I. INTRODUCTION

At a College of Europe Workshop in 2007, I was asked to elaborate on the idea that what really emerged from the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property law (“TRIPS Agreement”) in 1994 was “an incipient transnational system of innovation.” This idea was initially put forward in an article that Keith Maskus and I published in our book about the growing tendency of multilateral intellectual property negotiations to disrupt the capacity of nation states to maintain the supply of such critical public goods as education, public health, environmental safety, and scientific...
search. In the present article, I will summarize some of the main themes from our previous work and focus attention on the difficulties of nurturing a transnational system of innovation that could properly balance the needs of states at different levels of economic development.

Part I identifies some of the paradoxes that have emerged from overzealous efforts to re-regulate the global economy, in order to make it safe for investors in the production of knowledge goods, despite the long-standing drive of trade policy to deregulate that same economy in the name of free competition. Part II discusses the governance deficiencies that currently frustrate the need to balance public and private interests at the multilateral level.

Part III focuses on specific problems of maintaining the supply of knowledge as a global public good in the face of the high-protectionist ethos driving current trade policy and of the governance problems identified in Part II. Part IV concludes with a warning about the risks of succumbing to a dogmatic intellectual property ideology precisely at a moment when history beckons state actors to engage in open-minded experimentation with promising new technologies and with new legal tools to promote their development and widespread diffusion.

II. REGULATORY PARADOXES OF THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY

Let me first point out that, in an effort to promote trade in knowledge goods, we have paradoxically and energetically been re-regulating the global economy in ways that contradict the sixty-year historical mission of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). That mission was precisely to deregulate the global economy in the interest of free competition.

I find it disconcerting that “free traders” acquiesce so readily in this process of re-regulation, without critically examining the premise that ever-expanding intellectual property rights must enhance global economic welfare. One high-level governmental study, and many reputable intellectual property scholars, have ques-

4. See generally INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3.

When the GATT was adopted, the prevailing norm at the international level was that intellectual property rights represented islands of protection in a sea of free competition. Those islands were largely left to the domestic laws, which, however, were subject to norms of reasonableness and necessity under Article XX(d) of the GATT 1947.\footnote{See GATT 1994, supra note 6, at art. XX(d), carrying forward original article XX(d) in GATT 1947.} This provision expressly ordained that domestic intellectual property laws should not become disguised barriers to trade.\footnote{See GATT 1994, supra note 6, at art. XX, chapeau clause, disallowing measures that constitute “a disguised restriction on international trade” (carrying forward same language from GATT 1947).}

In contrast, when one reviews the massive amounts of intellectual property legislation that characterize the post-TRIPS model at every level, it seems more accurate to speak of islands of competition in a sea of legal monopolies. It is at best unclear who represents the larger public interest\footnote{For a discussion of the ambiguities inherent in the term “public interest,” see Dreier, supra note 9, who correctly observes that IPRs are given birth as an expression of the public interest in creativity and innovation. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3, did not equate the larger public interest with consumer access to knowledge or knowledge goods as such, although it is one component of a broader equation. Nor do we equate the broader public interest with “the sum total of private interests.” That, indeed, is why we chose to focus on the “privatization of global public goods.”} in negotiating forums dominated by powerful multinational firms that behave increasingly like a
“knowledge cartel.”13 This process has been dramatically evidenced in the recent Free Trade Negotiations, where the United States Trade Representative (USTR) directly espouses the interests of the pharmaceutical and entertainment industries, among others, in securing provisions that sometimes exceed what is permitted by congressionally enacted U.S. laws.14

Yet, there is reason to fear that the members of this “knowledge cartel” are more interested in “lock[ing] in temporary competitive advantages” from existing innovation than in formulating measures that would advance “the global public interest in [future] innovation, competition, or the provision of complementary public goods.”15 This one-sided drive to re-regulate the global economy thus produces distortions to trade that can impede worldwide economic growth in the long term.

For example, re-regulation can disrupt the transfer of technology under market conditions by allowing dominant firms to refuse to deal with would-be competitors in developing countries or to demand such increased rent extraction for up-to-date technology (based on immunities from reverse-engineering under TRIPS) that the welfare gains from technology installation are lost. Moreover, the same intellectual property standards that impede reverse-engineering also hinder local manufacturers’ efforts to add value and improvements to the existing technological base.16

“Without a legitimizing governance process that adequately represents all stakeholders,” Maskus and I fear that a re-regulated global market will “reflect dubious practices in developed markets for knowledge goods that may actually hamper both innovation and competition in the long run.”17 There is a “further risk that an over-regulated market for knowledge goods could compromise the

13. Id. at 19. See also John. Barton, Integrating IPR Policies in Development Strategies, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE (C. Bellman et al., eds., 2003) (stressing difficulties of entry into markets “dominated by multinational oligopolies” that are “compounded by the international IP system”).
15. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 19.
ability of nation states to supply other public goods that only they can provide in a decentralized world economy.”

