THE FUNCTIONS AND LIMITS OF ARBITRATION AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT UNDER PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

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INTRODUCTION

When drafting international agreements, be they contracts or treaties, lawyers often provide for resolution of future disputes, usually by selecting arbitration or judicial settlement.¹ For contracts likely to produce international commercial disputes among private parties, the modern shift from litigation to arbitration has assumed legendary proportions. Unfortunately, that development has become so engrained in the public consciousness that many have ignored an important countertrend. For controversies among states involving their exercise of sovereign powers and the application of public international law, dispute settlement has taken the opposite course: away from arbitration towards judicial settlement.

Partially documenting the trajectory of dispute settlement involving states under public international law, one study has reviewed the decline of arbitration from 1945 through 1990.² By contrast, no one

¹ See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974) (indicating that a “contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated . . . is . . . an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction”); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS 2 (1999) (indicating that it is “almost always advisable to include a contractual dispute resolution provision in any international contract,” which may “take the form of: (1) forum selection clauses, or (2) arbitration agreements”); Michael D. Mann & William P. Barry, Developments in the Internationalization of Securities Enforcement, 39 INT’L LAW. 937, 945 (2005) (opining that the “ability to decide in advance on an acceptable forum for disputes is . . . an essential element of international commercial transactions”).

has performed a corresponding analysis of the conscious effort to promote judicial settlement, launched in the nineteenth century, completed after the First World War, and reinforced after the Second World War. Virtually no one has examined the goals the leaders of that movement sought to accomplish. Likewise, virtually no one has compared that movement to the opposite direction taken by international commercial disputes. As a result, few people appreciate the substantially different functions and limits of arbitration and judicial settlement under private and public international law.

Seeking to fill the gaps just identified, Part I briefly reviews the celebrated shift from litigation to arbitration for international commercial disputes among private parties. In so doing, it recounts the functions served by arbitration, the limits of that process, and the correspondingly important role still played by judicial settlement in the resolution of international commercial disputes. Turning to the resolution of disputes among states under public international law, Part II documents four landmarks in the decisive shift from arbitration towards judicial settlement, as well as the goals pursued or accomplished at each stage. Having discussed the conscious promotion and apparent triumph of judicial settlement, Part III identifies the limits of that process and the correspondingly important role still played by arbitration for inter-state disputes having strong political dimensions. Building on the insights developed in Part III, Part IV seeks to explain the otherwise puzzling reluctance of states to embrace judicial settlement in the context of investment treaty disputes.

I. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES: FROM LITIGATION TO ARBITRATION

For international commercial disputes involving private parties, judicial settlement represents a logical starting point because most states possess experienced courts that have compulsory process over non-resident aliens, subject to permissive rules on personal jurisdiction.

During their formative years, many of those courts viewed arbitration as unwelcome competition and, therefore, adopted doctrines

calculated to arrest its development. As a result, judicial settlement remained the predominant form of adjudication for domestic and international commercial disputes until well into the twentieth century.

Although courts have grown more favorably disposed to arbitration, judicial settlement remains the default venue for international commercial disputes in the sense that parties who wish binding decisions and who have not provided otherwise must resolve their differences in municipal courts, often in two or more courts, with parallel submissions on jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, antisuit injunctions, and even the merits. Given the awful financial consequences,
the threat of decentralized judicial settlement serves as an incentive to conclude agreements expressly providing for dispute settlement in a single forum, either through litigation or arbitration. 12

Because they long served as the predominant venue for adjudication and, presumably, developed corresponding levels of expertise, one might understandably consider municipal courts as the natural choice for adjudicating commercial disputes. 13 While the assumption may remain valid for domestic controversies, 14 litigation in municipal courts entails serious drawbacks for parties to international transactions. For example, recourse to national judicial systems tends to confer strategic advantages on the local party. 15 Aside from the threat of parochial bias, which remains a problem in the United States and elsewhere, 16 hometown litigation allows local parties to engage their regular counsel, 17 employ familiar procedures, 18 present evidence and
arguments in their native languages, and appear before judges who share their business and legal culture. As a result, local parties may reap advantages bearing little relation to the merits of the case.

While one might level the playing field by providing for litigation in a third state, that approach can lead to neutrality of the worst kind, placing the disputing parties in equally bad positions: denying them both the opportunity to engage their regular counsel, to employ familiar procedures, to use their native languages, or to appear before decision-makers accustomed to their business and legal cultures. Furthermore, the judicial procedures of third states may not be well designed for international commercial disputes, the judges may lack relevant expertise, and their judgments will not enjoy worldwide enforcement in summary proceedings.

As practiced today, international commercial arbitration eliminates many of the drawbacks associated with hometown litigation. For example, while parties from developing states might complain about the supposedly Western orientation of major arbitration institutions, one probably cannot accuse them of the strong parochial biases often embedded in national judicial systems. To the extent that parties from developing states remain concerned about the cultural orientation of major arbitration institutions, they may insist on ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, approved by the United Nations General Assembly, in which developing, non-Western states enjoy a preponderant voice. In addition, the increas-

19. Id.
20. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 22.
22. BORN, supra note 1, at 9; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 22, 26.
23. BORN, supra note 1, at 9; LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 5; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 26.
24. As noted by most standard texts, there are few regional treaties and no global treaties requiring enforcement of foreign judgments. BORN, supra note 1, at 13, 105-06; COE, supra note 4, at 61; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 23. Although the Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted a Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which would require enforcement of judgments rendered by courts selected by contractual agreement in international commercial disputes, only one state has acceded to that instrument, which has not entered into force. See Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2005), http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98.
26. See BORN, supra note 5, at 7; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 196.
ing harmonization of international arbitration rules and laws means that all parties can reap the benefits of familiar procedures specifically designed for international commercial disputes. Furthermore, those instruments generally allow parties to employ their regular counsel without regard to bar membership at the place of arbitration. Finally, the opportunity to appoint an arbitrator, and the New York Convention’s widespread ratification help to ensure that tribunal members will have relevant expertise, that they will collectively appreciate the business and legal cultures of the disputing parties, and that their awards can be enforced in summary proceedings under uniform standards from “Albania to Zimbabwe.” Thus, because it combines neutrality with high levels of convenience for both parties, and because it promotes finality through worldwide guarantees of enforcement, arbitration has eclipsed judicial settlement as the predominant means of adjudicating international commercial disputes.

Given the pronounced shift towards arbitration, one often forgets that the process has substantial limitations, including a conspicuous vulnerability to sabotage. Thus, because arbitration depends on the consent of the parties, unwilling respondents may disrupt the process simply by withholding cooperation. For example, they may not respond to demands for arbitration. They may contest

28. See John Collier & Vaughan Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law 46 (1999); Redfern & Hunter, supra note 8, at 47; Tweeddale & Tweeddale, supra note 14, at 39. See also Born, supra note 5, at 39.

29. Tweeddale & Tweeddale, supra note 14, at 39. See also Born, supra note 5, at 37-38.

30. Lew et al., supra note 3, at 542; Redfern & Hunter, supra note 8, at 472.

31. Born, supra note 1, at 9; Lew et al., supra note 3, at 8; Redfern & Hunter, supra note 8, at 22.

32. See Buhring-Uhle, supra note 7, at 84; Lew et al., supra note 3, at 7.

33. Lew et al., supra note 3, at 693-94. See also Coe, supra note 4, at 61 (emphasizing the convention’s “wide acceptance” and the consequent standardization of the “general approach taken to foreign arbitral awards by contracting states”).

34. See Lew et al., supra note 3, at 6-7; Redfern & Hunter, supra note 8, at 22-23, 25-26.

35. See Buhring-Uhle, supra note 7, at 37, 38; Redfern & Hunter, supra note 8, at 1; Tweeddale & Tweeddale, supra note 14, at 39.

36. See Redfern & Hunter, supra note 8, at 26 (suggesting that the strong shift towards arbitration has resulted in fewer critical examinations of that processes).

37. See id. at 288 (observing that “delay and disruption became important issues in international commercial arbitration” during the final two decades of the twentieth century).

38. Tweeddale & Tweeddale, supra note 14, at 41.

39. Born, supra note 5, at 184; Buhring-Uhle, supra note 7, at 149.
the validity of arbitration agreements. They may refuse to appoint their own arbitrators. They may challenge the independence or impartiality of other tribunal members. They may object to the tribunals’ jurisdiction over some or all components of the disputes. Finally, they may not voluntarily satisfy awards. Barring outside intervention, any one of these steps could obstruct the arbitral process and transform it into a pointless exercise. As a safeguard against that misfortune, however, modern arbitration statutes empower national courts to prevent collapse by enforcing arbitration agreements, appointing arbitrators, deciding challenges, reviewing jurisdictional decisions, and enforcing awards. Thus, judicial assistance supplies the coercion needed to guarantee arbitration’s long-term viability as the preferred means of adjudicating international commercial disputes.

II. DISPUTES AMONG STATES UNDER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM ARBITRATION TO JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT

For inter-state disputes involving sovereign activities and the application of public international law, arbitration represents a logical starting point in the sense that it preceded judicial settlement and remained the normal means of adjudication until well into the twentieth century...
Nevertheless, the modern history of inter-state adjudication reveals a steady shift from arbitration towards judicial settlement. In recounting this transition, one may identify four landmarks, each of which reflects the crystallization of a new stage: (1) the formation of quasi-diplomatic joint commissions under the Jay Treaty of 1794; (2) the establishment of an independent and impartial tribunal to resolve the *Alabama Claims* in 1871; (3) the harmonization of procedural rules following inauguration of the Permanent Court of Arbitration by the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907; and (4) the consistent development of substantive international law following establishment of a truly Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and an International Court of Justice (ICJ) after the First and Second World Wars.  

