Still Tough on Crime?
Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United States

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the 1980s and 1990s, the criminal justice system in the United States became increasingly punitive. This Article describes the move toward greater punitiveness and contrasts this development in the United States with the restorative justice movement in Australia and New Zealand. Though punitiveness, rather than restorative justice, has been the dominant theme in American criminal justice policy, there are programs now operating in the United States that fit the restorative justice model.

To date, restorative justice in the United States has operated at the fringes of the criminal justice system with small programs, often run by churches and private agencies, handling a relatively small number of juvenile cases and cases involving minor offenses. By contrast, in many countries restorative justice is now fully in the mainstream, and in some countries restorative justice handles the majority of cases involving adult offenders. What are the prospects for widespread adoption of restorative justice principles and a substantial restructuring of the criminal justice system in the United States to accommodate those principles? Is the American public prepared to turn from punitive policies to restorative justice?

As a background to the issue of the public's receptivity to restorative justice principles and policies, this Article first reviews the punitive policies of the 1980s and 1990s and the dramatic declines in American crime rates during the last decade. The sharply declining crime rate might mean the time is ripe for a switch from punitive to restorative criminal justice policies, and there is some evidence that public anxiety about crime is starting to decrease and that support for punitive policies has declined. There are, however, several significant barriers to the adoption of restorative justice principles, including: (1) the market-driven media, which has an incentive to stress crime stories and frame them in a fashion that supports punitive responses and cues racial attitudes, (2) a political system that rewards the candidates and parties that play the “crime card,” and (3) a recent emphasis on sentencing principles that are difficult to square with restorative justice practices.

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II. United States: The Punitive Policies of the 1980s and 1990s

In the United States, a movement to restructure the sentencing process and increase sentence severity began in the late 1970s and continued throughout the 1990s as imprisonment rates swelled to unprecedented levels. The rehabilitative ideal, which dominated postwar penal theory and practice in the United States,1 suffered a “wide and precipitous decline” in the 1970s, attacked by both conservatives and liberals.2 As the rehabilitative ideal collapsed, it was replaced by an ideology of “crime prevention through incapacitation”3 and an increasing emphasis on retribution as a goal of criminal sentencing.4 The change in penal theory was expressed in legislation that rejected the goal of rehabilitation and in indeterminate sentencing regimes intended to tailor imprisonment to the individual offender’s need for rehabilitation. Many jurisdictions adopted mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in the 1980s,5 and there was a similar but more comprehensive trend at the federal level involving both mandatory minimum penalty statutes and more severe and rigid federal sentencing guidelines.6 In the 1990s, as the new higher sentences took effect, they were supplemented in many states with highly punitive recidivist statutes, many based upon California’s “three strikes” law.7 Although these statutes vary from

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2 Allen, supra note 1, at 7. Opposition to the rehabilitative ideal crossed ideological lines, including police chiefs, district attorneys, Quakers, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Prisoners Union. On the one hand, rehabilitation was criticized by groups including radical criminologists and civil libertarians who saw it as a threat to the political values of a free society and who expressed concern that the rehabilitative ideal had, in practice, proven particularly vulnerable to misuse. Id. at 39–56. Others argued that, given the limits of scientific knowledge and institutional capabilities, society was incapable of rehabilitating offenders. Id. at 57.

3 Id. at 10.


7 In California, the Act of March 7, 1994, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 12 (West) (amending Cal. Penal Code § 667 (West 1994)), became effective in March 1994 and was later ratified by voters in a referendum. The provisions are called “three strikes” laws based upon a baseball
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the new recidivist statutes provide that the sentence for a third, or in some cases a second, qualifying offense will be doubled or increased to life without parole.

By the end of the 1990s, the combined effects of the sentencing changes brought about significant increases in the duration of incarceration served by offenders and in the rates of imprisonment in the United States. For example, in the federal courts, the average sentence imposed in 1995 for some crimes was nearly double that imposed in 1980. Moreover, federal offenders sentenced in 1998 for certain crimes will spend about twice as long in prison, on average, as did offenders sentenced in 1984. In 2001, it was estimated that the rate of imprisonment in the United States was 699 per 100,000 population, the highest in the world. In comparison, the imprisonment rates for other Western nations fell within the range of forty to 125 per 100,000.

The shift toward a punitive focus can also be seen in the treatment of juvenile offenders. Beginning in the mid-1990s, a fundamental shift in juvenile justice policy occurred in the United States, and the treatment of serious and violent juvenile offenders experienced a major change. Between 1992 and 1996, forty states adopted or modified laws, making it easier to prosecute juveniles as adults in criminal court, and forty-seven states and the District of Columbia changed their laws targeting juveniles who commit serious or violent crimes. In contrast to the traditional regime, which based dispositions on the needs of the juvenile with the goal of rehabilitation, the states have increasingly shifted to dispositions that are based upon the offense with the goal of punishment. As a result, more juveniles than ever before are being charged and tried in criminal court, detained


Id.


Id. at 5 (showing rates ranging from 125 per 100,000 for the United Kingdom, 60 per 100,000 for Sweden, and 40 per 100,000 for Japan, with Canada, Australia, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Switzerland falling between the United Kingdom and Sweden).


Id. at xi.
longer, and incarcerated more frequently in adult correctional institutions.\(^{14}\) This trend continued throughout the 1990s.\(^{15}\)

Another manifestation of the punitive character of the contemporary American criminal justice system is the death penalty, which is authorized in thirty-eight states and in the federal system.\(^{16}\) There have been more than 800 executions since 1976, when the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a revised Georgia death penalty statute that has become the model for many other state statutes,\(^{17}\) and 3,692 persons were under death sentences in the United States as of January 1, 2003.\(^{18}\) Although the expansion of the death row population is due primarily to the cumulative effect of a low ratio of executions to death sentences imposed, the number of death sentences imposed yearly has also increased significantly.\(^{19}\) Strong support for the death penalty has been manifested in Congress,\(^{20}\) and the pro–death penalty culture seems to have influenced judicial

\(^{14}\)Id. at 6.


decisions as well.21 As discussed in greater detail in Part IV.A, general public support for the death penalty has dropped slightly since the mid-1990s, but a poll conducted in July 2001 indicated that approximately two-thirds of the public still support it.22

Public opinion polls in the United States throughout the 1990s demonstrated high levels of anxiety about crime and strong support for more punitive measures. Americans were concerned about crime and wanted harsher measures to deal with it. National polls identified crime as the most important problem facing the nation from 1994 to 1998, and from 1999 to 2001 crime was selected as the second- or third-most important national problem.23 Most Americans thought—and continue to think—that harsher sentences should be imposed. For twenty years, a random nationwide public opinion poll asked, "In general, do you think the courts in [your] area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals?"24 Every year from 1980 to 1996 more than 78% responded, "Not harshly enough."25 Although the percentage of respondents who say sentences are not harsh enough fell to 68% in 2000 (the last year for which data is available),26 that is still a very high rate of consensus.