Beyond the potential negative effects on innovation, the drive for ever stronger international IP standards is also disrupting the provision of other key public goods that are essential components of global public welfare, such as education, public health, environmental protection, food, security, scientific research, and competition. Increasingly, the knowledge inputs needed to promote these public goods are subject to exclusive property rights, and they are made available at high prices or on terms and conditions that render it difficult for ministries to provide essential public goods at the national level. Yet, these ministries were usually not represented at the negotiating forums where international intellectual property standards were set; and in these forums, there has been little regard to the impacts of intellectual property rights on the provisions of global public goods generally.

III. BALANCING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS IN AN INCIPIENT TRANSNATIONAL SYSTEM OF INNOVATION

Maskus and I concede that an “incipient transnational system of innovation” could enable successful innovators in all countries—developed or developing—to reach an integrated world market. If one believes that carefully calibrated intellectual property rights provide needed incentives to invest in risky forms of innovation, the public benefits likely to accrue from scientific and technological progress under such a worldwide


20. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 33-35 (stressing that “[a]ll countries could benefit from a functionally efficient transnational system of innovation if low barriers to entry enabled entrepreneurs anywhere to invest in the production and distribution of knowledge goods.”).

logical progress under such a worldwide system are potentially incalculable.\footnote{22}{See, e.g., M. P. Ryan, \textit{Useful Knowledge and the Development Agenda Debate at WIPO}, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP), Parma, Italy, 9-11 September 2006. However, some commentators believe that many developing countries should focus on comparative advantages in agriculture and other local endowments, rather than technological innovation. See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 9.}

There are serious obstacles to achieving such progress, however. In practice, the different national and regional capabilities and endowments of WTO Members limit their absorptive capacities and reduce the potential benefits of open markets for knowledge goods. This “technological divide” is widened by the high rents that must now be paid to technology exporters and by the absence of provisions conferring differential and more favorable treatment on developing countries under the TRIPS Agreement,\footnote{23}{See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, art. 65 (Transitional Arrangements).} even though that principle had been enshrined in the GATT (1947) at the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979.\footnote{24}{See GATT (1947), supra note 6, Part IV, “Results of the Uruguay Round — Legal Texts” 533-37 (1994).} The only differential treatment under TRIPS is now reserved for Least-Developed Countries (LDCs), the poorest of the poor, whose general compliance obligations have just been extended to 2013 (in addition to further exemptions for the patenting of pharmaceutical products until 2016).\footnote{25}{See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 65-66; World Trade Organization, Ministerial, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2, 14 November 2001 [hereinafter Doha Declaration on Public Health], A7; Decision by the Council for TRIPS of 27 June 2002, Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with respect to Pharmaceutical Products Council for Trade-Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. IP/C/25, (July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Decision on the 2016 Extension]. LDCs may postpone implementation of other TRIPS obligations, including the duty to provide patent protection for products other than pharmaceuticals, until 2013. See Decision by the Council for TRIPS of 29 November 2005, Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, WTO Doc. IP/C/40 (Nov. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Decision on the 2013 Extension]. During these transition periods, LDCs must continue to respect national treatment and most-favored-nation (MFN) obligations under arts. 3-4 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2.}

Disregarding the LDCs, all other developing countries—whether they fall in the high, medium, or low income brackets—must accordingly compete in markets for knowledge goods on roughly the same normative terms and conditions that govern advanced industrialized countries. A growing number of these developing countries have demonstrated considerable capacity in some technological fields, and some are beginning to challenge the technological supremacy of the OECD countries.\footnote{26}{See, e.g., J. Straus, \textit{The Impact of GATT and TRIPS on Economic Development},} Nevertheless, all of
them are struggling to cope with the enormous challenges and burdens, including financial burdens, thrust upon them by a universal set of relatively high intellectual property standards.  

These burdens and challenges affect even those developing countries that are not actively engaged in the production of knowledge goods. Such countries must nonetheless organize and maintain the defense of foreign intellectual property owners, with serious repercussions for their internal ability to meet, say, public education and public health goals at prices their general populations can afford.  

In other words, even developing countries that opt out of the world’s innovation “tournaments” must engage in burdensome efforts to cope with the social costs of world intellectual property norms, including the distributional inequities that poverty greatly magnifies. They must cope, with varying degrees of success, with the so-called “flexibilities” built into the TRIPS Agreement itself, which could, if mastered, potentially lower those same social costs. Increasingly, developing countries must also deal with official and unofficial pressures and threats to provide higher TRIPS-plus levels of intellectual property protection, which may become embodied in bilateral or regional Free Trade Agreements.

