A DARK SIDE OF VIRTUE: THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT AND REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

THOMAS M. ANTKOWIAK*

INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 2

I. REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

   VIOLATIONS ................................................................. 5
   A. Overview ................................................................. 5
   B. Remedies for Indigenous Peoples in International Law .......... 10

II. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT’S CASE LAW: REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ..................................................... 17
   A. Introduction ............................................................. 17
      1. Definition and Case Selection .................................... 17
      2. The Court’s General Criteria for Monetary and Non-monetary Remedies .................................................. 18
   B. Cases Involving Communities ....................................... 19
      1. Massacres .............................................................. 19
      2. Lands and Natural Resources ..................................... 30
      3. Political Rights ...................................................... 36
   C. Cases Involving “Single” Victims ................................... 38
      1. Cultural Discrimination ........................................... 38
      2. Disappearances, Extrajudicial Executions, Torture, and Rape .... 39

III. EVALUATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT’S INDIGENOUS REMEDIES ......................................................... 46
   A. Introduction ............................................................. 46
   B. Non-monetary Remedies ............................................. 51
      1. Land Restitution ..................................................... 52
      2. Legal Reform and Training Programs ......................... 56
      3. Rehabilitation Programs ........................................ 59
      4. Other Forms of Recognition, Restoration, and Accountability .... 62
   C. Monetary Remedies .................................................. 64

Copyright © 2014 by Thomas M. Antkowiak.

*Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. I thank the following colleagues for valuable comments on previous drafts: Roxanna Altholz, James Anaya, Perry Bechky, Kirsten Carlson, Ariel Dulitzky, Karen Engle, Alejandra Gonza, Alexandra Huneeus, Fergus MacKay, Tara Melish, Christopher Roederer, Oswaldo Ruiz, and Dinah Shelton.
INTRODUCTION

Indigenous peoples have endured grave injustices throughout history.\(^1\) Even after international affirmations of indigenous rights, massacres, forced removal, and persecution have continued.\(^2\) Of particular concern in recent years, extractive projects and other commercial developments have threatened their lives and livelihood.\(^3\)

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has now developed a

---


significant jurisprudence on these pervasive abuses against indigenous peoples. This case law is far more extensive than that of the other two regional human rights tribunals, the European Court of Human Rights, and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Also, unlike the various United Nations institutions that promote indigenous rights, the Inter-American Court issues binding and detailed judgments. As a result, the Court has become a world leader in the adjudication and redress of indigenous claims, influencing authorities across the globe. For this reason, this first close and critical examination of the Court’s reparations for indigenous peoples is vital.

With respect to non-monetary remedies and equitable relief, the Court has ordered the restitution of communal lands and other powerful measures, such as legislative reform, health care programs, cultural promotion initiatives, and public apologies. Yet the Court’s monetary reparations frequently disappoint. Examples include token sums ordered for plundered ancestral resources and a neglect of individualized compensation. In Saramaka People v. Suriname, the Court granted only $75,000 to the Saramaka community in compensation for timber valued in the millions. Market value was ignored by the Court, despite the petitioners’ requests, submitted evidence, and international legal standards. Nevertheless, only a few years later, the Court ordered the payment of nearly $19 million for a state’s expropriation of private land.

When not enforced with sufficient remedies, rights are diminished or even disregarded entirely. By undercompensating indigenous petitioners

4. The European Court of Human Rights has infrequently considered cases involving indigenous communities. See EUR. CT. H.R., CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE CASE-LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 19–21 (2011), available at http://www.echr.coe.int (referring only to a limited number of cases); Timo Koivurova, Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights Regarding Indigenous Peoples: Retrospect and Prospects, 18 INT’L J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 1 (2011) (“[T]here have been no landmark cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights . . . in favour of indigenous peoples”).


7. Id. ¶ 192.


in these ways, the Court fails to recognize them as full-fledged rights bearers. Fully entitled to collective and individual rights, they accordingly require appropriate remedies on both communal and individual levels. The Court’s crystallizing approach towards indigenous peoples demands prompt reform. This critique is urgent because indigenous cases continue to flow to the Court, and its criteria are increasingly adopted by UN authorities, regional human rights institutions, and national courts.

The Article proceeds as follows: Part I generally considers remedies in international law, and emphasizes the distinctive and evolving reparations standards for indigenous peoples. Part II examines all of the Inter-American Court’s reparations judgments for indigenous peoples. The Court’s cases concern single victims and whole communities; several community cases feature both individual and collective claims. Numbering nearly twenty in total, the judgments involve violations of the rights to life, communal property, personal integrity, equality, and political participation, among others. The section reviews nearly all of the remedies ordered by the Court, and highlights aspects that are particularly innovative or controversial.

Part III closely evaluates the Court’s remedial approach in the indigenous cases. To assess the judgments, this Part considers the following basic factors: 1) whether the reparations correlate with the kind and degree of harm proven before the Court; 2) whether the Court attends to the complex reality of indigenous petitioners; and 3) whether its orders have avoided excessive ambiguity, which allows states to evade their obligations.

Restorative justice methodology is proposed as a means for the Court to overcome these common challenges of remedial design. Faced with limitations and difficult choices, tribunals must adopt a victim-centered approach and “empower victims to define the restoration that matters to them.” Placing victims at the center of the process will immerse the Court in their reality, and tailor remedies more precisely to violations. While victims’ demands cannot always be met, their priorities must be understood—and then channeled into reparations that reasonably connect to the proven violations.

Part III then considers occasional deficiencies in the Court’s non-monetary remedies and recommends specific refinements. Primarily, it

---

that courts will enforce with the full complement of normally available remedies. The more extensive and potent the enforcement mechanisms, the more valuable a right becomes.”); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 887 (1999) (“[R]ights can be effectively enlarged, abridged, or eviscerated by expanding, contracting, or eliminating remedies.”).

encourages the Court to adopt more robust requirements for victim participation in the design and implementation of reparations. Overall, however, the Court’s pioneering approach in this area is applauded. With its non-monetary remedies, the Court has increasingly focused upon the reality of indigenous peoples, and has generally responded to their preferences and needs for restoration.

Next, Part III turns to the Court’s incongruous monetary reparations. Here, the Court frequently disregards the abovementioned parameters for remedial design. First, the Court’s compensation orders often do not correlate with the kind or degree of violation. To illustrate, an indigenous petitioner may show personalized harm, request individualized compensation, but only benefit from a collective remedy. Or a community may prove substantial economic damages, request market value compensation, and only receive a trifling sum in return. Second, at times the Court does not sufficiently account for the reality of indigenous petitioners, such as the difficulties they face in documenting environmental and cultural harm.

To conclude, Part IV urges the Court to commit to a victim-centered approach for monetary damages, as it generally has done for non-monetary remedies. In certain instances, it has proven reluctant to order justified cash compensation for indigenous individuals and communities, or even to closely evaluate their claims. If the Court does not reasonably respond to the way victims want to be restored, it will not adequately redress them. As a result, the Court will betray its mandate as a human rights tribunal and undermine the individual and collective rights of indigenous peoples.

I. REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

A. Overview

Numerous global and regional human rights agreements set out the right to a remedy. The concept of remedy includes substantive and procedural elements, and both are universally established. The procedural


element refers to a victim’s access to judicial, administrative, or other appropriate authorities, so that the claim of a rights violation may be fairly heard and decided. The substantive element constitutes the result of those proceedings—that is, the redress granted the successful claimant.

The main international and regional human rights treaties require an “effective” remedy or recourse. Without many explicit parameters, the international bodies formulating remedies for victims of human rights abuse initially turned to principles of state responsibility. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles) enumerate the prevailing rules on the subject. ILC Articles 30 (Cessation and non-repetition) and 31 (Reparation) provide, in part, that the state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to i) cease the act, if it is continuing, ii) offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require, and iii) make full reparation for the material and moral injuries caused by the act.

The commentary accompanying Article 31 explains that the state’s duty “to make full reparation for the injury” derives from the Factory at Chorzów case of the Permanent Court of International Justice. In that landmark decision, the Court held that “reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed.” Numerous international tribunals have accepted this

13. See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 11, art. 25; ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 2(3); European Convention, supra note 11, art. 13. An exception is the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.

14. The European Convention, for example, simply provides for “just satisfaction.” European Convention, supra note 11, art. 41. On the other hand, the American Convention on Human Rights offers more instruction for the Inter-American Court. American Convention, supra note 11, art. 63(1). See discussion infra Part II.

15. See SHELTON, supra note 12, at 50 (explaining that “[p]rior to the development of international human rights law” the law of state responsibility provided useful parameters for remedies).


17. Id. arts. 30, 31. Separating cessation and non-repetition from the concept of reparation represents a shift from earlier approaches, which considered both measures to be forms of reparation. See SHELTON, supra note 12, at 87. Now, however, cessation and non-repetition are understood as inherent “rule of law” obligations of the responsible state, independent from the notion of reparation. Id.

18. ILC Articles, supra note 16, art. 31 commentary.

principle of *restitutio in integrum*.\(^{20}\)

Reparation is further developed in ILC Article 34, which states, “[f]ull reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination.”\(^{21}\) Since full restitution, a return to the *status quo ante*, is impossible after many forms of rights violations, satisfaction must take a greater role in human rights law.\(^{22}\) Article 37(2) provides that “[s]atisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality.”\(^{23}\)

Cessation, non-repetition, restitution, compensation, and satisfaction are all key elements of the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles).\(^{24}\) The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Basic Principles in 2005.\(^{25}\) According to the Preamble, the Basic Principles “do not entail new international or domestic legal obligations but identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of existing legal obligations . . . .”\(^{26}\)

---


21. ILC Articles, *supra* note 16, art. 34. Restitution is the primary manner of remedy in interstate law, and the ILC considers satisfaction to be an exceptional measure, to be employed when restitution and compensation are insufficient. *Id.*, art. 35 commentary, art. 37 commentary.


23. ILC Articles, *supra* note 16, art. 37(2).


26. Basic Principles, *supra* note 24, at 3. The Basic Principles evade the contentious matter of defining “gross” violations of international human rights law and “serious” violations of international humanitarian law. A report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights concerning the Basic Principles noted that “shall” was only used in reference to a “binding international norm,” while “should” is employed in cases of “less mandatory” principles. *U.N. E.S.C.O.R.*, *Report of the*
Paragraph 18 of the Basic Principles establishes:
[victims] should, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of
the violation and the circumstances of each case, be provided with
full and effective reparation, . . . which include[s] the following
forms: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and
guarantees of non-repetition.27

According to the Principles, “restitution” means restoring a victim to his or
her original situation, such as returning confiscated property, whereas
“rehabilitation” includes “medical and psychological care as well as legal
and social services.”28 “Satisfaction” comprises several possible measures
including apologies, “full and public disclosure of the truth,” victim
commendation, or judicial and administrative sanctions.29 “Guarantees of
non-repetition” are equally varied, including legal reform and human rights
training programs.30

The Basic Principles’ major elements were later incorporated into
U.N. “hard law.” To illustrate, the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance provides for
compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of
non-repetition.31 The Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities calls for “all appropriate measures to promote the physical,
cognitive and psychological recovery, rehabilitation and social
reintegration of persons with disabilities” in the event of exploitation,
vioence, or abuse.32 Thematic treaties of the Americas, Africa, and Europe
now mandate similarly comprehensive redress for rights violations.33

Doc. E/CN.4/2003/63 (Dec. 27, 2002). In this regard, Dinah Shelton has criticized the Basic Principles
as overly conservative. SHELTON, supra note 12, at 147 n.211.
27. Basic Principles, supra note 24, at ¶ 18.
28. Id. ¶ 19, 21.
29. Id. ¶ 22. Note that the Basic Principles include measures “aimed at the cessation of continuing
violations” under the heading of satisfaction. This disregards the ILC’s important separation of
cessation and non-repetition from the concept of reparation. That is, placing cessation under a category
of reparation implies that, in the absence of a victim, the state has no obligation to desist from illegal
conduct. See SHELTON, supra note 12, at 149.
30. Basic Principles, supra note 24, at ¶ 23.
31. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
33. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication
of Violence Against Women art. VII, 33 I.L.M. 1534, 1536 (1994); Inter-American Convention Against
en/sla/dil/docs/inter_american_treaties_A-69_discrimination_intolerance.pdf; Council of Europe
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings art XII, May 16, 2005, COUNCIL OF
Even international criminal law has supported broad remedies for victims. The groundbreaking Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court requires the establishment of “principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation,” directs the States Parties to establish a trust fund for victims, and orders the Court “to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims.”

Subsequently, the U.N.-backed Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia was granted the competence to order “collective and moral reparations” to civil parties before it.

International human rights tribunals have both drawn from, and further developed, these advances in global law. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights recently ordered legislative and other broad measures in its leading judgment against Tanzania. The U.N. Human Rights Committee, established by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, has promoted multidimensional redress through commentary on the Covenant and various recommendations to states.

---

34. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3, arts. 68(1), 75(2), 79 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Furthermore, Article 68 provides that participation of victims will be allowed at all stages of the proceedings “determined to be appropriate by the Court.” Id. art. 68. For extensive treatment of the Rome Statute and the ICC, see Beth Van Schaack & Ronald C. Slye, International Criminal Law and Its Enforcement: Cases and Materials (2d ed. 2010).

35. E.C.C.C., Internal Rules [Rev.9], Rule 23 quinques (Jan. 16, 2015). In 2010, the ECCC issued its first judgment on reparations. The Civil Parties to the case requested apologies, medical care, educational programs, commemorations, and the “inclusion of the names of the Civil Parties in Case 001 in the final judgment, along with a description of their connection to [the prison camp].” Among other measures. Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Trial Chamber, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, at ¶ 652 (July 26, 2010). In response, the Trial Chamber merely recognized the names of the victims in the judgment, and ordered a compilation of the perpetrator’s “statements of apology.” Id. ¶ 683. These minimal reparations were affirmed on appeal. Case File 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/SC, Supreme Court Chamber, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Summary of Appeal Judgment (Feb. 3, 2012).


37. See, e.g., U.N. H.R., Int’l. Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, General Comment No. 31 [80]; U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, ¶ 16 (Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 31]. In response to individual petitions alleging human rights violations, the Committee has specifically requested that states implement the following measures: compensation, public investigation and prosecution, legal reform, restitution of liberty, employment or property, and medical care. See Shelton, supra note 12, at 184–185.
The Committee has stated that reparation to victims entails compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, and “measures of satisfaction, such as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.”

For its part, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights stands as the only international tribunal with binding jurisdiction that has ordered all such remedies. The depth and breadth of its reparations jurisprudence are unparalleled. Often in potent combinations, the Court has ordered wide-ranging measures such as monetary compensation, restitution, cessation, medical and psychological rehabilitation, apologies, memorials, legislative reform, and training programs for state officials, among others. This approach sharply contrasts with that of the world’s oldest human rights tribunal, the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court has historically favored only monetary compensation and declaratory relief, although exceptions to its constrained model have appeared during recent years.

B. Remedies for Indigenous Peoples in International Law

Indigenous rights in international law have developed significantly in the last three decades. Indigenous advocates have expanded classic international human rights norms to “express [indigenous peoples’] specific aspirations and self-understandings.” The expansion of indigenous rights

38. General Comment No. 31, supra note 37, ¶ 16.
40. See, e.g., DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 857–858 (2d ed. 2009) (summarizing the European Court’s limited reparations). More recently, the European Court has turned to new approaches to address its overwhelming caseload. For example, the “pilot judgment” procedure has led the European Tribunal to order national legal and administrative reform. See, e.g., Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, 2006–VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 57; Broniowski v. Poland, 2004–V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
42. Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 189, 237–38 (2001) (citing, among others, provisions on self-government and “the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources”); see also Lillian Aponte Miranda,
has led to a corresponding amplification of remedies in global law.

In 1989, the International Labour Organisation took a major step by adopting the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO Convention).\textsuperscript{43} In 2007, following over twenty-five years of difficult negotiations, the United Nations introduced its Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).\textsuperscript{44} Both instruments contain provisions on remedies for indigenous peoples.

Article 15 of the ILO Convention refers to a common situation where states retain the “ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources” corresponding to indigenous lands.\textsuperscript{45} Before exploring or extracting such resources, the Convention requires states to “consult these peoples.”\textsuperscript{46} The concerned communities also “shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive fair compensation for any damages.”\textsuperscript{47}

Article 16 addresses another frequent scenario: when indigenous peoples are forced from their lands. It provides, in part:

Whenever possible, these peoples shall have the right to return to their traditional lands, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to

\textit{Indigenous Peoples as International Lawmakers}, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 203, 207 (“Indigenous peoples have played a significant role in changing the legal landscape of human rights . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{43} ILO Convention, supra note 2. The ILO Convention has only been ratified by twenty-two states worldwide since 1989. Most are from Latin America. \textit{See id.} The Convention is certainly not without its critics. \textit{See, e.g.,} Sharon Venne, \textit{The New Language of Assimilation: A Brief Analysis of ILO Convention No. 169}, \textit{WITHOUT PREJUDICE}, 1989, at 53, 53 (arguing that the ILO Convention No. 169 is assimilationist and “far more destructive than its predecessor,” Convention No. 107).