In general, there was widespread public support for the punitive laws and policies noted above. For example, public opinion polls generally showed strong support for the adoption of "three strikes" laws and sexual offenders notification provisions,27 and legislators viewed any opposition to these provisions as akin to political suicide.28 Indeed, Democratic candidates tried to defeat the impression

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21 Indeed, in one case in which the lower courts had granted repeated stays of execution, the Supreme Court took the unprecedented step of ruling that no further stays could be entered in the case without the Court's permission. See Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000, 1000 (1992).
23 See id. at tbl.2.1 (noting that in 2002, concern about crime fell precipitously, replaced by concern about terrorism, war, and economy).
24 See id. at tbl.2.54 (reporting public attitudes towards judicial severity between 1984 and 2000); Hofer & Semisch, supra note 8, at 17 (reporting same for years 1980 to 1982). From 1980 to 1995 the percentage responding "[n]ot harshly enough" remained between 80% and 86% in every year but 1987, when it slipped to 79%; the proportion responding "[n]ot harshly enough" fell to 78% in 1996, 74% in 1998, and 68% in 2000. Sourcebook, supra note 22, at tbl.2.54.
25 Sourcebook, supra note 22, at tbl.2.54.
26 Id.
28 See Michael Vitello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 412-22 (1997) (discussing how both Democrat-controlled California State Assembly and Republican Governor Pete Wilson refused to temper extremism embodied in
III. THE RESTORATIVE JUSTICE MOVEMENT

Restorative justice has been defined as “a process of bringing together the individuals who have been affected by an offense and having them agree on how to repair the harm caused by the crime,” with the goal of restoring victims, offenders, and communities in a way that all stakeholders agree is just. The system is based upon the recognition that crime harms individuals (victims) and relationships (the victims' and offenders' respective communities).

The restorative justice model is often defined in opposition to the punitive model. In contrast to the United States justice system, which is designed to establish the culpability of the offender and to exact an appropriate punishment, the aim of restorative justice is to establish accountability for the harm, promote mutual understanding of its causes and effects, and develop a process to make amends. In the restorative justice paradigm, the offender is not ordinarily incarcerated, but instead is obligated to apologize and otherwise compensate the victim, ideally receive forgiveness, and be reintegrated into the community.

The restorative justice movement has been very influential in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, particularly in the area of juvenile justice, and it is gradually being extended to more cases involving adults. The movement became more prominent throughout the 1990s, strongly influenced by the indigenous

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proposed three strikes legislation because of fear of voter reprisals in upcoming election); see also Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan's Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 351 (2001) (noting that congressmen believed it was politically impossible to oppose passage of federal Megan's Law).


practices of the First Nation communities in Canada and the Maori tribes in New Zealand. In Canada, native peoples employed “circle sentencing or healing,” a process that involved offenders, victims, and their respective families and community supporters in a discussion of the causes, consequences, and remedies for the crime. Native circles of healing have addressed serious offenses, including domestic violence, sexual assault, and intrafamily sexual abuse. More formal victim-offender mediation programs in several large Canadian cities handle adult and juvenile offenses such as assault and breaking and entering. New Zealand adopted legislation in 1989 based on traditional Maori conflict resolution practices that emphasized the direct involvement of the family and community of juvenile offenders in developing a plan to rehabilitate them through “family group conferencing.” The primary function of family group conferencing was to decide whether to prosecute the offender and to decide about custody arrangements or alternative sanctions. Under the new law, diversion of juvenile offenders to family group conferencing reduced the number of cases going to court by approximately 80% and cut juvenile incarceration by half.

After more than a decade of experience with juveniles, family group conferencing is now being extended to adults. Restorative justice programs in Australia are generally based upon the New Zealand conferencing model, except that the police play a more prominent role in the process through an approach called Wagga-Wagga, named for the area where it was developed.

34Braithwaite, supra note 30, at 1743.
37See Mark S. Umbreit, Restorative Justice Through Mediation: The Impact of Programs in Four Canadian Provinces, in INT’L PERSPECTIVES, supra note 36, at 373, 379 (reporting results of programs operating in Calgary, Langley, Ottawa, and Winnipeg: 39% of 4445 cases referred in these four cities between 1991 and 1993 were mediated and 93% of these resulted in successfully negotiated agreements; additionally, more than three-quarters of victims and offenders reported high levels of satisfaction with mediation process and perceived it as fair).
38Strang, supra note 35, at 4.
41See Strang, supra note 35, at 6 (describing original Wagga-Wagga program in New South Wales that led to passage of Young Offenders Act of 1997, which became model for other provinces). The most prominent program not statutorily based is run by the Australian Federal Police in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and is undergoing continuous evaluation under the auspices of the Reintegrative Shaming Experiments (RISE) of Australian National University. Id.
programs were incorporated into provincial legislation, state juvenile justice institutions largely took over implementation, although police were still involved in referring cases to conferencing and participating as facilitators in the mediation.\textsuperscript{42} Currently Australian restorative justice programs focus mainly on juveniles, although three jurisdictions extend conferencing to adult offenders.\textsuperscript{43} The most common offenses referred to these programs are robbery, breaking and entering, property damage, disorderly conduct, motor vehicle theft, and assault.\textsuperscript{44}

