Alexander Sack to Peter Struve (Apr. 6,
1927) (on file with Hoover Institution), translated in Letter from Arman Tasheneff to Mitu Gulati
(Sept. 14, 2007) (on file with authors). Both Nolde and Struve wrote letters of recommendation
for Sack to Columbia University. Letter from Alexander Sack to Peter Struve (Apr. 15, 1927) (on
file with Hoover Institution), translated in Letter from Arman Tasheneff to Mitu Gulati (Sept. 14,
2007) (on file with authors).

60. A.N. SACK, RAZVERSTKA GOSUDARSTVENNYKH DOLGOV [RESTRUCTURING OF
SOVEREIGN DEBTS] 19–22 (1923) [hereinafter SACK, RAZVERSTKA]. Cf. Anna Gelpern, Odious,
Not Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (2007) (also discussing RAZVERSTKA and noting that it
casts doubt on the modern view of Sack).

61. SACK, RAZVERSTKA, supra note 60, at 3 n.2.
in *Restructuring* expounds the prevailing theory of sovereign debt—that the debts of the previous government should be repaid when a new government comes to power—and does not articulate a theory of odious debt. In the preface, Sack also asserts that the Bolshevik movement is a transient one and addresses himself to the imminent rebirth of the Russian state, the attendant restoration of legality, and the task of restoring fiscal sanity to the bankrupt nation.62 Poignantly, he cites the many debt assumption proclamations by leaders of the factions opposed to the Bolsheviks, such as Koltchak and Kerensky.63 Finally, Sack asserts that a resolution of the sovereign debt issue will determine whether the other “great states” of Europe will officially recognize Bolshevik Russia or treat it as the “sick person” of the Eurasian continent.64 *Restructuring* reveals that Sack was far from being the former tsarist minister who reformed and articulated a doctrine that would rid the proletariat of the burden of debt imposed from the grave by the Tsar. Rather, Sack believed that the new debts incurred by the Soviets risked being illegitimate because the government was lawless. No wonder the commissars ordered the destruction of Sack’s book.

Sack’s contempt for the Bolsheviks resurfaced in his later writings. In 1938, he wrote an article recounting two decades of unsuccessful efforts by foreign nations to get satisfaction from the Soviets for their various property confiscations and repudiations of public debt.65 In the conclusion, he laments the “melancholy” state of these foreign claims, noting that the Soviet Union had become a “powerful industrial countr[y],” universally recognized and traded with, and “[y]et it has not recognized, nor paid, any claims arising from its decrees of repudiation, confiscation, and nationalization.”66 Sack concludes by recounting a Russian fable of a cook and cat. The cook, who fancies himself a statesman, decides to employ reason instead of immediate sanctions with the cat, which he discovers eating the meat. While the cook scolds, however, the cat polishes off the meat. Sack, while making a point about the failed diplomatic efforts of the cook, is clearly disgusted that the cat will suffer no harm from its greedy and wrongful actions.67

62. *Id.* at 1–2.
63. *Id.* Sack relies on much the same historical evidence in *Les Effets.* See, e.g., SACK, *LES EFFETS,* supra note 4, at 2–9, 16–18, 22, 25, 47, 52, 82, 168, 181.
64. SACK, *RAZVERSTKA,* supra note 60, at 1 (trans. Arman Tasheneff).
67. *Id.* at 282.
Four years later, Sack was so outraged by the suggestion that he sympathized with the Soviets that he sued the *New York Times* for publishing a letter that, according to Sack’s complaint, “charged him ‘with being a defender and supporter of communism as a system.’” (The letter, at most, charged Sack with showing sympathy for Soviet interests during World War II.) When a colleague at NYU advised him strongly not to respond to the letter (in effect forbidding him to, as this colleague served as the law school censor), Sack was distraught, and indeed, this incident was the beginning of the decline of his employment relationship with NYU. In a hearing conducted by the university, Sack stated “you must remember that I was driven out of Russia...because of the Communists, and for me then to be represented as an advocate of communism...and not be allowed to answer the attack, upset me profoundly.” Later, in a statement submitted as evidence to the AALS, Sack wrote that he left Russia in 1921 “because of my opposition to the Soviet Government,” and that he has, as a “matter of public record,” always been “opposed to Communism.”

Finally, if the foregoing evidence is not sufficient to prove that Sack was not a Bolshevik sympathizer, there is the matter of Sack’s entry into the U.S. legal community. Sack came to the New York legal market via London as a result of his work as an expert witness on Russian domestic law. While in Paris, Sack was hired by an English law firm in a London-based case defending Equitable Life Assurance from claims from a Russian policy holder. Sack also appeared in New York iterations of the case, having been hired by firms such as Sullivan & Cromwell, Shearman & Sterling, and Davis Polk. Sack’s arrival in the United States

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68. Sack’s lawsuit was dismissed because the letter was not libelous per se; it did not accuse Sack of being a communist or of having communist beliefs. Sack v. New York Times Co., 59 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (App. Div. 1946). In the 1940s, even some of the most strident anti-Bolshevik refugees were defending aspects of the Soviet regime. See PIPES, STRUVE: LIBERAL ON THE RIGHT, supra note 59, at 440 (noting that even Struve “viewed the Red Army as a national army and Soviet victories as victories of the Russian nation”). Thus, Sack was not alone in being both anti-communist and advocating support for the plight of the Russian nation.

69. Alexander Sack, Statement at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Committee Meeting 3 (Dec. 30, 1942) (transcript on file with authors).

70. Complainant’s Statement, In the Matter of Professor Alexander N. Sack, Complainant, Before the Am. Assoc. of Univ. Professors and the Assoc. of Am. Law Schools ¶¶ 1, 9 (Dec. 1943) (on file with authors); see also Letter from Eustace Seligman to Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Esq. (Jan. 25, 1943) (“[Professor Sack] had been naturally greatly disturbed at being accused in the Weaver article [printed by the Times] of entertaining communist views when, in fact, he was a refugee from the communists....”) (on file with authors).

71. See infra text accompanying notes 93–97.

72. Questionnaire and Statement of Applicant, supra note 41, at question 13.
was not as an academic émigré from Paris spouting radical ideas. He came to the attention of American lawyers because of his helpful testimony on behalf of a large insurance company. Not exactly the building blocks for a radical legend.

Thus, far from being a revolutionary hero, Sack strongly opposed the Bolsheviks, and their rise to power caused him to leave Russia to make a career for himself elsewhere. In 1918, when Sack prepared his manuscript that overtly condemned “lawless” Bolshevik policy, he was formulating and articulating principles of law that he consistently promoted throughout his career. Perhaps Sack hoped that one of the other factions in the civil war would ultimately wrest control of Russia from the Bolsheviks, and that Restructuring would put him in a good position for a ministerial position in a more law-abiding government. Unfortunately for him, Sack backed the wrong group; having been censored for strongly opposing the Bolshevik position on public finance and sovereign debt, Sack would have realized, at the end of the civil war, that he had no future in communist Russia.

B. An American Professor of Law Teaching in New York, Whose Scholarship Was Consistently and Uncompromisingly Pro-creditor

Sack’s reputation as a Russian professor of law teaching in Paris, while technically true, is an oversimplification. Sack taught for eight years on Russian and French law faculties, but he also spent thirteen years teaching in the United States.73 And while Sack was born and educated in Russia, he left Russia in 1922, never to return, and immediately became an Estonian citizen. He became an American citizen in 1936, shortly after emigrating.74 Going by the numbers alone, it would be as accurate—if less romantic—to describe Sack as an American professor of law who taught in New York rather than a Russian professor of law who taught in Paris. But neither description accounts for the complexities of Sack’s background, citizenship, and peripatetic career.