\textsuperscript{45} ILO Convention, supra note 2, art. 15. Even when indigenous communities possess title to their territories, the law often establishes state ownership over water and subsurface resources. \textit{See, e.g.,} Inter-Am. Comm’n on H.R., \textit{Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natural Resources: Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human Rights System}, ¶ 180, Doc. No. 56/09, OEA/Ser.L/V/II (2009), available at \url{http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/docs/pdf/AncestralLands.pdf} [hereinafter Inter-Am. Comm’n Thematic Rep.] (describing this situation in the Americas); Dinah Shelton, \textit{Self-Determination in Regional Human Rights Law: From Kosovo to Cameroon}, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 60, 81 (2011) (“Subsurface mineral and water rights belong to the state in many countries, and even conveying title to indigenous peoples will not be sufficient to ensure that they are properly consulted and able to determine the nature and scope of projects affecting their lands.”).

\textsuperscript{46} The text continues: “with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands.” ILO Convention, supra note 2, art. 15.

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Id.}
exist . . . When such return is not possible . . . these peoples shall be provided in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at least equal to that of the lands previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future development.  

If communities prefer “compensation in money or in kind,” they may exercise that option. The Article concludes by emphasizing, “[p]ersons thus relocated shall be fully compensated for any resulting loss or injury.”

The UNDRIP, a non-binding instrument, offers more content on indigenous remedies. Still, efforts for more specific terms frequently derailed negotiations; as a result, details were not often achieved in the text. The central provision, Article 40, establishes:

Indigenous peoples have the right . . . to effective remedies for all infringements of their individual and collective rights. Such a decision shall give due consideration to the customs, traditions, rules and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and international human rights.

The UNDRIP generally calls for “effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for” actions that: deprive indigenous communities of their “integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities”; dispossess them of their territories or resources; force them to move, assimilate, or integrate; or “promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination” against them.

As for “cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without [the] free, prior and informed consent” of indigenous communities, states shall also provide redress, “which may include restitution.” Similarly, states “shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of ceremonial objects and human remains in their possession.” Both provisions require that redress procedures are developed “in conjunction with indigenous peoples.”

48. ILO Convention, supra note 2, art. 16.
49. Id. art. 16(4).
50. Id. art. 16(5).
51. See CLAIRE CHARTERS, Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: Global International Instruments and Institutions, in REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 163, 170–71 (Frederico Lenzerini ed., 2008) (noting that the redress provisions triggered some of the most contentious debates during the UNDRIP drafting process; some essential victories were obtained, however, such as replacing a “right to pursue redress” with the unencumbered right to redress).
52. UNDRIP, supra note 44, art. 40.
53. See id. arts. 8, 40.
54. Id. art. 11(2).
55. Id. art. 12(2).
56. Id. arts. 11(2), 12(2).
With respect to land remedies in particular, the UNDRIP elaborates to a greater extent than the ILO Convention. Forced relocation cannot occur “without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.” 57 When territories or resources have been used or damaged without their consent, “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation.” 58 Such compensation “shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress.” 59 The UNDRIP takes a major step forward by not requiring that indigenous communities currently possess their lands to receive redress. 60 On the other hand, when restitution is not possible, the instrument allows for a murky alternative: “other appropriate redress.” 61

Human rights authorities such as the United Nations treaty bodies and special procedures have begun to fill in the lacuna left by the ILO Convention and the UNDRIP. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on indigenous rights has urged extensive remedies for indigenous peoples, addressing “not only the impact on their environment or productive capacity, but also the impact on the social, cultural and spiritual aspects of their life.” 62 The ILO Committee of Experts, charged with monitoring the ILO Convention, seeks to provide protections for indigenous peoples by reviewing state reports and complaints. 63 However, the Committee’s recommendations to states are often oblique, and it avoids resolving individual land disputes and issues of valuation. 64

57.  Id. art. 10.
58.  Id. art. 28(1).
59.  Id. art. 28(2).
60.  CHARTERS, supra note 51, at 171.
61.  UNDRIP, supra note 44, art. 28(2).
63.  The full title of the Committee is the “ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations.”
64.  See, e.g., Charters, supra note 51, at 175 (noting that the ILO Committee of Experts “couches its recommendations in muted and indirect terms”). A recent sampling of decisions shows that the Committee primarily invites State Parties to submit information on the implementation of points relevant to the ILO Convention. Still, through its information requests, the Committee’s support can be perceived for important principles such as “fair compensation” for losses sustained by indigenous communities. E.g., Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Observation on the application of a Convention, C111 Brazil (2012) available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/TIP/1000:131000::NO:131000:P13100.COMMENT_ID:3057584; Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, Observation on the application of a
The U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC) has been more forthcoming on the subject of indigenous reparations. While its views on individual petitions have been restrained,65 the HRC’s concluding observations on state reports are quite demanding. For example, when considering Guatemala’s National Reparations Program, which attends to many indigenous communities, the HRC emphasized the importance of “comprehensive care with cultural and linguistic relevance, with a focus on psychosocial support, restoration of dignity and recovery of historical memory.”66 To address the discrimination of indigenous peoples in Guatemala, the HRC recommended legislative and policy reform, as well as education campaigns.67 With regard to access to justice barriers in particular, the Committee called for enhanced interpretation services and training programs for legal officials.68 Moreover, the Committee noted that Guatemala should “carry out prior and informed consultations with indigenous peoples for all decisions relating to projects that affect their rights.”69

Among the U.N. treaty bodies,70 the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee), which monitors compliance
with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, has attained distinction for its varied and meticulous recommendations for redress.\textsuperscript{71} In recent observations on Bolivia, for example, the Committee recommended specific legislative reforms, education programs to eradicate discrimination, as well as swift investigation and prosecution of various “acts of racist violence” against members of indigenous communities.\textsuperscript{72}

In a report on Rwanda, the CERD Committee urged the State to complete numerous actions on behalf of the Batwa people, whose territory had been “expropriated without prior consultation.”\textsuperscript{73} It called on Rwanda to “take all necessary steps, in consultation with and with the agreement of the Batwa, to offer them adequate land . . . so that they can retain their traditional lifestyle and engage in income-generating activities.”\textsuperscript{74} Among other measures, the Committee requested the State to ensure the community’s access to health care, education, and housing.\textsuperscript{75}

At the regional level, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has generally followed the Inter-American Court’s approach to reparations for indigenous peoples.\textsuperscript{76} The next sections review and evaluate this approach in detail. For its part, the African Commission on Human Rights has shown inconsistency in its reparative model, varying between “the total absence of remedies” and specific recommendations.\textsuperscript{77} For this reason, its 2010 decision on the Endorois community in Kenya is


\textsuperscript{74} Id.

\textsuperscript{75} Id. ¶ 16.

\textsuperscript{76} See Inter-Am. Comm’n Thematic Rep., supra note 45, ¶¶ 335–94 (citing extensively to the Inter-American Court while examining Inter-American standards on indigenous reparations and access to justice). The Court’s interpretations of the American Convention are authoritative for the Commission.

noteworthy.78 There, the African Commission found that the State, in creating a game reserve, “unlawfully evicted the Endorois from their ancestral land and destroyed their possessions.”79 Among other measures, the Commission recommended that Kenya return ancestral lands, recognize property rights, ensure access to religious and cultural sites, “pay adequate compensation to the community for all the loss suffered,” “pay royalties to the Endorois from existing economic activities,” and “ensure that they benefit from employment possibilities within the Reserve.”80

While the above institutions have made important contributions to the promotion of indigenous rights, they lack binding authority. In fact, the CERD Committee and others have occasionally faced formidable state resistance.81 And while several advance wide-ranging recommendations on indigenous remedies, “concluding observations” to states often cannot reach precision with respect to particular disputes or individuals. The reporting process of U.N. treaty bodies lacks the access to evidence and other resources available in court litigation. Even after individual complaint procedures, U.N. treaty bodies and regional commissions do not specify monetary damages beyond terms such as “just, fair and prompt” compensation.82

In contrast, the Inter-American Court exercises binding jurisdiction, and has issued numerous, detailed orders for both monetary and non-monetary reparations. It has required these remedies in a variety of


80. Id. at Recommendations ¶ 1.

81. See, e.g., CHARTERS, supra note 51, at 184–85 (noting that Australia and New Zealand have rejected CERD Committee views); Viljoen & Louw, supra note 77, at 4 (referring to cases where States did not implement any of the African Commission’s recommendations, and/or where States directly challenged the Commission’s findings). In 2011, the Inter-American Commission requested that Brazil halt construction on the Belo Monte hydroelectric power plant, a large initiative that endangered indigenous communities of the Xingu River Basin in Pará, Brazil. Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Precautionary Measures: Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River Basin, Pará, Brazil, PM 382/10 (Apr. 1, 2011), available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/representation/precautionary.asp. In response, the State withdrew its OAS ambassador and stopped paying dues to the regional organization. See The Americas, Chipping at the Foundations: The Regional Justice System Comes under Attack from the Countries whose Citizens Need it Most, THE ECONOMIST (June 9, 2012), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21556599/print.

82. E.g., High Commissioner of H.R., CERD Belize (GH/SP) (Mar. 3, 2012) (“Only when this is for factual reasons not possible, the right to restitution should be substituted by the right to just, fair and prompt compensation.”)
situations, for both indigenous communities and individuals. As a result, advocates, officials, and judges around the world now turn to the Court for specific standards and solutions. In fact, many of the reparations discussed above trace their origin to the Court’s exacting case law. As its global influence increases, a close assessment of the Court’s reparations for indigenous peoples is necessary.

II. THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT’S CASE LAW: REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

A. Introduction

1. Definition and Case Selection

This section examines cases predominately involving indigenous individuals and communities. While the Inter-American Court has not provided an exhaustive definition of indigenous peoples, it has emphasized that self-identification is important, and has offered characteristics that it finds significant: peoples who possess “social, cultural and economic
Traditions different from other sections of the national community,” who “identify[] themselves with their ancestral territories,” and who “regulate[] themselves, at least partially, by their own norms, customs, and traditions.”85 In addition, when several of these characteristics are demonstrated, the Court has considered certain “tribal” populations to be equivalent to indigenous groups.86 This Article includes these “tribal” cases concerning Afro-Latin populations such as the Maroons of Suriname.

2. The Court’s General Criteria for Monetary and Non-monetary Remedies

When the Court declares individuals or whole communities87 to be victims of human rights violations, they become “injured parties” under the American Convention and beneficiaries of reparations.88 The Convention provides:

[T]he Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.89

The Court has established that “reparations must be related to the facts of the case, the violations that have been declared, the damage proven, and the measures requested to repair the respective damage.”90 For the Court,
then, “general requests” with little factual or legal foundation are insufficient, as they impede an analysis of “their purpose, reasonableness, and scope.”

As for material damages in particular, the Court compensates the “loss of or detriment to the victims’ income, the expenses incurred owing to the facts, and the consequences of a pecuniary nature that have a causal nexus with the facts of the case.” On the other hand, to redress moral damages, the Court generally orders both monetary and non-monetary remedies. Moral harm is defined as “the suffering and grief caused to the direct victim and his next of kin, the harm to values that have great significance for the persons, as well as the changes of a non-pecuniary nature, in the living conditions of the victim or his family.” The Court determines cash compensation under moral damages “through reasonable application of judicial discretion and equity.” Non-monetary measures, for their part, are ordered “to commemorate and dignify victims, as well as to avoid the repetition of human rights violations.”

B. Cases Involving Communities

1. Massacres

Aloebotoe et al. v. Suriname opened a dark chapter of Court cases...
that never closed: massacres of indigenous and tribal populations in the Americas. In Aloeboetoe, army soldiers killed six persons suspected of belonging to an insurgency movement. The victims were Saramakas, an Afro-Latin community that the Court would subsequently consider a “tribal” population. Suriname eventually accepted responsibility for the deaths, prompting the Court to formulate reparations. To do so, it first had to determine the deceased victims’ successors.

The parties had disputed this point. The Inter-American Commission had urged the Court to follow Saramaka customs, which include matrilineal family configurations and the practice of polygamy. In contrast, Suriname had insisted that national civil law was applicable. The Court responded that “the obligation to make reparation . . . is governed by international law, which also applies to the determination of the manner of compensation and the beneficiaries thereof.” However, the Court then observed, “under international law there is no conventional or customary rule that . . . indicates successors. Thus, the Court has no alternative but to apply general principles of law.” It concluded that such principles recognize children, spouses, and ascendants as heirs.

The Court then applied these three categories to the Saramaka context, deciding to take into account the community’s customs “to the degree that it does not contradict the American Convention.”

98. The Court did not find it necessary to hold the State responsible for specific violations of the American Convention. See Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 11, ¶ 23 (Dec. 4, 1991) (“In view of the fact that the Government of Suriname has acknowledged its responsibility, the Court holds that the dispute concerning the facts giving rise to the instant case has now been concluded. As a result, all that remains is for the Court to decide on reparations and court costs.”).
99. Most litigation before the Court is initiated by the submission of the Inter-American Commission’s application. Since the year 2000, individuals alleging rights violations have been allowed to participate fully in all phases of the proceedings before the Court. Previously, they could only act through the Commission, until reaching the reparations stage.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Id. ¶ 61.
104. Id. ¶ 62.
105. Id. A similar constraint is found in international instruments such as the ILO Convention, Article 8(2). See ILO Convention, supra note 2, art. 8. Karen Engle states that this use of a “repugnancy clause” or “invisible asterisk” on indigenous rights represents an important limitation to the Court’s acceptance of customary law in Aloeboetoe. See ENGLE, supra note 1, at 125–36 (“These peoples shall have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible with
give preference to Saramaka tradition over national law because the community lived independently from the national legal framework; Suriname had not even provided “the facilities necessary for the registration of births, marriages, and deaths” of the Maroon population. Still, the Court did not wholly adopt Saramaka customs. It remarked that, “in referring to ‘ascendants,’ the Court shall make no distinction as to sex, even if that might be contrary to Saramaka custom.”

After identifying successors, the Court determined material and moral damages. Material damages were established for lost earnings and expenses incurred. In a rare move, the Court had sent a delegate to Suriname to collect relevant information for these calculations. The judgment set moral damages at $29,070 for each of the executed victims; this figure had been suggested by the Commission. But the Court only reluctantly ordered damages for the victims’ family members and dependents.

The Commission had alleged that the killings were racially motivated and urged collective reparations for the Saramaka community. The Court eventually ordered Suriname to reopen a village school and staff it with personnel, as well as to bring a local medical clinic back into operation. At the time, these demanding equitable remedies were unprecedented for the Court. The Court also stressed “the State is obligated . . . to inform the relatives of the fate of the victims and . . . the location of their remains.”

---

107. Id. ¶ 62.
108. See id. ¶¶ 90–95.
110. Id. ¶¶ 92–93.
111. First, the Court required significant proof to show economic dependency for material damages. See id. ¶¶ 69–73. On the other hand, the Court presumed that some parents had suffered moral damages. See id. ¶ 76. But the Court only ordered moral damages for the parents that it had not designated as successors, reasoning that those named successors would already receive compensation. See id. ¶¶ 76–77. Evidently, the Court confused the moral damages for the killed victims, to be inherited by their successors, with the moral damages that family members should receive in their own right.
112. Id. ¶¶ 82–83.
113. Id. ¶ 96. The Court granted these collective reparations despite stating: “[i]n practice, the obligation to pay moral compensation does not extend to such communities, nor to the State in which the victim participated; these are redressed by the enforcement of the system of laws. If in some exceptional case such [communal] compensation has ever been granted, it would have been to a community that suffered direct damages.” Id. ¶ 83.
114. Id. ¶ 109 (citing Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.)
regard “is of particular importance in the instant case, given the family relationships that exist among the Saramakas.”

Far less impressive was the Court’s modality for distributing monetary (material and moral) damages. It required two trust funds, one for child beneficiaries and the other for adults. Once the children reached majority, they became subject to the same conditions as adult beneficiaries. Adult beneficiaries could only withdraw up to 25% of their monetary reparations initially; subsequent withdrawals were allowed only on a semi-annual basis. Moreover, the Court called for a foundation “to act as trustee of the funds deposited . . . and to advise the beneficiaries as to the allocation of the reparations received or of the income they obtain from the trust funds.” Thus, while Aloeboetoe has been praised as remarkable for its acceptance of customary law, this recognition was limited, and—in any event—was ultimately overshadowed by the Court’s paternalism.

Eleven years passed until the Court heard another case concerning the massacre of tribal or indigenous populations. By then the Court had become more sophisticated in identifying and responding to the manifold consequences of human rights abuse. Still, almost nothing could have prepared it for Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala; no human rights court had ordered reparations for a tragedy of this magnitude. In 1982, an army commando unit stormed into the village of Plan de Sánchez, under the pretext that the community was aligned with guerrilla forces. Over 260 persons were executed in a single day, most of them members of the Maya Achi indigenous people.


115. Id.
117. Id. ¶ 105.
119. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
123. Id.
The Court’s reparations judgment, delivered in 2004, focused upon the numerous survivors. Because Guatemala had accepted the Court’s jurisdiction five years after the attack, the State was not held responsible for the actual executions. Still, Guatemala recognized legal responsibility for breaches of the rights to personal integrity, due process, judicial protection, privacy, property, and equal protection, as well as violations to the freedoms of religion, expression, and association.

The Court found that the survivors’ homes, animals, and other property had been destroyed or stolen. Villagers fled the area and were not authorized to return until 1985. Even then, they were constantly under the threatening surveillance of the military. While many pecuniary damages fell out of the Court’s jurisdiction, it still recognized the impact on the community’s “agricultural and other employment activities.” As a result, the Court ordered $5,000 in material damages to each of the 317 survivors. It also required that Guatemala implement, within five years, “a housing program to provide adequate housing to the surviving victims who live in that village . . . and who require it.” Since this program was ordered as a form of moral damages, it is unclear whether the Court asserted temporal jurisdiction over the houses’ destruction, which had occurred before Guatemala’s acceptance of the Court’s competence. In any event, the Court could have ordered material damages for the homes, because the State had formally recognized responsibility for property violations.