Restorative justice programs are also flourishing in Europe, particularly in Austria, Germany, and Finland. In Austria, victim-offender mediation has been part of the juvenile justice system since the mid-1980s, offering offenders the options of a reconciliation talk, compensation for damage done, or symbolic restitution through community service or payments to a public welfare organization rather than an individual victim.\textsuperscript{45} Mediation is also available for adult offenders on a limited basis.\textsuperscript{46} Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1994 in Germany, mediation was made formally available as an option to adult offenders where the penalty under regular proceedings would be a prison sentence of up to a year or just a fine.\textsuperscript{47} Interestingly, in both Austria and Germany, victim-offender mediation is used for more serious crimes than in other countries. In Germany, about 70% of the cases mediated in 1995 were violent crimes, and in Austria nearly three-quarters of the adult cases mediated involved violent interaction, such as barroom brawls or road rage.\textsuperscript{48} In Finland, despite the fact that victim-offender programs operate outside the formal criminal justice system, they handle as much as 20% of the caseload.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{42}Id. at 6 (noting that programs in Tasmania, Northern Territory, and ACT use police officers as conferencing facilitators, that in other states and territories police officers assist in mediation as part of conferencing team or have formal role, such as reading out charges against offender, and additionally that police are major source of referrals for cases in almost all states and territories).
\textsuperscript{43}Id. at 4, 27–28.
\textsuperscript{44}Id. at 7.
\textsuperscript{46}See id. at 69–70 (noting that 2000 adult offender cases were resolved through mediation in 1995 in four major pilot cities, compared to 66,444 adults who were formally convicted nationwide in same year).
\textsuperscript{47}Id. at 68 (stating that, in theory, more than 95% of criminal cases in Germany would have been eligible for this form of diversionary mediation).
\textsuperscript{48}Leena Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME & JUST. 235, 269 (2000); see also Löschnig-Gspandl & Kilchling, supra note 45, at 72 (describing cases mediated in 1992: 20% situational conflicts, 25% conflicts at work, 14% family conflicts, and 30–40% without personal element).
\textsuperscript{49}Kurki, supra note 48, at 269 (noting that victim-offender mediation accounted for 6300 offenders in 1993, compared to total of 23,181 offenders sentenced in 1995).
Although there is increasing interest in restorative justice in the United States,50 restorative justice principles have been adopted mainly in scattered small-scale programs dealing with minor offenses. The most popular form of restorative justice in the United States is victim-offender mediation. Nearly 300 victim-offender mediation programs now exist throughout the United States.51 Approximately half of the programs deal exclusively with juveniles,52 and most employ victim-offender mediation in cases involving offenses such as vandalism, minor assaults, theft, and burglary.53 More than half of these programs are funded or sponsored by churches or other private community organizations, though they may also receive governmental funding.54 Although there are a few very large programs, most are small. The average victim-offender program for juveniles receives 136 referrals per year, and the average program dealing with adults receives seventy-four.55 Other restorative justice practices, such as family group counseling, have been adopted in a smaller number of communities.56

Reparative probation and other citizen boards are being used to dispose of minor crimes in Vermont and other jurisdictions in the United States. There are adult citizen panels adjudicating nonviolent juvenile offenses in many cities, and reparative citizen boards are now widely used in Vermont.57 The Vermont program, unlike other restorative justice initiatives in the United States, was implemented statewide by a government agency pursuant to a law adopted by Vermont voters. By 1998, the Vermont reparative justice citizen boards were handling 1200 cases, a large share of Vermont’s relatively small caseload.58

50See id.; Mark S. Umbreit, The Restorative Justice and Mediation Collection: Executive Summary, OVC BULL., July 2000, at 1, 1 (stating that increasing number of crime victims are choosing to meet face-to-face with persons who victimized them), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications.
52Id. at 5–6 (noting that 45% of programs worked exclusively with juveniles, 47% worked with both juveniles and adults, and 9% worked exclusively with adults).
53Id. at 7.
54Id. at 6 (stating that 43% are sponsored by “[p]rivate, community-based agency” and 22% are sponsored by “Church-based organization”). Fifty-seven percent of programs identified the local, state, or federal government as the primary source of their funds. Id. (noting that 27% receive their primary funding from local government, 24% from state government, and 6% from federal government).
55Id. at 7. The largest programs received 1672 referrals. Id. Programs in Orange County, California and Portland, Oregon have received grants to divert 1000 or more juvenile cases yearly from overcrowded court systems. Id. at 3.
56See Kurki, supra note 48, at 275–80 (describing police-family group counseling in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania).
58Kurki, supra note 48, at 283 (noting that 1200 cases handled in 1998 were “more than one-third of the targeted probation caseload”).
IV. PROSPECTS FOR WIDESPREAD ADOPTION OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES

United States restorative justice programs have just touched the surface, with the focus on low-level offenses and offenders. What are the prospects for more widespread adoption? Will the United States copy the increasing success and prominence of restorative justice initiatives in other countries? Will these programs become central features of the justice system?

A. A Window of Opportunity?

At first glance, it might seem that the time is ripe for the United States to turn to restorative justice. We have taken punitiveness as far—and farther—than any other country. There is not much room to go further down that road, and many reasons point towards pursuing other alternatives. Restorative justice could appeal to conservatives who want to cut state budgets and to liberals who deplore the human costs of incarcerating such a significant part of the population. Moreover, the United States has experienced a record-setting decline in crime rates. Homicide and robbery rates fell to their lowest levels since the late 1960s, and serious violent crime continued to decline in 2000, reaching its lowest level in the twenty-seven-year history of the National Crime Victimization Survey. Additionally, property crime, including larceny, burglary, theft in general, and motor vehicle theft, continued a twenty-year decline.

There is some support for the common sense idea that public anxiety about crime and support for punitive policies are responses to high crime rates. For example, one researcher found that approximately two-thirds of the variation in public support for the death penalty could be explained by variations in the crime rate. According to this logic, the current drop in crime rates should correlate with less punitive attitudes, and indeed it appears there has been some softening

61Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Crime and Victim Statistics, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/cvict.htm (last revised Jan. 29, 2003). It should be noted that another measure, the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), indicated that violent crime in the United States had stabilized in 2000, after several years of decline. Id.; see also Michael R. Rand & Callie M. Rennison, True Crime Stories? Accounting for Differences in Our National Crime Indicators, CHANCE, Winter 2002, at 47, 47–48 (noting that two measures differ in a number of respects, including fact that UCR rates do not include unreported offenses).
in public support for the death penalty, which began dropping in the mid-1990s. Between May 1995 and May 2001, support for the death penalty fell from 77% to 65%. When respondents were given the choice of life imprisonment with no possibility of parole as an alternative punishment for murder, a national survey conducted in 2000 found that support for the death penalty dropped to 52%. State surveys found that respondents preferred the option of life without parole plus the payment of restitution from work in prison (LWOP+R) over the death penalty by a significant majority. Sixty-four percent of Nebraskans favored LWOP+R, as did 73% of New Yorkers.