The further questions raised by the Parisian myth are less easily answered. There is no evidence that Sack wanted or attempted to extend his stay in Paris; in any event, he did not go out of his way to court popular favor in France by presenting himself as strongly in favor of the

73. Sack was a “privatdotsent” at Petrograd University for four years, taught in Paris for four years and in the Hague for one. He taught at Northwestern University for two years and New York University for eleven.
74. Archival material from Bekmeteff and Freedman Home (on file with authors).
strict rule of state succession. Sack would not have needed to compromise his theories of state succession and odious debt to do so; his early and late writings confirm that he adhered to a strict interpretation of state succession and that he viewed the Bolshevik repudiation of the debt as illegal. But, one of the puzzles about Sack is why, in Les Effets, he never clearly states his views on the Soviet repudiation. Twice in Les Effets Sack promises to discuss the Soviet repudiation in greater depth in the “Annexes” to the book. The “Annexes” may have referred to Sack’s planned second volume of Les Effets, which he never wrote. In any event, in his magnum opus, published in Paris and largely sponsored by a French university, Sack never overtly articulates a stance on the repudiation. Unlike the hostile reception that his anti-repudiation stance received in Russia, Sack could hardly have found a more receptive audience for his position than in 1920s France.

Reading Les Effets, it is possible to infer that Sack disapproved of the Soviet repudiation. For example, his (incomplete) discussion of the tsarist debts is located in the section of Les Effets that discusses political transformations, where Sack reiterates the “unanimously established” doctrine that the new state (i.e., the Bolsheviks’) must assume the debts of the old (i.e., the Tsar’s). This choice of location suggests that Sack viewed the Russian revolution as a political transformation that did not justify the repudiation of debts as odious. But, by failing to fully discuss the Soviet repudiation and declining to pronounce his opinion on the

75. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at 52 (“Sur la répudiation des dettes russes par les Soviets, v. Annexes.”). Sack hints at his disapproval of the Soviet repudiation in a later chapter of Les Effets, in which he discusses the legal effect of treaties between debtor states concerning the debt of the prior government. Sack posits the rule that treaties that annul the obligation among debtor states are “null and void” from the point of view of the creditors of those states. Sack then describes extensively the treaties between the Bolsheviks and various states that broke apart from the former Russian Empire—the Baltic states, for example—in which the Bolsheviks liberated the former Russian territories from any debts owed the Soviet government as a result of debts incurred by the Tsar. Sack notes the “casualness” (desinvolture) with which the Bolsheviks took this step, commenting that it was caused by the Bolsheviks’ utter lack of intent to pay any part of the tsarist debt. Sack concludes this discussion with another (unfulfilled) promise to discuss the Soviet repudiation in the “Annexes.” Id. at 245 (“[A]u sujet de la répudiation de la dette russe par les Soviets, v. Annexes.”). The unwritten conclusion of this chapter, however, is that the various treaties between the Soviets and the former territories of the Russian Empire are legally irrelevant as concerns the claims of the creditors against those states.

76. Id. at xiv (noting that the planned second volume will include a special case study of the Russian debt). Sack’s 1938 article on foreign diplomatic claims against the Soviets contains much of the historical information that he may have planned to include in this second volume or the “Annexes.” See generally Sack, Diplomatic Claims, supra note 22; Sack, Diplomatic Claims (continuation), supra note 33.

77. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at 46, 52.
matter, Sack leaves open the possibility that Russia’s final transformation into a communist state after the civil war may have been something other than political—i.e., a state succession.

Sack does not include any reference to the Soviet repudiation in his chapters on odious debts, perhaps because he considered the transformation political rather than a state succession. But he does discuss a mistaken instance of odious debt forgiveness in this section. In the Treaty of Versailles, newly independent Poland was not required to pay debts attributable to the German and Prussian efforts to colonize areas of Poland. Sack opined that the Treaty wrongly treated all such debts as odious to Poland and that some of the debts should have been partitioned among the various ceding territories. Sack also disapproved of section 255 of the Treaty of Versailles, which exempted France from paying German debts attributable to the territories of Alsace and Lorraine because Germany had refused to pay France for any such debts when it annexed those territories in 1871. In *Les Effets*, Sack criticized France for repeating the wrong perpetrated by Germany, which “astonished” one French reviewer of the book.

If Sack was willing to criticize mistaken instances of odious debt forgiveness, why was he not willing to criticize a wrongful claim of odious debt repudiation?

While it is impossible to know why Sack did not write more forcefully about the Soviet repudiation in *Les Effets*, his coyness on the subject is part of a recurring pattern in his life: his uncompromising approach to matters concerning him and his scholarship, and an uncanny ability to anger the people who might have been able to help him. Sack’s dispute with NYU provides a case in point. Erwin Griswold represented Sack *pro bono* in his hearing before the AALS. Correspondence reveals that their relationship broke down badly in the summer of 1944, over Sack’s inability to compromise. The AALS had issued a tentative report that, in Griswold’s opinion, “clearly and overwhelmingly” favored Sack and made a “real contribution to the cause of academic freedom.” Instead of reacting with elation to the report (as Griswold did), Sack reacted with fury at “inaccurate and baseless statements” in

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78. *Id.* at 160.

79. *Id.* at 149 (“Si l’Allemagne, en 1871, a commis une injustice, ce n’est pas une raison pour que la France en fasse autant en 1919.”).


81. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Alexander N. Sack (Aug. 5, 1944) (on file with authors).
the report. Over Griswold’s objections, Sack submitted a 102 page document of errata and requested changes to the AALS committee, jeopardizing his good favor with the committee and his negotiating position with NYU. Griswold bemoaned Sack’s almost fanatical attention to the minutiae of the report, pointing out that Sack “cannot expect [the committee] to decide everything [his] way.” In later letters, and in his inimitably frank style, Griswold criticized Sack for his inability to “take advice” and for his selfish and “completely rigid” approach to the NYU matter. According to Griswold, Sack was “the most serious obstacle to the success” of Griswold’s effort to help him, and the type of man who “continuously adds to his own difficulties.”

Griswold was not the only member of the legal academy whose good will Sack squandered. Sack seems to have had little sense of tact or of the smallness and insularity of the academic world. For example, Sack wrote a letter in response to Thomas Baty’s review of Les Effets, asserting that Baty “thoroughly misrepresent[ed]” his ideas. Baty wrote a defense of himself, and the complete, unpleasant exchange was published in the Yale Law Journal. Sack’s review of Ernest Feilchenfeld’s Public Debts can best be described as nitpicky and mean, and so full of parenthetical punctuation marks (?)(!) as to be almost unreadable in places. Finally, instead of garnering support among the law faculty at

82. Id.
83. Alexander Sack, Memorandum of Requests for Corrections of and Additions to the Tentative Report of the Committee (submitted to the AALS Committee, 1944) (on file with authors). The committee’s final report was slightly less favorable to Sack, and Sack was not able to conclude a settlement with NYU until 1946. Agreement between Professor Alexander N. Sack and New York University (June 18, 1946) (on file with authors).
84. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Alexander N. Sack (Aug. 5, 1944) (on file with authors). Thomas Baty, in his 1927 review of Les Effets, makes note of—and pokes a bit of fun at—Sack’s overconfidence in the absolute correctness of his positions: “‘I wish,’ said Monckton Milnes once, ‘that I was as cocksure about anything as Macaulay is about everything.’ Professor Sack seldom leaves his readers in doubt as to what they are to believe.” Thomas Baty, Book Review, 37 Yale L.J. 273, 273 (1927).
85. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Alexander N. Sack (Feb. 27, 1945) (on file with authors).
86. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Alexander N. Sack (Sept. 11, 1945) (on file with authors).
89. Alexander Sack, Book Review, 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 608, 620–21 (1932) (reviewing Public Debits and State Succession). Sack and Feilchenfeld had many things in common. Feilchenfeld was a German Jewish scholar who fled Germany before World War II and took refuge in the United States. Sack and Feilchenfeld may have encountered each other in Berlin in the 1920s. From the 1921 introduction to Sack’s Razverstka, we know that Sack was in Berlin in
NYU during his employment dispute, Sack managed to alienate all of it, for example, by accusing one professor of doctoring the transcript of the university hearing90 and by suggesting that the school should lower the salaries of all full-time faculty proportionally rather than dropping his entirely.91 In a remarkable letter submitted to the AALS, the entire full- and part-time faculty at the NYU law school (excluding the faculty directly involved in the dispute) supported the school in dropping Sack, and indicated that they preferred not “to continue association with [him] in view of his groundless and reckless charges against those who have befriended him.”92 Regardless of his scholarship and teaching abilities, Sack would have been treated as a pariah in academic legal circles after the events of the 1940s.