To assess moral damages, the Court weighed multiple factors. The Court noted that the victims were unable to bury their dead, or to carry out essential funeral rites. Constant military presence repressed the community’s traditional governance structure, the perpetrators of the massacre remained unpunished, and efforts at justice were met with threats.
and harassment. In recognition of the victims’ suffering and the deterioration of their physical and mental health, the Court ordered $20,000 in moral damages to each of the 317 survivors.

Turning to non-monetary measures, the Court made a significant pronouncement: “Given that the victims in this case are members of the Mayan people, this Court considers that an important component of the . . . reparation is the reparation that the Court will now grant to the members of the community as a whole.” Several of the reparative measures ordered for the community broke new ground.

On many occasions, the Court had ordered the publication of its judgments and public acts for the state to acknowledge responsibility for rights violations. However, before Plan de Sánchez it had never required that such publications and events be carried out in the community’s own language, in addition to the national language. The Court directed that a public event take place at the site of the massacre, with the participation of “high-ranking State authorities,” and “taking into account the traditions and customs of the members of the affected communities.”

The judgment also required a development program on an unparalleled scale. As noted above, in Aloeboetoe the Court had called for the State to reopen a local school and medical clinic. In Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, a judgment from 2001 discussed below, the Court had instructed the State to invest $50,000 “in works or services of collective interest for the benefit of the [community].” But Plan de Sánchez ordered, “in addition to the public works financed by the national budget allocated to that region,” the following to be completed within five years: maintenance and improvement of the community roads, sewage system, and potable water supply; establishment of a health center in the village; allocation of teachers “trained in intercultural and bilingual teaching for primary, secondary and comprehensive schooling”; and “study and dissemination of the Maya-Achí culture in the affected communities

134. See id.
135. Id. ¶¶ 88–89.
136. Id. ¶ 86.
137. See id. ¶ 102 (“The Court considers that the State must translate the American Convention on Human Rights into the Maya-Achí language, if this has not been done already, as well as the judgment on merits delivered by the Court on April 29, 2004, and this judgment. Guatemala must also provide the necessary resources to publicize these texts in the municipality of Rabinal and deliver them to the victims of the instant case.”).
138. Id. ¶¶ 100–01.
through the Guatemalan Academy of Mayan Languages.”

The Court had been encouraged to provide such ambitious reparations by the victims’ submissions, as well as by indications that the State would be receptive to reinforcing social services. In addition to those programs, the judgment required the housing program mentioned above and improvements to the community’s chapel. A broad medical and psychological treatment program was also mandated. Finally, because of the ongoing impunity in the case, the Court underscored Guatemala’s obligation to investigate the facts and “identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and masterminds.”

In 1986, a year before the crimes of Aloeboetoe, Suriname had perpetrated another mass murder. Moiwana Village v. Suriname eventually reached the Court and was decided in 2005. Government and militia forces attacked Moiwana Village on the suspicion that community members supported an insurgency movement. State agents and collaborators killed at least thirty-nine defenseless Moiwana residents, and wounded many others. Survivors fled the region and refused to return.

Like the victims of Aloeboetoe, Moiwana residents were Maroons; they belonged to one cultural group, the N’djuka, and the Aloeboetoe victims belonged to the Saramaka. Similar to Plan de Sánchez, the Moiwana massacre occurred before the State had accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the judgment refused to assess violations of the right to life. Although Suriname contested most allegations, the Court found violations of the freedom of movement, and the rights to personal integrity, due process, judicial protection, and property.

The Court observed that community members continued to suffer displacement, and, as a result, “their ability to practice their customary

141. Id. ¶ 109 (“The State also indicated that the measures of reparation could comprise the obligation of the State to provide social services, in accordance with international standards.”)
142. Id. ¶¶ 107–08.
143. Id. ¶ 98.
145. Id. ¶¶ 86(12), 86(27).
146. Id. ¶ 86(15).
147. Id. ¶¶ 86(15), 86(19).
148. See id. ¶ 4.
149. See id. ¶ 233 (finding no violation of the right to life).
150. Id. ¶ 233(1)–(4).
means of subsistence and livelihood” was “drastically limited.”151 Because of the ongoing deprivation of home and property, the Court had jurisdiction over these facts and presumed material damages of $3,000 for each of the 130 survivors.152 “In efforts to repair the loss of [their] homes,” the Court ordered another significant measure discussed below.153

The judgment called for $10,000 per survivor for moral damages.154 This assessment took into account several factors. Despite “N’djuka emphasis upon punishing offenses in a proper manner,” efforts at prosecution had been obstructed by the State, and no conviction for the attack had resulted.155 The reigning impunity and the N’djuka community members’ inability to bury their dead produced anguish and “spiritually-caused illnesses.”156 Afraid to return home, the community’s connection to its traditional lands—“of vital spiritual, cultural and material importance”—was severed.157

The petitioners had also requested that Suriname “rebuild the houses in the village and construct, furnish and staff fully-equipped and functional educational and health facilities, all with the prior informed consent of the victims and with their full cooperation.”158 In response, the Court ordered the establishment of a $1.2 million fund to be directed “to health, housing and educational programs for the Moiwana community members.”159 In contrast to Plan de Sánchez, which mandated specifics about such programs without indicating a budget, Moiwana Village determined the fund’s total amount and then set up a committee to decide how precisely to deploy those resources. The implementation committee was composed of three members: one chosen by the victims, another by the State, and the third upon the agreement of both parties.160

At first glance, the three-person committee could represent an enhancement to the Plan de Sánchez methodology. There, the Court did not directly ensure the input or participation of the victims in the development programs. Also, Moiwana’s inclusion of a state representative—if a supportive, dedicated liaison for victims—could

151. Id. ¶ 186.
152. Id. ¶ 187.
153. Id.
154. Id. ¶ 196.
155. Id. ¶ 195(a).
156. Id. ¶ 195(b).
157. Id. ¶ 196(c).
158. Id. ¶ 199(h).
159. Id. ¶ 214.
160. Id. ¶ 215.
facilitate negotiations with an intractable government, as Suriname had proved to be at the time. But the Court stopped short of fulfilling the petitioners’ request; it did not require the community’s “prior informed consent” and their “full cooperation” in any development initiative.\textsuperscript{161} The three-person committees are discussed further in Part III.\textsuperscript{162}

As for other measures to redress moral damage, the Court directed Suriname to investigate and prosecute, as well as to recover and deliver the remains of community members killed during the attack.\textsuperscript{163} It required the State to issue an apology during a public ceremony with the N’djuka leader and high-ranking government authorities.\textsuperscript{164} The Court also ordered the construction of a memorial, whose “design and location shall be decided upon in consultation with the victims’ representatives.”\textsuperscript{165} With respect to the community’s traditional lands, the Court instructed the State to implement an effective mechanism for their delimitation, demarcation, and titling—all with the victims’ participation and informed consent.\textsuperscript{166} Thus, various Moiwana remedies demanded the survivors’ involvement, moving away from the “top-down” approach found in judgments such as Aloeboetoe and Plan de Sánchez. Finally, as a novel form of reparation, the Court required safety guarantees for any community members who decide to return to Moiwana Village.\textsuperscript{167}

At the time of the Plan de Sánchez massacre, during Guatemala’s civil war, there were hundreds of other vicious attacks against indigenous peoples. The Guatemalan Army considered many communities to be the “internal enemy,” supportive of guerrilla initiatives, and so conducted “scorched-earth” operations against them.\textsuperscript{168} Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, a Court decision from 2012, concerned five of these brutal operations, all contemporaneous with Plan de Sánchez.\textsuperscript{169} Like the killings in Plan de Sánchez, the Río Negro executions themselves fell out of the

\textsuperscript{161.} See id. ¶ 199.

\textsuperscript{162.} See infra Part III.


\textsuperscript{164.} Id. ¶ 216.

\textsuperscript{165.} Id. ¶ 218.

\textsuperscript{166.} Id. ¶¶ 209–11.

\textsuperscript{167.} Id. ¶ 212.


Court’s jurisdiction. Still, the Court had competence over the case’s continuing violations, including, among others, forced disappearances, deeply flawed criminal investigations, forced displacement, and physical and psychological impacts upon the next of kin and survivors.

After accepting Guatemala’s “partial” recognition of liability and finding several human rights violations, the Court proceeded to assess reparations. Like previous cases, it stressed that both collective and individual measures were necessary. The Court made the unusual decision to combine material and moral damages. In equity, it ordered total monetary compensation according to the following parameters: $30,000 for each victim of forced disappearance, $15,000 for each surviving massacre victim, $10,000 to each survivor who had a family member disappear, and an additional $10,000 to each survivor who was a victim of slavery or involuntary servitude. Compensation already granted to victims under Guatemala’s National Reparations Program was subtracted from these amounts.

The judgment set out sweeping non-monetary remedies, most of which responded to the victims’ requests. Like Plan de Sánchez, the Court insisted on prompt investigation and prosecution, as well as public recognition of responsibility, and publication of the judgment. Both the event and the publication had to be translated into the Maya Achí language. In fact, many of the measures contemplated the Mayan worldview. When ordering the identification and return of remains, the Court opined that such steps would help close “the mourning process” and “contribute to the reconstruction of [the Maya Achí’s sense of] cultural integrity.” Further,
the State was obligated to cover funeral costs “in agreement with the next of kin . . . [and while] respecting their beliefs.”

The judgment even called for a program “for the rescue, promotion, dissemination and conservation of . . . ancestral customs and practices, based on the values, principles and philosophies of the Maya Achi people.”

This initiative “must be designed and executed with the active participation of the members of the Río Negro community” and their representatives. Also noteworthy, the Court mandated medical and psychological treatment consonant with indigenous medicine and customary practices.

The reparations did not stop there. The victims had requested the building of a museum to “honor the memory of the numerous victims of the internal armed conflict.” Before the judgment, Guatemala had indicated that it would agree to the museum. The Court approved, expressing its satisfaction with the State’s commitment.

Finally, the Court turned its attention to the case’s displaced communities. The Guatemalan government had relocated many Río Negro survivors to the Pacux settlement. But the Court observed that the living conditions in Pacux have not allowed its inhabitants to return to their traditional economic activities. Instead, they have had to participate in economic activities that have not provided them with a stable income, and this has also contributed to the disintegration of the social structure and the cultural and spiritual life of the community.

In light of the “precarious living conditions” in Pacux, the judgment ordered that the State build or improve: the health center’s resources, nutrition programs, roads, affordable electrical service, water, drainage and sewage systems, and schools, including “the establishment of a bilingual, Spanish and Maya Achi, high school education program.” No sum was specified for these purposes.
2. Lands and Natural Resources

In 2001, the Inter-American Court issued its leading judgment on indigenous land rights, *Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua*. The State had granted a logging company concessions to take timber from the community’s traditional lands. Despite provisions in Nicaraguan law that recognized communal properties on the Atlantic coast, the Awas Tingni lacked official title to their territory. The Court concluded that Article 21 of the American Convention (right to property) protected the Awas Tingni’s ancestral property rights. This ruling on an indigenous right to communal property was a first for an international human rights tribunal. The Court also found, among other violations, that the community members’ right to judicial protection was breached.

*Awas Tingni*’s reparations set the precedent for *Moiwana*’s property remedies, discussed above. Specifically, Nicaragua was ordered to adopt in its domestic law “the legislative, administrative, and any other measures necessary to create an effective mechanism for delimitation, demarcation, and titling” of the communal lands, all “in accordance with [the Awas Tingni’s] customary law, values, customs and mores.” The Court stressed that the State must ensure “full participation by the Community” in this regard. Second, upon implementation of the mechanism, the State was required to “carry out the delimitation, demarcation, and titling of the corresponding lands”; in the interim, it needed to “abstain from any acts that might . . . affect the existence, value, use or enjoyment of the property.”

As noted earlier, the Court instructed the State to invest $50,000 “in works or services of collective interest . . . by common agreement with the Community.” This sum was determined in equity to redress moral

---

189. *Id.*, ¶ 153.
190. *Id.*, ¶ 103, 151.
191. *Id.*, ¶ 155.
194. *Id.*, ¶ 164.
195. *Id.*
196. *Id.*
197. *Id.*, ¶ 167.
damages. The Court did not examine moral suffering in detail, only alluding to the Awas Tingni’s difficult situation “due to lack of delimitation, demarcation, and titling of their communal property.”

The Court never determined material damages. The brief on reparations was filed twelve days late; the Court considered the delay unreasonable and rejected the submission. The brief, prepared by the Awas Tingni community’s attorneys, requested a separate reparations phase to allow for the presentation of evidence and expert testimony. It also set out a “preliminary declaration” that outlined substantial moral and material damages. For its part, the State had maintained that the concession had not led to the harm of community lands. Unfortunately, the Court refused to assess these significant claims and arguments.

Three cases against Paraguay—Yakye Axa Community, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community, and Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community—concerned displaced indigenous communities who had been unable to reclaim their traditional lands owing to flawed administrative procedures. Incapable of practicing customary modes of subsistence in temporary settlements, these communities endured harrowing living conditions. In each case, the Court found violations of the rights to life, due process, judicial protection, and property, among others. With respect to the right to life, Yakye Axa held that the community members’ right to vida digna...
(officially translated in the judgment as “decent life”) was breached, owing to abysmal conditions in the settlements. Xákmok Kásek concluded that Paraguay was responsible for two separate right-to-life violations: the first for infringing the vida digna of the entire community, like Yakye Axa, and the second for not acting to prevent thirteen deaths, which were traced to the settlement’s health conditions. In Sawhoyamaxa, the Court held the State responsible for nineteen such deaths, most of them children of the community. Unaccountably, Sawhoyamaxa did not declare a distinct violation of vida digna.

The Court took a similar approach to material damages in all three judgments. In compensation for the numerous efforts conducted before national authorities to recover the lands, the Court awarded sums in equity to be delivered to each community’s leaders. However, it declined to consider lost earnings of the communities, or the substantial “effect that not having possession of their traditional habitat has had on [their] cosmovision and on [their] members.”

As for moral damages, the judgments again ordered development funds “as compensation for the non-pecuniary damage” suffered by the communities. The Court required roughly comparable amounts to be invested in educational, housing, agricultural, and health projects. Three-member committees, described above, were charged with program implementation. However, in all three cases, petitioners had demanded a stronger role for community members in project design and execution.

214. See Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 202(g) (“the
In all three cases, requests were also made for individualized payments for moral damages, aside from community funds. Nevertheless, Yakye Axa called for only collective monetary and non-monetary remedies. In Sawhoyamaxa, the Court ordered payment of $20,000 for each of the 17 community members whose death was attributed to the State. Xákmok Kásek, in a new formulation, required Paraguay to pay $260,000 to “the leaders of the Xákmok Kásek Community” so that, “pursuant to their customs and traditions, they distribute the amounts due to each of the [thirteen] family members of the individuals who died or invest the money as they see fit.” That is, rather than paying $20,000 directly to the next of kin, community leaders were authorized to distribute the funds. From an individual rights perspective, these orders are troubling, especially if the payments are not distributed in an equitable fashion.

On the other hand, the non-monetary remedies granted by the Court were generous in the Paraguayan cases. All three decisions ordered: the prompt return of ancestral territories; the creation of “an effective mechanism for indigenous peoples’ claims to ancestral lands”; the provision of medical, nutritional, educational, and other basic services while the communities remain landless; and the publication and dissemination of the judgments. Also of interest, both Sawhoyamaxa and Xákmok Kásek required the establishment of a registration and documentation program, as many community members had not been implemented of which [development] programs must be previously consented to by the interested parties and must adjust to their customs”); Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 197(c); Sawhoyamaxa Community’s Brief containing Pleadings, Motions, and Evidence, Part IV, available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos.cfm; Xákmok Kásek Community’s Brief containing Pleadings, Motions, and Evidence, Part IV (copy provided by the Inter-American Court’s Secretariat and on file with author).


217. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 226 (“That amount must be distributed among the next of kin of the victims pursuant to the cultural practices of the Sawhoyamaxa Community.”).


219. Id.

220. See infra Part III.

registered at birth and lacked official identification.\textsuperscript{222}

In 2007, the Maroons returned to the Court to litigate \textit{Saramaka People v. Suriname}.\textsuperscript{223} In \textit{Saramaka}, the Court analyzed resource extraction from communal lands to a far more detailed extent than in the \textit{Awas Tingni} judgment. The petitioners had denounced the State’s logging and mining concessions on their traditional lands—territories that nonetheless had not been officially recognized by Suriname.\textsuperscript{224} In response, the Court held that Suriname should not have granted various concessions within Saramaka territory without complying with certain safeguards, including prior consultation, benefit-sharing, and impact assessments.\textsuperscript{225} As a result, the Court found violations of the rights to property, juridical personality, and judicial protection.\textsuperscript{226}

After assessing the evidence, the Court determined that “a considerable quantity of valuable timber was extracted” from the territory without any compensation, and the community was “left with a legacy of environmental destruction, despoiled subsistence resources, and spiritual and social problems.”\textsuperscript{227} The State had also issued “small-scale” gold mining concessions within traditional Saramaka land.\textsuperscript{228} By the date of the litigation, however, no gold had been mined from traditional Saramaka territory.\textsuperscript{229}

For material damages, the Court ordered Suriname to pay only $75,000 to compensate the community for the timber taken and related property damage.\textsuperscript{230} The Court determined this figure “based on equitable

\begin{thebibliography}{99}


\bibitem{224} Id. ¶ 93.