A similar softening may be occurring in connection with attitudes about sentence harshness. In 1994, 85% of respondents reported that local courts were “not harsh enough” in dealing with criminals; that number fell to 74% in 1998 and 68% in 2000. Similarly, other attitudes related to punitiveness are also starting to show a change. A poll conducted in 2000 found that 68% of the public believed that “attacking social problems” is the best approach to lowering the crime rate, as opposed to 27% who favored more money for additional prisons, police, and judges. This was a significant change from 1994, when 42% of the public favored more spending for law enforcement and just 51% wanted to attack social causes. In 2002, Peter Hart published the results from two national telephone surveys and six focus groups, which he argues demonstrate a “significant transformation” and a fundamentally different perspective that rejects purely punitive approaches to criminal justice. Hart found increased support for prevention rather than punishment and for alternative sentences for nonviolent offenders, especially drug offenders, as well as decreased support for mandatory sentences. He also found significantly increased support for rehabilitation.

These attitudes are fertile ground for restorative justice proposals.

B. Barriers to Acceptance

Although these polls may be harbingers of change, there are significant barriers to the adoption of restorative justice principles in the United States. The first barrier is the potential linkage between punitive policies and lower crime

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55 Gallup Poll May 10–14, 2001 (also reporting 43% preferred life imprisonment, 5% no opinion), available at LEXIS, CMPGN library, RPOLL file. This question was first asked August 25 to September 5, 2000. Id.
57 Sourcebook, supra note 22, at tbl.2.54.
58 Id. at tbl.2.46 (reporting Gallup Poll).
59 Id.
61 Id. at 3–5, 12–13.
62 Id. at 9, 17–18.
rates. Two other important factors, which operated throughout the 1990s, are the news media’s heavy focus on crime and violence, and the political system’s rewards for the candidates and parties that have played the “crime card.” These factors can increase public fear of crime and strengthen support for punitive measures. Research into the effects of the psychology of cognition and risk assessment provides models that suggest how these effects may be amplified by common cognitive errors. Another element of the equation is the fit between the restorative justice and the sentencing reform movements. Restorative justice may face an uphill battle to the extent that restorative justice proposals seem at odds with the popular sentencing reforms of recent years. Finally, the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the resulting focus on terrorism, have introduced a new factor that may make it more difficult to focus on reforms not directly linked to public safety.

1. The Perception That Punitive Policies Keep Crime Rates Low

The most obvious barrier to the adoption of restorative justice policies may be the perceived link between the increasingly punitive policies of the last twenty years and the drop in crime rates over the past decade. If harsh policies are necessary to reduce crime, then falling crime rates provide no occasion for taking a new direction.

It is by no means clear that the punitive policies of the 1980s and 1990s are the principal cause of the current reduction in crime (though they have certainly played some role). Many scholars believe that social forces operating independently of punitive legislation, such as an improvement in the economy and changes in the drug culture, are responsible for most of the recent drop in American crime rates.73 This conclusion is in line with the traditional view that altering sentencing policies has relatively little influence on crime rates.74 Further,

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73 See William Spelman, The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 97 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000) (attributing approximately 27% of drop in crime rates to prison expansion and remainder of drop to other social factors); Bruce D. Johnson et al., The Rise and Decline of Hard Drugs, Drug Markets, and Violence in Inner-City New York, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA, supra, at 164 (arguing that drop in violent crime in New York City was caused by shift in drug culture from heroin, cocaine, and crack to marijuana as urban drug of choice); Jeff Grogger, An Economic Model of Recent Trends, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA, supra, at 266 (identifying decline in cocaine trade and growth in wages in low-skill labor market as catalysts for drop in crime rate); see also ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 100–27 (concluding that increases in incarceration in California during 1980s may have resulted in roughly 15% reduction in crime, concentrated in burglary and larceny categories, but finding no substantial incapacitation benefits for homicide, assault, and robbery). But cf. Joanna M. Shepherd, Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California’s Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 159 (2002) (using county by county data to find greater deterrent effect from three strikes legislation, claiming that during first two years it deterred approximately eight murders, 3952 aggravated assaults, 10,672 robberies, and 384,488 burglaries).

74 Michael Tonry & David P. Farrington, Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention, 19 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6 (1995) (citing President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967), National Academy of Sciences Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative
there is evidence that the U.S. has pushed increases in sentencing severity to the point that the marginal returns in crime reduction are quite small, and are more costly than other crime reduction strategies.\footnote{Beale, supra note 29, at 45.}

Determining the precise relationship between the punitive policies discussed above and crime rates is beyond the scope of this Article, but several related points warrant further discussion here. In considering whether the U.S. will be receptive to restorative justice initiatives, the critical point will be whether the policymakers and the public think restorative justice initiatives are likely to increase crime—regardless whether this view is supported by criminal justice scholarship. Moreover, politicians and the media play a critical role in shaping the public's attitudes on criminal justice policy. The impact of the news media and the political process in shaping public opinion is discussed in the sections that follow.

2. The News Media's Focus on Crime

Televisio...
for an average of 20% to 30% of the typical local news broadcast, with some channels devoting as much as 42%.81

Thus, television viewers in the United States were deluged during the 1990s with crime stories on the national and local news. These traditional broadcasts were buttressed with crime news from newer media sources, particularly the networks’ proliferating news magazines and the cable news channels. Network news magazines—which viewers see as news programs, though their producers characterize them as entertainment—proliferated in the 1990s and devoted 20% to 40% of their broadcasts to crime stories.82 Cable news networks also dove heavily into tabloid-style crime coverage, which could generate large increases in viewership. For example, the heavy tabloid-style coverage of the disappearance of Washington intern Chandra Levy in the summer of 2001 was credited with increasing the viewing audiences of CNN and the Fox News Channel by 44% and 136%, respectively, over the same period the prior year.83