A. The Jay Treaty Commissions: The Quasi-Diplomatic Practice of Arbitration  

Virtually all writers trace the modern history of international tribunals to the General Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Great Britain, commonly known as the Jay Treaty of November 19, 1794. Seeking to resolve a num-

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52. See MANLEY O. HUDSON, *INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: PAST AND FUTURE* 3 (1944).

ber of differences left outstanding after the War of Independence, that instrument established three arbitral commissions, whose membership consisted exclusively of U.S. citizens and British subjects.

The first commission, established under Article V of the Jay Treaty, had the task of identifying the location of the St. Croix River, designated as the northeast boundary of the United States in the treaty ending the War of Independence. While the mandate appears relatively simple, the drafters of the earlier treaty lacked personal knowledge of that “largely unsurveyed” region, relied on an inaccurate map, referred to the name of a river unknown to contemporary inhabitants of that region, and left no record by which one might have ascertained the river they intended to designate as the border of the United States. Notwithstanding the difficulties that it confronted, the first commission had the fortune to reach a unanimous decision.


54. J.L. SIMPSON & HAZEL FOX, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1 (1959); ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 2; Janis, supra note 53, at 14; Shifman, supra note 53, at 128.

55. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 3; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 191.

56. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 3; J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 89 (3d ed. 1998); ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 2; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 218-19; Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 105.

57. 2 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § 563, at 116 (1922); 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 5-6 (1898); ROBERT C. MORRIS, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND PROCEDURE 42-45 (1911); RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 191; RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at xxvi; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 216; SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 1; Lillich, supra note 53, at 266; Schwarzenberger, supra note 53, at 720.

58. PHILIP C. JESSUP, THE PRICE OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 26 (1971); MOORE, supra note 56, at 1-2; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 41.

59. MOORE, supra note 57, at 2; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 41.

60. MOORE, supra note 57, at 3; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 42.

61. MOORE, supra note 57, at 2, 24; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 41, 44.

62. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 3; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 191; SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 1; Pinto, supra note 53, at 66.
The second commission, established under Article VI, faced the task of resolving claims by British merchants for debts incurred by U.S. citizens, which remained outstanding due to legal impediments imposed by former colonies during the War of Independence. After the claims proved much larger than expected by the United States and thus increased the stakes beyond a comfortable scale, doctrinal and interpersonal quarrels broke out among commissioners, causing the American members to withdraw, thereby bringing a halt to the proceedings in July 1799. Three years later, the United States settled the remaining claims of British merchants by treaty for $2,664,000.

The third arbitral commission, established under Article VII, faced the task of settling the claims of U.S. citizens for losses resulting from British detention or condemnation of ships and cargo bound for French ports during a period of armed conflict between Britain and France. During the course of its proceedings, the third commission confronted difficult questions regarding the scope of its jurisdiction.

63. Moore, supra note 57, at 271-76; Morris, supra note 57, at 62.
64. Ralston, Athens to Locarno, supra note 53, at 191; Ralston, Law and Procedure, supra note 53, at xxvi; Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, supra note 53, at 216; Simpson & Fox, supra note 54, at 1-2; Lillich, supra note 53, at 270-71.
65. Moore, supra note 57, at 286, 288.
66. Id. at 283-85, 287, 288-91. See also Morris, supra note 57, at 62; Lillich, supra note 53, at 272-73.
68. Moore, supra note 57, at 292; Ralston, Athens to Locarno, supra note 53, at 192; Lillich, supra note 53, at 273-74.
69. Moore, supra note 57, at 290-92; Morris, supra note 57, at 62; Simpson & Fox, supra note 54, at 2. See also Hudson, supra note 52, at 3; Ralston, Law and Procedure, supra note 53, at xxvi.
70. Jessup, supra note 58, at 26; Moore, supra note 57, at 298. See also Hudson, supra note 52, at 3; Morris, supra note 57, at 63; Ralston, Law and Procedure, supra note 53, at xxvi; Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, supra note 53, at 217; Simpson & Fox, supra note 54, at 2; David J. Bederman, The Glorious Past and Uncertain Future of International Claims Tribunals, in International Courts for the Twenty-First Century, supra note 53, at 161, 164; Lillich, supra note 53, at 274-75.
71. Jay Treaty, supra note 53, art. VII. See also Moore, supra note 57, at 299-310; Morris, supra note 57, at 60; Ralston, Athens to Locarno, supra note 53, at 192; Ralston, Law and Procedure, supra note 53, at xxvi; Simpson & Fox, supra note 54, at 2; Lillich, supra note 53, at 276.
72. Moore, supra note 57, at 324; Morris, supra note 57, at 61; Lillich, supra note 53, at 277-78.
and the exhaustion of local remedies. On two occasions, withdrawal of the British commissioners forced the tribunal to suspend its proceedings. Despite these setbacks, the commission eventually resumed its work and, in the course of eight years, rendered over 530 awards in favor of U.S. claimants, who received some $11,650,000 in compensation.

The significance of the Jay Treaty commissions lies in their revival of arbitration, which had fallen into disuse during at least one, or more centuries, of European conflicts over religion, territory, and the consolidation of nation-states. Furthermore, departing from the tradition of arbitration by monarchs and ecclesiastical figures who

73. Moore, supra note 57, at 332-33; Lillich, supra note 53, at 278-79.
74. Moore, supra note 57, at 324, 337-39; Lillich, supra note 53, at 277-78, 279; Pinto, supra note 53, at 67.
75. Moore, supra note 57, at 332, 339; Lillich, supra note 53, at 277-78, 279-80.
76. Ralston, Law and Procedure, supra note 53, at xxvi.
77. See Hudson, supra note 52, at 3 (553 awards); Moore, supra note 57, at 342-43 (553 awards); Bederman, supra note 70, at 164, 167 (536 awards); Janis, supra note 53, at 14 (536 awards).
78. Jessup, supra note 58, at 25; Moore, supra note 57, at 343-44; Morris, supra note 57, at 60-61; Lillich, supra note 53, at 280. See also Ralston, Law and Procedure, supra note 53, at xxvi (mentioning the award of “a net sum considerably in excess of $11,000,000”).
80. Hudson, supra note 52, at 3; Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, supra note 53, at 210; Simpson & Fox, supra note 54, at 1.
81. Moore, supra note 79, at x; Morris, supra note 57, at 14-15; Meyer, supra note 53, at 3; Abi-Saab, supra note 51, at 921; Geoffrey Best, Peace Conferences and the Century of Total War: The 1899 Hague Conference and What Came After, 75 Int’l Aff. 619, 628 (1999); Moore, supra note 53, at 497; William L. Penfield, International Arbitration, 1 Am. J. Int’l L. 330, 337 (1907); Scott Memorandum, supra note 79, at 26 n.1.
82. See Moore, supra note 79, at x; Morris, supra note 57, at 14. See also Redfern & Hunter, supra note 8, at 63 (observing that arbitration “fell into disuse with the rise of the modern state”).
stated no reasons for their awards, the Jay Treaty afforded the first prominent example of arbitration by collegial tribunals issuing reasoned awards based on the application of legal principles. Finally, the Jay Treaty extended the use of arbitration beyond the traditional scope of territorial disputes to include the resolution of numerous claims involving injuries to aliens under the law of state responsibility.

While not detracting from their significance, the Jay Treaty arbitrations also illustrate the ways in which the membership of the commissions and their rules of procedure led to a combination of legal proceedings and diplomatic negotiations, with a heavy emphasis on the latter. For example, one should recall that the Jay Treaty led to establishment of commissions drawn exclusively from citizens of the disputing parties. Understanding that they served in a representative capacity, commission members tended to view their mandates as

83. Observers frequently mention the practice of certain European polities, during the Middle Ages, of submitting their disputes to arbitration by the Pope, the Holy Roman Emperor, or other sovereigns. See, e.g., ANTONIO SANCHEZ DE BUSTAMANTE, THE WORLD COURT 3 (Elizabeth F. Read trans., 1925); HUDSON, supra note 52, at 17; MERRILLS, supra note 56, at 89; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 7-12; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 55, 174, 181-82; RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at xxv; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 200-10; Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 97 n.1; Manfred Lachs, The Development and General Trends of International Law in Our Time, 169 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 224 (1980). Unwilling to expose the sufficiency of their analysis to outside critique, the Pope, the Holy Roman Emperor and other sovereign arbitrators typically provided no reasons for their decisions, thus casting doubt on the legal basis for their awards. See MERRILLS, supra note 56, at 89; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 55, 91-92; Abi-Saab, supra note 51, at 921-22.

84. See Schwarzenberger, supra note 53, at 716, 724 (using the Jay Treaty arbitrations to mark the point at which “international judicial organs” received the entitlement to “settle international disputes on the basis of international law,” and opining that the awards rendered by two of the commissions achieved an “impressive” level of quality); Shifman, supra note 53, at 128-29 (observing that the Jay Treaty “was a milestone because it showed that quasi-judicial procedures applying international legal principles could be used to settle disputes between nations”).

85. See Charney, supra note 53, at 118 (concluding that the awards issued under Article VII of the Jay Treaty “played an important role in the development of State Responsibility law”).

86. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.