The question still remains, however, why Sack, with his uncompromising character, would not have strongly asserted his disapproval of the Bolshevik repudiation in Les Effets. It seems unlikely that he was hoping not to burn his bridges in Russia, as they had already been burned, or that he was reluctant to alienate a group of Bolshevik apologists in France, as he seemed to possess a talent for alienating groups of intellectuals. We do not have enough information to speculate as to his motivations. But Sack’s stinginess in supporting the popular French condemnation of the repudiation was perhaps one more manifestation of his knack for estranging people who might otherwise have helped him.

91. Id. ¶¶ 4, 61.
92. Id. ¶ 74.
C. Not the Pre-eminent Scholar on Public Debts and State Succession, nor an Eminent Scholar of Public International Law, but Perhaps the First To Use the Term “Odious Debts” in the Sovereign Debt Context

To determine whether Sack was the preeminent scholar on public debts and state succession of his day, and an éminence grise of the international law community, we examined his background and training, the contemporary reviews of his book, and the way he was discussed and treated by other legal scholars. We also examined the sources of his odious debts doctrine to determine whether Sack viewed the doctrine as a restatement of existing law or as a new construct.

Sack, at the time he published *Les Effets*, was known (if at all) as a scholar of Russian banking and financial law rather than a scholar of sovereign debt or international law. He was not the preeminent scholar of sovereign debt before publishing *Les Effets*. Rather, the book was his effort to *become* the preeminent scholar of sovereign debt, but not a preeminent scholar of public international law. *Les Effets* was an effort to develop a new and controversial area of law—international financial law—that he envisioned as a hybrid, fitting neither within the field of public international law nor the field of domestic law. Sack believed this new species of law would better serve the needs of private creditors owed money by state debtors than public international law.

Contemporary evidence shows that Sack was not generally regarded as a scholar of international law by his peers, or as a preeminent scholar in any field. At the time of publication, *Les Effets* was widely reviewed and uniformly praised for its meticulous scholarship, the unprecedented scope of its collection of primary sources, and its usefulness for future writers in the area. But its central proposal—to create an international law of finance—was not well received, and the doctrine of odious debts was either overlooked by reviewers or criticized by those who noticed it.

While Sack continued to write and consult on the topic of sovereign debt throughout his career, he never published the second planned volume of *Les Effets*, and his later scholarship focused on topics such as

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93. Sack published a collection of lectures based on *Les Effets*, *La Succession aux Dettes Publiques D’Etat*, supra note 48, but he did not produce the volume he ambitiously outlined in the introduction to *Les Effets*. SACK, *LES EFFETS*, supra note 4, at xiv (stating that the proposed second volume would address state financial obligations arising from contracts of all sorts, pensions, paper money, etc.).
conflicts of law, international taxation, and aviation law. And during World War II, when NYU needed to cut costs, Sack was the first full-time professor to be dropped—an unlikely fate for an eminent (or pre-eminent) scholar.

1. Sack’s Background and Training

Sack’s educational, research, and employment background indicate that, in 1927, he was not an international law scholar—that is, someone who focused his study on the laws governing the interactions of states with each other. He was interested in the domestic (Russian) laws governing finance, and specifically, public finance, which includes the study of how states raise capital (e.g., taxation versus debt financing).

Sack trained not only in law but also in economics, and his interest in public debts was probably an outgrowth of that training. His early files contain detailed charts of Russian public debts going back decades prior to the Tsar’s abdication and a study of the public finances of the British Raj. He also studied and wrote about the provisions of bond indentures for Russian railroad bonds, many of which were backed by guarantees from the tsarist government. But we found no files indicating an early interest in public international law (i.e., clippings about diplomatic actions prior to 1917).

Sack’s early employment similarly shows his interest in public finance. He worked on two economic committees for the provisional government that followed the Tsar and in 1918 may have attended meetings between the Soviet and newly independent Estonian governments when they met to negotiate the fate of the tsarist debt attributable to Estonian territory. Sack compiled numerous files of paper clippings about the negotiations over the apportionment (and the Soviet’s ultimate forgiveness) of the debt—the first evidence we found of his interest in an international negotiation about sovereign debt. After leaving Russia, Sack


95. See infra text accompanying notes 153–54.


worked for the Estonian government, where he advised and wrote about the impact of currency fluctuations on public finance.99

Sack’s expertise in Russian financial law helped secure his entry into the U.S. legal community. In 1929, Sack appeared as an expert witness for Equitable Life Assurance, which was then defending against claims on its pre-revolutionary insurance contracts. After taking control in 1917, the Bolsheviks shut down a number of foreign companies, including Equitable Life, seizing what assets they could.100 Equitable and other companies like New York Life stopped paying on claims from Russian contracts.101 Claimants sued the parent company both in London and New York.102 Sack provided expert testimony on whether the insurance company was obligated to compensate the insureds (or more likely, their descendants) who presumably had fled the Soviet regime. He opined that the insureds had no claim; that when Equitable was forced to leave the Soviet Union, Equitable’s obligations were extinguished and the Soviet government inherited its obligations.103 Sack appeared on behalf of Equitable in London, and subsequently in New York, and it was through this work that he gained the admiration of lawyers such as John W. Davis, who later sponsored his admission to the New York Bar.104

Thus, when he published Les Effets in 1927, Sack was a relative newcomer to the field of sovereign debt scholarship, having written more on topics related to banking, finance, and currency. According to the bibliography in Les Effets, Sack had published four works relating to public

99. ALEXANDER N. SACK, CURRENCY REFORM IN THE BALTIC STATES (1924) (in German); ALEXANDER N. SACK, FIXING THE VALUE OF MONEY (1925).
101. See Rubles for Rudkowsky, supra note 100; To Force Regulation?, supra note 100.
104. Letter from John W. Davis to Clerk of the Appellate Division (Sept. 23, 1937) (on file with authors). Davis, the Davis in Davis Polk & Wardwell, a former U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Solicitor General of the United States, and the Democratic nominee for President in 1924, was a legendary conservative lawyer who argued in favor of “separate but equal” in Brown v. Board of Education. See WILLIAM H. HARBAUGH, LAWYER’S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS (1973); Jerold S. Auerbach, Book Review, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1100 (1974).
In the Introduction to *Les Effets*, Sack explains that the recent events in Russian history had sparked his initial interest in public debt: the Russian revolution of 1917 caused him to examine the effects of a *political* transformation of a state on its national debt, and the declaration of the independence of Poland caused him to examine the effects of a *territorial* transformation. His interest grew in the succeeding years, with the Bolshevik “coup d’État,” the 1918 repudiation of the tsarist debts, and various post-war treaties—particularly the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Berlin in 1918, and with the Baltic states in 1920–21. But the Introduction also confirms that Sack did not approach the topic from the point of view of public international law.  