This crime coverage was driven largely by economic and marketing considerations, rather than traditional journalistic considerations. In the case of local news, the nature and extent of crime coverage did not correlate with the crime rates in the viewing area.84 Instead, the content and style of local news broadcasts are driven largely by marketing considerations and varied by the perceived tastes of the local audience, as well as the station’s attempt to carve out a distinctive niche in its local market.85 Similarly, the increase in national prime-time coverage of local crime stories appears to be a response to economic pressures within the television industry.86 Certainly it did not correlate with crime rates, which, as noted above, fell precipitously during the 1990s. It should be noted that during the same period the entertainment media also provided viewers with a diet full of crime and violence. For example, one study of television

81HAMILTON, supra note 80, at 245.
82See RICHARD L. FOX & ROBERT W. VAN SICKEL, TABLOID JUSTICE: CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF MEDIA FRENZY 79 tbl.2.10 (2001) (showing that crime segments were included in more than 40% of 48 Hours broadcasts in 1997 and 1998, and in 29% to 45% of Dateline broadcasts between 1994 and 1998).
84HAMILTON, supra note 80, at 239 (describing study of 16,000 local news stories from fifty-seven stations in nineteen different markets which found that emphasis on crime in local news depends not on actual crime in area but on viewer interest in violent programming, and that, controlling for many demographic factors, viewers who report higher consumption of violent entertainment programs are more likely to watch local news with crime emphasis and to follow national or international news stories that involve violence, such as reports on military conflicts).
85See generally Beale, supra note 80 (discussing effect of media’s increased emphasis on violence on public’s attitude toward crime and criminal justice policies).
86Id. at 12.
content in 1998 to 1999 found that there were an average of eighteen serious
scenes of violence per hour in both broadcast and cable television.87

Crime and violence in the media can affect public opinion either directly, by
increasing the fear of crime and perceptions of the frequency of crime, or
indirectly, by setting the public’s agenda to increase the salience of crime as a
political issue.

There is a correlation between an individual’s consumption of programming
depicting crime and violence and his or her greater fear of crime and more
exaggerated perception of crime rates.88 Some researchers have concluded that
television viewing causes these exaggerated views.89 This line of thinking is
sometimes called the “cultivation hypothesis,” which posits that repeated viewing
of violent episodes cultivates the viewer’s misleading impression of the frequency
of such activity in the real world.90 Although the cultivation hypothesis has some
common sense appeal, it suffers from an important limitation: correlation does not
demonstrate any cause and effect relationship. It may be that those with
exaggerated fears of crime select programming that reflects their views. To date,
there has been no demonstration that viewing violence causes viewers to have
increased fears of crime or to believe that crime is more frequent.91

Other research, which stands on a firmer footing, establishes that the news
media play an important role in setting the public agenda, i.e., determining which
issues the public believes to be most important.92 This effect is most pronounced
when media is viewers’ chief source of public information and less significant
when the public has a great deal of personal contact and information.93 This
agenda-setting research provides an explanation for the continuing salience of the
crime issue throughout the 1990s at a time when crime rates were falling to
historically low levels. Most people’s sense of the seriousness of the crime

87S. ROBERT LICHTER ET AL., HOLLYWOOD CLEANS UP ITS ACT: CHANGING RATES OF SEX
AND VIOLENCE IN ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA tbl.3 (2002), available at
88See generally Beale, supra note 29, at 47–49 (discussing research on effect of crime and
violence in media).
89Id.
90The cultivation hypothesis is most closely associated with the work of George Gerbner. See,
e.g., George Gerbner & Larry Gross, Living with Television: The Violence Profile, 26 J. COMM. 173,
178–79 (1976) (discussing long-range study of trends in television content and effects). For a
discussion of Gerbner’s work and its critics, see RICHARD SPARKS, TELEVISION AND THE DRAMA
OF CRIME: MORAL TALES AND THE PLACE OF CRIME IN PUBLIC LIFE 86–93 (1992); see also Beale,
supra note 29, at 48 (noting that efforts to demonstrate that high television viewing causes
exaggerated fear of crime have been subject to many critiques).
91Beale, supra note 29, at 47.
92For a general discussion of agenda-setting research, see ELIZABETH M. PERSE, MEDIA
EFFECTS AND SOCIETY 43–44 (2001); Everett M. Rogers et al., A Paradigmatic History of Agenda
Setting Research, in DO THE MEDIA GOVERN? 225, 229 (Shanto Iyengar & Richard Reeves eds.,
1997).
93See Maxwell McCombs & Sheldon Gilbert, News Influence on Our Pictures of the World,
in PERSPECTIVES ON MEDIA EFFECTS 1, 11–12 (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillmann eds., 1986)
describing Shanto Iyengar et al., Experimental Demonstration of the “Not So Minimal”
Consequences of Television News Programs, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 848 (1982).
problem appears to be based upon what they have seen or read in the news, rather than on their personal experience. For these individuals, the news media’s constant focus on crime stories implicitly sends the message that crime is one of the most pressing issues facing our nation. Public opinion polls reflect the fact that many members of the public may have accepted this message, at least in the absence of more obviously pressing social problems. In that sense, the attacks of September 11, 2001, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the economic turmoil following the collapse of huge companies like Enron, have demonstrated that real news can force tabloid crime stories off center stage.

3. The Political Story—Rewards for Playing the Crime Card

A political focus on crime has supplemented the media’s focus. In the last third of the twentieth century, crime became a hot political topic in the United States, and politicians have vied to be the toughest on crime. After the Republicans deliberately adopted a “tough on crime” strategy in the late 1960s, they won almost every presidential election between 1968 and 1988; the only exception was 1976, on the heels of Richard Nixon’s resignation. The crime issue was so successful that Democrats decided to fight fire with fire. Bill Clinton campaigned—and won—on his record as a pro-death penalty governor who would use federal funds to hire more local police. Congressional Democrats recognized that their traditional emphasis on liberal crime policies had become a major political liability, and they shifted ground to take that issue away from the Republicans. Within Congress, mammoth crime bills passed with little opposition in the fall before each congressional election, despite the draconian penalties they imposed. One article concluded that “control of the crime issue is a necessary, though perhaps not sufficient, requirement for political victory in America.”

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94See, e.g., Public Agenda Online, Crime: People’s Chief Concerns (June 2000), at http://www.publicagenda.com/issues/pcc_detail.cfm?issue_type=crime&list=4 (reporting ABC News Poll’s finding that 81% of respondents based their opinion of crime problem’s seriousness on what they have seen or read in news).