87. See HUDSON, supra note 52, at 19 (explaining that the practice of appointing nationals to joint commissions conferred a “representative capacity” on tribunal members); RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 57 (emphasizing that mixed tribunal members “were apt to regard themselves and be regarded by others as simply the representatives of the nations in dispute and therefore serving in no judicial function”). See also Schwarzenberger, supra note 53, at 726 (opining that the legal opinions of members from two Jay Treaty commissions “were determined by their . . . views on the national interests of their own countries”).
an extension of diplomacy. Furthermore, while the membership of commissions inclined the process towards negotiation of acceptable outcomes, their rules of procedure reinforced that orientation. For example, Articles VI and VII empowered their respective commissions to render decisions by majority vote, but required the presence of at least one party-appointed member from each side to conduct business. Under these circumstances, the party-appointed members from either side held a collective veto, which they could exercise by withdrawing and bringing the proceedings to a temporary or permanent halt. Needless to say, this arrangement encouraged a “high-level of consensus-seeking” among tribunal members. Thus, although they rendered awards founded on legal principles, these joint commissions worked best when their members blended the functions of judges and negotiators, reconciling the demands of justice with the expediency of compromise.

88. See MERRILLS, supra note 56, at 89 (indicating that these “early Anglo-American commissions were not judicial tribunals in the modern sense, but were supposed to blend juridical with diplomatic considerations to produce . . . a negotiated settlement”); ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 2 (opining that the composition of the Jay Treaty commissions contradicted “any idea of third-party settlement,” and describing the proceedings as more “diplomatic . . . than judicial in character”). See also COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 226 (explaining that in “the early days of arbitration . . . arbitrators were regarded as exercising an essentially diplomatic function”); RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 22-23 (noting that mixed commissions tend to “recall their diplomatic origin and strive always to make a bargain between the opposite pretensions of the parties” (quoting SLAVCO STOYKOVITCH, DE L’AUTORITE DE LA SENTENCE ARBITRALE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 6 (1924)); R. Y. Hedges, The Juridical Basis of Arbitration, 1926 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 110, 113 (asserting that during the first half of the nineteenth century, “arbitration was largely of a diplomatic character,” meaning that tribunals based their awards on “calculations of national interest rather than on a true balance of arguments”).

89. See Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 106 (suggesting that “tribunals with a majority of national arbitrators are more likely to turn to compromise, whereas tribunals composed of non-national arbitrators are likely to operate strictly on the basis of law”); Scott Memorandum, supra note 68, at 28 (asserting that “the practice of arbitration since the negotiation of the Jay treaty in 1794” has led many to conclude that “arbitration is too often synonymous with compromise; that it is ‘an adjustment’ of difficulties rather than ‘a judicial decision’ of controversies”).

90. See Jay Treaty, supra note 53, art. VI (collection of pre-war debts), art. VII (unlawful seizures of ships and cargoes).

91. See supra notes 68-69, 74-75 and accompanying text.

92. See Bederman, supra note 70, at 164.

93. COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 32; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 2. See also RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 56 (recognizing that one of the commissions’ “decisions were generally just and always well-fortified by reasoning”).

94. SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 3. See also Lillich, supra note 53, at 280-81; Pinto, supra note 53, at 71.
B. The Alabama Claims: Arbitration Becomes a Judicial Process

Despite the Jay Treaty’s revival of arbitration, many writers regard the Alabama Claims as the greatest arbitration in modern history.\(^95\) Commenced under the Treaty of Washington of May 8, 1871,\(^96\) that arbitration famously sought to resolve an accumulation of claims alleging British violations of neutrality involving the construction of armed vessels for the Confederacy during the American Civil War.\(^97\) While it sounds almost incredible to the modern ear, the volatile mix of British actions and U.S. recriminations brought the two states closer to the brink of war than at any time since 1814.\(^98\)

After years of unsuccessful efforts to negotiate a rapprochement,\(^99\) the United States and Great Britain agreed to submit the Ala-

\(^95\) See, e.g., BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 51; ADRIAN COOK, THE ALABAMA CLAIMS 9 (1975); H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 9 (1933); MORRIS, supra note 57, at 60; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 197; RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at xxvii; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 2; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 241; Best, supra note 81, at 629; Janis, supra note 53, at 14; Schwebel, supra note 53, at 364. See also Abi-Saab, supra note 51, at 922 (describing the Alabama Claims as the “real beginning of modern international arbitration, in the technical sense”).


\(^97\) COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 32; HUDSON, supra note 52, at 5; HYDE, supra note 57, § 564, at 120; JESSUP, supra note 58, at 2; MOORE, supra note 57, at 495-96; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 74; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 197; RALSTON, LAW AND PROCEDURE, supra note 53, at xxvii; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 63; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 241; SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 8; Caron, supra note 79, at 9; Janis, supra note 53, at 14; Stephen M. Schwebel, The Performance and Prospects of the World Court, 6 PACE INT’L. L. REV. 253, 254 (1994).

\(^98\) See Moore, supra note 53, at 495. See also Cook, supra note 95, at 19; FRANK WARREN HACKETT, REMINISCENCES OF THE GENEVA TRIBUNAL OF ARBITRATION 1872: THE ALABAMA CLAIMS 18 (1911); Meyer, supra note 53, at 1; Schwebel, supra note 97, at 254. In fact, there had been a “widespread” fear that “Union victory would be followed by a war of revenge against Britain.” Cook, supra note 95, at 29. See also Meyer, supra note 53, at 2 (quoting Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy for the proposition that “the English . . . are more apprehensive of war than they are willing to confess, and hostilities may be nearer than our people suppose”).

\(^99\) When the U.S. minister to London made a conciliatory proposal to arbitrate the Alabama Claims in 1863, the British foreign minister waited nearly two years before replying that “Her Majesty’s Government [were] the sole guardians of their own honor” and that he viewed the proposal as incompatible with the “dignity and character of the British Crown.” See JESSUP, supra note 58, at 3; MOORE, supra note 57, at 496. In 1868, the new U.S. minister to London negotiated a plan to arbitrate the Alabama Claims. MOORE, supra note 57, at 501-04. See also COOK, supra note 95, at 51-61. Following an intemperate speech by the chair of its Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate rejected the treaty by a vote of 44 to 1. See COOK, supra note 95, at 95, 99 (describing the speech as a “dangerously exaggerated and unbalanced piece of work,” which dragged the dispute “back into the hysterical atmosphere of the war years”); Tom Bing-
Alabama Claims to arbitration before a tribunal of five jurists, one each to be appointed by the President of the United States, the Queen of England, the King of Italy, the President of the Swiss Confederation, and the Emperor of Brazil. After conducting hearings in Geneva during the summer of 1872, the tribunal rendered an award in favor of the United States in the amount of $15,500,000, an enormous sum by prevailing standards. Although its party-appointed arbitrator submitted a lengthy and vitriolic dissent, the British government fully, if ironically, satisfied the award by tendering bonds issued by the U.S. government to finance its expenses during the Civil War.

Reviewing its significance, many writers emphasize that the Alabama Claims arbitration removed a cause of war between two great powers with a history of difficult relations, thus proving that arbit...
tration could resolve controversies of the first order. More importantly for the development of international tribunals, Great Britain and the United States did not merely resort to arbitration; they altered its character. Instead of establishing a quasi-diplomatic joint commission, the disputing parties consented for the first time in history to arbitration before a panel of jurists appointed mostly by neutral governments, charged with a mandate to apply specific legal rules, and having the capacity to transact business by majority vote. In so doing, they marked a turning point in the development of international adjudication: from then on, the trajectory of arbitration shifted decisively towards a judicial model.

107. In less than a century before the American Civil War, the United States and Great Britain had fought each other in two major wars. Meyer, supra note 53, at 1; Bingham, supra note 99, at 1.

108. Cushing, supra note 100, at 185-86; Michael Dunne, The United States and the World Court, 1920-1935, at 11-12 (1988); Hyde, supra note 57, § 564, at 121; Rosenne’s The World Court, supra note 53, at 3; Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, supra note 53, at 242 (quoting Professor Moore); Janis, supra note 53, at 15. But see Caron, supra note 79, at 9 (opining that the Alabama Claims arbitration “was somewhat exaggeratedly credited with defusing the potential conflict between the United States and Great Britain”).

Because the three substantive rules on neutrality set forth in the Treaty of Washington essentially determined the question of liability in the Alabama Claims, one may say that the United States and Great Britain actually settled that issue by negotiation. See Hudson, supra note 52, at 106; Lauterpacht, supra note 95, at 151; J.L. Brierly, The Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, 4 J. Brit. Inst. Int’l Aff. 227, 227 (1925); Mr. Choate’s Address on the Anglo-American Project of International Arbitration (Oct. 5, 1907) [hereinafter Choate’s Address of Oct. 5, 1907], reprinted in American Addresses at the Second Hague Peace Conference 44, 49 (James Brown Scott ed., 1910) [hereinafter American Addresses]. Thus, the arbitration served mainly to settle the amount of damages. Ralston, Athens to Locarno, supra note 53, at 190.

109. See Bingham, supra note 99, at 24 (explaining the Alabama Claims arbitration’s significance as involving “one of the very few instances in history when the world’s leading nation . . . has agreed to submit an issue of great national moment to the decision of a body in which it could be, as it was, heavily outvoted”). See also Ralston, Athens to Locarno, supra note 53, at 56, 197 (emphasizing the “distinctive” and “unusual” structure of the tribunal); Simpson & Fox, supra note 54, at 8 (describing the “new type of tribunal” constituted to hear the Alabama Claims).


111. Bishop, supra note 110, at 2; Collier & Lowe, supra note 28, at 32; Merrills, supra note 56, at 91. See also Rosenne’s The World Court, supra note 53, at 3 (opining that the significance of the Alabama Claims “lies in the nature of the tribunal”).