\bibitem{225} Id. ¶ 129.

\bibitem{226} Id. ¶ 214(1)–(3).

\bibitem{227} Id. ¶ 153.

\bibitem{228} Id. ¶ 156.


\end{thebibliography}
grounds,” without explaining its calculations further.\textsuperscript{231} It added the $75,000 to a $600,000 community development fund, which it established to redress the “suffering and distress” of the Saramaka community.\textsuperscript{232}

The community development fund, again created as a form of moral reparation, was directed by the Court “to finance educational, housing, agricultural, and health projects, as well as provide electricity and drinking water, if necessary, for the benefit of the Saramaka people.”\textsuperscript{233} To supervise implementation, the Court appointed a three-person committee, which “shall consult with the Saramaka people before decisions are taken and implemented.”\textsuperscript{234} Yet the petitioners had requested more control, urging that all development projects be “determined and implemented with the informed participation and consent of the Saramaka people.”\textsuperscript{235}

On the positive side, the Court’s other remedies required significant community involvement. Suriname was directed to demarcate and grant collective title for Saramaka territory “in accordance with their customary laws, and through previous, effective and fully informed consultations with the Saramaka people.”\textsuperscript{236} The State was also required to grant the community legal recognition of their “collective juridical capacity . . . in accordance with their communal system, customary laws, and traditions,” and adopt national legislation to give legal effect to those rights “through prior, effective and fully informed consultations with the Saramaka people.”\textsuperscript{237} Lastly, Suriname was ordered to publish and broadcast selections of the judgment, in both Dutch and Saramaka.\textsuperscript{238}

\textit{Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador}, handed down in 2012, concerned the Sarayaku, an indigenous community from the Ecuadorian Amazon.\textsuperscript{239} While the State had granted a communal property title to the Sarayaku, it had reserved a number of rights, including rights to subsurface natural resources.\textsuperscript{240} Ecuador eventually signed a contract with a foreign company to start oil exploration.\textsuperscript{241} The Sarayaku resisted these

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{231} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{232} Id. ¶ 200–01.
\item \textsuperscript{233} Id. ¶ 201.
\item \textsuperscript{234} Id. ¶ 202.
\item \textsuperscript{235} Id. ¶ 192 (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{236} Id. ¶ 194.
\item \textsuperscript{237} Id. ¶ 194(c).
\item \textsuperscript{238} Id. ¶ 197.
\item \textsuperscript{239} See generally Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 (June 27, 2012).
\item \textsuperscript{240} Id. ¶ 62.
\item \textsuperscript{241} Id. ¶ 64.
\end{itemize}
activities, which damaged their lands and threatened their way of life.242 The Court found breaches of the rights to collective property, life, personal integrity, due process, and judicial protection.243

Sarayaku replicated Saramaka’s disappointing material damages. The judgment granted the community only $90,000 for environmental damage—including the “destruction” of Sarayaku forests—”suspension of production activities,” and expenses such as travel and legal costs.244 The Court preferred to allocate far more value, $1,250,000, to the community development fund for “the suffering caused to the People and to their cultural identity.”245 Notably, the Court loosened its paternalistic methodology in Sarayaku, declaring that the fund “may be invested as the People see fit, in accordance with its own decision-making mechanisms and institutions.”246 It is true that the Court found it necessary to offer guidance, suggesting “educational, cultural, food security, health care and eco-tourism development projects.”247 Nevertheless, for the first time, full discretion was given to the community, and the three-person implementation committee was finally abandoned.

Sarayaku also required a series of demanding equitable remedies, including the removal of explosives left throughout the territory, as well as other cleanup and reforestation measures.248 In addition, Ecuador was instructed to “implement effectively the right to prior consultation” of indigenous peoples, ensure “the participation of the communities themselves” in legislative and administrative reform, train government officials on indigenous rights, and conduct a public acceptance of liability “in the presence of senior State officials and [community] members” in Kichwa and Spanish. Finally, the State was ordered to broadcast, “through a radio station with widespread coverage in the southeastern Amazonian region, the official summary of the Judgment, in Spanish, Kichwa and other indigenous languages of this subregion.”249

3. Political Rights

In YATAMA v. Nicaragua, an indigenous organization’s candidates

242. Id. ¶¶ 92–123.
243. Id. ¶ 341.
244. Id. ¶¶ 313, 316.
245. Id. ¶ 323.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. ¶¶ 289–308.
249. Id.
were denied participation in municipal elections. The Court found that the State’s electoral laws placed discriminatory restrictions upon the candidates’ political rights. The candidates had also been unjustly prevented from contesting their exclusion through national tribunals. According to the Court, then, Nicaragua violated the petitioners’ political and due process rights, as well as their right to equality.

Assessing documentation and testimony, the Court observed that the candidates had incurred various expenses during the electoral campaign. It refused to compensate loss of earnings, however, because “they do not have a causal relationship with the violations declared in the judgment.” As for moral damages, the Court recognized that selection as a political candidate signifies “a great honor among the members of the indigenous and ethnic communities of the Atlantic Coast.” When unjustly excluded from the elections, the candidates felt “frustration” at being unable to represent their communities, and concluded that the treatment was owed to discriminatory motives.

In compensation for both material and moral damages, the Court ordered that the State pay $80,000 to the YATAMA organization, “which should distribute it as appropriate.” Thus, while the Court determined that dozens of individuals were victims of rights violations, and petitioners had requested both individual and group remedies, it only awarded reparations to the collectivity. For its part, YATAMA was charged with the daunting—and judicial—task of disaggregating economic and moral damages. The judgment’s non-monetary remedies were also of a collective, or societal, character. The Court ordered legislative reforms to eliminate discriminatory effects. The decision was also to be published and broadcast on radio in the languages spoken on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast: Spanish, Miskito, Sumo, Rama, and English.

251. Id. ¶ 229.
252. Id. ¶ 176.
253. Id. ¶ 275.
254. Id. ¶ 245.
255. Id. ¶ 246.
256. Id. ¶ 247.
257. Id. ¶ 248.
258. Id. ¶¶ 252–259.
259. Id. ¶ 253.
C. Cases Involving “Single” Victims

Mirroring Latin America’s tumultuous modern history, the Court has heard numerous cases of forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture, rape, and discrimination. These crimes have victimized many indigenous individuals and their families. This section begins the review with López-Álvarez v. Honduras, a 2006 judgment about a Garifuna leader’s freedom of expression and right to equality.

1. Cultural Discrimination

López-Álvarez endured coercion to self-incriminate, inhuman treatment, detention for over six years in abysmal conditions—despite never having been convicted—and a prohibition from speaking his Garifuna language while in prison. Consequently, the Court found violations of his rights to personal integrity, liberty, equality, due process, and judicial protection, as well as his freedom of expression.

The Court granted López-Álvarez $25,000 in lost wages. His family members were awarded $10,000 for various expenses. As for non-pecuniary damages, despite considering the varied abuses suffered by López-Alvarez, the Court only ordered the payment of $15,000. It granted lesser amounts to certain family members, who were considered victims in their own right.

The equitable remedies also dashed the petitioners’ hopes. The Court called for a criminal investigation, improved detention conditions in

---

260. For convenience, the Article refers to this category as “single victims,” although the cases may actually involve several victims—generally, the principal victim and his or her family members.

261. The judgment in Gudiel-Álvarez v. Guatemala, concerning twenty-six victims of forced disappearance, mentions that perhaps two victims belonged to indigenous communities. Gudiel-Álvarez v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 253, ¶ 189 (Nov. 20, 2012). But this was not a salient aspect of the case, nor were the remedies ordered specific to indigenous peoples. As a result, I omit this judgment from the present study.


263. According to the Court, “[t]he Garifunas are Afro-descendants mixed with indigenous people, whose origin goes back to the XVIII century and whose Honduran villages were developed in the North Coast of the Atlantic littoral region. Their economy is based on, among others, traditional fishing, cattle raising, the cultivation or rice, banana, and yucca, and the traditional production of fishing instruments. Male polygamy is admissible within the Garifuna culture. The Garifunas, as an ethnic minority, have their own culture, which has had great influence of the development of the Honduran culture.” Id. ¶ 54(1).

264. Id. ¶ 225.
265. Id. ¶ 194.
266. Id. ¶ 195.
267. Id. ¶ 202.
268. Id. (having suffered violations to their personal integrity).
Honduras, non-specified human rights training for prison officers, and the publication of the judgment. But none of the measures directly addressed ethnic issues, despite demands from López-Álvarez’s attorneys. For example, they urged “the measures necessary so that the Indian and Black populations may have complete access to justice; and especially so that they be allowed to use their mother tongue in all procedural actions and in the detention centers.” The Court’s refusal to order reparations contemplating the Garifuna community at large is incongruous given the decision’s pointed remarks on cultural discrimination, and the remedies required in contemporaneous judgments such as Moiwana and Yakye-Axa.

2.Disappearances, Extrajudicial Executions, Torture, and Rape

Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, decided on the merits in 2000, was the Court’s first indigenous disappearance case. It was a high-profile matter, as it involved Efraín Bámaca-Velásquez, a guerrilla commander, and his U.S. spouse, Jennifer Harbury, who brought international attention to his plight. Guatemalan soldiers captured Bámaca-Velásquez, held him in clandestine detention centers, and tortured him. He was last seen tied to a bed in a military hospital, where he was questioned and abused. The Court found violations of his rights to life, liberty, humane treatment, due process, and judicial protection, among others.

While the Court still possessed relatively little experience with indigenous petitioners, it demonstrated sensitivity to Bámaca’s Mayan heritage. Even in calculating lost wages, the Court acknowledged the “Mayan custom that the elder son usually contributes to the sustenance of his parents and siblings.” Significant expenses were granted to

269. Id. ¶¶ 207–210.
270. Id. ¶ 205(a)(iv).
271. Id. ¶¶ 166–174.
272. See infra Part III(B).
276. Id. ¶ 121(1).
277. Id. ¶ 230.
278. Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 91, ¶ 52 (Feb. 22, 2002). Note that the Court did not grant Bámaca-Velásquez compensation for lost wages for the time that he served as a “guerrilla commander”: because of “the characteristics of that activity, the Court does not deem it appropriate to establish a compensation regarding the income of the
compensate Harbury’s ceaseless efforts to determine Bámaca’s whereabouts. The Court granted $100,000 for Bámaca’s suffering, $80,000 for Harbury’s ordeal, and lesser amounts to other family members.

The central objective of Bámaca’s family was to locate his remains and conduct Mayan funeral ceremonies, but these attempts had been met with fierce resistance. As a result, the Court directed Guatemala to “provide the necessary conditions not only to determine the whereabouts of the victim, but also to take those remains to the place chosen by his next of kin, at no cost to them.” In doing so, the Court stressed, “for the Mayan culture, [and the] Mam ethnic group, funeral ceremonies ensure the possibility of the generations of the living, the deceased person, and the deceased ancestors meeting anew.” Sadly, as of this writing, and over ten years after the reparations judgment, Bámaca’s remains still have not been recovered.

The Court also mandated “a national exhumations program,” which Guatemala had demonstrated willingness to implement. Another vague order required that the State “adopt the legislative and any other measures required to adapt the Guatemalan legal system to international human rights norms and humanitarian law.” Finally, Guatemala had to conduct a criminal investigation, publish excerpts of the Court’s judgment, and publicly recognize its responsibility for the facts.

In Escué-Zapata v. Colombia, the Court considered the detention and prompt execution by the Colombian Army of Germán Escué-Zapata, an indigenous leader from the Nasa community. After assessing the State’s victim during that period.”}

279. *Id.* ¶ 51.
280. *Id.* ¶ 55 (granting a total of $125,000 to Ms. Harbury for pecuniary damages).
281. *Id.* ¶ 66.
282. *Id.* ¶ 69.
283. *Id.* ¶ 82.
286. *Id.* ¶ 85.
287. *Id.* ¶¶ 78–84.
acknowledgment of responsibility, the Court established violations of the rights to life, humane treatment, personal liberty, and the “inviolability of private residence,” among others. It then granted lost wages in equity, and compensated various expenses of family members.

With respect to moral damages, the Court set $50,000 as compensation for Escué-Zapata’s suffering. Lesser amounts were ordered for family members. Notably, the Court took into account that his relatives waited four years “until the State delivered [Escué-Zapata’s] mortal remains,” leading to severe “moral and spiritual repercussions” for the Nasa culture.

Some of the judgment’s non-monetary measures were unexpected. Consistent with Court case law, the petitioners had requested a monument to commemorate Escué-Zapata’s life. Instead, the Court required Colombia to establish a $40,000 fund under Escué-Zapata’s name “so that the Community can invest it in collective interests, service or works for its own benefit, in accordance with [its] . . . decisions, usages, customs and traditions.” Escué-Zapata was the judgment’s principal victim—not his entire indigenous community, not even several members of the community. Under these circumstances, an order for a communal fund appears unprecedented in the Court’s jurisprudence.

Previously, the Court had ordered scholarships for the children of victims. In addition to providing full expenses for Escué-Zapata’s daughter’s university education (tuition, materials, room and board), the Court added a creative new element: that the State cover all transportation costs for visits to her community so that she can maintain her familial and cultural ties while studying. Also of interest, the petitioners had requested the establishment of a university chair in honor of Escué-Zapata;


289. Id. ¶ 196.
290. Id. ¶¶ 143–145.
291. Id. ¶ 156.
292. Id. ¶ 155.
293. Id. ¶ 153.
294. Id. ¶ 157.
295. Id. ¶ 168.
296. Id. ¶ 131 (“the members of the Indigenous Community . . . will not be considered ‘injured part[ies]’ under the terms of Article 63(1) of the Convention.”). On the other hand, some of Mr. Escué-Zapata’s family members were deemed victims of personal integrity violations. Id. ¶ 196.
the State accepted the proposal during proceedings before the Court. 299
Furthermore, the judgment called for more typical remedies, such as a
criminal investigation, medical and psychological treatment for Escué-
Zapata’s family members—“taking into account” their “customs and
traditions”—and the judgment’s publication in Spanish and Nasa Yute. 300
Colombia was also required to publicly recognize liability through an event
with community leaders in both Spanish and Nasa Yute. 301

Florencio Chitay-Nech, the mayor of San Martín Jilotepeque, was
another Mayan victim of the Guatemalan internal conflict. 302 During
proceedings before the Court for Chitay-Nech v. Guatemala, the State
accepted legal responsibility for his forced disappearance. 303 After
evaluating the record, the Court affirmed violations of his rights to personal
liberty, personal integrity, life, juridical personality, and participation in
government. 304

Unlike many indigenous victims before the Court, Chitay-Nech had a
substantial and well-documented income as a public official, permitting an
order for $75,000 in lost wages. 305 His family was also compensated for
some expenses, but received far less than what they requested. 306 “In
attention to the compensation ordered by the Court in other cases of forced
disappearances” and the acute suffering of Chitay-Nech, the judgment
required $80,000 in moral damages. 307 The Court also ordered significant
amounts—between $40–50,000—for his children, finding that they had
suffered constant persecution, displacement, and “denial of justice.” 308

The Court took a more conservative approach to equitable remedies
than it had in Escué-Zapata, rejecting petitioners’ requests for memorial
scholarships and a local museum. 309 Instead, the Court issued a modest
order to install a “commemorative plaque” in a “public place significant to
the next of kin.” 310 Moreover, because the victim’s remains still had not

299. *Id.* ¶ 178.
300. *Id.* ¶ 172.
301. *Id.*
302. Chitay-Nech v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-
303. *Id.* ¶¶ 13–21.
304. *Id.* ¶ 309.
305. *Id.* ¶ 267. Petitioners actually asked for much more, pointing to Mr. Chitay-Nech’s increasing
earning potential.
306. *Id.* ¶¶ 265–266.
307. *Id.* ¶ 278.
308. *Id.*
309. *Id.* ¶ 249.
310. *Id.* ¶ 251.
been found after nearly three decades, the State was required to locate and return them as soon as possible, in order to permit a burial “in accordance with [Mayan] beliefs and close the mourning process.”

Finally, the Court directed Guatemala to continue its criminal investigation, publicly accept responsibility in Spanish and Mayan Kaqchikel, publish the judgment, broadcast it on the radio in both languages, and provide medical and psychological treatment to Chitay-Nech’s children.

In *Tiu-Tojín v. Guatemala*, the State again recognized liability before the Court, this time for the forced disappearances of Maria Tiu-Tojín and her daughter Josefa. In fact, Guatemala had already granted some reparations in response to the Inter-American Commission’s recommendations. Such measures included an apology, a memorial, and compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages equivalent to $260,000, distributed to six of the victims’ family members. Despite these remedies, the Court heard the case, convinced by the petitioners that essential problems remained unresolved. Principally, and like many cases before it, the criminal investigation had stagnated and the victims’ remains had not been found.

As a result, the Court set out the case’s facts, well aware of the reparative value of such an authoritative statement, and called for a comprehensive criminal investigation, a search for the victims’ remains, and the judgment’s publication and radio broadcast in Maya K’iché and Spanish. Significantly, the Court concluded that the victims’ next of kin had faced major obstacles in obtaining accountability “due to the fact that they belonged to the Mayan Indian People.” The judgment accordingly directed the State to provide interpreters and other support for their pursuit of justice through the national courts.

Finally, in 2010, the Court issued two judgments against Mexico: *Fernández-Ortega et al.* and *Rosendo-Cantú*. The facts shared many...
disturbing details: both cases concerned rapes perpetrated by Mexican soldiers against indigenous women. Petitioners demonstrated, through witness testimony, reports, and expert statements, that heavy military presence in the Mexican state of Guerrero resulted in numerous episodes of violence against indigenous women. After the rapes, the victims and their families endured a protracted denial of criminal justice and reparations. In its judgments, the Court accepted the State’s “partial” admission of liability and proceeded to find violations and order remedies.