95See id. (describing polling data on seriousness of crime issue).

96See generally Beale, supra note 29, at 40-44 (discussing crime and national political discourse).


98Chernoff et al., supra note 29, at 577.

99See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

100Chernoff et al., supra note 29, at 577.
Much of the recent federal crime legislation can be explained as symbolic politics, which deliberately exploits the public’s fear of crime. Indeed, a comparative study by Anthony King concluded that various features of the American political system produce extreme electoral vulnerability and thereby create much greater incentives for empty symbolic actions that play on public fears than do the British or German systems. In contrast to their British and German counterparts, King found that American members of Congress devoted a far greater share of their time to consideration of, and participation in, political activities to raise money and support for their next reelection campaign, and far less time to consideration of substantive issues. As a result, more legislative action in the United States is devoted to ensuring reelection than to solving underlying problems. In King’s view, this feature of the hyper-democratic American electoral system manifests itself dramatically in criminal justice legislation.

Viewing crime legislation as symbolic politics fits well with interest group models of the political system’s function. Powerful special interest groups can demand legislation conferring tangible benefits. In contrast, politicians can placate the general public with legislation or administrative action that provides only empty symbolic gestures.

Moreover, current punitive policies are strongly supported by two key interest groups that have a financial stake in continuing current policies and the increased rates of imprisonment. The individuals and groups that build and staff prisons have a strong financial interest in policies that will maintain or increase the rate of imprisonment and are an increasingly important political force. For example, the union representing correctional workers in California was the largest

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102 KING, supra note 29, at 43–46.
103 Id. at 140–54.
104 For a general introduction to interest group theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 12–37 (1991) (discussing political impact of interest groups as viewed from perspective of political science and economics). Interest group theory is discussed in the context of federal crime legislation in Beale, supra note 101, at 1248–53.
106 Id.
contributor to Governor Pete Wilson’s 1994 campaign. In general, the victims’ rights movement in the United States has also supported a political agenda of vindictiveness and punitiveness, including the death penalty, harsher sentences, and pretrial incarceration. Victims’ rights programs are also direct beneficiaries of the current “tough on crime” policies because a large share of their funding comes from fines levied against those convicted of federal crimes and their forfeited assets. There are also direct alliances between some victims’ rights groups and other interest groups that support the punitiveness agenda. For example, the Doris Tate Crime Victims’ Bureau, which was a driving force behind California’s three-strikes legislation, received 78% of its funding from the state prison guards’ union.

Although a survey of comparative political systems is beyond the scope of this Article, one historical fact tends to support the contrast Anthony King drew between the American system and those in which the criminal justice system is less punitive and restorative justice principles are more widely embraced. Death penalty scholars have noted the existence of popular support for the death penalty in other countries at the time of abolition (and often thereafter). Abolition has not been the result of popular demand but of legislative action contrary to public opinion. For example, when the British Parliament suspended the death penalty in 1965, only 21% of the public favored abolition. The vote in Parliament was treated as a vote of conscience. No party discipline was imposed, and most members did not see this as an issue on which to canvas their constituents, but rather one on which they elected to exercise their own judgment. At the time of this action, the majority of the public still favored the death penalty. Lord Windlesham called the decision “one of the most conspicuous, and courageous, ever taken by parliamentarians, irrespective of party, in the knowledge of the widespread extent of disapproval for their actions.” Although public opinion polls in Great Britain continued to show widespread support for the death

107 Id. (noting that California Correctional Peace Officers Association provided 84% of funding for “Crime Victims United” Political Action Committee, which contributed significantly to Wilson’s campaign).
109 Id. at 161.
110 Id. at 164.
113 Hodgkinson, supra note 112, at 639.
114 Rutherford, supra note 112, at 264.
penalty,115 restoration was debated and defeated on at least ten occasions with increasing majorities in Parliament.116 Similarly, when the death penalty was abolished in France, 62% of the public favored retention.117 The death penalty is also popular with the public in other countries that have abolished it.118

Given the recent political history, it is difficult to imagine a majority of an American legislature taking such a position based upon conscience, in the face of strong public opposition. Moreover, it is by no means clear that the personal views of legislators would lead them away from punitive policies and toward restorative justice.

4. Magnifying the Damage from Media and Politics—Cognitive Errors

Common cognitive errors also may have played a role in inflating public fear of crime and support for punitive policies in the United States. Several mechanisms that play a role in knowledge acquisition and attitude formation—availability, overgeneralization, (over) confidence, and biased processing of information—may all play a role.

It is easy to see how the twin factors of availability and overgeneralization can affect the public’s views on criminal justice policy. Cognitive availability plays a key role. Not all events and occurrences are equally subject to our recall, and the availability heuristic biases judgment because some examples and events stand out and are recalled much more easily than others. In particular, unusual and startling events are much easier to recall (more available) than common ordinary events. Judgments can be biased because some examples and events are more available than others. Thus news reports of horrific crimes (or miscarriages of justice) may be easily recalled when members of the public think about the criminal justice system.

The tendency toward overgeneralization means that people base general views on a few cases or even a single case. Overgeneralization multiplies the effects of availability. For example, a highly publicized series of abductions (and in several cases, murders) of children in 2002 (including Samantha Runion, Elizabeth Smart, and Danielle Van Dam) may have led the public to believe there

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115Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 111, at 12 (noting that in 1966, after suspension, 76% favored reintroduction, and support rose to 82% by 1975); Peter Hodgkinson, The United Kingdom and the European Union, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 112, at 193, 194–95 (noting that in 1992, for first time since 1950s, majority was opposed to restoration of death penalty for murder, with figures at 42% for restoration, 44% against restoration, and 14% undecided).

116Hodgkinson, supra note 115, at 195. However, 66% favored restoration of the death penalty for terrorist murders. Id. at 196.