2. A Preeminent Scholar of International Financial Law, Not Public International Law

In the Introduction to *Les Effets*, Sack explains that he perceived a gap in the field of international law on the subject of state succession and debts, and that his project for the book was to fill this gap. But rather than approaching the project as an international lawyer, Sack proposes to locate his rules on state succession within a new field called “international financial law.” Sack believed that international law governed only the relations among states; relationships between states and private creditors—specifically, private creditors who were citizens of a debtor state—were governed by private international law.  

105. Sack’s works on public debt included an article on the law of Russian railway bonds, a book on state bankruptcy, *Razverstka*, which addressed the partition of debts after the dissolution of a debtor state, and an article on the distribution of the debts of the Austro-Hungarian empire. SACK, *LES EFFETS*, supra note 4, at bibliography page:  


106. See SACK, *LES EFFETS*, supra note 4, at introduction.

107. See, e.g., FEILCHENFELD, *supra* note 13, at 591–99 (criticizing the concept of international financial law); Clyde Eagleton, Book Review, 46 POL. SCI. Q. 615, 616 (1931) (reviewing FEILCHENFELD, *PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESION*) (describing Sack’s theory as “international financial law” and noting that Feilchenfeld’s “wide disagreement with the other important current work on the subject, by Sack”); N. Politis, Preface to SACK, *LES EFFETS*, supra note 4, at 1, V (noting that Sack has made a remarkable contribution to the study of a new branch of law that people have rightly called international financial law) (“L’ouvrage de M. SACK marquera, dans l’évolution du droit international, une date pour avoir fait cette démonstration au sujet d’un des aspects du crédit public et apporté une remarquable contribution à l’étude de la nouvelle branche du droit des gens qui a été justement appelée le droit financier international.”).
of other states—were out of its ambit. Domestic financial law, which is specific to each country, was also inadequate to address issues arising between public debtors and private creditors. Given the absence of law to govern this important set of relationships, Sack’s innovation was to propose a new species of private law—essentially, private contract law\textsuperscript{108}—that would view states as private actors when they borrowed from foreign citizens on the international debt market. Sack described his proposed area of law as “sui generis” and envisaged it as having universal reach (“super-étatique”).\textsuperscript{109}

Sack was prescient because this is indeed the way in which the law governing state debts to foreign bondholders has evolved.\textsuperscript{110} Starting in the 1970s, and following the passage of sovereign immunities statutes in a variety of jurisdictions, the borrowing of sovereigns from private creditors has become a species of domestic law—namely, the domestic law chosen by the parties to the contracts. Perhaps not anticipating that states would ever be willing to waive their immunity to suit in another sovereign’s domestic courts, Sack proposed that a separate body of private law be created to deal with states’ relationships with private creditors.

Thus it was clear to Sack that he was not “doing” international law in \textit{Les Effets}, and it also was clear to the contemporary reviewers of his book, of which there were many. \textit{Les Effets} was reviewed in legal and financial reviews, in several different languages, and by some of the most prominent scholars in international law.\textsuperscript{111} The reviews almost uniformly praise Sack’s effort to document the topic of sovereign debt and state succession. George Grafton Wilson, reviewing in the \textit{American Journal of International Law}, writes that “students of international fi-


\textsuperscript{109} Id. at xi, 84–88 (“Je crois pouvoir affirmer que la succession des dettes d’État est une institution de droit sui generis qui ne ressortit pas au droit international public, mais au droit public général. Sur ce point, mes conclusions concordent avec celles de A. RIVIER, E. NYS, F. LISZT, en partie avec celles de F. HOLTZENDORF”).

\textsuperscript{110} D.P. O’Connell, \textit{State Succession and the Theory of the State}, in \textit{Grofian Society Papers} 23, 66–67 (C.H. Alexandrowicz ed., 1972) (acknowledging that Sack’s “highly original” work was the “imaginative precursor of the contemporary school of international lawyers which is attempting to subject international financial transactions to the governance of general principles of law mediating between public…and private international law”).

\textsuperscript{111} We have access to what we think were likely all of the reviews of Sack’s book at the time because Sack himself kept a detailed list of the reviews, with complimentary excerpts from each of the reviews. He sent such a list to Dean Leon Green when seeking employment at Northwestern University in 1929, to the Guggenheim Foundation when applying for a grant in 1936, to Erwin Griswold when preparing for the hearing before the AALS, and to the Andrew Freedman Home in 1953.
nance and of international law [are] under great obligations to the author, who has assembled such a wealth of material in such an admirable form.”\(^{112}\) In his 1931 treatise, Ernst Feilchenfeld also praises the work as “perhaps the most profound treatise ever written on the subject” and “unrivaled in its careful analysis of the details.”\(^{113}\) But not one of the reviews describe Sack as the preeminent scholar in the area; rather, they view the work as establishing Sack as a scholar of note in this area.\(^{114}\)

Some prominent reviewers in the positivist tradition of international law reject Sack’s legal assertions outright. Phillip Jessup comments dryly that “in spite of the wealth of material which Mr. Sack presents, it is almost impossible to discover a rule of international law.”\(^{115}\) Hersch Lauterpacht mocks the notion of a set of rights that belonged neither to public international law nor to domestic law: “Where then does it belong? [Sack’s] answer is: It is a right sui generis based on ‘droit financier’ and ‘droit public général,’ whatever that may be.”\(^{116}\) Lauterpacht comments that Sack mistakenly views international law through too narrow a lens; international law, while primarily concerned with the relations among states, also deals with a variety of state-individual relations (one state’s relations with the diplomats of another state being an exam-

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\(^{112}\) George Grafton Wilson, Book Review, 22 AM. J. INT’L L. 479 (1928) (reviewing LES EFFETS); see also Baty, supra note 84, at 275 (writing that the book “is most carefully, scientifically and elaborately planned, and the amount of research and thought expended on it must have been enormous”); Ch. R., Book Review, 34 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 841, 842 (1927) (reviewing LES EFFETS) (“Par son érudition, par la richesse de sa documentation, par la profondeur et l’ingéniosité de ses aperçus, il marque une date dans l’étude du Droit des gens.”). Along similar lines, Nicholas Politis, in the Preface to LES EFFETS, calls Sack a “Benedictine layman,” patiently finding and parsing the evidence of 150 years of state practice. N. Politis, Preface to SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at II (“Avec la patience d’un bénédictin laïque et le discernement d’un savant averti, il a suivi de très près la longue liste des traités d’annexion et de règlement de dettes conclus depuis 150 ans et analysé une à une leurs clauses; il a recherché la manière dont elles ont été appliquées, les mesures législatives, administratives et judiciaires auxquelles elles ont donné lieu; il a recueilli et classé l’opinion de tous les auteurs qui ont écrit sur la matière.”).

\(^{113}\) FEILCHENFELD, supra note 13, at 575.

\(^{114}\) See, e.g., N. Politis, Preface to SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at V (“L’ouvrage de M. SACK marquera, dans l’évolution du droit international,…et apporté une remarquable contribution à l’étude de la nouvelle branche du droit des gens qui a été justement appelée le droit financier international.”) (“Mr. Sack’s work marks a date in the evolution of international law…and makes a remarkable contribution to the study of the new area of law appropriately called international financial law.”).


ple). Thomas Baty criticizes Sack for “importing wholesale into the simple and austere law of nations the ideas and conceptions of private law.” For these three members of the international law community, Sack’s book was a useful resource for examples of treaties and national practice, but it would not be ranked among the works of a great publicist. Sack’s work was more positively received by reviewers in financial or economic journals, who were (by discipline or nationality) less unsettled by Sack’s hybridization of international and domestic law. Barbara Wootton, an economist at the University of London, praises Sack’s effort to create a comprehensive “code” establishing the distribution of debt among various components of a former state and the limits of creditors’ and debtors’ rights in a large variety of possible situations. But Wootton criticizes Sack for abandoning the systems of sanctions provided by the law of nations without supplying a new system to enforce his code. French legal reviewers were also receptive to Sack’s “constructive” efforts to propose a new code of law, one stating that this kind of scholarship gives practical effect to the field of international law, which had previously existed more as a form of literature than law.