When, instead, developing countries opt into the production of knowledge goods for local consumption or export purposes, they face an even more complex and burdensome “balancing act.” On the one hand, they must internalize universal IP norms in ways that stimulate relevant industrial sectors having innovative poten-
tial without, however, legally discriminating against foreign competitors. The national treatment principle of the TRIPS Agreement—\(^{31}\) which the WTO Appellate Body has deemed a cardinal premise of the worldwide intellectual property system—\(^{32}\) thus reinforces the lack of “differential and more favorable treatment” in that same Agreement.

This formidable challenge is then made considerably more difficult by the countervailing welfare goals these countries must also meet, for political reasons, among others, with respect to, say, public health and public education. Here, in short, even economically dynamic developing countries must resolve tensions between calibrating TRIPS-compliant domestic IP norms to stimulate innovation and adjusting the same set of norms to provide access to knowledge and medicines on affordable terms and conditions.\(^{33}\) These efforts are reflected, for example, in India’s new patent law, where efforts to stimulate the research-based pharmaceutical sector increasingly conflict with efforts to preserve the well-developed capacity of local producers to supply low-cost generic drugs to both domestic and foreign consumers.\(^{34}\)

More generally, the TRIPS Agreement has thus obliged developing countries to engage in a delicate balancing act between stimulating the production of private knowledge goods, when feasible, and maintaining the supply of essential public goods.\(^{35}\) Public international law, however, affords them little guidance in choosing normative and practical tools for achieving this balance. Rather, the relentless drive to privatize knowledge goods, which has picked up even more steam in bilateral and regional FTAs since TRIPS (despite implicit promises to the contrary during the Uruguay Round), has been accompanied by no comparable collective action at the intergovernmental level to preserve and coordinate the supply of global public goods. This governance gap persists despite a growing clamor for such initiatives by NGOs en-

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31. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 3 & 4.


35. For deep conceptual issues, see Peter Drahos, The Regulation of Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3, at 46-64.
gaged in “regime shifting” tactics and by the so-called “Friends of Development,” who have sought to prod the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in new, more development-friendly directions.

Indeed, we have no trusted governance mechanism for balancing public and private interests in this emerging transnational system of innovation at all. We lack clear theoretical premises or empirical evidence to determine which intellectual property standards would best promote diverse goals over time. We have generated few ideas, and little discussion about how to maintain the supply of other global public goods — including knowledge itself — under a supra-national intellectual property regime. And we have not even begun to acknowledge the need to deal with adverse distributional impacts, especially on the poor, that even the most carefully balanced intellectual property regime may produce.

IV. MAINTAINING THE SUPPLY OF KNOWLEDGE AS A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD

In the rest of this article, I focus primary attention on the topic of innovation itself, and particularly its dependence on the continued upstream availability of knowledge as both a domestic and a global public good. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize winner, has written brilliantly on this general concept. Moreover, recent efforts to focus attention on both human rights and human welfare in the context of overall development goals has added new and welcome dimensions to the debate about international IPRs.

37. See infra note 52; for details, see Chon, supra note 8 at 2844-49 (citing authorities).
41. See, e.g., Gerhart, supra note 29; Chon supra note 8.
42. See generally Stiglitz, supra note 5.
Nevertheless, these approaches should not deflect attention from more specific needs to devise an economically stable innovation system potentially of benefit to all countries, even if they raise searching questions about distributive justice and larger developmental goals that cannot be ignored.

For present purposes, I wish to underscore the extent to which today's high protectionist agenda progressively tends to compromise the availability of knowledge inputs needed for future innovation by expanding the protection of contemporary outputs as if there were no tomorrow.\textsuperscript{44} This short-sighted approach threatens to disrupt the delicate "ecology of information" that James Boyle has eloquently portrayed.\textsuperscript{45}

A fundamental problem is that international trade negotiations have not self-consciously postulated the need to seek intellectual property norms and incentives that would best advance the incipient worldwide system of innovation as such.\textsuperscript{46} On the contrary, special interest lobbyists claiming to know what best serves that system have promoted normative solutions that maximize rents from existing innovation. These self-serving IP proposals are then exchanged for trade concessions in other areas that may or may not advance the long-term interests of the technology importing countries.\textsuperscript{47}

This linkage methodology first evolved in the 1980s, when a Cold War political stalemate had blocked the progressive harmonization of rudimentary international IP standards at WIPO, and countries at very different levels of development were unwilling to exchange purely IP concessions as such. Once a more robust transnational IP system had been installed on the shoulders of the


\textsuperscript{47} See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer,\textit{ The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties}, 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 415 (2004) (showing that these agreements seek to capture positive externalities and spillovers from existing innovation).
TRIPS Agreement, however, continued reliance on this linkage methodology has undermined the stability of that very system by blinding negotiators to the cumulative social costs of unbalanced, over-protectionist IP regimes even in the most advanced economies.