112. See Hedges, supra note 88, at 113 (opining that “the judicial element of arbitration may be said to have taken root” following the Alabama Claims arbitration). See also Brownlie, supra note 53, at 672; Collier & Lowe, supra note 28, at 33; Simpson & Fox, supra note 54, at 10.
C. The Hague Peace Conferences: The PCA and Harmonization of Procedural Law

In 1899, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia convened the first Hague Peace Conference with the objective of terminating or curtailing the European arms race, which had assumed monumental proportions. Since the proposal attracted little enthusiasm among European governments, which depended on military power to perpetuate colonial empires, Nicholas added arbitration to the conference’s agenda, which drew a more favorable response.


114. BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 41; JOSEPH H. CHOATE, THE TWO HAGUE CONFERENCES 6 (1913); SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 42, 43; SCOTT, supra note 79, at 47-48; Bederman, supra note 113, at 9; Best, supra note 81, at 621; Amos S. Hershey, Convention for the Peaceful Adjustment of International Differences, 2 AM. J. INT’L L. 29, 29 (1908); Scott, supra note 113, at 8; Knox Memorandum, supra note 53, at 6. See also Message of the Czar, Aug. 24, 1898, reprinted in DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PROGRAM OF THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE 1-2 (1921).

115. See Paul M. Kennedy, The First World War and the International Power System, INT’L SECURITY, Summer 1984, at 7, 7-8 (noting that the First World War was preceded by an “arms race of staggering proportions,” during which “military expenditures more than doubled” in Germany and Austria-Hungary); Vagts, supra note 113, at 32 (describing the growing military budgets of major European powers from 1894 to 1913, including a 117 percent increase by Great Britain, a 91.5 percent increase by France, a 158 percent increase by Germany, and a 160 percent increase by Austria). See also GEORGE ELIAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 15 (1971) (asserting that “after 1870, the arms race quadrupled the military expenses in the first ten great states in the world”); Best, supra note 81, at 621 (opining that “Europe was beginning to look like an armed camp”); Jörg Manfred Mössner, Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 671, 671 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1995) (observing that “[m]ilitary budgets increased enormously during the last decade of the 19th century”).

116. KUEHL, supra note 53, at 44-45; SCOTT, supra note 79, at 47-48; Scott, supra note 113, at 8. See also Best, supra note 81, at 622 (recounting that “the chancelleries of Europe handled [the Tsar’s invitation] like a parcel that might contain a bomb”).

117. See Best, supra note 81, at 619.

118. BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 41-42; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 44-46; SCOTT, supra note 79, at 48; Arthur Eyffinger, Living Up to a Tradition, in THE HAGUE: LEGAL CAPITAL OF THE WORLD, supra note 53, at 29, 36; Scott, supra note 113, at 8-9. See also Circular Note of Count Mouravieff to the Diplomatic Representatives Accredited to the Court at Petrograd ¶ 8 (Dec. 30, 1898), reprinted in DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PROGRAM OF THE FIRST HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE, supra note 114, at 2, 3 [hereinafter Circular Note of Count Mouravieff].

119. See Scott, supra note 113, at 9 (observing that the provisions on arbitration described in the second circular were “much better received”). See also Instructions to the American Delegates to the Hague Conference of 1899 [hereinafter Instructions to the American Delegates in
Because a “decided” worldwide movement already favored the creation of a permanent international tribunal,¹²⁰ which “could not be ignored,”¹²¹ several delegations arrived in The Hague with instructions to make proposals on the topic.¹²² For example, the United States favored a continuously sitting international court,¹²³ staffed by eminent jurists and modeled on the U.S. Supreme Court.¹²⁴ The British preferred a permanent institution without a fixed bench,¹²⁵ but with the capacity to establish tribunals quickly when disputes arose between states.¹²⁶ Russia added a plan to make arbitration mandatory for certain categories of disputes.¹²⁷ By contrast, Germany opposed most of the plans on practical grounds: unlike its potential adversaries, Germany could mobilize its army in a matter of days,¹²⁸ giving it an unmatched capacity to launch preemptive strikes.¹²⁹ Under these cir-

¹²⁰ HUDSON, supra note 52, at 6. See also Caron, supra note 79, at 4 (referring to the “popular belief circulated at the end of the century that the establishment of a permanent international court would be an important step toward a world free of war”).

¹²¹ HUDSON, supra note 52, at 6. See also SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 12 (“By the end of the nineteenth century, arbitration had become a widely spread international custom; and it was natural that its discussion should occupy a considerable place in the deliberations of the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907.”).

¹²² HUDSON, supra note 52, at 6; Caron, supra note 79, at 15.

¹²³ BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 43; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 137; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 72, 278; SCOTT, supra note 79, at 52-53; Caron, supra note 79, at 15, 17; Instructions to the American Delegates in 1899, supra note 119, at 14-16; Report to the Secretary of State of the Delegates to the First Hague Conference [hereinafter Report of the Delegates to the First Hague Conference], in INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATES, supra note 119, at 17, 22.

¹²⁴ MORRIS, supra note 57, at 137; Report of the Delegates to the First Hague Conference, supra note 123, at 22.

¹²⁵ BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 43; FREDERICK W. HOLLS, THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE 238 (1900); MORRIS, supra note 57, at 137; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 279; Caron, supra note 79, at 15.

¹²⁶ BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 42; HOLLIS, supra note 125, at 236; MORRIS, supra note 57, at 137; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 279; Hans Jonkman, The Role of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in International Dispute Resolution, 279 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 18 (1999).

¹²⁷ MORRIS, supra note 57, at 138; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 321-22; Caron, supra note 79, at 15-16; Hershey, supra note 114, at 32-33.


¹²⁹ See MEYER, supra note 53, at 16. See also HOLLS, supra note 125, at 1, 5 (noting that German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who died just before the first Hague Peace Conference,
cumstances, Germany feared that potential targets would use the ponderous machinery of arbitration to buy time and, thus, neutralize Germany’s military advantage.\(^\text{130}\)

While some have claimed that German resistance abated,\(^\text{131}\) thus permitting agreement on a Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,\(^\text{132}\) one might say that Germany relented only after it prevailed on the important points.\(^\text{133}\) As adopted, the convention created no permanent international tribunal\(^\text{134}\) and did not subject any category of dispute to mandatory arbitration.\(^\text{135}\) Thus, while the convention established the so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague,\(^\text{136}\) that institution does not represent a court in the traditional sense.\(^\text{137}\) It has no fixed bench.\(^\text{138}\) To the contrary, it had pursued a policy of “consistent and continually increasing preparation for war . . . and the avowed determination to be ready to strike the first blow . . . with greater swiftness than any possible opponent”).

\(^\text{130}\) M ORRIS, supra note 57, at 136; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 73; TUCHMAN, supra note 128, at 264; Caron, supra note 79, at 16.

\(^\text{131}\) R ALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 256; Caron, supra note 79, at 16; Janis, supra note 53, at 15.


\(^\text{133}\) See SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 309 (describing the concessions made to Germany as “surrender” rather than “compromise”).

\(^\text{134}\) Caron, supra note 79, at 16-18.

\(^\text{135}\) CHOATE, supra note 114, at 36; M ORRIS, supra note 57, at 138-39; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 76-77, 310; Caron, supra note 79, at 16-17; Janis, supra note 53, at 16.

\(^\text{136}\) Hague Convention of 1899, supra note 132, art. 20.


For almost a century, writers have repeated the clever observation that the Permanent Court of Arbitration is neither “permanent” nor a “court.” COLlier & LOWE, supra note 28, at 35; FRANCK, supra note 53, at 17; HUDDSON, supra note 52, at 8; M ORRIS, supra note 57, at 137-38; RALSTON, ATHENS TO LOCARNO, supra note 53, at 260; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 5; Bederman, supra note 113, at 10; Shabati Rosenne, The International Court
encompasses three elements: (1) a list of individuals nominated by states parties from whom they may choose arbitrators in the event of a dispute, 139 (2) a small International Bureau or secretariat that provides registry services to ad hoc tribunals, 140 and (3) a set of procedural rules that apply in the absence of contrary agreements by the disputing parties. 141 In other words, the PCA represents an optional facility for arbitration that states may activate as desired. 142
When Nicholas II convened a Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, the prospects for international adjudication had improved. For example, while arbitration had slipped onto the agenda “almost as an afterthought” in 1899, it dominated the negotiations in 1907. Furthermore, when the United States renewed its efforts to establish a permanent international tribunal with a fixed bench, the proposal drew support even from the German delegation. However, the project failed when a rift opened between large and small states on the principles for judicial appointments. Whereas larger states demanded permanent representation on the court, smaller states insisted on a system reflecting the juridical equality of all states. Unable to reconcile these conflicting views, negotiations for a permanent interna-

143. Bederman, supra note 113, at 9. See also Morris, supra note 57, at 126.
145. Bustamante, supra note 83, at 46-47; Choate, supra note 114, at 77; Dunne, supra note 108, at 19; Fachiri, supra note 137, at 4; Hudson, supra note 52, at 25; Hudson, supra note 144, at 4; Jessup, supra note 139, at 75-76, 420; Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, supra note 53, at 129, 430, 440; Scott, supra note 79, at 52-53; Tuchman, supra note 128, at 287; Moore, supra note 53, at 499; Hans-Jürgen Schlochauer, Permanent Court of International Justice, in 3 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 988, 988 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1997); Schwebel, supra note 97, at 255; Stephen M. Schwebel, Reflections on the Role of the International Court of Justice, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1061, 1062 (1986); Draft of an Identical Circular Note Proposed to and Approved by Secretary of State Knox, to be sent to the American Ambassadors at London, Berlin, and Paris (Nov. 25, 1912) [hereinafter Knox Circular Note], reprinted in Scott, An International Court of Justice, supra note 53, at 18, 21; Knox Memorandum, supra note 53, at 8; Instructions to the American Delegates to the Hague Conference of 1907 [hereinafter Instructions to the American Delegates in 1907], in INSTRUCTIONS TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATES, supra note 119, at 67, 79-80; Scott Memorandum, supra note 79, at 66; Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 81.
147. Scott, supra note 79, at 65. See also James Brown Scott, The Project of a Permanent Court of International Justice and Resolutions of the Advisory Committee of Jurists: Report and Commentary 29 (1920); Mössner, supra note 115, at 676; Schwebel, supra note 97, at 255.
tional court fell short of completion in 1907. As a result, delegates concentrated on revisions to the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, adjusting its provisions in light of experience, but leaving the fundamental structure untouched.