As a work of scholarship, Les Effets had only a slight impact on the field of public international law before the late 1990s, probably because Sack’s idea of international financial law was too radical for its time. Feilchenfeld, writing on the same topic four years later, ac-

117. Id. at 166.
118. Baty, supra note 84, at 274.
119. See also Wilson, supra note 112, at 479 (“The reader of this work of Professor Sack may find much with which he feels inclined to disagree.”); Louis Trotobas, Book Review, 3 L’ANNEE POLITIQUE FRANÇAISE ET ÉTRANGÈRE 367, 368 (1928) (reviewing LES EFFETS) (questioning why Sack would abandon international law rather than trying to reform it and make it more responsive to the interests of private creditors); Ch. R., supra note 112, at 842 (expressing hesitation at the enormous potential of Sack’s proposed “super-state” law).
120. Barbara Wootton, Book Review, 38 ECON. J. 95, 95–96 (1927) (reviewing LES EFFETS).
121. Id. at 96.
122. Book Review, REVUE DE DROIT BANCAIRE 333 (1927) (reviewing LES EFFETS) (“L’ouvrage est le type des travaux à faire pour que le droit international cesse d’être une forme de littérature et devienne une codification de pratiques réelles.”); see also Book Review, REVUE DE SCIENCE ET DE LEGISLATION FINANCIÈRES (1927) (reviewing LES EFFETS) (probably written by Gaston Jèze); Book Review, 7 RECUEIL DES DECISIONS TRIBUNAUX ARBITRAUX MIXTES 1010 (1928) (reviewing LES EFFETS); Baron Boris Nolde, Book Review, 54 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 838 (1927) (reviewing LES EFFETS); P. Tager, Book Review, 66 BULLETIN DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DE LÉGISLATION COMPARÉE 404 (1927) (reviewing LES EFFETS); SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at xii (describing his project as “essentiellement constructive”).
cuses Sack of being “misleading” as to the “existence and non-existence” of certain legal protections:

[Sack] does not…state existing rules,…and claims as rules of international financial law non-existing and controversial rules which have not become generally recognized in international law. These omissions and errors are not accidental, but a consequence of his attempt to base legal results on an unrecognized system of law.123

D.P. O’Connell, writing in 1972, comments that Sack failed to “attract[] sympathetic attention” to his ideas because his scheme of creating a “property relationship” between a territory and its creditors was unworkable.124

It was only after publishing Les Effets and emigrating to the United States that Sack gained expertise in the area of public international law. In 1930, James Garner, a public international law scholar, recommended Sack to be a visiting professor at Northwestern University.125 Garner was concerned that the faculty at Northwestern would assume that Sack was a public international law scholar, so he wrote Dean Leon Green on at least two occasions to emphasize that Sack was not a public international law scholar and unlikely to be able to teach that subject. Rather, Garner explains, Sack is an expert on “International Financial Law.”126 Despite his lack of experience in the subject, Sack taught the general course on international law for the two years he spent at Northwestern, and each year that he taught at NYU.

3. Inventing, Rather Than Synthesizing, the Doctrine of Odious Debt

While Sack may have been trying to invent a new code of international law in Les Effets, it is still possible that his doctrine of odious debts restates an existing state practice, and thus that modern proponents of the doctrine are justified in arguing that it is a rule of customary international law. Sack, after all, was noted for his meticulous research, and even Feilchenfeld admits that “the thorough study of international practice which [Sack] has undertaken in his book provides an extraordinary amount of valuable information for the student of international

123. Feilchenfeld, supra note 13, at 596.
125. Garner was on the faculty of the University of Illinois Law School. See Letters from James W. Garner to Dean Leon Green (Mar. 31, 1930 and Apr. 2, 1930) (on file with authors).
126. Id.
law.” But an examination of Sack’s sources for the doctrine—and the scant reviews it received—shows that Sack was not stating a rule based exclusively on state practice.

Writing in 1927 about odious debts, Sack knew of two examples of state practice that, in combination, could have provided a basis for the three requirements (consent, benefit, and creditor knowledge) of his odious debts doctrine: the United States’ position in its negotiations following the Spanish-American war in 1898, and Justice Taft’s opinion in the Tinoco arbitration in 1923.

Sack does refer to the arguments advanced by the United States in favor of Cuba’s repudiation of Spanish debt following the Spanish-American War as support for his doctrine of odious debts. In that negotiation, Cuba sought to repudiate debt contracted by Spain and secured by Cuban revenue streams. The United States argued, in part, that the debts were invalid for moral reasons because they were “‘imposed upon the people of Cuba without their consent and by force of arms,’” and “‘contracted by Spain for national purposes, which in some cases were alien and in others actually adverse to the interest of Cuba,’” such as “‘the purpose of supporting a Spanish army in Cuba.’” Thus Sack could have based his requirements of benefit and consent on the assertions of the United States.

However, the position of the United States on Cuba was not exactly state practice at the time—not even for the United States—and Sack knew as much. At most, it was an exception to the more generally accepted rule that a ceding territory becomes responsible for debts specific-

127. Feilchenfeld, supra note 13, at 596.
129. Sack, Les Effets, supra note 4, at 159 (quoting 1 J.B. Moore, History and Digest of International Arbitrations, to Which the United States Has Been a Party 358–59, 367 (1906)).
130. Historian Lou Perez and legal scholar Deborah Weissman point out that scholars of that period cannot assert with a straight face that U.S. practice was consistent with a doctrine of odious debts. In cases such as that involving Santo Domingo, the United States was front and center in arguing that all debts should be paid, regardless of their despotic roots (the despots in that case having been foisted on the people of Santo Domingo by the United States). See Louis A. Perez, Jr. & Deborah M. Weissman, Public Power and Private Purpose: Odious Debt and the Political Economy of Hegemony, 32 N.C. J. Int’l L. & Comm. Reg. 699, 710–12, 717–19 (2007).
131. Maybe, by refusing to follow existing state practice at the time, the United States was trying to alter the default rule of customary international law. But that seems implausible in light of the broader U.S. position at the time. Id.
cally attributed to the territory. Previously, in *Restructuring*, Sack had not treated the U.S.-Spain negotiation as meaningful precedent. After describing a number of cases in which debt succession did not follow territorial cession, Sack noted that: “theoreticians of international law considered the position initially taken by the Spanish as flawless from the perspective of international law.” This tells us two things. First, Sack was reporting that in 1898, the majority position in international law was set against acknowledging an odious debt defense. Second, Sack’s failure to criticize Spain and international law scholars on this point suggests that he agreed with the Spanish position.

Oddly, in the odious debt discussion in *Les Effets*, Sack does not refer to the most immediate precedent for an odious debts defense—the Tinoco arbitration involving a dispute between Costa Rica and the Royal Bank of Canada—which Sack discusses elsewhere in *Les Effets.*

Sack’s doctrine of odious debts is largely consonant with the one implicitly expressed by the arbitrator in that case, Chief Justice Taft. Taft ratified Costa Rica’s nullification of a loan contracted by the previous (Tinoco) government with the Royal Bank of Canada, on the grounds that the Bank had not acted in good faith in making the loan, which was secured by patently irregular currency for obviously irregular purposes (the personal support of the soon-to-flee dictator and payment of four years salary in advance to the dictator’s brother). The rule that Taft articulated is loosely based on common law: the loan was invalid because the debtor failed to prove that it had, in good faith, “furnish[ed]…money to the government for its legitimate use.” Rather, the Bank actually knew, or should have known, that the funds were intended for “personal and not for legitimate government purposes.” Had Sack cited to Taft, he could have based his requirements of lack of benefit and creditor awareness on Taft’s approach.