Respectable economic inquiry has never been more perplexed and uncertain about the potential hazards of our ever-expanding, ever more protectionist intellectual property regimes. Nor have serious efforts been made to reconcile the private and public interests of countries at different levels of development, with a view to optimizing global welfare in a healthy competitive environment. Indeed, in some countries, especially the United States, even the word “competition” has become suspect under an antitrust law that increasingly views monopoly as a socially desirable tool to promote research and development. Yet, those who cling to this pessimistic Schumpetarean outlook largely ignore, or at least under-appreciate, the extent to which so much of today’s basic research is performed at government expense in universities and other government-funded entities. The very success of this growing public-private partnership in technological innovation could instead justify a greater degree of competition in downstream applications and improvements than was previously thought economically desirable.

While a group of developing countries has recently called for sustained economic analysis of these questions at the international level, the most powerful countries’ trade negotiators relentlessly

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49. CIPR, supra note 8; Branstetter, supra note 16; see also Ullrich, supra note 19 at 726-57.

50. See, e.g., J. Drexel, Intellectual Property Rights as Constituent Elements of the Market Order, paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP), Parma, Italy, September 9-11 2006; Eleanor M. Fox, Can Antitrust Policy Protect the Global Commons from the Excesses of IP/Rs?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 758-69; see also S. Ghosh, Comment: Competitive Baselines for Intellectual Property in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 793-814.


52. See WIPO General Assembly, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/31/11, 27 August 2004; Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues Raised in Document WO/GA/31/11, WIPO Doc HLM/1/4, 6 April 2005; Proposal by Morocco on Behalf of
seek to export their increasingly dysfunctional intellectual property systems to the rest of the world at the very time when those systems are in danger of breaking down at home. If these trends continue unabated, the poorly designed intellectual property mechanisms forged in bilateral and multilateral forums could stifle rather than accelerate the pace of innovation in the emerging transnational system.

We ignore, for example, the extent to which low eligibility standards and dubious conceptual formulations have flooded technology markets with weak patents that generate thickets of rights and other blocking effects, which in turn shift funds away from R&D into wasteful litigation and other counter-measures. We ignore the spreading tentacles of copyright law, which have made truly creative expression ever more difficult by narrowing user and public-interest safeguards, and which have surrounded computer programs and other functional works with impenetrable legal and technological fences. We risk elevating the costs of R&D across entire economies through database protection laws so poorly designed that they have embarrassed both the highest court called


53. See, e.g., Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 20-23 (citing authorities); Reichman & Dreyfuss, Patent Law Harmonization, supra note 39.


to enforce them and even the legislative entity that spawned them. And we continue to roll out competition laws and policies that claim to advance innovation — as if that were not sufficiently the province of IPRs — rather than to reign in anticompetitive arrangements that limit both the diffusion of innovation and the pace of improvements.

Professor Dreier rightly reminds us that the advent of new technologies requires some adjustments of pre-existing IP paradigms and that allowing users and consumers to free-ride on investments in such technologies would also constitute a shortsighted policy resulting in market failure. But few, if any, reputable scholars endorse such policies. The scarecrow of free-riding has become a political gambit to steer legislators away from softer modalities of protection that could overcome market failure with lower social costs and without unnecessarily impeding future innovation.

A. Rationalizing the Protection of Cumulative and Sequential Innovation

Professor Dreier has called attention to special problems posed by information technologies and biotechnology, in which each new advance seems to depend upon a mix of preceding innovative contributions. This phenomenon is, indeed, the problem of “cumulative and sequential innovation,” which I have addressed in a number of monographs and articles.

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60. See Drexl, supra note 50; Fox, supra note 50; Ullrich, supra note 19; see also M.D. Janis, “Minimal” Standards for Patent-Related Antitrust Law Under TRIPS, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 774-792.


63. See Dreier, supra note 9; Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2002); Jerome H.
Traditional patent law presupposes clear boundaries between non-obvious inventions, and it proceeds on the assumption that the initial inventor is best-equipped to develop the new product or process and bring it to market in an efficient manner. The powerful exclusive rights of the patent paradigm rest upon both these premises and make it possible for innovators to exchange their creations for value in the absence of market failure.  

In reality, the conditions of present-day technological innovation increasingly contradict and confound these premises. When patents are freely granted for merely incremental additions to the knowledge stock, as routinely occurs under today’s low eligibility requirements, innovations clustering around common technical trajectories overlap, with no clear proprietarial lines of demarcation. These proliferating patents then give rise to thickets of rights that produce blocking effects on both follow-on innovation and upstream basic research. Scarce resources needed for R&D are progressively diverted to litigation seeking judicial clarification of boundary lines that are inherently blurred by definition. Meanwhile, the pace of innovation is further slowed because exclusive property rights in “slivers of innovation” act as a barrier to entry to those who must use existing inventions to produce value-adding improvements. Experience with small-scale innovation in different fields suggests that the market often discerns the course of improvements faster than the initial innovator, and that would-be competitors would move quickly to invest in value-adding improvements but for the potential blocking effects of the first-comer’s exclusive rights. Exchange often fails to occur because the second comers fear to disclose small-scale applications of know-

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66. See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 65; see also supra note 54.

67. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 65 at 339-353; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, *Reaching Through the Genome*, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 61 at 209-30; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 41.


how to the initial innovator and cannot proceed to deliver value-
adding improvements without incurring the risk of actions for in-
fringement. The domestic patent laws, and their sui generis
counterparts, thus clumsily impede the pace of innovation because
of a well-intentioned aim to immunize the first-comers from free-
riding appropriations of their initial investments in R&D.

From a broader perspective, the forgoing analysis shows the
dominant Cosean model, in which rational actors contract around
strong and clearly defined exclusive property rights, to be at war
with two pre-existing subsystems on which competitive economies
traditionally depended. One such subsystem was the set of liability
rules that governed trade secrets in the past, especially when pat-
ents were hard to obtain because of high eligibility standards, and
routine engineers could freely provide value-adding improvements
by reverse-engineering the technical know-how embodied in sub-
patentable innovation. The second major subsystem undermined
by a mindless expansion of exclusive property rights was the Mer-
tonian model of open access and sharing of scientific research re-
results, which provided a continuous flow of upstream knowledge
inputs often funded by government science agencies. It also com-
plicates the evolution of promising new innovation models based
on voluntary forms of coordinated collective action.

From a theoretical perspective, I have elsewhere argued that
policymakers should be exploring and experimenting with novel
intellectual property regimes that could defend cumulative and
sequential innovation against free-riding appropriators without
unduly blocking value-adding improvements and without depriv-
ing first-comers of a fair share of the revenues from such improve-
ments. To this end, a set of “take and pay” liability rules, known as
a “compensatory liability regime,” can be fashioned to regulate the
pace of improvements while impeding wholesale duplication of pro-

70. See Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 63 (discussing Arrow’s Information Para-
dox).
71. See Rober P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
72. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 63.
73. See, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual Property
Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 707 (2001); Jerome H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir,
A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protection-
ist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 317 (2003); Graeme B. Din-
woodie & R. Cooper Dreyfuss, Patenting Science: Protecting the Domain of Accessible Knowl-
dge, in The Future of the Public Domain: Identifying the Commons in Information
[hereinafter Patenting Science].
74. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin or Linnux and the Nature of the Firm,
102 YALE L. J. 369 (2002); see also GLYN MOODY, REBEL CODE: LINUX AND THE OPEN
SOURCE REVOLUTION (Perseus Books Group 2002).
tected small-scale innovation.\textsuperscript{75} This alternative form of protection would provide \textit{ex ante} entitlements to promote value-adding uses of cumulative and sequential innovation with low transaction costs and fewer barriers to entry, and it would also avoid many of the coordination problems that frustrate the collective action needed for complex innovative undertakings.\textsuperscript{76}

This is not the place to explore such proposals in detail. I mention them here because they attempt to address the problems that an increasingly dysfunctional intellectual property system has elicited. Many other ambitious proposals are on the table, such as open-source initiatives, patent pools, science commons and other clearing house models,\textsuperscript{77} which merit investigation and study. Yet, all these worthwhile responses to the pressing problems of the day could be compromised if the knowledge cartel that has captured the international IP law-making process continues to ratchet up ever-more protectionist standards in the name of so-called “harmonization.”

\textbf{B. A Moratorium on Stronger International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting Exercises}

The forgoing discussion suggests that the last thing that an incipient transnational system of innovation needs at the moment are additional rounds of international IP law-making exercises. On the contrary, the developing countries need a breathing space in which to accommodate the social costs of the TRIPS Agreement (and posterior TRIPS-plus agreements, if any). They must particularly master the nuances of existing international standards of protection, including both built-in and subsequently added flexibilities, with a view to adapting this legal infrastructure to their own assets, needs and capabilities.\textsuperscript{78} At the same time, policymakers in

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{75} Reichman, \textit{Green Tulips}, supra note 63; \textit{see also} Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, \textit{Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional Knowledge}, in \textit{INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP}, supra note 3 at 337-66.
\item\textsuperscript{76} \textit{See}, Tom Dedeurwaerdere, A Philosopher’s View, paper presented to the International Workshop on Gene Patents and Clearing Models: From Concepts to Cases, Catholic University, Leuven, Belgium, 8-10 June 2006.
\item\textsuperscript{78} \textit{See}, e.g., Dutfield, supra note 14; \textit{see generally} Mueller supra note 34 (for an in-depth survey of India’s struggle to reconcile international patent standards with its own development goals); \textit{see also} Abbott & Reichman, supra note 33 (discussing potential impact of amended TRIPS provision 31bis).}
\end{itemize}
developed countries need to step back and take stock of their growing intellectual property predicaments, without worsening existing problems by further succumbing to the “more is always better” propaganda of a powerful knowledge cartel.