118For example, a 1996 Dutch poll showed 52% of the population supported the death penalty. Thomas Sancton, A Matter of Life or Death, TIME (Europe), May 21, 2001, at 28. Despite public support for the death penalty, the Baltic states adopted the Sixth Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights, regarding abolition of the death penalty, because of their desire to be accepted into the European Union. Hodgkinson, supra note 112, at 635–38.
is an epidemic of such cases. In fact, there are 200 to 300 serious child abduction cases per year nationwide, of which fifty to 150 end in the child’s murder.119 Experts believe that the number of cases is stable or falling.120 Given availability and overgeneralization, however, the media’s focus on these cases may lead the public to perceive a crisis that calls for legal reforms.121

Once the public adopts the view that harsh measures are needed to deal with a crime wave or crisis, it is difficult to dispel this view. Even views based upon minimal information are typically held with great confidence.122 Thus, judgments based upon sensational news reports about atypical cases may continue to hold sway, even if the media also reports contrary evidence. Once individuals hold a certain point of view, they process new information in a highly biased fashion consistent with their views.123

These factors converge when public attitudes are founded on a visceral sense of danger, which can operate in an unconscious fashion that prompts us to vigilance. Intuitive responses based upon such cuing are held with great confidence and ordinarily cannot be altered by logical arguments or news reports suggesting a different point of view. Psychologist Howard Margolis argues that members of the lay public who learn of risks or dangers tend to jump to one extreme view or another (i.e., to regard a situation as very serious and requiring action, not at all serious, or one where action might do more harm than good), and to remain locked into that view.124 In the context of criminal justice policy, Margolis’s analysis provides a good model for understanding how the media’s focus on violent sensational crimes tends to promote the visceral sense of danger that prompts many people to jump to the conclusion that more action is needed to ensure public safety.125 This has been translated into calls for longer sentences for dangerous criminals. The hot cognition and affective responses that are provoked by violent crimes are especially strong and resistant to persuasion or arguments about the counterproductive effects of punitive proposals or the atypicality of the cases in question.

120See id. (citing data from U.S. Justice Department and National Center for Missing & Exploited Children).
121For example, the publicity surrounding Polly Klass’s abduction and murder played a key role in the adoption of California’s Three Strikes Law. See generally Vitiello, supra note 28, at 395 (discussing how California’s three strikes legislation is emblematic of excesses of U.S. crime prevention policy).
122Beale, supra note 29, at 59.
123Id. at 59–60.
124See Howard Margolis, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE EXPERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 76 (1996) (employing four-cell risk matrix, in which costs of taking precautions are on one axis and costs of doing nothing are on other, to represent and explain public attitudes).
125Beale, supra note 29, at 60–64.
5. Compatibility with Contemporary Sentencing Reforms

Finally, the restorative justice movement seems to be at odds with the sentencing reforms that are one of the hallmarks of the 1980s and 1990s. By 1999, eighteen states and the federal government had developed or implemented some form of sentencing guidelines. The main goals of these guidelines were to curb judicial and prosecutorial discretion, promote more uniform and consistent sentencing, and adjust punishment levels according to different categories of offenses and offenders.126 The sentencing guidelines also assisted states in projecting funds needed for correctional facilities.127 Depending on the state, sentencing guidelines reflected different philosophies. For example, “just deserts” or retribution was the underlying premise for the sentencing systems in Minnesota, Washington, and Oregon; whereas the Virginia framework reflected an incapacitation rationale.128

Almost all the sentencing guidelines reflected core principles that are in conflict with the restorative justice movement, namely, proportionality, uniformity, and transparency. Proportionality speaks to the match between the gravity of the offense and the sanction. Restorative justice does not use a standardized, objective measure of a crime’s severity, but instead focuses on a subjective understanding of the harm done to a specific victim and considers the specific circumstances of the offender.129 Uniformity requires that offenders with similar records, or who have committed similar offenses, receive similar punishments. By emphasizing individualized solutions, sentencing under a restorative justice scheme would not have uniform results. Finally, sentencing guidelines were designed to ensure that punishments be imposed in a transparent manner, according to clearly articulated rules. Restorative justice programs, in contrast, feature discretion in deciding punishments, something that the sentencing guidelines were designed to redress.130

The sentencing reforms focusing on uniformity and proportionality have their greatest appeal in the cases of the most severe offenses, where the community’s interest in public safety and the offender’s interest in liberty are at their zenith. Despite the apparent conflict between restorative justice and sentencing systems, it has been suggested that there may be an opportunity for “restorative sentencing” for nonviolent, noncareer offenders who have committed minor crimes.131 A potential model for incorporating restorative justice into

128Id. at 3.
130Lubitz & Ross, supra note 127, at 4.
131Id. at 5 (proposing that in North Carolina’s structured sentencing bands, those offenders who receive community-based sanction could be guided by restorative justice principles).
sentencing is the Oklahoma Community Sentencing Act of 1999. This suggestion is consistent with the trend, noted above, to incorporate restorative justice principles mainly in programs dealing with minor offenses.

V. OVERCOMING THE BARRIERS? NEW FACTORS IN THE EQUATION

Although the barriers to change are substantial, there are new factors in the equation. The presence of new situations and new information can serve as a catalyst for dramatic shifts in public opinion. In other contexts, such as fear of environmental risks, public opinion has been shown to shift dramatically—flip-flopping from one extreme to another—under certain conditions. Although reasoned arguments cannot ordinarily shift an individual’s opinions, an individual confronting striking new events or information may suddenly reassess and adopt a new opinion (now held with equal fervor to the one just abandoned). Several new factors have appeared in the criminal justice equation that might have such an impact on public opinion.

In the context of the death penalty, such a shift in public opinion may have been occurring before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Researchers Phoebe Ellsworth and Samuel Gross identified a significant drop in support for the death penalty and several new factors creating a situation conducive to change in death penalty support: new information, a new script, and a new option. The existing news media "script" of guilty defendants stringing out the legal process through endless appeals based on technicalities was supplanted by a new "script" of innocent death row inmates as victims of ineffective counsel and/or incompetent, unethical or racist police, who narrowly escaped execution for someone else’s crime. The new information came from scientific evidence, DNA testing, that proved innocence reliably in several highly publicized cases. A new option, a moratorium, was introduced, creating a middle ground that permitted death penalty supporters to reassess without reversing their position. At the same time, the Democrats’ move toward matching the Republicans’ punitive crime agenda made crime a less critical issue politically and reduced the


133 See supra text accompanying notes 50–58.

134 Margolis, supra note 124, at 121–43.

135 See Beale, supra note 29, at 63–64.

136 Gross & Ellsworth, supra note 63, at 7–12.

137 In what Gross and Ellsworth describe as the accepted "script," death penalty sentences were repeatedly reexamined during an interminable series of appeals by lawyers searching for "technicalities" to get the defendant off, while the prisoner lived the high life in prison and the victim’s family waited in agony for closure. Id. at 27–28.