The decisions required only modest material damages: $5,500 for lost earnings. As for moral damages, Mexico was instructed to pay Fernández-Ortega $50,000, Rosendo-Cantú received more, $60,000, because she was a minor when the rape occurred. Lesser amounts, between $2,500 and $10,000, were ordered for family members of both victims.

Non-monetary remedies in both cases reached remarkable levels. The judgments generally resemble each other, but this discussion will focus on Fernández-Ortega because it includes slightly more detail. The Court began with its familiar orders for a criminal investigation, legal reform, and publication/broadcast of the judgment in the Spanish and Me’phaa languages. Then, the Court noted an expert witness’ statement that a public acceptance of responsibility was particularly important to the community in question. As a result, and fulfilling petitioners’ requests, it required that “senior authorities” of state and federal government participate in such an act, along with Fernández-Ortega, her family, and

325. Id., ¶ 301.
members of her community.  

In its orders for medical and psychological care, the Court furnished a great degree of specificity. Several human rights training programs were also required for the military and other state officials. These programs were to “include a gender and ethnicity perspective.”

The Court granted scholarships to Fernández-Ortega’s five children, covering “all the costs of their education until the completion of their higher education, whether of a technical or professional nature.” The judgment also issued a broad order for “the girls of the community of Barranca Tecoani that currently carry out their middle school studies in the city of Ayutla de los Libres, to be provided with housing and a proper diet.”

An expert witness had stated that approximately thirty girls faced a dangerous, three-hour commute to school. As a result, many were forced to labor as domestic workers under degrading conditions, so they could stay in Ayutla de los Libres and attend school. The order is extraordinary because these girls were not deemed to be injured parties by the Court; the Court did not expressly find that the State was responsible for having violated their rights.

To conclude, following the petitioners’ requests, the Court ordered more reparations of a “community scope” to “allow the victim to reincorporate herself into her living space and cultural identity” and to help “reestablish the fabric of the community.” The State was directed to create a community center for the promotion of women’s rights. “Under the responsibility and management of the women of the community,”

329. Id. ¶ 244.
330. See infra Part III.
331. Id. ¶ 260.
332. Id.
333. Id. ¶ 264.
334. Id. ¶ 270 (“Regardless of the above mentioned, this measure can be complied with by the State if it opts to install a high school in [Barranca Tecoani].”)
335. Id. ¶ 268.
336. Id.
337. See id. ¶ 224 (“In the present case, the victims are Mrs. Fernández Ortega, her husband, Mr. Prisciliano Sierra, and their children, Noemí, Ana Luz, Colosio, Nélida and Neftalí, all bearing the surname of Prisciliano Fernández; accordingly, they will be considered beneficiaries of the reparations ordered by this Court.”).
338. This was their initial request, but the petitioners modified it later. See id. ¶ 266 (“The Court notes the change in the request initially made by the representatives that the resources should be handed to OPIM. This revised claim for reparation was not made at the appropriate procedural moment . . . therefore, the Court will not consider it because it is time-barred, but will refer to the initial request submitted by the representatives.”).
339. Id. ¶ 267.
center should seek to develop activities “adapted to the indigenous community’s view of the world.”

Clearly, petitioners’ efforts to document the systematic violations suffered by Me’phaa women in Guerrero yielded fruit.

III. EVALUATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT’S INDIGENOUS REMEDIES

A. Introduction

The Inter-American Court, then, has consistently applied to indigenous peoples the contemporary remedies of international human rights law: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition. It has fully affirmed that for reparations to pursue the ideal of *restitutio in integrum*, they must incorporate this multidimensional approach. But has the Court done enough to ensure that its reparative model is “effective” for both indigenous individuals and communities?

International law has firmly established that persons belonging to minority groups do not relinquish their individual rights; rather, they also benefit from group protections. As emphasized in the UNDRIP, indigenous peoples have the right to effective remedies for all infringements of collective and individual rights. When these rights are not enforced with sufficient remedies, they are diminished, if not disregarded entirely.

Certainly, the Court faces serious constraints in formulating remedies.

---

340. Id.
341. For example, in its general comment on Article 27 of the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee stated that “this article establishes and recognizes a right which is conferred on individuals belonging to minority groups and which is distinct from, and additional to, all the other rights which, as individuals in common with everyone else, they are already entitled to enjoy under the Covenant.” U.N. Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment No. 27(50) art. 27, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/ Add.5 (Apr. 8, 1994) (emphasis added); see also ILO Convention, supra note 2 (referring to individual rights and protections for indigenous peoples).
342. UNDRIP, supra note 44, art. 40. Nicola Wenzel explains that “[t]o mark the difference from individual rights . . . most authors concur in defining group rights with reference to the holder of the right. In contrast to individual human rights, the holder of a group right is not the individual but the group itself.” Nicola Wenzel, *Group Rights*, in *MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW* ¶ 2 (2011).
343. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 9, at 887 (noting “rights can be effectively enlarged, abridged, or eviscerated by expanding, contracting, or eliminating remedies.”); Fallon, Jr., supra note 9, at 685–86 (stating “a right without any remedies would possess dramatically less value than a right that courts will enforce with the full complement of normally available remedies . . . the more extensive and potent the enforcement mechanisms, the more valuable a right becomes.”); HENKIN, supra note 9.
After most human rights abuses, the *status quo ante* cannot be restored at all. Moreover, governments—even those who seek to comply fully with the Court’s orders—confront resource limitations, political opposition, and the justified distrust of indigenous peoples. In the face of these challenges, how can reparations be enhanced for indigenous victims? First of all, to improve remedies in general, some guidelines are readily apparent.

Most basically, the Court must strive to calibrate remedies to the rights violated. Reparations must reasonably relate to the kind and degree of harm proven before it. Unlike the approach of the European Court and many domestic tribunals, there cannot be a monolithic response—such as cash compensation—to every rights violation. In this way, society-wide remedies must correlate to proven systematic abuses or flawed legislation, communal remedies to communal rights violations, and individual remedies to individual rights abuses (although there will be mutual reinforcement among these reparations measures). Thus, when a personal measure is sought for an assassinated indigenous leader, a modest payment to his community cannot be the Court’s only response.

Second, all complications emerging from the implementation of remedies cannot be foreseen. Still, before the Court designs reparations and chooses between similar approaches, it must carefully evaluate likely consequences. To do so, the victim’s reality must be closely studied.

344. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, *The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law*, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 109 (1999) (commenting that “[in a world of limited resources,] the question will often be not whether we should redress both past and future injuries, but whether we can redress injury at all.”); Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 91, ¶ 82 (Feb. 22, 2002) (García-Ramírez, concurring) (“When all is said and done, *restitutio* only represents a reference point, an ideal target, in both meanings of the word: an idea and an unattainable goal.”).


346. This uniform response has been rightly criticized because it fails to differentiate between the rights violated, giving “the same remedial answer to every constitutional question.” John C. Jeffries, *Disaggregating Constitutional Torts*, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 262 (2000). Jeffries argues that even U.S. courts, which have a more narrow remedial mandate than the Inter-American Court, should tailor their remedies to the situation—that is, damages should be integrated with the occasional systemic injunction, criminal procedure measures (exclusion of evidence, reversal of convictions), and other applicable forms of redress, such as a court-ordered apology. See *id.* at 262, 281–92.


348. See James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, *Reevaluating Regional Human Rights*
For example, the Court has recognized some of the sizable obstacles confronted by indigenous and tribal peoples when litigating and claiming reparations. In *Moiwana Village*, it afforded the petitioners “more latitude . . . with respect to acceptable means of proving identity,” because “many Maroons do not possess formal identity documents, and were never inscribed in the national registry.”

However, the Court has also disappointed on this count. Recall its rejection of the Awas Tingni’s reparations brief for arriving twelve days late. At minimum, it should have granted the petitioners’ reasonable request for a subsequent reparations proceeding to present and evaluate evidence, as environmental and cultural impacts are burdensome to prove and require sophisticated assessments. While the Inter-American Commission apparently was also at fault for delays, the Court should have provided ample opportunity for all parties to dispute these topics. This is especially true since *Awas Tingni* was the Court’s very first case concerning ancestral lands and environmental damage. Notably, the Court provided an additional reparations stage in *Salvador-Chiriboga v. Ecuador*, a subsequent case concerning the expropriation and valuation of private

---


352. According to James Anaya, who represented the Awas Tingni, the Court only allowed ten days to submit arguments and evidence on reparations, after the merits proceeding. Due to “an internal administrative error, the Commission did not notify [us] . . . until after the deadline had passed.” S. James Anaya & Maia S. Campbell, *Gaining Legal Recognition of Indigenous Land Rights: The Story of the Awas Tingni Case in Nicaragua*, in *HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES* 117, 141 (Deena R. Hurwitz & Margaret L. Satterthwaite eds., 2009).
Third, and related to the previous points, Court orders should avoid excessive ambiguity, which allows states to substitute more convenient measures or to shirk their duties entirely. In a wide-ranging study on the Court’s reparations, numerous victims’ advocates stated that its remedial orders could benefit from more specific terms. Greater precision would reduce disputes between victims and state representatives, and expedite the implementation of remedies. It should be noted, however, that elaborate detail from the Court is not always possible. Judges have restricted information before them and limited expertise.

John Braithwaite’s restorative justice “keystone” suggests a method of remedial design that will assist courts with these common obstacles. Faced with limitations and difficult choices, tribunals must “empower victims to define the restoration that matters to them.” This victim-centered standard implies a multi-step, participatory process. Once a court facilitates the petitioners’ full engagement before it, it must listen closely to their preferences and needs, convey them in its remedial orders if violations are found, and then ensure the victims’ central role in implementation.

This approach directly addresses the three problem areas sketched above. Placing victims at the center of the process and enhancing information exchange will immerse the Court in their reality, and tailor remedies more precisely to violations. Unsurprisingly, restorative justice has led to high levels of victim satisfaction. The methodology is particularly fitting for indigenous cases, as indigenous cultures founded

---


355. See id. at 40–43.

356. In particularly complex matters, judges may need to limit themselves to the creation of a mechanism or the establishment of objectives for the parties. Here, a helpful approach is suggested by “experimentalist regulation” in U.S. public law litigation. In this model, parties are given discretion to achieve particular goals set by a court. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1017–20 (2004).

357. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 10, at 46.

358. Id. See also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 157, 182, 200 (2004) (noting the limitations faced by courts in situations of mass abuse and emphasizing the need to involve victims in the design of reparations).

359. The victim-driven processes of restorative justice achieve personal engagement, accountability, apologies, and other forms of redress, and have resulted in high levels of satisfaction for participants. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1744 (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It Work?, 3 ANNU. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 161, 175 (2007).
these very principles centuries ago and often practice them today.\footnote{360} Clearly, all victims’ demands cannot always be met. However, their priorities must be channeled into reparations that reasonably relate to the proven rights violations.\footnote{361} An “appropriate” relationship, already required by the Court, will be demonstrated through the input of victims themselves, of course.\footnote{362} Also, other experts, such as anthropologists and environmental specialists, are essential to show judges the specific impacts of violations.\footnote{363} This approach, following victims’ preferences, will allow for some variance in remedial packages even among cases with similar violations. Such methodology recognizes diversity among communities and individuals,\footnote{364} and is entirely feasible for international courts that are not unduly bound by precedent.\footnote{365} The remainder of this section will evaluate the Court’s indigenous remedies in light of Braithwaite’s victim-centered standard and the other basic parameters outlined above, considering both

\footnote{360.} \textit{Braithwaite, supra} note 10, at 5 (”[R]estorative justice has been the dominant model of criminal justice throughout most of human history . . . (among indigenous of Americas, Africa, Asia and the Pacific), restorative traditions have persisted into modern times.”)

\footnote{361.} In a previous article, I recommended that the Court adopt a more “participative” approach, whereby it issues a decision on the merits and then obligates the parties to negotiate remedial solutions. With that model, victims would express their priorities during negotiations with states. \textit{See Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches, supra} note 39, at 402–07.

\footnote{362.} \textit{See, e.g.,} Fernández-Ortega et al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215, ¶ 221 (August 30, 2010) (”[T]his Court has established that reparations must be related to the facts of the case, the violations that have been declared, the damage proven, and the measures requested to repair the respective damage. Consequently, the Court must respect all these factors to ensure that its ruling is appropriate and in keeping with the law.”)

\footnote{363.} \textit{Beristain, supra} note 354, at 618–19 (stating that expert witnesses have helped the Court’s judges understand the nature of violations against indigenous peoples); Nieves Gómez, \textit{Indigenous Peoples and Psychosocial Reparation: The Experience with Latin American Indigenous Communities, in Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: International and Comparative Perspectives 143–147} (2008) (explaining various psychological and spiritual harms suffered by indigenous peoples at both collective and individual levels); \textit{Yatama v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127, ¶¶ 1–33} (June 23, 2005) (García-Ramírez, J., concurring) (asserting that the Court must examine the historical and cultural context of indigenous peoples to determine the rights violations suffered).

\footnote{364.} \textit{See Yatama}, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127, ¶ 31 (García-Ramírez, J, concurring) (”The fact that the rights are of a universal nature does not mean that the [remedial] measures that should be adopted . . . [must] be uniform, generic, the same, as if there were no differences, distances and contrasts among their possessors.”).

\footnote{365.} As Jo Pasqualucci states, “there is no formal rule of \textit{stare decisis} in the Inter-American system, although the Inter-American Court regularly cites to . . . its well-established case law.” Jo M. \textit{Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights} 48 (2d ed. 2013). The Court itself has held that its case law “cannot be invoked as a criterion” to be universally applied; instead each case needs to be examined individually. \textit{Paniagua Morales et al. v. Guatemala, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 76, ¶ 104} (May 25, 2001).
monetary and non-monetary reparations.

B. Non-monetary Remedies

One of the Court’s defining characteristics is its resolute commitment to non-monetary remedies.\textsuperscript{366} Such equitable orders offer many advantages. As opposed to cash compensation, they can target specific violations—for example, by requiring the release of an arbitrarily detained individual.\textsuperscript{367} In addition, non-monetary, forward-looking measures can be more efficient and less expensive than lump sum attempts at full economic compensation.\textsuperscript{368} In the indigenous context, as reviewed above, these remedies assume varied and demanding forms, such as: cessation of ongoing violations, land restitution, medical and psychological care, apologies, memorials, cultural initiatives, legislative reform, training programs for state officials, and community development schemes. The orders have often responded to the express petitions of individuals and communities. Over the years, these reparations have reinforced that victims most desire the means to restore their dignity, health, and place in society.\textsuperscript{369}

For those unaccustomed to the Court’s sweeping remedial powers, its orders to reform constitutions or to establish elaborate development programs are surprising. Yet such reparations are consistent with the Court’s mandate, as established in the American Convention.\textsuperscript{370} Further,
many remedies have been accepted and implemented by states, albeit slowly, and, in some cases, very reluctantly. Still, like any court of equity, the Court has occasionally fallen short of its significant potential.

The following four sub-sections consider some of the vices and virtues of the Court’s main non-monetary remedies for indigenous peoples. Refinements are proposed for the occasional deficiencies noted. Primarily, the Court is encouraged to require more robust victim engagement in the design and implementation of reparations. Yet overall, with respect to its non-monetary remedies, the Court has increasingly focused upon the complex reality of indigenous peoples, and has generally responded to their preferences for restoration.

1. Land Restitution

In several cases before the Court, indigenous and tribal communities principally sought to recover or protect their traditional lands. In response, the Court has not only endorsed the communities’ rights to their ancestral territories, but it has also required the establishment of domestic laws and procedures to make such rights effective. The Court discourages States from furnishing alternate lands or monetary compensation. In these

or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.” American Convention, supra note 11, art. 63(1).


372. See, e.g., Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 194(c) (Nov. 28, 2007) (ordering that Suriname “remove or amend the legal provisions that impede protection of the right to property of the members of the Saramaka people and adopt, in its domestic legislation, and through prior, effective and fully informed consultations with the Saramaka people, legislative, administrative, and other measures as may be required to recognize, protect, guarantee and give legal effect to the right of the members of the Saramaka people to hold collective title of the territory they have traditionally used and occupied”); Gaetano Pentassuglia, Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 165, 171 (2011) (“[T]he [Court] has converted indigenous property rights into a state’s obligation to delimit, demarcate, and title the lands in question, thereby requiring an effective domestic procedure to realize those rights.”).

373. See Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cnty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 284 (August 24, 2010) (“Once the Community’s traditional territory is fully identified . . . if it is owned by private entities, whether natural or legal persons, the State, though its competent authorities, must decide whether it is possible to expropriate the land for the
cases, the Court recognizes that the ancestral land represents a “perpetual resource” with spiritual, cultural, and economic dimensions that sustain both present and future generations. It acts to safeguard the “all-encompassing relationship” between indigenous peoples and their territories.

In doing so, the Court has not shied from an inevitable clash with colonial and assimilationist policies and laws. The lands may officially belong to the state or private parties; in addition, some of the territories enjoy a wealth of natural resources. A title transfer to indigenous communities could represent a brazen challenge to society’s powerful strata. Beyond the political cost of such decisions, the expropriation of private lands can prove very expensive for states in monetary terms. It is

indigenous peoples. To decide this question, the State authorities must follow the criteria established in this judgment . . . taking very much into account the special relationship that the indigenous have with their lands for the preservation of their culture and their survival. At no time should the decision of the domestic authorities be based exclusively on the fact that the land is owned privately.”).