For all these reasons, Keith Maskus and I have called for a moratorium on intellectual property standard-setting exercises for the immediate future. In our view, “further harmonization is not an improper goal, but rather a premature exercise under the new and uncertain conditions that attend the development of cutting-edge technologies generally and information-based technologies in particular.”

Professor Dreier correctly understands our proposal to be directed at developed and developing countries alike. Our hope is that, as states at different levels of development “accommodate[d] existing international [IP] standards to their own nascent or evolving systems of innovation,” a body of fresh empirical data would emerge with which to compare and test different development strategies. In the long run, such data might make it more feasible for states to trade further intellectual property concessions once again, “on a win-win basis, without coercion and with fewer risks that powerful interest groups had rigged the rules to lock in fleeting competitive advantages.”

If developing countries (whose interests vary greatly according to per capita GDP and industrial capacities) rallied around the call for such a moratorium, it could help them collectively resist bilateral pressures in FTA negotiations that have so far succeeded on a “divide and conquer” strategy. These countries should, however, remain willing to consider minimalist, good faith responses to new or rampant free-riding practices that might unexpectedly emerge during the moratorium period.


80. See Dreier, supra note 9.
81. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 37; see also Reichman & Cooper Dreyfuss, supra note 39.
82. Maskus & Reichman, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3 at 37.
83. For example, certain rampant forms of free-riding on digital sound recordings might require a positive response, in the spirit of TRIPS, even if not clearly covered by treaty obligations. By the same token, had developing countries been willing to consider
C. New Institutional Initiatives

While both the European Commission and the European Patent Office\(^{84}\) have recently demonstrated greater awareness of the dangers of extending IP protection in the absence of solid economic justification, there is no sign that either USTR or the administration will reduce pressures currently being exerted to stiffen intellectual property standards in multilateral, regional, and bilateral forums.\(^{85}\) Accordingly, if a healthy worldwide system of innovation is to emerge in the post-TRIPS environment, the need for a proper balance of public and private interests within that system is factually dependent on the developing countries’ ability to resist the drive to re-regulate the world economy. Important in this regard was the WIPO Development Agenda,\(^{86}\) and other parallel initiatives, such as the Access to Essential Medicines\(^{87}\) and Access to Knowledge\(^{88}\) campaigns, whose mission it is to document developing country complaints about how they may be ill-served by TRIPS and TRIPS-plus standards of IP protection.

At the same time, we need more reliable information about how IPRs may be helping the developing countries, especially in certain fields and at certain levels of per capita GDP.\(^{89}\) In so doing, it is important to take account of the different conditions affecting different industrial sectors in these countries. For example, while a stronger patent regime has certainly caused problems for Brazil’s public health program,\(^{90}\) that country has become a major innova-

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\(^{85}\) See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 14.


\(^{89}\) See, e.g., Mirta Levis, Role, Perspectives and Challenges of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry in Latin America, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, 55-63, supra note 83; see also Barbara Rosenberg, Market Concentration of the Transnational Pharmaceutical Industry and the Generic Industries: Trends on Mergers, Acquisitions and Other Transactions, in
tor and exporter in the aircraft industry and, allegedly, in the biomedical sector as well. IPRs may have played a positive role in both cases.

Similarly, some Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical companies are reportedly well-positioned to benefit from universal patent norms, even if many smaller Indian firms may be denied prior opportunities to reverse-engineer cheap generic drugs. Ideally, our quest for reliable empirical studies of what actually transpires in developing countries should enable scholars and policymakers better to differentiate the situations in low and middle-income countries from those at a more advanced state of industrialization.

Because today’s most scientifically and commercially valuable knowledge goods are likely to be products of cumulative and sequential innovation, all countries — not just developing countries — need norms that reinforce the natural sharing ethos of public science and that expand the semi-commons of nonpatentable or subpatentable ideas and know-how accessible to routine engineers. To this end, the developing countries in particular need to embrace a pro-competitive ethos by strengthening their capacities and technologies of reverse-engineering. They need to experiment with new intellectual property models, including those based on open-source solutions and on the strategic use of liability rules, which can cure market failures without impeding follow-on innovation and without creating barriers to entry.

Above all, developing countries need to formulate suitable competition law rules and policies (hopefully coordinated) to ensure that foreign technologies and know-how flow to local markets at prices local entrepreneurs can afford. In so doing, they should also make use of competition law exceptions in the TRIPS-Agreement.