138 Id. at 28–29.

139 Id. at 39.

140 Id. at 45–48.
importance of the death penalty as a defining credential for a conservative.\textsuperscript{141} Thus, several Republicans were leading figures in the moratorium movement.\textsuperscript{142} It is not yet possible to determine whether the shift Gross and Ellsworth identified was derailed by the terrorist attacks. As they noted, death penalty attitudes can be strongly influenced by singular events, such as a mass murder,\textsuperscript{143} and polls taken after September 11 show that death penalty support has remained constant or risen slightly.\textsuperscript{144} It is too soon to say whether this is a momentary pause or another more permanent settling of public opinion.

In the broader context of criminal justice, state budgetary pressures are now creating pressures to rethink punitive approaches. By the midpoint of 2002, many states were in serious financial difficulty; estimates of the total state budget shortfalls for fiscal year 2002 ranged from $27 to $38 billion.\textsuperscript{145} One response to the budget shortfalls has been to reduce sentences and to repeal or limit mandatory minimum sentencing laws, which are now perceived as unnecessarily harsh and fiscally onerous. As one state correctional official observed, "budget problems are making people ask fundamental questions about whether we can afford to keep on doing what we’ve been doing."\textsuperscript{146}

\textsuperscript{141}Id. at 45.
\textsuperscript{142}Id.
\textsuperscript{143}Id. at 52.

Polls taken after September 11, 2001 show no change in the support for life with no possibility of parole instead of the death penalty. Several polls have been conducted on this issue; although individual pollsters reported somewhat different rates of support, in each case the individual pollsters’ results were consistent before and after September 11. For example, Gallup found that 52% supported the death penalty and 43% supported life without parole in both May 2001 and May 2002. Compare Gallup Poll, May 10–14, 2001, with Gallup Poll, May 6–9, 2002. Both polls are available at LEXIS, CMPGN library, RPOLL file. Similarly, ABC polls in April 2001 and May 2002 both reported that 46% of respondents favored the death penalty over life without parole. Compare ABC News, Apr. 20–24, 2001, with ABC News, May 1–5, 2002.


Thirteen states modified their harsh sentencing laws in 2001 and 2002, and others had similar proposals under consideration.\textsuperscript{147} Many of the legislative changes occurred in states led by Republicans,\textsuperscript{148} and Republican governors in other states closed prisons as a cost-cutting measure.\textsuperscript{149} Some states that once led the way on harsh sentencing laws are now seeking ways to cut their costs by measures that include reducing incarceration. Louisiana, for example, which has the highest per capita incarceration rate in the nation, enacted legislation eliminating mandatory sentences for certain nonviolent crimes.\textsuperscript{150} The legislature also limited the application of the state’s three strikes law.\textsuperscript{151} It was estimated that the state will save $60 million per year in prison operating funds.\textsuperscript{152}

California, which passed the toughest three strikes law in the nation,\textsuperscript{153} exemplifies the conflicting currents. Voters have demonstrated support for some nonpunitive approaches, and the state faces the toughest fiscal pressures in the nation, but also counter pressures from key interest groups that favor a continuing emphasis on incarceration. In 2000, California voters approved Proposition 36, an initiative diverting nonviolent drug-possession offenders from prison into probation with court-mandated treatment.\textsuperscript{154} It was estimated that the law would save the state $200 to $250 million annually, as well as $450 to $500 million of decreased prison construction funds.\textsuperscript{155} California faced a state budget deficit of $23.6 billion in 2002,\textsuperscript{156} and prison expenditures—which now account for one of every fourteen dollars in the state general fund\textsuperscript{157}—seem like a logical place to cut costs. But this move would not be popular with a key interest group: prison guards and their union, who have been among Governor Gray Davis’s biggest campaign donors.\textsuperscript{158} Despite estimates that budget deficit and rising costs would require the state education cuts of $954 million, the governor continued with plans

\textsuperscript{147}Id. Nineteen states and the District of Columbia have made, or were proposing, sentencing changes in 2002. The states in question are Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, North Dakota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. Id. at fig.2.


\textsuperscript{149}Id. (reporting closings in Ohio, Florida, Michigan, and Illinois).

\textsuperscript{150}Id.

\textsuperscript{151}Id.

\textsuperscript{152}Id.

\textsuperscript{153}In a five-to-four decision involving a defendant who had shoppedlifted three golf clubs, the United States Supreme Court held that the imposition of a life sentence under California’s three strikes law did not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 (2003). Under the California three strikes law, the defendant was not eligible for parole until he had served at least twenty-five years.


\textsuperscript{157}Schiraldi & Greene, supra note 151.

\textsuperscript{158}Small Fixes, Big Payoffs, supra note 153.
to spend $335 million to build a new prison to hold the state’s declining prison population. In May 2003, after additional budget cuts the governor vetoed a bill estimated to cut costs by $70 million annually by enabling nonviolent prisoners to obtain early release dates to participate in work or education programs.

VI. CONCLUSION

It is impossible to say at this juncture whether the barriers to change are sufficient to shore up most punitive policies, or whether instead we are at a turning point, when support for punitive policies wanes sufficiently to permit restorative justice to become a major force. Given the conflicting factors noted above—including continuing media emphasis on crime, political benefits for politicians who appeal to the fear of crime, interest groups that benefit from high rates of incarceration, low crime rates, and state budget shortfalls—it would be difficult to predict the direction of public opinion even without the intrusion of several critical events in 2001 and 2002. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 and fear of future attacks are a major source of public anxiety whose implications for the issues discussed here are not yet clear. The public may see domestic acts of terrorism as entirely different from “normal” crime, or they might instead harden their attitudes toward all criminals. Further, the stock market collapse of 2002, accompanied by revelations of widespread corporate wrongdoing and rising unemployment rates will certainly affect public opinion, though again, the implications for penal policy are unknown, beyond the obvious point that penalties for white collar criminals are being increased. Finally, there are some indications that the violent crime rate may be starting to rise. Just as falling crime rates may provide a favorable context for progressive criminal justice policies, rising crime rates may reignite calls for tougher measures.