374. See BERISTAIN, supra note 354, at 591 (explaining that, in these cases, the lands are of major cultural and economic importance to the communities); BARBARA ROSE JOHNSTON & HOLLY M. BARKER, CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF NUCLEAR WAR: THE RONGELAP REPORT 184 (2008) (referring generally to the lasting significance of ancestral lands).


376. See Ana Vrdoljak, Reparations for Cultural Loss, in REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 213 (2008) (“In the context of indigenous claims for reparations, restitution is the most unsettling for states because it often involves a direct confrontation with colonial and assimilation policies and practices.”); BERISTAIN, supra note 354, at 587–90 (noting the historical context for land distribution and frequent removal of indigenous peoples in several Court cases).

377. See id.; JEREMIE GILBERT, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM VICTIMS TO ACTORS 181 (2006) (describing common “patronizing” approaches of states to “protect” such lands by placing them in reserves or in trust—and thus preventing the direct ownership of indigenous peoples). During the Universal Periodic Review procedure before the U.N. Human Rights Council, the Paraguayan delegation stated, “[i]n order to facilitate [compliance with the restitution of lands ordered by the Inter-American Court] it was necessary to reach consensus with various stakeholders within Paraguayan society. The cases were complex and required a high content of mutual understanding and concessions from all parties.” U.N. Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review, Paraguay, ¶ 82, A/HRC/17/18 (Mar. 28, 2011).

378. For example, in Xákmok Kásek, the Court ordered Paraguay to return 10,700 hectares of land to the community, and a significant part of this territory belonged to private landowners or corresponded to a nature reserve. Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶¶ 98, 107, 150 (Aug. 24, 2010).
not surprising, then, that processes to return territories have faced major delays in most Court cases. Nevertheless, the Court has generally held firm, requiring restitution, cleanup, and reforestation, as well as pertinent legislative and administrative reforms. In Xákmok Kásek, the Court even ordered fines if Paraguay did not return territory to the petitioners within three years.

While these property remedies are pioneering, even courageous, their design can be refined. To begin, the Court should take a more proactive approach to the devastation caused by extraction projects. To help prevent the repetition of these abuses, the Court should place more emphasis on the improvement of states’ regulatory frameworks. One possibility is to reaffirm an indigenous community’s right to “free, prior, and informed consent” (FPIC) to all such projects. However, in its most recent judgment on the topic, Sarayaku v. Ecuador, the Court ignored FPIC, only referring to the weaker right to be consulted before potentially-harmful

379. See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ¶ 10 (May 20, 2009) (observing that the three-year deadline for the land restitution had expired without the State having completed the order); Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court, “Considering,” Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ¶ 11 (Feb. 8, 2008) (noting that “little progress had been made” with respect to the return of lands). However, on June 11, 2014, Paraguay finally passed a law to enable the restitution of the Sawhoyamaxa lands. Ejecutivo promulga restitución de tierras a los Sawhoyamaxa, ULTIMA HORA (June 11, 2014, 9:49 AM), http://www.ultimahora.com/ejecutivo-promulga-restitucion-tierras-los-sawhoyamaxa-n802515.html. Apparently, then, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua is the sole case thus far where land restitution has been fully achieved. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty v. Nicaragua, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 3, 2009).


381. Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 288 (Aug. 24, 2010) (holding that “if the three-year deadline in this Judgment expires . . . and the State still has not turned over the traditional land or, as the case may be, the alternative land . . . the State will have to pay the Community [$10,000] for each month of delay.”).

382. The Court has held that, with regard to “large-scale development or investment projects that would have a major impact” within indigenous territory, states have “a duty not only to consult” with the affected community, “but also to obtain [its] free, prior, and informed consent, according to [its] customs and traditions.” Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 134 (Nov. 28, 2007).
A state’s capacity to redress extensive property harm must also be reinforced. As the U.N. Special Rapporteur for indigenous peoples has observed, states should “adopt regulatory measures for companies . . . that are aimed at . . . sanctioning and remedying violations of the rights of indigenous peoples.”

For example, when mutually-accepted impact levels are exceeded in extraction projects, government contracts should clearly require companies to halt projects and provide reparations to affected communities, including restoration initiatives. Within specific judgments, the Court can urge such contracts and related measures through its orders to reform legislation and policy. These contracts could make costly environmental restoration and other reparations more feasible for states to ensure. If ultimately funded by a corporation’s deeper pockets, such redress will be more likely for indigenous communities.

When requiring restitution or demarcation of land, the Court has at times neglected to account for the porosity of boundaries and the shared use of indigenous lands. Enforcement of some Court orders to strictly delimit borders has aggravated tensions among neighboring communities. Moiwana offers a better response to this complex reality.

The judgment urged the participation of both the petitioners and neighboring indigenous communities in the border definition process.

---

386. Of course, these contracts must be enforceable, and many powerful multinational corporations will seek to avoid or challenge such agreements and related laws. For example, when El Salvador revoked mining concessions for environmental concerns, the affected corporations aggressively challenged the State before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and other bodies. See, e.g., Edgardo Ayala, Rural Communities Push El Salvador Towards Ban on Mining, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY, May 29, 2014, available at http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/05/rural-communities-push-el-salvador-towards-ban-mining (referring to the lawsuits initiated by two multinational corporations).
387. See, e.g., Dulitzky, supra note 120, at 51; BERISTAIN, supra note 354, at 612.
388. See, e.g., Dulitzky, supra note 120, at 50; BERISTAIN, supra note 354, at 625.
389. See, e.g., Dulitzky, supra note 120, at 50.
In fact, the full engagement of victims—following Braithwaite’s standard—is the only way to avoid a re-victimization of indigenous communities and a retrenchment of inequitable conditions. If demarcation, environmental restoration, and corresponding legislative reform efforts are conducted without the vigorous participation of the affected communities, the “reparations” may result in further harm and subjugation. The mere right to be “consulted” about such efforts, currently emphasized by the Court, does not provide sufficient agency to indigenous peoples and is easily exploited. While commentators have praised the Court for advancing a principle of “effective participation,” it has neglected this principle when favoring consultation over consent, and when designing certain development programs and health care reparations, as discussed below.

2. Legal Reform and Training Programs

Indigenous advocates and other experts have underscored that land restitution and related remedies, although fundamental in many cases, are not enough. Many of the disturbing violations addressed by the Court trace their origins to the deep-seated discrimination of indigenous peoples by dominant factions of society. When the Court identifies a discriminatory law or practice, it has occasionally ordered legal and

391. See, e.g., JOHNSTON & BARKER, supra note 374, at 225–47 (explaining that, in the Marshall Islands, U.S. remedial efforts—including environmental cleanup and medical treatment—were not only insufficient, in many instances they actually produced further harm); Gómez, supra note 363, at 156 (“[T]he execution of reparatory measures must generate processes and spaces for reflection and dialogue for all beneficiaries.”); Hamber, supra note 369, at 146 (asserting that the process for delivering reparations is key to their effectiveness); BERISTAIN, supra note 354, at 23–26 (underscoring the importance of victim participation in the implementation of remedies); FUNDACIÓN PARA EL DEBIDO PROCESO LEGAL, DESPUÉS DE PROCESOS DE JUSTICIA TRANSICIONAL, ¿CUÁL ES LA SITUACIÓN DE LAS VÍCTIMAS?: LOS CASOS DE CHILE Y GUATEMALA 7 (2008), available at http://www.dplf.org/es/resources/justicia-transicional-13 (affirming that reparations programs can easily result in re-victimization).

392. The Court’s “right to consultation” is not enough; there are too many opportunities for manipulation by states and corporations, despite its attempts to establish guidelines for the principle. See Antkowiak, Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric, supra note 375, at 169–70.

393. Gaetano Pentassuglia has praised the Court for incorporating its principle of effective participation “through the whole body of [its] jurisprudence.” Pentassuglia, supra note 372, at 177.

394. See, e.g., ENGLE supra note 1, at 183–84 (“[L]and alone is insufficient to ensure development . . . efforts to combat racism, guarantee economic compensation, and protect land and heritage thus all play a role” in a broader conception of development); ANAYA, supra note 1, at 98 (calling for “remedies that tear at the legacies of empire, discrimination, suppression of democratic participation, and cultural suffocation”); Gómez, supra note 363, at 148 (noting that a goal of reparation is “the participation of the victim/survivor in the creation of a country with new ways of seeing and understanding the world based on the value of cultural diversity”).

395. See, e.g., ENGLE supra note 1, at 183–84; ANAYA, supra note 1, at 98.
administrative reforms, as well as training programs for state officials.396

The Court must provide guidance to foster meaningful implementation by unenthusiastic bureaucrats. Such detail will also facilitate the Court’s supervision and verification of state compliance. At times, the Court has only offered vague outlines for training programs for state officials.397 Similarly, for legal reforms the Court may only call on the State to “adapt [its] legal system to international human rights norms,” as in Bámaca-Velásquez.398 While this directive may appear far-reaching, in reality such ambiguous language has little chance for enforcement.399 Ill-defined orders are not really remedies at all; they are readily evaded by states and, as a result, fail to protect and redress corresponding rights.

In contrast with Bámaca-Velásquez, the Court provided concrete details in Fernández-Ortega and Rosendo-Cantú. These judgments urged a “standardized action protocol for the investigation of sexual abuse” for both the State of Guerrero and the federal government “based on the parameters established” in the Istanbul Protocol and World Health Organization guidelines.400 Both decisions also required “permanent

396. Many will respond that such efforts are insufficient to transform the societal structures that perpetuate the persecution and oppression of indigenous peoples and other groups. See, e.g., Maria Paula Saffon & Rodrigo Uprimny, Distributive Justice and the Restitution of Dispossessed Land in Colombia, in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN TRANSITION 391 (Morten Bergsmo, et al. eds., 2010) (arguing that many reparations measures “leave untouched many of the conditions of exclusion that are at the basis” of the problem); see also Caroline Bettinger-López, The Challenge of Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights Law in the Cotton Field Case, 15 CUNY L. REV. 315, 334 (2012) (indicating that the Court’s remedies in the “Cotton Field Case” against Mexico did not fully respond to “the messy reality of a community struggling with an ostensibly unstoppable succession of violent crimes against women”).


399. For example, more than five years after the Court vaguely ordered Guatemala in Bámaca-Velásquez to “conform” national laws to international human rights standards, the State still had not provided even minimal information concerning its compliance. Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court, “Considering,” Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ¶8(c) (July 10, 2007), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/bamaca_16_01_08.pdf.

training programs” on “the diligent investigation of cases of the sexual abuse of women that include a gender and ethnicity perspective.”  

Mexico was ordered to direct the courses to numerous federal and Guerrero state officials, including prosecutors, judges, police, and healthcare personnel who “constitute the first line of response to women victims of violence.”

_Fernández-Ortega and Rosendo-Cantú_ certainly placed considerable demands upon the State: law and policy reform, training programs, and several other exacting measures. In fact, the reparations rivaled those of _Río Negro Massacres_, a case that involved five massacres and hundreds of victims. Did the Court overstep its bounds in the Mexican cases? One aspect, mentioned already, was clearly problematic: ordering reparations for several individuals who had not been deemed injured parties before the Court.

However, the number of victims in a case is not the only determinative factor for reparations. If violations have been proven, corresponding remedies must be ordered. In _Fernández-Ortega and Rosendo-Cantú_, severe abuses—at both personal and macro levels—were established over the course of the litigation; thus, the Court was obligated to order both individual and collective remedies. Faced with such sprawling demands, however, it will be unrealistic to expect rapid compliance from states—especially for reparations concerning indigenous peoples, who unfortunately often lack the political and economic capital to expedite the measures.

---


403. See _Fernández-Ortega et al._, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215, at ¶¶ 224, 270 (failing to name several individuals as “injured parties,” yet ordering the State to take measures to provide them with housing and proper diet).

404. Id. ¶ 79 (presenting the case in the context of “institutional military violence” in the state of Guerrero, where soldiers have committed numerous rights violations against indigenous women); _Rosendo-Cantú_, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, at ¶ 71 (same).

While the Court displayed ambition in the Mexican judgments, quite the opposite occurred in López-Álvarez v. Honduras. The decision had established numerous abuses, including violations of the rights to equality and freedom of expression because of the Honduran prison’s ban on the Garifuna language. López-Álvarez justifiably requested structural remedies to address discrimination in Honduras. The Court responded with an order to improve conditions in the State’s detention centers, and mandated a “training program on human rights for the officers that work in the penitentiary centers.” Inexplicably, however, the reparations avoided any reference to cultural or ethnic discrimination.

Structural orders, by definition, have the potential to bring about much-needed changes in Latin American societies. In fact, several of the Court’s directives have already done so. While a degree of specificity is required, the Court will also do well to leave some flexibility in its orders. All twists and turns in such broad initiatives certainly cannot be anticipated and resolved by a remote tribunal’s single judgment. In all cases, however, the Court must demand that victims maintain a meaningful role as these processes unfold. As victims, they must be involved as it impacts their interests and defines the remedies due to them. As often-marginalized indigenous peoples, they may need redoubled governmental efforts to ensure them a voice in the design of new legislation and policy.

3. Rehabilitation Programs

Medical and psychological care for indigenous peoples is a formidable undertaking for both the Court and states. In judgments involving multiple petitioners, the Court has ordered medical and psychological treatment through state medical institutions, instead of direct cash disbursements to victims. This is presumably done to reduce costs for defendant states.

---

407. Id. ¶ 225(4).
408. Id. ¶ 205.
409. Id. ¶ 210.
410. Antkowiak, Emerging Mandate, supra note 345, at 301–02 (describing how states have complied with Court orders for legislative reform and human rights training programs).
Yet public medical institutions often lack adequate facilities and training to treat victims of severe human rights abuse. Yet public medical institutions often lack adequate facilities and training to treat victims of severe human rights abuse. 412 Difficulties are compounded in indigenous cases, where medical personnel struggle to access remote communities and to overcome language and cultural barriers, including unfamiliarity with traditional treatments. 413

Plan de Sánchez made an early and notable attempt in this regard, requiring “a specialized program of psychological and psychiatric treatment” that takes into account “the special circumstances and needs of each person . . . in order to provide collective, family and individual treatment.” 414 The Court even requested the assistance of an experienced Guatemalan NGO, the Community Studies and Psychosocial Action Team. 415 While the novel program was not without its flaws and setbacks, 416 it stands as one of the few health initiatives deemed fulfilled by the Court. 417

In the Paraguayan trilogy of cases, the Court found precarious health conditions in the makeshift camps. In response, it called for funds to implement various community programs, including health projects, which have not been completed as of this writing. 418 Like other development initiatives, the health projects will be subject to the direction of a three-person committee, which may stifle the voice of the communities. The Court did not expressly require the programs to consider indigenous customs or to obtain their consent, despite petitioners’ requests. 419 In this

412. See Beristain, supra note 354, at 245–46.   
413. See Gómez, supra note 363, at 147.   
415. Id. ¶ 108.   
416. See Beristain, supra note 354, at 271–76.   
417. Note that several states have complied with orders to provide future medical expenses, but only Aloeboetoe and Plan de Sánchez appear to have fulfilled their equitable remedies related to healthcare. Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 5, 1997); Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court, “Declaring,” Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ¶ 103 (July 1, 2009), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/sanchez_01_07_09_ing.pdf.   
419. See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 201(g) (Mar. 29, 2006) (requesting that all implemented programs “must be previously consented to by the interested parties and must adjust to
way, once health care is finally deployed, it likely will be ill-matched to community needs.

Fernández-Ortega and Rosendo-Cantú were much more attentive to complexities on the ground. As emphasized by the petitioners, these cases involved indigenous women living in remote areas who had suffered brutal gender violence. The Court demanded that Mexico provide expert medical personnel to care for the victims. In the event that State personnel did not have the requisite expertise, the Court mandated that private specialists be hired. Further, the Court ordered all medical staff to obtain the consent of the victims before treatment by offering “[p]rior, clear, and sufficient information.” The care, including all pertinent medication, was to be provided for as long as necessary in a medical facility located as close as possible to the victims. Mexico was also directed to arrange for transportation and interpreter services, as well as to compensate other costs “related [to treatments] and strictly necessary.”

In Río Negro, the most recent judgment on this topic, the victims requested “culturally appropriate” psychological care from the State. Their expert witness had explained aspects of traditional Mayan healing practices during the proceedings. The Court required that the victims and the State together design the precise modalities for the healthcare. Still,
to do so, the community members will need to overcome wariness of government authorities and other barriers. A better, more focused solution may have directed Guatemala to arrange meetings with specialists chosen by the victims, in order to formulate a treatment plan. In addition, the Court should have instructed the State to ensure that the health personnel, once designated, would have sufficient resources to provide effective and lasting care. In Plan de Sánchez, as noted above, community leaders joined with a trusted Guatemalan NGO holding relevant expertise. This ongoing partnership made it easier for victims to eventually obtain the desired health care from the State.428

4. Other Forms of Recognition, Restoration, and Accountability429

As reviewed above, the Court has frequently responded to indigenous petitioners’ demands that states undertake other meaningful actions. These include public apologies and official acceptances of responsibility, offered by high-level officials to community members and transmitted far and wide.430 Such well-established remedies are complemented by the Court’s more recent innovations, such as orders to build a museum or implement programs to promote indigenous cultures, all requested by victims. These reparations can foster respect for indigenous peoples and accentuate the state’s responsibility for atrocities. They lift the “veil of denial” over national policies that subjugated and decimated indigenous communities.431 As long as states ensure that victims or their representatives have leadership roles, these endeavors can lead to the redress and empowerment

148. SeeBeristain, supra note 354, at 272, 623.

428. SeeBeristain, supra note 354, at 272, 623.

429. As noted in the above review of Court remedies, scholarships have also been frequently ordered; such measures provide a key opportunity for restoration and rehabilitation. See, e.g., Escué-Zapata v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 165, ¶ 170 (July 4, 2007) (ordering full expenses for the victim’s daughter’s university study, including all transportation costs for visits to her community).