See Negotiating Health, 65 & 73-75, supra note 83.
91. See supra note 89.
92. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 34; Timmermans, supra note 87 at 50-53. See also Joan Rovira, Creating and Promoting Domestic Drug Manufacturing Capabilities: A Solution for Developing Countries?, in Negotiating Health, 227-40, supra note 83.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 63-76; see also R. Cooper Dreyfuss & G. Dinwoodie, WTO Dispute Resolution and the Preservation of the Public Domain of Science Under International Law in International Public Goods and IP, supra note 3 at 861-883 (providing innovative proposals); Marianne Levin & Annette Kur, Towards More Balanced, User Friendly Paradigms in IP Law: A Project to Reform TRIPS, Special Session: the IP in Transition Research Programme presented to the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (ATRIP) conference in Parma, Italy, (Sep. 5, 2006) (providing innovative proposals).
95. See supra note 29.
to obtain bulk access to educational and scientific texts at prices the local educational community can afford.96

Ideally, all developing countries should experimentally be testing different approaches to stimulating and disseminating innovation in their national and regional systems of innovation and to defining the relevant supporting legal standards that could prove effective for different players at different levels of development, all of whom are necessarily operating within the incipient transnational system of innovation. Valid experiments of this kind should eventually lead to bottom up proposals for future intellectual property standards that are demonstrably consistent with development goals and that suitably reconcile public and private interests at national, regional and, ultimately, global levels.97

Another overarching goal for developing countries is to experiment with new techniques, strategies and institutions for maintaining the supply of knowledge as a public good. While this dimension was painfully ignored during the multilateral trade negotiations that gave birth to the TRIPS Agreement, governments in the most technologically advanced countries clearly understand the importance of funding basic research and the need to provide critical upstream inputs for groundbreaking scientific research, which the private sector cannot sustain.98 Yet, one of the biggest defects of multilateral and bilateral standard-setting exercises, without public interest negotiators seated at the table, is precisely the emergence of a one dimensional normative infrastructure that can make the provision of the public good side of innovation ever harder and more costly.99

In this regard, we must particularly ensure that developing countries are connected to the worldwide flow of scientific and technical information, in what UNESCO calls the drive for “knowledge societies,”100 a goal that will require restraints on electronic fencing of disembodied information.101 We will need better research exemptions to all intellectual property regimes. We must

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96. See, e.g., Drexl, supra note 50; Correa, supra note 29; Ullrich, supra note 19; Okediji, supra note 19.
97. See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Dinwoodie, supra note 94; Levin & Kur, supra note 94.
100. See Towards Knowledge Societies, UNESCO WORLD REPORT (UNESCO Publishing 2005).
ensure that both government-funded and government-generated scientific research results are widely disseminated at affordable costs. And we need to encourage developing countries to invest wisely in forms of public-private cooperation that focus on capacity building in universities and on the transfer of both innovative capacity and technology from the public to the private sectors.

In so doing, we must also take pains to distinguish problems of distributive injustice from problems directly dependent on IPRs. While these issues are often interrelated, Peter Gerhart’s recent work shows that we have not thought enough about how developed countries cope with distributional aspects “behind the scenes,” and why this absence of secondary coping mechanisms magnifies the social costs of IPRs in developing countries.

Finally, looking beyond innovation as such, we must find ways to ensure that progress in stimulating the production of knowledge goods leads to the support of other public goods, such as public health, agriculture, the environment, education and scientific research generally. In other words, we must reverse the trend that makes the globalization of private knowledge goods increasingly at odds with the provision of global public goods, and instead take steps to ensure that the emerging transnational system of innovation adequately fosters and supports the supply of both, in an environment that remains responsive to basic human needs and fundamental human rights.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The TRIPS Agreement of 1994 is usually characterized as a technical harmonization exercise that consecrates basic standards of intellectual property protection established in developed countries. From that perspective, there has been a sustained emphasis on compliance by other countries that must conform their laws and practices to these international standards, and on the need for still higher levels of protection that technology exporting countries demand in the name of efficiency and wealth maximization.

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103. See Gerhart, supra note 29; see also Chon, supra note 8.
104. See Chon, supra note 8; Yu, supra note 43.
In contrast, Maskus and I contend that, perhaps as an unintended consequence, the TRIPS Agreement has spawned an incipient transnational system of innovation, which could provide worldwide incentive effects with positive gains for both innovation and welfare. A number of developing countries, including Brazil, Chile, China, India, Malaysia and Thailand have taken steps to profit from these opportunities, and critics of globalization ignore these growing successes at their peril.  

Higher intellectual property standards have nonetheless engendered new problems for all countries, and they have particularly complicated the already arduous task of formulating and implementing economic development strategies in poor countries. In his early work, Maskus emphasized that IP regimes were but one component of a healthy, development-oriented economy and that, without a broader, well-coordinated infrastructure that included corporate law, bankruptcy law, and a solid educational system, among other variables, IP protection might add little to economic growth in its own right. In a perceptive recent article, Margaret Chon argues that the interrelation between IPRs and overall development policies may be far more complex than was previously understood, and that differential and more favorable treatment — which Professor Chon calls “substantive equality” — will become essential if developing countries are to succeed in the post-TRIPS environment.