While some have expressed disappointment at the failure to achieve more at the Hague Peace Conferences and others have offered tepid endorsements of the PCA, state practice suggests a much higher level of enthusiasm, at least until establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920. During the relevant period, states concluded roughly 120 new treaties providing for

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149. Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, 1 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J., 226, 236 (1920) (address by Baron Descamps, President of the Committee); Bourgeois, supra note 138, at 36; BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 677; CHOATE, supra note 114, at 77-79; DUNNE, supra note 108, at 19; FACHIRI, supra note 137, at 4; HUDSON, supra note 144, at 4; MANLEY O. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, at 82 (1943); HYDE, supra note 57, § 572, at 140; JESSUP, supra note 139, at 420; KUEHL, supra note 53, at 104; MEYER, supra note 53, at 29; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 456; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 13; Bederman, supra note 113, at 11; Caron, supra note 79, at 21; Moore, supra note 53, at 499; Mössner, supra note 115, at 676; Knox Circular Note, supra note 145, at 21; Scott Memorandum, supra note 79, at 66.


151. SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 254; Knox Memorandum, supra note 53, at 6; Report to the Secretary on the Second Hague Conference, supra note 146, at 93, 100.


153. Hershey, supra note 114, at 48. See also David Jayne Hill, The Net Result at The Hague, in S. Doc. 60-433, at 3 (1908) (observing that “[t]he Hague Conferences have been saluted with contempt on the one hand, and satire on the other”); SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 1 (indicating that the “great public” felt that the lack of agreements on disarmament and compulsory arbitration “involved the failure of the Conference”); Moore, supra note 53, at 498-99 (recognizing that the PCA “failed to meet the expectations which many had indulged”); Joseph H. Choate, Progress at the Second Hague Conference, Address to the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 24-25, 1908), reprinted in AMERICAN ADDRESSES, supra note 108, at xiii, xiii (lamenting the “general disposition” of journalists to “belittle and depreciate the work” of the Second Hague Conference).

154. See BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 673; JESSUP, supra note 58, at 34; Mr. Scott’s Address on the Elements Entering into the Composition of an International Court of Arbitral Justice (Aug. 1, 1907) [hereinafter Mr. Scott’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907], reprinted in AMERICAN ADDRESSES, supra note 108, at 84, 86.

155. See HUDSON, supra note 52, at 7 (discussing recourse to the PCA, and its decline following establishment of the PCIJ in 1920).
arbitration. They also brought some 14 disputes before tribunals constituted by the PCA, making that institution the center of gravity for arbitration among states during the first two decades of the twentieth century.

Although it did not endure, one may attribute the PCA’s season of popularity to two practical, if modest, features. First, while arbitration had been possible for over a century, the Hague Conventions made it simple by providing the necessary ingredients: a pool of arbitrators, a set of procedures, and a competent registry. Second, by supplying rules of procedure, the conventions neutralized a previous tendency towards “extreme informality” in arbitration, and initiated the broad harmonization (but not detailed standardization) of procedural rules, for which arbitration later became famous.

156. Id.; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 7; Janis, supra note 53, at 16. See also CHOATE, supra note 114, at 40 (alluding to the conclusion of more than 144 “standing arbitration treaties” between 1899 and 1913).

157. H UDSON, supra note 52, at 7; KELLOR & DOMKE, supra note 139, at 44; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 7; Janis, supra note 53, at 16.


159. See WILLIAM EVANS DARBY, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 474-75 (3d ed. 1899). See also Hudson, supra note 137, at 459 (emphasizing the importance of the PCA’s International Bureau, which “has served . . . as an impartial body through which negotiations and communications may be conducted; it has offered a locus in which tribunals may have their seats; and it has furnished trained personnel upon which tribunals may rely”). But see SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 426 (quoting Professor Asser, a founder and member of the PCA, for the proposition that the process was “difficult, time-consuming and expensive to set in motion,” at least when compared to a traditional court permanently in session).


161. Before 1899, there were no commonly accepted rules of procedure for arbitrations between states. Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 234 (address by Baron Descamps, President of the Committee); B ISHOP, supra note 110, at 12-13. According to one source, the absence of clear procedures led to fears, complications, and delays for consumers of arbitration. B ISHOP, supra note 110, at 12-13. As amended in 1907, the rules of procedure adopted by the Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes still comprise a routine point of departure for drafting arbitration agreements and for framing arguments on disputed procedural points. S IMPSON & FOX, supra note 53, at 13.

162. See HYDE, supra note 57, § 570, at 134 (emphasizing that the procedural rules “are mainly descriptive of the general steps to be followed”). See also HUDSON, supra note 52, at 84 (explaining that “[u]nlike the procedure in some national courts,” procedures before international tribunals have not “concealed within the confines of strict and rigid rules”); Bederman, supra note 70, at 174 (discussing unsuccessful efforts to “standardize” the procedures of international tribunals); Charney, supra note 53, at 125 (recounting the failed effort to promulgate a rigid procedural code for arbitration among states, and concluding that states prefer the flexibility traditionally afforded by arbitration).

Nevertheless, the PCA’s growing popularity soon exposed the limitations of that system. As the number of cases increased and became simpler to track within a single institutional process, it became clear that tribunals formed by the PCA saw their mandate as resolving particular disputes, and not as developing a consistent body of jurisprudence for the benefit of all states.\footnote{Sir Hersh Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court 6 (1958); Caron, \textit{supra} note 79, at 13; Scott Memorandum, \textit{supra} note 79, at 25, 38, 39, 41.} Under these circumstances, the procession of \textit{ad hoc} tribunals never developed the continuity required to support an accumulation of precedent\footnote{Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, \textit{supra} note 149, at 235 (address by Baron Descamps, President of the Committee); Report of the Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Feb. 10, 1944), reprinted in 39 Am. J. Int’l L. Supp. 1, 34 (1945) [hereinafter Report of the Inter-Allied Committee]; Brownlie, \textit{supra} note 53, at 677; Hudson, \textit{supra} note 52, at 162, 246-47; Hudson, \textit{supra} note 149, at 80; Hudson, \textit{supra} note 144, at 283; Hyde, \textit{supra} note 57, § 572, at 138 n.7; Lauterpacht, \textit{supra} note 164, at 6; Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, \textit{supra} note 53, at 427 (quoting Joseph Choate); Clarke, \textit{supra} note 137, at 345, 401; Hudson, \textit{supra} note 137, at 458-59; Moore, \textit{supra} note 53, at 499; Scott Memorandum, \textit{supra} note 79, at 41, 43; Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, \textit{supra} note 137, at 81; Mr. Choate’s Remarks on Introducing the Proposed Court of Arbitral Justice (Aug. 13, 1907) [hereinafter Mr. Choate’s Remarks on the Proposed Court of Arbitral Justice], reprinted in American Addresses, \textit{supra} note 108, at 97, 98. See also Ralston, Athens to Locarno, \textit{supra} note 53, at 30; Penfield, \textit{supra} note 81, at 332.} and, thus, to confer the jurisprudential benefits of stability,\footnote{Bourgeois, \textit{supra} note 138, at 35; Dunne, \textit{supra} note 108, at 19.} coherence\footnote{Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law 294 (7th rev. ed. 1997).} and certainty.\footnote{See Lauterpacht, \textit{supra} note 164, at 6. See also Moore, \textit{supra} note 53, at 499.} As one prominent observer exclaimed “each case [was] decided as if it were an isolated problem, sporadic, never occurring before and never to occur again,” with the result that “Chaos” and “Chance” sat as umpire and arbitrator.\footnote{Scott Memorandum, \textit{supra} note 79, at 37 (quoting Harvard Professor Eugene Wambaugh). See also Clarke, \textit{supra} note 137, at 400 (lamenting that the “evanescent and fugitive character” of such tribunals led to a “great contradiction in their rulings” on nearly identical questions).}

To summarize, while the Hague Peace Conferences led to the harmonization of procedural rules for arbitrations between states, recourse to the PCA left the development of substantive principles in disarray. The desire to remedy this flaw not only justified the

\begin{quote}
harmonized procedural rules have marked commercial arbitration as the rare example in which international law and practice have established clear rules, universally and consistently enforced across the globe.
\end{quote}
posals for a permanent tribunal in 1907, it also represented a principal reason for continued interest in judicial settlement through the end of the Great War.

D. The PCIJ and the ICJ: The Consistent Development of International Law

Although the Hague Conferences billed arbitration as a means for securing peaceful settlement of disputes, its availability did not prevent Germany from exhibiting her military prowess in two World Wars. Nevertheless, the unprecedented destruction wrought by those conflicts called forth a new demand for international institutions designed to prevent war, including a permanent court engi-

170. See, e.g., Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 81 (“Let us . . . seek to develop . . . a permanent court, . . . which shall consist of the same judges, . . . pay due heed to its own decisions, . . . and gradually build up a system of international law, definite and precise, which shall . . . regulate the conduct of nations.”).