430. On occasion, such statements have been broadcast via radio following petitioners’ requests, as radio is a common means of communication among ethnic and indigenous communities appearing before the Court. See, e.g., YATAMA v. Nicaragua, Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (May 28, 2010), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/supervisiones/yatama_28_05_10_ing.pdf (confirming that Nicaragua completed broadcasts in at least four locally-spoken languages).

of indigenous peoples.\(^{432}\)

In several cases, petitioners above all have sought an end to impunity. Only criminal accountability will bring them full satisfaction. For the Court and other legal authorities such as the International Law Commission (ILC), criminal investigations and punishment are not technically reparations; these measures are required by a state’s general obligation to respect and ensure human rights, as set out in Article 1(1) of the American Convention.\(^{433}\) For the varied objectives and benefits of criminal justice, both public and personal, the Court frequently mandates investigation and prosecution.

When requiring criminal accountability, the Court has shown increasing sensitivity to the indigenous context.\(^{434}\) *Tiu-Tojín v. Guatemala* observed: “[I]t is necessary that the States grant . . . effective protection taking into account [indigenous peoples’] specific features, economic and social characteristics, as well as their special situation of vulnerability, their common law, values, uses and customs.”\(^{435}\)

A first step along this path, according to the Court, was that

---

432. See, e.g., *Beristain*, supra note 354, at 530; *Gómez,* supra note 363, at 148–55; *Lenzerini,* supra note 347, at 616–17. Unfortunately, Ecuador recently attempted a “unilateral” recognition of responsibility, which did not allow for the participation of the Sarayaku, and thus was rejected by the community. *See Estado Ecuatoriano Realiza Acto de Disculpas Públicas Sin Acuerdo de Sarayaku, CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Nov. 25, 2013)*, available at [https://cejil.org/comunicados/estado-ecuatoriano-realiza-acto-de-disculpas-publicas-sin-acuerdo-de-sarayaku-0](https://cejil.org/comunicados/estado-ecuatoriano-realiza-acto-de-disculpas-publicas-sin-acuerdo-de-sarayaku-0); see also *Bettinger-López*, supra note 396, at 329–30 (describing problems and disappointments associated with Mexico’s public event to recognize the violations of the “Cotton Field Case”).

433. See, e.g., *Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras*, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶¶ 166–67, 178–81 (July 29, 1988). Thus, investigation and prosecution are conceptually independent from a state party’s duty to redress victims. While the International Law Commission and others share this conceptual view, one cannot deny that the punishment of perpetrators also has a crucial reparative function for the individual victim.

434. See, e.g., *Río Negro Massacre v. Guatemala*, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 250, ¶ 272 (Sept. 4, 2012) (“[I]t is evident that the victims of prolonged impunity will suffer different effects not only of a pecuniary nature owing to the search for justice, but also other sufferings and harm of a psychological and physical nature and on their life project, as well as other possible changes in their social relationships and in their family and community dynamics, particularly in the case of an indigenous community.”) (footnotes omitted). This sensitivity is also demonstrated when the indigenous victim’s remains have not been found. See, e.g., *Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala*, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 91, ¶ 82 (Feb. 22, 2002) (ordering the State to find the victim’s remains as soon as possible, to facilitate Mayan funeral ceremonies).

Guatemala “ensure that [the victims] understand and are understood in the legal proceedings.” Thus, the State needed to provide the victims interpreters and other vital assistance in their ongoing role as civil parties to criminal proceedings. The Court’s attention to reality will support the victims as they face averse local tribunals and prosecutors in their quest for justice.

C. Monetary Remedies

While the Court’s non-monetary remedies have often responded to the demands and distinctive context of indigenous peoples, a study of its monetary reparations shows troubling results. The abovementioned parameters for remedial design are often disregarded. First, the Court’s compensation orders frequently do not correlate with the kind or degree of violation. For example, an indigenous petitioner may show personalized harm, request individualized compensation, but only benefit from a collective remedy. Or a community may prove significant economic damages, reasonably request market value compensation (after documenting what market value indicates), and only receive a token sum in return. Second, the Court at times does not sufficiently account for the reality of indigenous petitioners, such as the difficulties they face in proving environmental and cultural harm. In short, with respect to monetary damages, the Court overlooks the victim-centered approach, demonstrating a reluctance to evaluate and respond to the claims of indigenous individuals and collectivities.

1. Material Damages

a. Cases Involving Indigenous Communities

This section considers material damages ordered for the community itself, and material damages for individuals belonging to the group. In these cases, individual material damages have only been granted at all on a few occasions. Starting with Aloëboetoe, the Court granted individualized compensation for lost wages and numerous expenses—although the sums were shackled to restrictive trust funds. Plan de Sánchez concerned hundreds of survivors, as the actual massacre took place before the State

436. Id. ¶ 100. The Court appears to draw this instruction from the ILO Convention. See ILO Convention, supra note 2, art. 12 (providing, in part, “[m]easures shall be taken to ensure that members of these peoples can understand and be understood in legal proceedings, where necessary through the provision of interpretation or by other effective means.”).

had accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. To compensate material loss, which the Court characterized as a disruption of “agricultural and employment activities,” it presumed damages to consist of $5,000 per victim. It also acknowledged that Plan de Sánchez residents had lost their homes, and set up a housing program as a “measure of satisfaction seeking to repair the non-pecuniary damage.”

In Moiwana there was a similar lack of *ratione temporis* jurisdiction over the massacre. As a result, like in Plan de Sánchez, the State was able to avoid paying lost wages for the deaths. Still, the Court found that “community members were violently forced from their homes and traditional lands into a situation of ongoing displacement,” and suffered “poverty and deprivation since their flight from Moiwana Village, as their ability to practice their customary means of subsistence and livelihood has been drastically limited.” Lacking detailed evidence of this material harm, it nevertheless saw fit to presume “on grounds of equity” $3,000 per survivor. Similar to Plan de Sánchez, Moiwana also established a separate measure, under non-pecuniary damages, to address the loss of the community members’ homes.

Three to five thousand dollars per person may appear negligible for the severe impact, over several years, upon the survivors’ livelihood. Still, some tribunals may have thrown out the claims entirely, without a methodical presentation of “convincing” evidence and documentation. The Inter-American Court at least provided some recognition of petitioners’ individual requests, which will contribute to a restoration of their dignity.

---

439. Id. ¶ 93.
441. Id. ¶ 186.
442. Id. ¶ 187.
443. Id. ¶ 214. One may ask why material harm such as the destruction of houses was primarily addressed under the heading of moral damages. The Court’s approach could be explained by the *ratione temporis* difficulties of the two cases. Arguably, the Court could not directly compensate for one-time property damage that occurred before its jurisdiction was accepted. The broader developmental programs offered a flexible, forward-looking alternative. Such initiatives can help rebuild the community in a deeper sense, attending to aspects of moral harm. In fact, Awas Tingni had already awarded a small development fund under this rationale. See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 167 (Aug. 31, 2001).
444. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (1979) (describing the higher level of certainty required in U.S. tort law).
445. See Jaime E. Malamud-Goti & Lucas Sebastián Grosman, Reparations and Civil Litigation:
substantiate their material losses, it was also reasonable to presume economic damages after the victims’ ordeal in Moiwana. In doing so, the Court acknowledged the great difficulty of documenting financial losses when a community—who did not even possess identification papers—was forced to flee and live in exile.

The Court took a step backward in Río Negro Massacre v. Guatemala. Río Negro also involved massacres occurring before the State’s acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction. A significant aspect distinguishes this case, however: the State was held responsible for the forced disappearance of seventeen identified persons. Their remains had not yet been recovered at the time of litigation; legally, then, Guatemala was fully liable for continuing violations of the right to life. Nevertheless, the Court only ordered $30,000 for material and moral damages for each disappeared victim. At a minimum, such an amount might address moral damages according to Court criteria. But it fails to account for lost wages and other expenses, requested by petitioners. Such a low sum is inconsistent with the Court’s own admission that the violations “necessarily entail[ed] grave pecuniary consequences.”

Xákmok Kásek and Sawhoyamaxa tell nearly the same story. The Court found the State responsible for deaths, and petitioners requested individualized material damages, such as lost wages and other consequential damages. While the Court ordered other forms of compensation, no individual economic damages were granted. It is true that the claims needed more precision and substantiation; however, at least modest damages could have been presumed under the circumstances. The result in YATAMA was comparable: individual economic damages were


447. Id. ¶ 309.

448. See infra Part III(C)(2).

449. Id. ¶ 308.

both requested and proven, yet the Court only awarded a collective sum to the organization.\(^{451}\) There is no guarantee that YATAMA leaders will distribute these funds at all, much less according to the exact damages that each individual incurred.

The Court has also ordered material damages for indigenous communities as a whole. In all three Paraguayan cases, the Court granted “in equity” modest amounts—between five and forty-five thousand dollars—to community leaders as reimbursement for the expenses associated with reclaiming their lands.\(^{452}\) Yet the Court was also requested to order lost earnings and other damages for the communities \textit{per se}, in order to redress their inability to practice customary economic activities while displaced from their lands.\(^{453}\) While such claims were sensible, the petitioners offered little to provide a basis for such calculations. The Court refused to consider their invitations to determine compensation “in fairness.”\(^{454}\)

In \textit{Saramaka}, Suriname had granted logging concessions in the petitioners’ territory. The Court found that “a considerable quantity of valuable timber was extracted” without any compensation, and the community was “left with a legacy of environmental destruction, despoiled subsistence resources, and spiritual and social problems."\(^{455}\) In response, the Court ordered Suriname to pay only $75,000 for the timber taken and related property damage. The judgment added that amount to a $600,000 community development fund, which it established to redress the “suffering and distress” of the Saramaka community.\(^{456}\) The Court determined the $75,000 “based on equitable grounds,” without explaining its calculations further.\(^{457}\)

The Saramaka community’s expert—a former World Bank Chief Environmental Adviser with thirty-five years of experience assessing


\(^{454}\) \textit{E.g.}, Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 190.


\(^{456}\) \textit{Id.} ¶ 200–01.

\(^{457}\) \textit{Id.} ¶ 199.
environmental and social impacts—had “conservatively” estimated the extracted timber’s market value as over ten million dollars. His conclusions on environmental damages and timber value appear to have gone largely ignored. Despite the Court’s recognition of “environmental destruction” and the petitioners’ calls for market value compensation, the judgment set a very low bar for economic reparation.

In the subsequent case Sarayaku v. Ecuador, the petitioners described significant impacts upon the community’s lives and lands, and urged corresponding material damages. The Court replied that evidence lacked specificity, and it is true that petitioners provided few concrete estimates of economic damages. But even government reports had informed of “notable negative impact” caused by the “destruction” of Sarayaku forests. Ultimately, the judgment recognized the following: the Sarayaku’s territory and natural resources were clearly damaged; their economic well-being was “affected by the suspension of production activities” for months at a time; and they incurred various expenses while seeking “the protection of their rights.” However, the Court only awarded the community $90,000 in material damages.

What could explain such low figures for pecuniary damages? The Court quickly points to the additional development funds, which granted $600,000 to the Saramaka and $1.25 million to the Sarayaku. Yet these funds were not presented as material damages, and, in the case of the Saramaka, they came with restrictions as to their use and implementation. In any event, the total monetary damages ordered in each judgment—including the development funds—likely did not remotely approximate what the communities were owed under market value.

International law frequently requires that the amount of compensation should be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated property.

460. Sarayaku Community’s Brief containing Pleadings, Motions, and Evidence, 116–132 (copy provided by the Inter-American Court’s Secretariat and on file with author) (requesting eventually that the Court determine monetary damages in equity).
462. Id. ¶ 313.
463. Id. ¶ 316.
464. Id. ¶ 317.
465. The community development fund was ordered “to finance educational, housing, agricultural, and health projects, as well as provide electricity and drinking water, if necessary, for the benefit of the Saramaka people.” Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 201 (Nov. 28, 2007).
immediately before the expropriation took place.\footnote{466} Moreover, compensation should be “prompt, adequate and effective,” with “prompt” often interpreted as “without delay plus interest until the date of actual payment.”\footnote{467} For its part, the Inter-American Court has expressly accepted the Hull formula: “just compensation” must be “prompt, adequate and effective.”\footnote{468} However, increasingly influenced by the European Court of Human Rights, it has shown ambivalence toward market value. According to Salvador-Chiriboga \textit{v. Ecuador}, for “adequate” compensation in expropriation matters, states should contemplate the property’s market value, but also provide a “fair balance between the general interest and the [owner’s] interest.”\footnote{469} Thus, the Inter-American Court resisted an outright acceptance of market value; nevertheless, it still granted Salvador-Chiriboga $18.7 million for her land, plus significant interest.\footnote{470}

Clearly, market value was more important in the Court’s compensation calculations for Salvador-Chiriboga’s private land than for the Saramaka’s communal territories. There have been attempts to explain away differing compensation schemes for indigenous peoples. For example, owing to their “traditional” and collective “worldview,” monetary compensation and individual reparations are of less interest to them.\footnote{471} While this may be accurate in several instances,\footnote{472} it is certainly not a universal truth.\footnote{473} Realities and preferences must be closely evaluated in every case. The inevitable result of such stereotyping is illustrated by

\begin{flushright}
469. Salvador-Chiriboga, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 179, ¶¶ 97–98. The Court added that interest should also be paid from the “date that the victim actually lost the right to enjoy possession of the property.” \textit{Id.} ¶ 100.
470. \textit{Id.} ¶ 84. Judge García-Ramírez remarked that “never before” has an Inter-American Court reparations order “come close to that amount even in cases of extrajudicial killings [including massacres].” \textit{Id.} ¶ 19 (García-Ramírez, J., dissenting).
471. See, e.g., Lenzerini, \textit{supra} note 347, at 618 (“Indigenous peoples generally feel that their own values and identity may not be compensated with money, in contrast to the typical Western mentality.”); Vrdoljak, \textit{supra} note 376, at 197, 219–20 (“[T]he intrinsic importance of traditional lands to . . . indigenous communities makes monetary redress, in lieu of restitution, problematic and untenable.”).
472. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pevar, \textit{The Rights of Indians and Tribes} 50 (2012) (explaining that although the Sioux were offered $100 million by the U.S. government in compensation for the loss of their Black Hills territory, most have refused to accept the compensation because they only want their land back).
473. Beristain notes that Guatemalan indigenous victims have desired individual monetary payments. Beristain, \textit{supra} note 354.
\end{flushright}
Salvador-Chiriboga: private landowners obtain millions, while indigenous peoples receive condescending gestures of charity in the form of developmental programs.

Even if the takings in Saramaka and Sarayaku were lawful, these communities deserved far greater material damages. The Inter-American Commission has stated that compensation must be “at least equivalent to that which any [non-indigenous] landowner with full legal title to the land would be entitled in the case of commercial development”—to do otherwise would be discriminatory. In fact, total monetary compensation could even be higher in the case of indigenous and tribal peoples, due to the distinctive value of their lands and resources. They do not merely represent a home or an investment, but rather, in many cases, provide generations with spiritual, cultural, and economic sustenance. In this context, then, some commentators and courts have called for a “cultural value premium” over market value.

b. Benefit Sharing

One promising aspect to the Inter-American jurisprudence in this area concerns benefit sharing. In Saramaka, the Court held that commercial projects must share a “reasonable benefit” with the affected indigenous community. It considered that the benefits concept is “inherent to the right of compensation” recognized in the American Convention’s right to property. Article 21 requires “just compensation,” along with other conditions, upon deprivation of property. Moreover, following


479. Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights establishes: “1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. 2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just
Saramaka, a complete deprivation is not necessary to obtain benefits. 480

Global experience shows that benefit sharing has most commonly taken the form of a one-time payment before operations begin. 481 Nevertheless, it is likely more beneficial and lucrative to secure a reasonable percentage of profits to empower indigenous communities for both the present and future. 482 If desired by the affected communities, the Court should encourage these enduring agreements, which should be subject to periodic review as long as the project continues in order to maintain fair terms. 483

However, to establish indigenous property interests, and thus to activate benefit sharing and compensation, the Court looks to see whether the resources in question have been “traditionally” used by the community. To illustrate, the Court considered whether the Saramaka should have a property interest in the gold found in their territory:

[The community has] not traditionally used gold as part of their cultural identity or economic system. Despite possible individual exceptions, members of the Saramaka people do not identify themselves with gold nor have they demonstrated a particular relationship with this natural resource, other than claiming a general right to “own everything, from the very top of the trees to the very deepest place that you could go under the ground.” 484

Still, the Saramaka Court recognized that gold mining “will necessarily affect other natural resources necessary for the survival of the Saramakas, such as waterways.” 485 In this way, even the extraction of “non-traditional” resources can require benefits for communities.

compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law.” American Convention, supra note 11, art. 21.

480. In establishing this requirement, the Saramaka Court cited to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 140. The Court also highlighted the U.N. Special Rapporteur’s statement that states should secure “mutually-acceptable benefit sharing.” Id. These two U.N. authorities had urged benefit sharing in relation to “major” development projects. The Saramaka judgment did not add that qualifier.