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132. SACK, RAZVESTKA, supra note 60, at 21 (trans. Anna Gelpem).
133. See SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at 2–3 (citing Tinoco’s coup as an example where the holder of power changed but the form of government did not); at 11, 15 (quoting and citing Taft’s opinion in the arbitration). Sack also does not cite to Great Britain’s 1900 decision not to honor the war debts of the South African Republic after the Anglo-Boer War, which others view as an example of the British theory of odious debts. See, e.g., Mohammed Bedjaoui, Special Rapporteur, *Ninth Report on Succession of States in Respect of Matters Other than Treaties*: *Draft Articles on Succession in Respect of State Debts, with Commentaries*, [1977] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 45, 70, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/301 and Add.1.
135. Id.
136. Id.; see also Gelpem, supra note 4, at 411.
Perhaps Sack’s omission of the Tinoco decisions was an oversight.\textsuperscript{137} But Sack’s merit, according to his reviewers, was his painstaking thoroughness and his careful attention to detail in referencing the relevant materials to whatever point he was making. Another possibility is that Sack did not view the Tinoco decision as correct because Taft specifically declined to find that there had been a state succession and not a mere change of government in the case, and state succession (i.e., territorial change) was a condition precedent for Sack’s doctrine of odious debts.\textsuperscript{138} But since Sack included the (in his view, incorrect) absolution of Poland for German colonial debt in his discussion of odious debts, it seems unlikely that he would fail to discuss Tinoco on the grounds that it was incorrectly decided.\textsuperscript{139} Another possibility is that Sack, in formulating his doctrine, was not especially concerned in grounding it in the precedents of international practice, and that he was more interested in asserting his view of what the law should be, rather than what it actually was.

Other than state practice, Sack relied on a broad array of scholars in Les Effets, many of whom had written about sovereign debt, although not in such depth as Sack. The notion that some debts—variously called hostile, war, or subjugation debts—might be invalid for reasons of equity or morality was not new to international law scholars.\textsuperscript{140} Sack’s work on odious debt appears to have synthesized the preexisting notions of hostile, war, and subjugation debts under the umbrella of odiousness, and added a more fleshed-out concept of the duty of creditors to discover the purposes to which a state puts the money it borrows. For example, Sack borrowed the idea of debts “hostile” to a territory transferred between sovereigns from Charles Cheney Hyde, who devoted several paragraphs to the idea in his 1922 text.\textsuperscript{141} Sack cites to Hyde and uses the phrase “hostile” several times in his discussion of odious debts.\textsuperscript{142}

Sack relied on another scholar, Gaston Jèze, for the phrase “debts de régime.” Jèze, a French scholar of public finance, used the phrase to de-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{137} King suggests that Sack’s failure to include the Tinoco arbitration in this section was an oversight. King, supra note 128, at n.328.
  \item \textsuperscript{138} Gelpen, supra note 4, at 411–12.
  \item \textsuperscript{139} Sack, Les Effets, supra note 4, at 160, 163–64.
  \item \textsuperscript{140} E.g., Michalowski, supra note 39, at 47 n.77 (citing to the work of the Italian scholar, Nitti, writing in 1931).
  \item \textsuperscript{141} Charles Cheney Hyde, I International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States 218 (1922) (discussion of hostile or harmful debts on pp. 209, 213–14, 216–17, 218, 223).
  \item \textsuperscript{142} See, e.g., Sack, Les Effets, supra note 4, at 157, 160, 165–68.
\end{itemize}
scribe debts incurred by one of the warring regimes during a civil war, if
the money was used to pay for the war effort and not public services.
Successor states were not legally obligated to pay “debts de régime.”
Otherwise, Jèze—who generally backed the rights of creditors—
believed that any debt incurred by a “regular” government should be
considered a state debt, regardless of the uses to which that government
put the money.143 Thus Jèze believed that, in the absence of a civil war,
a lender was not responsible for inquiring as to the uses of the money he
lent to a government. While Sack cited to Jèze for the phrase, he gave it
a significantly different meaning, defining “debts de régime” as debts
incurred by a despotic regime for the purposes of propping up its regime
or subjugating the population that fights against it.144 Sack thus blends
the ideas of hostile debts and regime debts, and he rejects Jèze’s prin-
iple that creditors, except in times of civil war, were not obligated to in-
quire into the intended purposes of the money they lend.145

143. Gaston Jèze, Cours de Science des Finances et de Législation Financière
denies the efforts of “défenseurs du bolchevisme” to justify the Soviet repudiation of the
Tsarist debt. Id. at 305. According to Jèze, the tsar’s debts were state debts because, no matter how
“execrable” the tsarist regime was, it was the “regular” government and not engaged in a civil war
at the time it contracted the debt. Jèze considered the Soviet repudiation to be unjustifiable from
both a legal and a political perspective. Id. at 304–05.

While Jèze was a proponent of the rights of creditors, he was in many regards a better friend of
the developing nations than Sack. Jèze represented Haile Selassie, the exiled Négu from Ethiopia,
in negotiations with the League of Nations regarding Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia. See Jig
Up?, TIME, July 6, 1936 (referring to Jèze as Selassie’s “wily French lawyer”). Conservative
Royalist elements in France were outraged that Jèze would represent an African against Italy, the
“Latin sister” of France, and demonstrated in Paris, provoking nationwide student strikes and riots
between liberal and conservative students. Jèze was forced to hold his lectures outside of the
university, and even then, conservative students attempted to block entrance to his classes, while
his supporters would attempt to keep them open. See, e.g., Edward A. Jones, Royalism in French
Politics, 8 PHLON (1940–1956) 53, 58–59 (1947). Jèze also, despite his supposed conservative
leanings, took the radical step of advocating increased taxation of the elites in the 1920s, when
France was facing financial crisis. See William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third
Republic 156 (1969). To the extent the modern odious debt movement needed to find a French
intellectual as their hero, maybe Jèze would have been a better candidate than Sack. And for the
Americans, there is the added attraction that Jèze was significantly influenced by both the
Federalist Papers and the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncements regarding taxation and
representation. See King, supra note 128, at 16; Apropos of Translations, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 204,
204 (1959) (noting that Jèze published his translation of the Federalist papers in 1902, the second
such translation into French, the first having been in 1792).


145. In the introduction to Les Effets, Sack acknowledges a special debt of gratitude to Jèze,
whom Sack considered the preeminent scholar in the area. Still, Sack notes that he diverges from
Jèze, particularly in trying to construct a legal system (“système juridique”) to govern the
relations between states and creditors. Sack, Les Effets, supra note 4, at xi (“Je considère que
notre problème ne saurait être régulièrement résolu si on ne l’analyse pas dans le plan des
Finally, while Sack’s use of the word “odious” to describe invalid state debts appears to have been new, the descriptor “odious” previously had been applied to immoral personal debts in an international law treatise.\textsuperscript{146} In Book III of De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius uses the word “odious” several times to describe the action of punishing or binding one person for the misdeeds or personal debts of another.\textsuperscript{147} When searching for an adjective to describe the immorality of holding a successor state responsible for the personal (because hostile) debts of the previous regime, Sack—or perhaps his translator, Mme. Schtoupak—may have relied on Grotius for using the word “odious” in that context.\textsuperscript{148}

But despite adding the term “odious” and flagging the notion of creditor awareness, Sack did not expand the doctrine of odious debts

\textsuperscript{146} Even here, it is by no means certain that Sack’s use of the term “odious” in the context of invalid state debts was new. We have found the term “odious debt” used in the early nineteenth century. For example, the populist Massachusetts lawyer, Robert Rantoul, used the term in speeches in the United States to describe the debts of the French monarchy. Rantoul was not using the term in a legal sense, but the question of whether Sack got the term from these prior discussions is raised. See The Value of the Federal Union Calculated (July 1833), in MEMOIRS, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF ROBERT RANTOUL, JR. 203 (Luther Hamilton ed., 1854), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=-IssAAAAIAAJ\&pg=PA203\&dq=odious+debt\&date:1820-1865\&as_brr=0 (using the phrase “odious debt” in an 1833 speech); see also William B. Dana, Our Financial Policy, 53 MERCHANTS’ MAG. & COMM. REV. 30, 32 (1865), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=4IkEAAAAQAAJ\&pg=RA1-PAR32\&dq=odious+debt\&date:1820-1865\&as_brr=0#PRA1-PAR32,M1 (“This...exemption will do more to make the national debt odious...”).