Other recent studies have focused on the interplay of private and public goods in a healthy, pro-competitive global economy. One key phenomenon here is the extent to which expanding international IP legislation to support the “globalization of private knowledge goods” has increasingly burdened and complicated developing country efforts to achieve broader development goals that

106. See, e.g., Straus, supra note 26; Ryan, supra note 22.
108. See Maskus, supra note 93; see also Jerome H. Reichman, Taking the Medicine with Angst: An Economist’s View of the TRIPS Agreement, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 795, 802 (2001) (reviewing Keith E. Maskus, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000)).
110. See generally INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3.
provide both measurable economic growth and equitable access to the fruits of growth for poor and disadvantaged citizens.\textsuperscript{111} While history demonstrates that the enforcement of intellectual property rights and the pursuit of overall economic welfare are not antithetical in relatively free-market economies, as some human rights declarations expressly recognize, the one-sided emphasis on private rights in the WTO and WIPO law-making processes has made it far more difficult than in the past for most developing countries to bridge the technology divide\textsuperscript{112} and to maintain the supply of such basic public goods as health, education, food security, environmental protection and even a pro-competitive economic environment.

In this regard, they have so far received little comfort from the WTO Dispute Settlement apparatus, which has tended to ignore adverse distributional effects of the TRIPS standards, despite certain enabling provisions in that agreement.\textsuperscript{113} While recent legislative concessions regarding public health adopted by the WTO\textsuperscript{114} may be seen as a partial response to demands for less “formal equality”\textsuperscript{115} and more “substantive equality,”\textsuperscript{116} the developing countries have largely been left on their own to sort out the developmental difficulties that TRIPS and post-TRIPS pressures have engendered.\textsuperscript{117}

From a broader perspective, the incipient transnational system of innovation that the TRIPS Agreement brought to life in 1994 needs time and a stable competitive environment in which to grow and flourish through the efforts of entrepreneurs in both developed and developing countries, without further top-down regulatory interference from misguided protectionist legislation. WTO Members

\textsuperscript{111} See generally Maskus & Reichman in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3.

\textsuperscript{112} See, e.g., Towards Knowledge Societies, UNESCO WORLD REPORT, supra note 100; Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (New Press 2002); see also Heald, supra note 107; Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 1 (2002).

\textsuperscript{113} See Howse, supra note 109; Gerhart, supra note 29; but see Jerome H. Reichman, Securing Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement After US v. India, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 585, 586 & 594-97 (1998)(finding that WTO Appellate Body may defer to local law under art. 1.1 of TRIPS when good-faith effort to comply is otherwise demonstrated).

\textsuperscript{114} See supra note 25; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 33.


\textsuperscript{116} See Chon, supra note 8.

\textsuperscript{117} Post-TRIPS Pressures under so-called Free Trade Agreements have significantly cut back upon even the public health concessions made under the Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 25; see, e.g., Abbott & Reichman, supra note 33. See also Thomas Cottier, The Doha Waiver and Its Effects on the Nature of the TRIPS System and on Competition Law—The Impact of Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 9 at 175-99.
must be allowed broad latitude to ensure that this system remains pro-competitive, with affordable access to knowledge inputs and outputs for both creators and users of knowledge goods. By the same token, WTO Members must retain sufficient autonomy and power to preserve the supply of global public goods that are indispensable to both growth and welfare in a properly functioning worldwide intellectual property regime.118

With specific regard to the promotion of innovation as such, concerned governments must make strenuous efforts to resist claims that the technology exporting industries know what is best for the rest of the world. In reality, legal scholars and economists have never been less certain about the levels of IP protection likely to preserve these industries’ long-term competitive advantages even in their home countries.119 We do not stand at the end of intellectual property history, as the high-protectionist lobby wants us to believe. Nor will ever-stronger IPRs and ever higher levels of harmonization redound to the benefit of even the most developed countries, let alone the rest of the world.

On the contrary, we have crossed a new historical threshold where an emerging transnational system of innovation in an integrated global market place with an interconnected research community breeds unprecedented opportunities and uncharted means of realizing them. Far from locking in the sixteenth and twentieth century intellectual property models of the past, we need new models, and we need time and space to experiment with them, and with new legal approaches to finding the best balance of private and public interests for this global economy. It is precisely a time for experimentation,120 comparable to the period in the 1880s, when the Paris and Berne Conventions were first negotiated. It is not a time to codify obsolete approaches and standards that are likely to boomerang against the long-term interests of developed countries as well as to undermine economic growth and human welfare in the developing countries.

118. See Maskus & Reichman in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND IP, supra note 3, at 27-33 (suggesting legal modalities to secure this objective by discussing “impact of intellectual property standards on the reserved welfare powers of WTO members”).

119. See, e.g., Reichman & Cooper Dreyfuss, supra note 39; Dutfield, supra note 14 (predicting shift in terms of IP trade favoring China and India).