171. Lauterpacht, supra note 164, at 6. See also Scott Memorandum, supra note 79, at 42-43 (quoting Elihu Root).

172. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 150, arts. 1, 37-38; Hague Convention of 1899, supra note 132, arts. 1, 20. See also Schwebel, supra note 97, at 254 (explaining that the peace movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was “transfixed” with the idea that recourse to arbitration could prevent armed conflict).

173. See Moore, supra note 53, at 499 (recognizing that the PCA’s “inability to prevent the recurrence of war was soon demonstrated”). See also Redfern & Hunter, supra note 8, at 59 (expressing regret that the PCA “did not avert the great conflicts of the twentieth century”).


175. See Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, Walking an International Law Tightrope: Use of Military Force to Counter Terrorism—Willing the Ends, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 405, 406 (2006) (asserting that the destruction of World War I prompted establishment of the League of Nations as a means of securing international peace); Petras, supra note 174, at 1235-36 (describing the “immense destruction” wrought by World War I and identifying establishment of the League of Nations as an effort to ensure that such wars could not recur); Karin G. Tackaberry, Time to Stand Up and Be Counted: The Need for the United Nations to Control International Terrorism, ARMY LAW., July 2007, at 1, 20 (explaining that the “widespread death and destruction” of World War II “served as a catalyst for the creation of the UN” in order to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”).
neered to secure the peaceful settlement of international disputes. 176 As explained below, however, the legacy of that court, and of its successor, became the consistent development of international law.

While it technically did not establish a judicial organ for League of Nations, Article 14 of the Covenant instructed the organization’s Council to “formulate and submit to the members of the League . . . plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice.” 177 To that end, the Council summoned a group of distinguished jurists. 178 Ten individuals accepted the invitation, 179 thus forming an Advisory Committee of Jurists consisting of five citizens from the so-called “Great Powers” and five citizens from smaller states. 180

From start to finish, the Committee’s work represented the direct continuation of efforts launched during the Second Hague Peace Conference. To begin with, a substantial minority of the Committee had participated in the First or Second Hague Conferences, including Elihu Root who, as Secretary of State, had instructed the U.S. delegation to seek a permanent international court in 1907. 181 Furthermore,

176. See Shaw, supra note 53, at 960 (explaining that the first permanent international court “was intended . . . to prevent outbreaks of violence”). See also Lauterpacht, supra note 164, at 3 (describing the Court’s “primary purpose” as the maintenance of peace “in so far as this aim can be achieved through law”); Rosene, supra note 137, at 191 (identifying “the avoidance or the settlement of disputes” as the PCIJ’s “prime objective”).

177. League of Nations Covenant art. 14. See also Fachiri, supra note 137, at 1; Meyer, supra note 53, at 40; Scott, supra note 79, at 62; Scott, supra note 147, at 2; Moore, supra note 53, at 500.

178. Fachiri, supra note 137, at 2; Meyer, supra note 53, at 41; Schlochauer, supra note 145, at 989. See also Scott, supra note 79, at 63; Scott, supra note 147, at 2-3; Moore, supra note 53, at 500.

179. Jessup, supra note 139, at 419; Scott, supra note 79, at 63.

180. Scott, supra note 79, at 63.

181. See Jessup, supra note 139, at 420; Scott, supra note 147, at 13 (both describing Root’s participation in the Second Hague Conference). In addition to Root, the Committee included Baron Edouard Descamps, who represented Belgium at the First Hague Conference, Francis Hagerup, who represented Norway at the Second Conference, and Arturo Ricci-Busatti, who had served as secretary to Italy’s delegation at the Second Conference. Compare Bourgeois, supra note 138, at 36-37 (listing the individuals proposed for membership in the Committee), with Reports to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, at 15, 205, 211 (James Brown Scott ed., 1917) (identifying the relevant delegates to the First and Second Hague Conferences). See also Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference 360 (1975) (describing Ricci-Busatti’s role).

The League’s Council had also extended invitations to Luis Drago, who represented Argentina at the Second Hague Conference, and Henri Fromageot, who represented France at the Second Hague Conference. Compare Bourgeois, supra note 138, at 36-37 (listing the individuals proposed membership in the Committee), with Reports to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, supra, at 206, 209 (identifying Drago and Fromageot as delegates to the and Second Hague Conference). In the end, neither gentleman accepted the honor.
despite plans to meet in London, Committee members gathered in The Hague after the Dutch government drew their attention to the “undying memories” of the Peace Conferences and invited them to complete the work left unfinished in 1907. To greet Committee members in that historic city, the League’s Council dispatched Léon Bourgeois, a former French prime minister, the head of the French delegation to both Hague Conferences, and president of the commission on pacific settlement of disputes at both Hague Conferences. In addressing the Committee, Bourgeois called for establishment of a “true permanent court,” not controlled by the disputing parties but having the “mandate” and “duration” needed to establish a “real jurisprudence.” To that end, Bourgeois expressed the hope that Committee members would take the reports of the previous work in the Hague as their point of departure.

Heeding Bourgeois’ admonition, Elihu Root proposed a resolution identifying the acts and resolutions of the Second Hague Conference as the foundation for the Committee’s work. In so doing, he aimed to reassure observers that the Committee did not seek to advance the interests of its members or their home states, but to complete an undertaking supported by the community of states. While

See Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 226 (identifying the “membership of the Committee, after certain changes in the original list necessitated by the inability of some of those first appointed to serve”); BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 95 (describing the Committee’s final composition after some of the preliminary invitees proved “unable or unwilling to serve”).

182. SCOTT, supra note 147, at 5.
183. BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 96.
184. DUNNE, supra note 108, at 17; TUCHMAN, supra note 128, at 252.
185. SCOTT, supra note 147, at 6; James Brown Scott, Léon Bourgeois—1851-1925, 19 AM. J. INT’L L. 774, 775-76 (1925). See also Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 227 (address by M. van Karnebeek, Dutch Foreign Minister); TUCHMAN, supra note 128, at 252.

186. Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 227 (address by M. van Karnebeek, Dutch Foreign Minister); SCOTT, supra note 147, at 6; Scott, supra note 185, at 775-76. See also BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 42; TUCHMAN, supra note 128, at 257. Bourgeois also received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1920. MEYER, supra note 53, at 59; Scott, supra note 185, at 776.

187. Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 230 (address by M. Léon Bourgeois). See also BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 96; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 7; Caron, supra note 79, at 26.
188. Bourgeois, supra note 138, at 36.
189. JESSUP, supra note 139, at 419-20; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 13; The Constitution of an International Court, supra note 148, at 1-2. See also MEYER, supra note 53, at 41.
190. SCOTT, supra note 147, at 14; The Constitution of an International Court, supra note 148, at 1-2. See also JESSUP, supra note 139, at 420 (emphasizing Root’s desire to “show the con-
not adopting the text of Root’s proposal,\(^{191}\) Committee members accepted its substance,\(^{192}\) thus enabling completion of their task in the remarkably brief period of less than six weeks.\(^{193}\)

Following adoption of its statute and organization of its work, the PCIJ began to hold regular sessions in The Hague in 1922.\(^{194}\) Over the course of nearly two decades, it rendered thirty-two judgments in contentious cases\(^{195}\) and twenty-seven opinions in advisory proceedings.\(^{196}\) While most of those decisions involved relatively technical questions of treaty interpretation\(^{197}\) and did not prevent the outbreak of World War II or other wars,\(^{198}\) they stood out for their high quality\(^{199}\) and for the unprecedented accumulation of practice by an international tribunal.\(^{200}\) Thus, the PCIJ represented a “tremendous”\(^{201}\) or “decisive”\(^{202}\) advance not by preventing war,\(^{203}\) but by producing volumes of reasonably coherent jurisprudence\(^{204}\) that, for the first time,
marked case law as a significant factor in the development of substantive international law.  

Although the German invasion of The Netherlands forced the PCIJ to suspend its work in 1940, the Court’s strong track record ensured that it emerged from World War II with its reputation largely intact. Thus, while negotiations regarding the post-war order aimed for replacement of the League with a more effective organization, they produced an equally strong sentiment favoring retention of a world court based on the favorable experiences of the past. Although some argued for direct continuation of the PCIJ so as not to interrupt the continuity of its jurisprudence, the Charter’s drafters elected to form a new International Court of Justice (ICJ) as one of the principal organs of the United Nations Organization.

Despite the formal inauguration of a new court, the Charter’s drafters sought to preserve continuity with the PCIJ at the functional level. For example, they constituted the ICJ under a Statute almost

205. See SIMPSON & FOX, supra note 54, at 19; Jull, supra note 202, at 380. See also ELIAN, supra note 115, at 6 (concluding that the activity of the PCIJ “brought a significant contribution to the development of international law”); Schwebel, supra note 145, at 1063 (describing the PCIJ’s importance in terms of its significant contributions so the “progressive development of international law”).

206. UNCIO DOCS., supra note 194, at 382; HUDSON, supra note 52, at 11, 140; Manley O. Hudson, The Succession of the International Court of Justice to the Permanent Court of International Justice, 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 569, 569 (1957).

207. See UNCIO DOCS., supra note 194, at 382 (recognizing that the PCIJ’s decisions “in several scores of cases produced a general satisfaction throughout the world”); United Nations Comm. ofJurists, Report of Rapporteur on Draft of Statute of an International Court of Justice (Apr. 25, 1945), in U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: SELECTED DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE DRAFTING OF THE STATUTE 113, 113 (1946) [hereinafter United Nations Comm. of Jurists] (recalling that the PCIJ “had functioned for twenty years to the satisfaction of the litigants and that, if violence had suspended its activity, . . . th[e] institution had not failed in its task”). See also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE RESULTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION, THE SEC’Y OF STATE 139 (1945) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT] (describing the “unanimous agreement” that the PCIJ had “rendered effective service and had made an excellent record”).