\textsuperscript{147} See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE Book III 1232 (Richard Tuck ed., Liberty Fund Inc. 2005) (1625) (“Seneca says, ‘If any Man lend Money to my Country, I shall not own myself his Debtor, nor take it as my own Debt, but shall willingly pay my Proportion to discharge the Debt.’[...] Hence it was particularly provided by the Roman Laws that no Peasant should be obliged for the Debts of another Peasant; and in another Place, that no one’s Possession should be distrained for the Debts of another, nor even for the Public; and in Justinian’s Novels, Reprisals, are expressly forbid; giving this Reason for it, because it is not just that one Man should be the Debtor, and another be forced to pay the Debt; where also such Exactions are called odious. And Theodorick, in Cassiodore, called it a base License, for one Man to be kept as a pledge for another.”).

The French translation of this passage of Grotius uses the word “odieuses.” HUGO GROTIUS, III LE DROIT DE LA GUERRE, ET DE LA PAIX 223 (Jean Barbeyrac trans., Basle 1746) (“[E]xécutions odieuses, comme elles sont appellées au même endroit.”).

\textsuperscript{148} Sack clearly was familiar with Grotius’ seminal treatise, as he cites to it numerous times in Les Effets. SACK, LES EFFETS, supra note 4, at 23, 31, 46, 65, 89, 90, 93.
beyond the ideas advanced by Taft, Jèze, Hyde, or the United States. At the end of his discussion of odious debts, Sack emphasizes that the defense should only be recognized in exceptional circumstances, when it is incontestable that a debt is odious—not just in the eyes of the successor government.149

Only a handful of the contemporary reviews of Sack’s work mention his doctrine of odious debts,150 suggesting that it was viewed as insignificant to Sack’s general thesis, or perhaps that it was an unexciting synthesis of the work of prior writers that bore no mention. Baty criticizes it, regarding it as a mere expedient to “save the credit” of Sack’s “startling” central thesis that public debt adheres to the territory of the state.151 Anticipating modern critics of Sack’s doctrine, Baty points out that the determination of whether a debt is odious depends on whether the government that incurred the debt was “good or bad—and that is a question which international law has always refused to answer.”152 Further, Baty notes that Sack leaves a loophole for odious governments trying to finance the suppression of a revolution: “[T]he ‘odious’ government can always cover up its tracks by mixing the ‘odious’ loans with other more agreeable ones….So the ‘odious’ financier who backs a despot has only to stipulate that the loan is partly for blackboards and test-tubes.”153 Lauterpacht comments that Sack’s treatment of the debts of unsuccessful revolutionary governments—a topic related to odious debts—is unsatisfactory, as it fails to distinguish between debts incurred for the purpose of discharging normal governmental duties, which should be honored by the successor state, and those incurred to keep the revolutionary government in power, which need not be (in effect, failing to distinguish between debts that might be considered to benefit the populace and those considered odious to the populace or the successor state).154

Finally, Feilchenfeld—who uses the term “odious debts” in his 1931 book without explanation or citation to Sack—curtly notes that the “American and English doctrines on imposed and odious debts have

149. Id. at 162–63.
150. Other than Baty and Lauterpacht, we found only two reviews that mention odious debts. Book Review, Revue de Droit Bancaire 333 (1927); Book Review, Revue de Droit International Privé 604, 605 (1928).
151. Baty, supra note 84, at 274.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Lauterpacht, supra note 116, at 165–66 (mentioning the theory of “obnoxious” debt but not commenting on it).
not...become rules of law.”¹⁵⁵ Thus, Feilchenfeld characterizes odious debts as a theory—not a rule of law—and implicitly assigns its origin to arguments advanced by America and Great Britain—not Sack.¹⁵⁶ Further, Feilchenfeld argues against the idea of excusing war debts in the case of annexation, dismissing the arguments advanced by the British after the Boer war (and by extension, Sack) as “sentimental rather than logical.”¹⁵⁷

To summarize, there are several problems with the tendency of modern scholars to rely on Sack as a source of customary international law. First, Sack did not consider himself to be an international law scholar, which is shown not only by his background, training, and academic interests, but also by the Introduction to Les Effets. Second, while Sack was, to some extent, engaged in the Anglo-American “positivist” task of international law scholarship, he was also engaged in the continental tradition of constructing and proposing new rules of international law. The third problem is that Sack was not considered by his peers to be an eminent publicist of international law.

4. A Phantom, Not a Publicist

Sack was not treated by his peers or his employers as a preeminent scholar of international law or public debts (or anything, for that matter). Had Sack been the preeminent scholar of some field, it is likely that

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¹⁵⁵. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 13, at 558. Feilchenfeld also uses the term “odious debts” in a 1928 article about German war reparations, again with no cite to Sack or anyone else. Ernst H. Feilchenfeld, Reparations and German External Loans, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 300, 310 (1928).

¹⁵⁶. Howse, while crediting Sack with originating the doctrine of Odious Debts, suggests that the American delegation negotiating with Spain in 1898 may have used the term “odious debts.” If so, then Sack and Feilchenfeld may have derived the term from this source. Howse, supra note 9, at 5, 14.

¹⁵⁷. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 13, at 719 (full discussion at 716–21). Feilchenfeld’s work on public debt, like that of Sack, turned out not to be especially influential during his lifetime. A search for Feilchenfeld in Westlaw’s “All Law Reviews, Texts & Bar Journals” database on July 1, 2007, for example, yielded no citations to Public Debts prior to 1982, but three citations to his 1942 monograph entitled THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION. Like Sack, Feilchenfeld has also enjoyed a surge of citations in the modern odious debt debate. A search for Feilchenfeld in Westlaw’s “All Law Reviews, Texts & Bar Journals” database yielded six citations to Public Debts after 1982. See also Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82 (2006).

In 1977, an important United Nations report on state succession and public debt, written originally in French, cites to Sack in discussions on the nature of state debts, whether a state acquiring a new territory also acquires its debts, and on localized debts. Bedjaoui, supra note 133, at 57, 60, 75–76, 83, nn. 26, 50–51, 127, 166. But, in its lengthy discussion of odious debts, it never cites to Sack; rather, it cites extensively to Feilchenfeld, including Feilchenfeld’s argument against the equitable reasons for excusing even war debts. Id. at 67–74.
the academy or the various academic institutions where he taught would have memorialized him in some way—as, for example, with the Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition or the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law at the University of Cambridge. Short of chairs named in his honor, there might have been conferences or lecture series, portraits of him on the walls, photographs of him surrounded by colleagues and students, and at least a few doctoral dissertations and master’s theses written under his supervision.

Sack’s resume indicates that he taught at five academic institutions: the University at Petrograd, the Academy of International Law in The Hague, the *Institute des Sciences Sociales et Politiques* and the *Ecole des Hautes Etudes Internationales* in Paris, Northwestern University in Chicago, and finally, New York University.\(^{158}\) With the exception of The Hague, where Sack taught for one year, the libraries of these institutions had no record of Sack—no dissertations or theses that he supervised, not even a photograph from an old yearbook.\(^{159}\) Needless to say, there were no buildings, chairs, lecture series, or conferences named for Sack. Forget preeminence; he was a phantom.