482. See id. The Pascua Lama mining project, which is located on the border of Chile and Argentina, is currently exploring such an arrangement: sharing a percentage of profits with local indigenous communities. See Negocios, Pascua Lama Viabiliza Proyecto tras Acuerdo con Comunidades (May 28, 2014), available at http://www.latercera.com/noticia/negocios/2014/05/655-579997-9-pascua-lama-viabiliza-proyecto-tras-acuerdo-con-comunidades.shtml.

483. See Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, supra note 481, ¶ 60. Contracts should also contemplate dispute resolution, damages, and other potential liabilities. See id.


485. Id.
Of course, petitioners may not be able to demonstrate, to the Court’s satisfaction, these problematic and ambiguous standards: that the extraction will impact their “survival,” or that the resources in question have been used “traditionally” by their community. If valuable resources, such as certain minerals and oil, have not played a conspicuous role in indigenous customs, communities could be deprived of significant compensation and benefits. Since the landmark Awas Tingni judgment, the Court has recognized indigenous peoples as communal property owners. The next, and far more volatile, step must now be taken: when they happen to live upon resource-rich territories, they must receive economic compensation commensurate with such ownership.

c. Cases Involving Single Victims

In most of the indigenous cases involving single victims, the Court’s material damages resemble its typical awards for non-indigenous cases, especially with respect to lost wages. This is because many cases concern low-income individuals with little financial documentation. As a result, the Court orders modest sums “determined in equity”; these estimates often use minimum wage as a reference point. Even when more evidence is available, the Court resists current economic methodologies to fully assess the victim’s earnings capacity.

In both single-victim and community cases, the Court has had particular difficulty with farmers who offered little documentation of their assets and income. Still, in Fernández-Ortega and Rosendo-Cantú, it showed more willingness to consider material damages in this scenario. The judgments found that the petitioners were unable to farm owing to several rights violations, and estimated lost earnings “based on the annual value of the harvest produced” from their parcels of land. Unfortunately, however, even this basic approach has not been applied to other indigenous cases. In Sarayaku, petitioners provided information about the


487. See, e.g., STAN OWINGS, UNDERSTANDING EARNING CAPACITY ASSESSMENT AND EARNING CAPACITY OPTIONS 69–109 (2009) (reviewing the numerous factors that are currently considered in assessing earnings capacity).

community’s production of yuca and its approximate value; yet there is little indication that these data points were seriously considered by the Court.489

d. Conclusion

Without a doubt, indigenous community cases can be extremely difficult and expensive to litigate. These are not just cases about collective rights; as discussed, they can feature the individual claims of numerous community members as well.490 With respect to reparations, petitioners may need to prove a range of elements: the precise location of territories and natural resources, as well as their “traditional use”; any impacts on such lands/resources and corresponding market value; the identification of possibly hundreds of victims and their next of kin; various physical, psychological, and cultural harms; individual and communal lost earnings and other consequential damages, among many other items.491

The Court’s approach to material damages should better account for the complexity of these cases, and the many additional obstacles faced by indigenous petitioners, such as discrimination and socio-cultural barriers. When petitioners indicate that material damages are significant, the Court should facilitate the submission of evidence, and commit to its full analysis. This certainly may require the Court to hold separate hearings on reparations and afford additional time to litigants, especially when they have shown good faith during the process. Of course, the Court refused these requests in Awas Tingni. Such opportunities could have delivered considerable monetary reparations to the community, instead of the $50,000 consolation sum that was ultimately ordered.492

Further, the Court should show more willingness to presume material

489. Sarayaku Community’s Brief containing Pleadings, Motions, and Evidence, 118 (copy provided by the Inter-American Court’s Secretariat and on file with author).
490. In fact, before Sarayaku v. Ecuador, the Court had only found violations “to the detriment of the [individual] members” of a community, even if the right to communal property was breached. See Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 170 (Aug. 24, 2010) (Grossi, J., concurring). In Sarayaku, for the first time, the Court held that the indigenous community itself experienced various rights violations. See Indigenous Community Kichwa of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 341 (June 27, 2012) (declaring the State responsible for violations against the community).
491. Representatives of indigenous communities clearly shoulder key responsibilities here, as they must ensure that individual members communicate their preferences and needs for reparations. There could be disputes among leaders and/or other members of the community; as a result, petitioners could be divided into separate cases.
492. Unsurprisingly, the community’s attorneys estimated far higher material damages. Awas Tingni Community’s Reparations Brief, 9–11 (copy provided by the Inter-American Court’s Secretariat and on file with author) (initially estimating material damages at approximately $750,000).
damages in indigenous group cases. In several of the community cases reviewed above, some form of economic harm—whether individual or collective—was obvious. When damages are requested in these instances, the Court must respond, even with modest amounts such as in Plan de Sánchez or Moiwana Village. The costs of this approach will not be insignificant, and states will resist. Nevertheless, such payments will expressly affirm individual and collective rights. In addition, even a few thousand dollars could make a difference to an impoverished person’s quality of life.

As long as material damages are sought for individuals and communities, both indigenous advocates and the Court should conduct more thorough assessments. Both must show a disposition to analyze the intricate economic consequences of rights abuse, a willingness that is often evident in the design of non-monetary remedies. Various economic models are available to assist in the evaluation of damages in the indigenous context.

2. Moral Damages

a. Cases Involving Single Victims

In indigenous cases involving single victims, the Court has granted moral damages that generally follow both the requests of petitioner

493. The Court appears more willing in smaller cases to presume material damages, often determining lost wages and other consequential damages in equity. See, e.g., Gudiel Álvarez v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 253, ¶ 367 (Nov. 20, 2012) (noting that, while the petitioners did not substantiate consequential damages, such expenses could be presumed and determined in equity as $10,000); Díaz Peña v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 244, ¶¶ 160–161 (June 26, 2012) (holding that, while the petitioners did not document medical costs, such expenses could be presumed and determined in equity as $5,000).

494. Eric Yamamoto and Brian Mackintosh state that individual payments and “economic justice” are “key to a personal and public sense of ‘reconciliation achieved.”’ Eric K. Yamamoto & Brian Mackintosh, Redress and the Salience of Economic Justice, A FORUM ON PUBLIC POLICY: A JOURNAL OF THE OXFORD ROUND TABLE 1, 13 (2010). Even a modest payment could have much significance, based on an understanding that “in our system of justice, when damage occurs money is paid.” Yael Danieli, Justice and Reparation: Steps in the Process of Healing, in REINING IN IMPUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS 303, 309 (Christopher C. Joyner ed., 1998).

495. See BERISTAIN, supra note 354, at 166 (“Reparation should always, and without exception, have an economic aspect that helps to rebuild lives and to face the consequences of the violations.”) (translation by author).

496. For example, petitioners and the Court should consult developing models that assess the earnings capacities of farmers and the self-employed. See generally Lawrence Spizman & Frederick Floss, Loss of Self-Employed Earning Capacity, 12 J. LEGAL ECON. 7 (2002–2003); Ralph J. Brown, Loss of Earning Capacity in the Case of a Farmer, LITIG. ECON. DIG., 1995, at 1.
the parameters of comparable, non-indigenous judgments. It is true that López-Álvarez should have been provided more than $15,000 for enduring over six years of inhuman detention conditions, as well as an illegal arrest and discriminatory treatment.497 But other judgments, such as Bámaca-Velásquez and Chitay-Nech, have ordered significant moral damages—$80–100,000—a range that is standard at the Court for torture and forced disappearance.498 Cases like Escué Zapata, Fernández-Ortega, and Rosendo-Cantú combined reasonable moral damages with non-monetary remedies of an expansive nature, as described above.499

b. Cases Involving Communities

In indigenous community judgments, moral damages have only rarely been granted to specific individuals. In Plan de Sánchez, the Court granted $20,000 to each of the 317 survivors.500 Moiwana called for $10,000 per survivor for moral damages.501 In Sawhoyamaxa, the Court ordered $20,000 for each of the seventeen community members whose death was attributed to the State.502 Combining moral and material damages, Río Negro required $30,000 for each victim of forced disappearance and lesser amounts for other victims.503 However, indigenous petitioners have also unsuccessfully requested individualized payments for moral damages.504

---


499. While $50,000 may seem paltry as compensation for an extrajudicial execution, the Court granted comparable amounts in similar contemporaneous cases. See, e.g., Cantoral-Huamaní et al. v. Peru, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 167 (July 10, 2007) (granting $50,000 to each victim); Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 166 (July 4, 2007) (granting $50,000 to each victim).


504. For example, in Sawhoyamaxa, the Court found the State responsible for 17 deaths. Yet it did
Despite victims having demonstrated individual violations (such as acute personal suffering), apart from those violations associated with their community membership, moral compensation was denied.

While these results are certainly disappointing, it is difficult to conclude that significant differences exist between indigenous and non-indigenous judgments. This is because, in cases with numerous petitioners, the Court generally appears to make economic reparations more feasible for defendant states, often granting victims lower moral damages than what they would receive in smaller cases for similar violations. There have also been non-indigenous group judgments where victims have requested and proven individual moral damages, but did not receive any payment at all.

not award the identified family members moral damages for their own suffering, despite their requests and the Court’s frequent presumptions in this regard. Sawhoyamaxa Community’s Brief containing Pleadings, Motions, and Evidence, 34, available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/casos.cfm. The Court only compensated the moral harm of the deceased. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 226. In Xákmok Kásek, petitioners also requested individual compensation for the family members of the deceased. These payments were to address both the moral harm of the deceased, as well as the suffering of the family members themselves. Xákmok Kásek Community’s Brief containing Pleadings, Motions, and Evidence, 47–48 (copy provided by the Inter-American Court’s Secretariat and on file with author). Instead, the Court awarded a sum to the community’s leaders, to distribute “as they see fit.” Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 325 (Aug. 24, 2010). While their compensation was not fully prevented here, it certainly is not assured.

505. See, e.g., Massacres of El Mozote v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, ¶ 384 (Oct. 25, 2012) (granting $35,000 for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages to each executed victim). Nevertheless, a troubling disparity appeared in two recent Court judgments against the same State. The Court in Gudiel Álvarez v. Guatemala, a case that did not prominently involve indigenous peoples, granted $80,000 in moral damages to each of the estates of 26 victims of forced disappearance. Gudiel Álvarez v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 253, ¶ 371 (Nov. 20, 2012). In contrast, Río Negro, as noted above, ordered only $30,000 for each of 17 victims of the same violation. Río Negro Massacre v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 250, ¶ 309 (Sept. 4, 2012). Some will defend the gap by noting that Río Negro involved many more total victims—382 survivors receiving compensation—and also required expansive community measures requested by petitioners. Still, the difference is too stark and sends a discriminatory message to Río Negro victims—even to those who may have preferred the higher proportion of non-monetary remedies.

506. See Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches, supra note 39, at 396; see also BERISTAIN, supra note 354, at 178 (quoting a current Inter-American Court Judge, who states, “[i]f you have to compensate three hundred people, you have to think realistically about a compensation of millions for the State, which possibly will not comply. So you need to find in equity an amount that helps the victim . . . and that doesn’t make the State react negatively.”) (translation by author).

To alleviate the cash shortfall in large cases, the Court often requires substantial non-monetary reparations. There is no doubt that several of these remedies, such as public apologies, offer powerful redress on both collective and individual levels. In fact, “collective” remedies such as health care programs have a clearly individual component. Still, if the Court denies victims their prioritized individual remedies, it will shortchange individual rights.

For now at least, the Court appears to have set its strategy, choosing to mitigate a state’s financial burden in group cases, despite numerous potential objections. Under these circumstances, two imperatives are evident. First, if the Court reduces moral damages, it must do so equitably across indigenous and non-indigenous cases.

Second, as with material damages, the Court must look to the evidence and victims’ preferences when ordering non-pecuniary reparations. When a victim shows moral harm and states that an individual payment is important, some degree of compensation must be provided. In fact, for years the Court has indicated that moral harm should be presumed for serious violations. Yet currently, in indigenous community cases, individual moral damages only seem assured when deaths occur. That approach is insufficient: if the Court does not reasonably respond to the way victims want to be restored, it does not adequately redress them. As a result, it fails its mandate, and critical rights are greatly diminished relative to the right to life.

c. Community Development Funds

For years now, the Court has established community development funds, ostensibly as a collective remedy for moral damages. Community development funds, such as the one established in the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua case, are intended to provide redress to communities affected by human rights violations. However, as with other forms of non-pecuniary reparations, the Court must ensure that these funds are distributed equitably and that they genuinely address the harms suffered by individuals.

---

508. Such a distribution of remedies may still prove satisfactory to victims, who often prioritize measures of recognition, restoration and accountability. See supra note 369 and accompanying text.

509. As maintained throughout this article, rights are undermined by weak remedies. At the very least, the Court could openly recognize that it is reducing monetary reparations for these pragmatic reasons. As Paul Gewirtz states, “[b]y candidly acknowledging that they are providing something less than a full remedy, courts leave the unfulfilled right as a beacon. This leaves open the possibility that at some point the courts will be able to furnish a more complete remedy.” Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585, 673 (1983).

510. The sum should never be presented as full compensation for suffering, since in these terms it will certainly disappoint. See Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in The Handbook of Reparations 451, 466 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006).

511. Citing to various Court judgments, Jo Pasqualucci states, “evidence is not necessary to prove non-pecuniary damages to a person who has been subject to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, extrajudicial execution, forced disappearance, or arbitrary detention.” PASQUALUCCI, supra note 365, at 236.

512. This approach began in Awas Tingni: Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua,
leaders have frequently asked for these funds, although often with the key proviso that they be deployed in accordance with their modes of governance and customs. 513 Before Sarayaku, nevertheless, the Court placed restrictions upon the funds. To illustrate, Saramaka provided that the fund “will serve to finance educational, housing, agricultural, and health projects, as well as provide electricity and drinking water, if necessary, for the benefit of the Saramaka people.” 514 Decisions to use the funds were left to an “implementation committee” composed of one representative appointed by the community, another by the state, and a third jointly named by the community and the government. 515

As noted above, the Court finally abandoned this approach in Sarayaku, granting the community full control over the assets. Such a reform was necessary, because these funds serve as reparations for rights violations. Regardless of how one chooses to conceptualize the programs, as material or moral redress, they cannot come with judicially-imposed constraints. Otherwise, they are just another incarnation of Aloeboetoe’s ghost: “reparations” with unjust restrictions for victims.

Defining the funds as moral reparations affords the Court significant flexibility. 516 By not representing the programs as material damages, it need not concern itself with market value and stacks of financial and technical documents. Rather, the Court can control non-pecuniary awards to an extent, as subjective estimates of “pain and suffering.” Standards for moral damages, moreover, are relatively modest in the Court’s case law, as reviewed above. In this way, a non-pecuniary framework allows the Court to avoid multi-million dollar judgments like Salvador-Chiriboga. The development funds are just large enough to distract from the meager orders for material damages. Not surprisingly, states, which already owe the communities some level of social investment 517 and face far more costly


513. See, e.g., Saramaka People, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 192 (Nov. 28, 2007) (explaining that representatives of the community requested that awards all be “determined and implemented with the informed participation and consent of the Saramaka people.”).

514. Id. ¶ 201.


516. As already noted with respect to ratione temporis issues. See supra note 443 and accompanying text.

517. However, as the Inter-American Commission states, reparations “must not be confused with
alternatives, have not vehemently objected to the Court’s approach.\textsuperscript{518}  
As a consequence, the Court’s historic affirmation of indigenous peoples as communal property owners is compromised. Rather than receive their due for lost, damaged, or co-opted property, they receive a non-threatening fund to redress moral harm—when they have actually suffered from both moral and material perspectives. The Court’s reluctance to closely evaluate damages and order substantial monetary compensation recalls one enduring viewpoint on indigenous peoples: they should be “assisted” primarily because they represent an important part of society’s diversity. According to this flawed view, “cultural survival” is permissible, but economic power is not—because a “rich Indian” represents “a signal of corruption, cultural loss, or values gone awry.”\textsuperscript{519}  

IV. CONCLUSION  
In many respects, the Inter-American Court has led a global movement for the recognition and redress of indigenous rights. However, the above examination of monetary reparations has shown disquieting results, particularly in the group cases. In these community cases, the Court does not always respond to substantiated claims for damages by individuals and groups. When it neglects the well-founded requests of individual petitioners for material or moral damages, it sacrifices their individual rights to collective concerns. Yet the Court also undermines collective rights, such as the communal right to ancestral property, when it

\textsuperscript{518} Some commentators have suggested that the Court’s development programs may go too far, because they attend to social, economic and cultural rights. See generally Iris T. Figueroa, Remedies without Rights?: Reparations and ESC Rights in the Inter-American System (May 2010) (unpublished student note), available at http://works.bepress.com/iris_figueroa/1. It is true that the American Convention’s text offers limited provisions on social, economic and cultural rights. Still, the Court’s expansive interpretation of the right to life as the right to a “dignified life” (\textit{vida digna}) addresses this issue. Indigenous judgments and other decisions have established that the right to life entails certain key cultural, social and economic protections. See, e.g., Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 217 (Aug. 24, 2010); Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 167 (June 17, 2005). At a minimum, then, the Court should require sociocultural remedies when \textit{vida digna} is neglected.

evades proven claims for compensation.

The full restoration of victims is often out of reach, especially in large group cases. In such circumstances, their priorities and needs, supported with evidence, must direct a tribunal’s difficult choices. With its non-monetary remedies, the Court has pioneered a victim-centered approach by directly responding to indigenous petitioners. Nevertheless, their redress and empowerment will be critically limited if the Court restricts monetary reparations for individuals and collectivities.