208. Schwebel, supra note 97, at 257.

209. Rosenne, supra note 137, at 191; Schwebel, supra note 97, at 257; Schwebel, supra note 145, at 1063.

210. See, e.g., HUDSON, supra note 52, at 143. See also United Nations Comm. of Jurists, supra note 207, at 113 (recalling the PCIJ’s effective performance and indicating a subtle preference for its continuation under an amended statute).

211. UNCIO DOCS, supra note 194, at 381, 383, 385, 387; MEYER, supra note 53, at 88.

212. See UNCIO DOCS, supra note 194, at 384 (emphasizing that the “creation of the new Court will not break the chain of continuity with the past” and listing some of the practical steps taken to ensure that “continuity in the progressive development of the judicial process will be
identical to that of its forerunner. Furthermore, the ICJ established its seat in The Hague, moving into the same facilities previously used by the PCIJ, where it employed virtually the same staff members, and exercised jurisdiction under treaties that referred to the PCIJ. Furthermore, when the ICJ formally inaugurated its work, the leadership of the World Court did not change: Judge José Guerrero, the PCIJ’s last president, became the ICJ’s first president. From that time on, the ICJ has applied the PCIJ’s decisions interchangeably with its own, thus maintaining a continuous jurisprudence. Under these circumstances, observers have come to regard the two courts as a single organizational unit.

Despite the continuity of jurisprudence, observers have called attention to the fact that the transition from the PCIJ to the ICJ entailed a notable decline in the rate of judicial activity, which began in 1945 and lasted for many decades. Thus, in the first thirty-five years of its existence, the ICJ rendered only twenty-six judgments in con-
tentious cases, a rate of less than one per year and not comparable to the thirty-two judgments issued by the PCIJ in roughly half the time. Although the situation did not improve during the 1980s, the following decade saw an increase in Court’s workload. By about its sixtieth anniversary, the ICJ had rendered ninety-two judgments in contentious cases and regularly had a docket of ten or more pending cases, thus marking the busiest period in the combined history of the two courts.

Moving from quantitative to qualitative assessments, observers have drawn attention to another change that accompanied the transition from the PCIJ to the ICJ. Whereas the PCIJ’s decisions concentrated on relatively technical questions of treaty interpretation, the ICJ’s decisions have focused more on the application and development of customary international law. Furthermore, when compared to its predecessor, the ICJ has addressed a greater variety of weighty and cutting-edge matters, including the use of force, credible alle-

222. Malanczuk, supra note 167, at 290.
223. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
224. See Malanczuk, supra note 167, at 290.
225. One may use the publications of Judge Stephen M. Schwebel to track the growth of cases on the ICJ’s docket. As of his elevation to the bench in 1981, the Court had only one active case. Stephen M. Schwebel, The Docket of the World Court, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 2 (1998) [hereinafter Schwebel, The Docket of the World Court]; Schwebel, supra note 53, at 359. As of 1994, the number had grown to roughly one dozen. Schwebel, supra note 97, at 258. Although the number of pending cases fell to nine during 1998, it later rebounded and stood at twenty-three when Judge Schwebel left the bench in 2000. Schwebel, The Docket of the World Court, supra, at 2; Schwebel, supra note 53, at 359.
227. Merrills, supra note 220, at 176. See also Brownlie, supra note 53, at 694 (recognizing that “the Court has had a consistently full calendar of contentious cases” in recent years). As of July 31, 2007, the number of pending cases stood at twelve. Report of the ICJ, supra note 226, para. 9.
228. Rosenne’s The World Court, supra note 53, at 238.
229. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
231. See Rosenne, supra note 137, at 202 (explaining that many cases brought before the ICJ “have been weightier, and of greater general importance than those brought before the Permanent Court”). See Report of the ICJ, supra note 226, para. 11 (emphasizing the “cutting-edge” issues raised by cases on the Court’s docket).
gations of genocide,\textsuperscript{233} and the cooperative exploitation of shared natural resources.\textsuperscript{234} Despite these new challenges and some notable criticisms relating to particular cases,\textsuperscript{235} observers continue to express a high regard for the quality of the ICJ’s work.\textsuperscript{236}

Beyond fluctuations in their activity and in the character of issues submitted for decision, no assessment of the PCIJ and the ICJ would be complete without a comparison of goals to performance. As in all things, expectations tend to influence one’s conclusions. For example, many people expected the PCIJ and the ICJ to play leading roles in the maintenance of international peace and security by providing a substitute for armed conflict.\textsuperscript{237} Because neither Court has made significant contributions to that idealistic goal,\textsuperscript{238} one might assess their combined track record in disappointing terms. Nevertheless, one should recall that many have described the establishment of a continuous jurisprudence and the progressive development of international law as important (perhaps the most important) justifications for establishment of the PCIJ and its successor, the ICJ.\textsuperscript{239}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{235} See José E. Alvarez, \textit{Burdens of Proof}, ASIL NEWSL. (ASIL, Washington, D.C.), Spring 2007, at 1, 7 (discussing the ICJ’s recent judgment in \textit{Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide} and concluding that “the majority of the ICJ’s judges appear in need of a basic course in Fact-Finding 101”). See also BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 693 (listing three judgments criticized by British publicists as being “too radical”).
  \item \textsuperscript{236} See Schwebel, \textit{supra} note 97, at 258; Steinberger, \textit{supra} note 194, at 45.
  \item \textsuperscript{237} See UNCTD DOCS, \textit{supra} note 194, at 393; ELIAN, \textit{supra} note 115, at 5; LAUTERPACHT, \textit{supra} note 164, at 3; SHAW, \textit{supra} note 53, at 960; Rosenne, \textit{supra} note 137, at 191.
  \item \textsuperscript{238} See BROWNLIE, \textit{supra} note 53, at 693 (acknowledging that the Court “has not been at all prominent in the business of keeping the peace”); LAUTERPACHT, \textit{supra} note 164, at 4 (“[I]t would be an exaggeration to assert that the Court has proved to be a significant instrument for maintaining international peace.”). See also Schwebel, \textit{supra} note 97, at 257 (“[T]he hope of the peace movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, that international adjudication was the substitute for war . . . was ill-founded and undisputedly idealistic.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{239} See FACHIRI, \textit{supra} note 137, at 92; HUDSON, \textit{supra} note 144, at 16; LAUTERPACHT, \textit{supra} note 164, at 5, 6, 8; Georges Abi-Saab, \textit{The International Court as a World Court, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 3, 9} (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996); Jiménez de Aréchaga, \textit{supra} note 197, at 1. See also \textit{REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra} note 207, at 138 (“[T]he International Court of Justice . . . has an important part to play in developing international law just as the courts of England and America have helped to form the common law.”); Permanent Court of Arbitration, Circular Note of the Secre-
it bears repeating that the practice of referring to and building on past decisions has remained a conspicuous part of their combined work product,\(^{240}\) with the result that the two courts have established a continuous and reasonably consistent jurisprudence,\(^{241}\) which by all accounts has made a significant contribution to the clarification and development of international law.\(^{242}\)

In sum, whereas the PCA inaugurated the broad standardization of procedural rules for arbitration of disputes among states, the PCIJ and the ICJ consolidated that work and extended it to the consistent and progressive development of international law.

### III. DISPUTES AMONG STATES UNDER PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT

While observers have long discussed the declining stream of PCA arbitrations, which slowed to a trickle following inauguration of the PCIJ\(^ {243}\) and, then, nearly ceased during several decades of the ICJ’s existence,\(^ {244}\) Professors Gray and Kingsbury documented a broader drop in recourse to arbitration for inter-state disputes over the period from 1945 to 1990.\(^ {245}\) During the same time, the number of

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\(^{240}\) See Lauterpacht, supra note 164, at 9, 11.

\(^{241}\) Id. at 18.

\(^{242}\) See Brownlie, supra note 53, at 693; Lauterpacht, supra note 164, at 5; Shaw, supra note 53, at 1005; Steinberger, supra note 194, at 45.

\(^{243}\) See Collier & Lowe, supra note 28, at 36; Hudson, supra note 52, at 7; Shaw, supra note 53, at 958; Hudson, supra note 137, at 459. See also Jonkman, supra note 126, at 26; Sohn, supra note 53, at 15; Sohn, supra note 137, at 1 (all describing the decline of recourse to the PCA starting in the 1920s).

\(^{244}\) See Brownlie, supra note 53, at 673; Janis, supra note 53, at 16, 35; Jonkman, supra note 126, at 27-28; P.H. Kooijmans, International Arbitration in Historical Perspective: Past and Present (Comments on a Paper by Professor L.B. Sohn), in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: PAST AND PROSPECTS, supra note 53, at 23, 25; Shifman, supra note 53, at 135, 141-42.

\(^{245}\) See Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 99-100.
international courts grew sharply, suggesting a nearly complete transition from arbitration to judicial settlement.