It is especially poignant that New York University Law School, the institution where Sack spent eleven years—eight of them as a full professor—had no record of his tenure there. Despite being a full professor, NYU dropped Sack from the faculty in 1943 as part of the law school’s cost-cutting measures during World War II. Sack engaged in a protracted and contentious dispute with the law school over the manner in which he was dropped, claiming that it was in retaliation for publishing an article in the *New York Times* urging co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The AALS eventually found that the law school had wrongfully dismissed Sack, not because of what he wrote, but because they dropped him from a tenured position.\(^{160}\) The fact remains, however, that Sack was the first full-time professor that the school deemed expendable, suggesting that he had not achieved the eminence that would cause a university to seek alternative methods (i.e., seeking grants or donations) for funding his salary.\(^{161}\) Sadly, it seems

\(^{158}\) Sack, Autobiographical Note, *supra* note 42.

\(^{159}\) The *Ecole des Hautes Etudes Internationales* had no record that Sack had ever taught there. The librarian explained that any records on him were likely lost in a flood due to a burst pipe. Telephone Interview with Denise Godard, Librarian, Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales (May 2007).

\(^{160}\) AALS Tentative Report, *supra* note 90, at 3 (basic findings V, VI, & VII).

\(^{161}\) See, e.g., Graham, *supra* note 89, at 794–99 (describing the efforts of Columbia, Chicago, and Yale to keep Rheinstein and Kessler on their faculties).
that Sack was just not important enough to the law school—or any of
the schools where he taught—for it to preserve his memory.

CONCLUSION

Sack’s life did not end happily. He was physically, emotionally, and
financially devastated by his firing from NYU. During the employment
dispute, Sack told the law school “I have always been a Professor, since
1917. I have always dreamed of continuing until my old days in this
great work of a man of science and teacher…. [F]or me, it is my whole
life.”162 He suffered a severe hearing loss in December of 1942, from
which he never quite recovered. (NYU cites the hearing loss as one of
the reasons for terminating his employment.)163 Sack worked as a spe-
cial advisor to the Justice Department from 1943 to 1946 and as a con-
sultant until about 1950. After that, he was unable to find work and his
savings ran out. In 1953, Sack and his wife, Nina, moved to the Andrew
Freedman Home, a retirement home for the “formerly wealthy,” located
on the Grand Concourse in the Bronx. He died two years later.

Sack, were he able to write his own epitaph, would no doubt say that
he was misprized, mistreated, and misunderstood in his lifetime. But he
might also protest that he has been egregiously misconstrued and mis-
characterized in the twenty-first century. From the large corpus of his
scholarly works, only a few sentences have been exhumed by modern
anti-debt activists as the legal support for a proposition—that successor
regimes may repudiate debts incurred by their distasteful predeces-
sors—that Sack in his lifetime consistently disparaged and would have
vigorously opposed today. Why has Sack been subjected to this indig-
nity?

There are two possible answers. The first has to do with international
law’s prescription that distinguished publicists are among the sources of
customary international law. In an area of law as murky as sovereign
debt, where there are few sources of state practice through the ages,
modern scholars have an incentive to search for a publicist from the
past—preferably one who articulates a view of past state practice that is

162. Transcript of Vanderbilt Hearing at 362–63, reprinted in Memorandum of Requests for
Corrections of and Additions to the Tentative Report of the Committee Submitted by the
Complainant at 96–97 (written by Sack and submitted to the AALS committee in 1944) (on file
with authors).
163. Statement of Chancellor Harry Woodburn Chase in the case of Professor Alexander N.
Sack at 2 (on file with authors); Letter from Frank H. Sommer, Dean, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law to
Chancellor Harry Woodburn Chase, Chancellor, N.Y. Univ. (Mar. 9, 1943) (on file with authors).
consistent with what the modern scholar wants. If that publicist happens
to have been long dead, European, and had some fancy title, he is even
more likely to impress modern judges. Sack presents just such a fig-
ure.164

But one of the problems with modern scholars drawing authority
from the writings of long deceased scholars, particularly ones writing in
a foreign language, is the ease with which mistakes can be made.
Somewhere along the line, there was an error in translating Sack’s re-
sume—his brief work on economic matters for the Russian government
in 1917 was translated into his having been a tsarist minister—and bet-
ter still, his doctrine of odious debts (read selectively) appeared to lean
against the interest of his tsarist background. And then there was the
fact that he had once taught at a university in Paris. Put all of this to-
gether and Sack makes a wonderful headliner for the modern odious
debts movement and the argument that the doctrine of odious debts is
part of customary international law. There is no doubt that the error and
its perpetuation were not intended to mislead. But the enthusiastic per-
petuation of the Sackian myth only occurred (and perhaps will continue
to occur) because no one had an incentive to unearth the true Sack; the
myth was too convenient.

The second answer lies in a single word: odious. Sack’s 1927 book on
state succession did not try to expand the category of state debts—war,
hostile, or subjugation debts—that might legally be disavowed by a sub-
sequent regime. Based on his sources, Sack was merely trying to restate
what those criteria were and constrain any tendency toward irrational
exuberance in their application. Other scholars of his time had written
about the topic, but none of them have attracted the attention of a curi-

164. In international law circles, there is debate over the use of the writings of “publicists” to
make arguments about what customary international law is. The concern of those who criticize
the use of writings of publicists is not the misreading of history and the misuse of historical
figures—the matter at the heart of our project—but the failure to differentiate between normative
and positive statements about the law by modern publicists. See William J. Aceves, Scholarship
as Evidence of International Law, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2003); Jack
Goldsmith, Panel Discussion: Scholars in the Construction and Critique of International Law, 94
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 317, 319 (2000). The controversy over the use of these statements of
publicists arises within the context of a larger debate over the expansion in recent years of
customary international law, particularly in the context of human rights. See Curtis A. Bradley &
Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1857 (1998); A. Mark Weisburd, American
Judges and International Law, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1475, 1507–08 (2003); Ernest A.
Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 391
(2002).
ous combination of twenty-first century neoconservatives and liberal debt relief activists. Only Sack added the winning adjective. When Sack’s text was discovered by modern scholars, the word “odious” glinted through the sediment of the passing decades, causing Sack's name, above all others, to be associated with this putative doctrine of public international law—a verbal coup that would have ensured the career of an advertising executive on Madison Avenue. “Odious” satisfies the three criteria required for a successful buzzword. First, it is highly emotive. Second, most people understand the literal meaning of the word and subliminally sense its emotive baggage. Among legal scholars, especially, it is rare to hear a word that carries such clear moral condemnation; it grabs the attention of people who are used to dealing in deliberately ambiguous and fuzzy locutions. Third, most people do not use the word in everyday speech; if we heard someone use it in ordinary conversation instead of a word like hateful, we might think her somewhat pompous. This third criterion is key; a buzzword must not be cliché, and odious is fresh and piquant. And so, when succeeding generations plucked from the turgid academic prose of the 1920s a single word—odious—they also pulled from the grave the pen, the hand, and the scholar who first associated that word with a small body of legal precedents.

Before returning Alexander Sack to his eternal rest, let us ask ourselves this question: how many obscure, pencil-pushing legal academicians of our day would not cheerfully trade places with Professor Sack? To achieve fame, to have one's name turned into an adjective, to have one’s writings posted on the Internet a century hence, to have scholars of the twenty-second century research and tell one's story, this—for law professors—is the stuff of Mephistophelean bargains. And if that fame is bought cheaply by the clever (or inadvertent) use of a single word, and if one's fate is to be misunderstood for all eternity, what matter?