Since the appearance of Gray’s and Kingsbury’s work, however, arbitration involving states has experienced a revival on two fronts. Beginning in mid-1990s, demand for the PCA’s services and those of its International Bureau increased dramatically. A decade later, the list of pending arbitrations hovered at ten to twelve per year, marking one of the busiest periods in the PCA’s history. In a related field, the number of arbitrations brought against states under investment treaties also jumped from single digits to scores of pending claims. While surprising to many, the popularity of arbitration for particular categories of disputes might not have surprised proponents of judicial settlement in 1907 or 1920. As explained below, they foresaw the limits of judicial settlement and, thus, contemplated a substantial role for

246. See, e.g., SHAW, supra note 53, at 1011 (describing the “proliferation of judicial organs on the international and regional level”); D.W. Bowett, Contemporary Developments in Legal Techniques in the Settlement of Disputes, 180 RECUEIL DES COURS 169, 178-79 (1983-II) (recognizing the appearance of “several new courts” at the international level); Caron, supra note 79, at 24 (mentioning the recent growth of “international adjudicative bodies”); Dupuy, supra note 220, at 792 (referring to the “proliferation of international courts and tribunals”).

247. See SHAW, supra note 53, at 953-54; Jonkman, supra note 126, at 17, 29-30, 40-42; Shifman, supra note 53, at 141-44.

248. See infra notes 281-285 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of investment treaty arbitration in testing and reinforcing hypotheses about the limits of judicial settlement in claims involving states, their sovereign acts, and the application of public international law).

249. See infra notes 281-285 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of investment treaty arbitration in testing and reinforcing hypotheses about the limits of judicial settlement in claims involving states, their sovereign acts, and the application of public international law).

250. In 1995, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) had five pending claims with $15 million in controversy. Roberto Daniño, Remarks in Honor of Antonio R. Parra, NEWS FROM ICSID (Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes, Wash., D.C.), Apr. 26, 2005, at 12, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDNewsLettersRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&DocId=DC4. Ten years later, the list of pending cases had grown to ninety with more than $25 billion in controversy. Id. See also MEG N. KINNEAR ET AL., INVESTMENT DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO NAFTA CHAPTER 11, Gen. Section at 26 (2006) (comparing the total of three BIT claims registered at ICSID as of 1994 with the total of 106 treaty-based claims filed as of 2004); CAMPBELL McLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 5 (2007) (recounting the “exponential” growth in investment treaty arbitration from the first registered case in 1987 to the current total of more than 200 disputes); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 476-77 (comparing the eight ICSID cases registered and the 19 ICSID cases pending in 1998 with the 30 new cases registered and 63 cases pending in 2003); GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 4 n.11, 30 (2007) (comparing the 35 claims registered by ICSID from 1966 to 1996 with the 166 claims registered by ICSID from 1996 to 2005); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1538-39 (2005) (describing the “exponential explosion” of claims from a rate of one claim per year at ICSID during the 1980s to a rate of one or two claims per month in 2001).
arbitration of claims having a particular gravity or involving the discretionary allocation of valuable resources.

When designing a Court of Arbitral Justice in 1907 and when finally establishing the PCIJ in 1920, sponsors had to define the relationship between those institutions and the machinery already supplied by the PCA. Despite calls for termination of the PCA, leading proponents of judicial settlement favored its continuation, going so far as to memorialize that objective in the Draft Convention for the Establishment of the Court of Arbitral Justice and in the PCIJ’s Statute. Emphasizing the need for parallel institutions, they explained that judicial settlement would lend itself to adjudication of “purely legal” disputes, but that arbitration would remain a more suitable forum for controversies having strong “political” dimensions. To understand the distinction, one must explore the charac-

251. For example, in anticipation of the PCIJ’s inauguration, the Argentine delegation unsuccessfully called for the PCA’s termination during the first Assembly of the League of Nations. HUDSON, supra note 149, at 56; Jully, supra note 202, at 381 n.3.

252. FACHIRI, supra note 137, at 21; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 435-36, 442; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 41; The Constitution of an International Court, supra note 148, at 4, 11; Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 84; Mr. Choate’s Remarks on the Proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, supra note 165, at 97; Mr. Scott’s Report of Oct. 16, 1907, supra note 146, at 122-24 (quoting H.E. Léon Bourgeois); Letter from James Brown Scott, Director, Division of International Law, Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, to H.E. Jonkheer J. Loudon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands (Jan. 12, 1914) [hereinafter Scott Letter], in SCOTT, AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 53, at 1, 3.


254. Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice art. 1, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S 379 [hereinafter PCIJ Statute]. See also FACHIRI, supra note 137, at 21; Jully, supra note 202, at 380-81 & n.2.


256. Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 230 (address by Léon Bourgeois); SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 425 (quoting Léon Bourgeois); Scott, The Organization of International Justice, supra note 225, at 64, 65 (quoting Léon Bourgeois); Mr. Scott’s Report of Oct. 16, 1907, supra note 146, at 114 (quoting Léon Bourgeois); Scott Letter, supra note 252, at 3. See SCOTT, supra note 147, at 41; The Constitution of an International Court, supra note 148, at 11 (recounting Elihu Root’s discussion of the respective functions of the PCIJ and the PCA, indicating that Root viewed judicial settlement as useful in resolving questions of “strict” law, and suggesting that he viewed arbitration as useful
ter and limits of judicial settlement contemplated at the relevant times.

In 1907 and 1920, supporters of an international court clearly favored a judicial body having the continuity required for the consistent and progressive development of international law. They also sought to ensure that the court’s decisions would gain worldwide acceptance. Therefore, in 1907 and 1920, Elihu Root and other U.S. officials argued that the bench of a permanent international court should represent the world’s major juridical systems. One gets the feeling that they meant “representation” in a literal sense: the court would not merely have a diverse bench, but would also have a mandate to develop universal principles for the benefit of mankind.

Although the concept of a representative bench had appeared in the 1907 Draft Convention for the Establishment of the Court of Ar-

to resolve controversies based on broader principles of “justice”). See also HUDSON, supra note 149, at 36 (quoting records from the League of Nations’ First Assembly and indicating that the PCA “would still have a role to fill in certain international disputes” which did not lend themselves to decisions “based on strict rules of law”).

257. Draft Convention for the Establishment of the Court of Arbitral Justice, supra note 253, art. 1; Bourgeois, supra note 138, at 35; BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 677; BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 63; DUNNE, supra note 108, at 19; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 443-44; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 13; Clarke, supra note 137, at 406-07, 408; Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 81; Mr. Choate’s Remarks on the Proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, supra note 165, at 98; Mr. Scott’s Report of Oct. 16, 1907, supra note 146, at 126-27.

258. See Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 230 (address by Léon Bourgeois); HUDSON, supra note 149, at 630; LAUTERPACH, supra note 164, at 5, 8.

259. See Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 81.

260. For a discussion of the issue in 1907, see BUSTAMANTE, supra note 83, at 46-47, 63; JESSUP, supra note 140, at 76; SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 443; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 12-13; Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 82; Mr. Choate’s Remarks on the Proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, supra note 165, at 98; Mr. Choate’s Remarks on the Selection of the Judges of the Court of Arbitral Justice by the Principle of Election (Sept. 18, 1907), reprinted in AMERICAN ADDRESSES, supra note 108, at 109, 110; Mr. Scott’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 154, at 91-92; Mr. Scott’s Report of Oct. 16, 1907, supra note 146, at 127. For a discussion of the issue in 1920, see JESSUP, supra note 139, at 421; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 62-64.

261. See Mr. Choate’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 137, at 81 (advocating a court that could “speak with the authority of the united voice of the nations” and, thus, “command the approval” of all nations); Mr. Scott’s Report of Oct. 16, 1907, supra note 146, at 126 (describing the indispensability of a court whose composition would reflect “the different judicial systems of the world, would be fitted to ascertain and develop a system of international law based upon a large and liberal spirit of equity in touch with the needs of the world”). See also SCOTT, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES, supra note 53, at 443 (“[A]n international court should represent the various juridical systems of the world, for it is only by judges trained in these various system[s] that we can hope to create and develop that international equity which would be at once the honor and the justification of the court.”).
bitral Justice, the issue became a serious point of contention among members of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, some of whom viewed it as an effort to secure permanent representation for large and powerful states on the bench of the PCIJ. However, when Root described his goal as enriching the range of perspectives brought to bear on cases before the court, the proposal received the Committee’s approval, became part of the PCIJ Statute, and carried over to the ICJ Statute.

In related step, the drafters of the PCIJ Statute established a system of periodic judicial elections conducted simultaneously, but independently, by the two principal political organs of the League of Nations, which carried over to the ICJ Statute under the United Nations. While many have emphasized and even criticized the resulting politicization of elections, the process may encourage judges to look beyond the resolution of particular cases and to articulate legal principles designed to serve the interests of all member states.

Taken together, a representative bench and periodic elections by political organs tend to enlarge the range of interests that international courts bring to bear on the decision of controversies. To illustrate the point, one may compare the range of perspectives involved in arbitration and judicial settlement. As ad hoc tribunals with no continuing existence, no affiliation with intergovernmental organizations having political mandates, and no capacity to affect the legal interests of third states, arbitral tribunals may see the disputing parties as their sole audience, and the resolution of the particular dispute as their sole task. By contrast, as permanent tribunals with a represen-

263. SCOTT, supra note 147, at 62-63.
264. Id. at 64-65.
265. PCIJ Statute, supra note 254, art. 9.
266. ICJ Statute, supra note 216, art. 9.
267. PCIJ Statute, supra note 254, art. 8.
268. ICJ Statute, supra note 216, art. 8.
270. See BROWNLIE, supra note 53, at 680; SCOTT, supra note 147, at 38-39 (quoting Mr. Justice Loder, Dutch Supreme Court); SHAW, supra note 53, at 962.
271. See Charney, supra note 53, at 126; Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 115. See also Hans-Jürgen Schochauer, Permanent Court of Arbitration, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 981, 986 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1997) (indicating that arbitral tribunals
tative bench, organic links to intergovernmental organizations, and mandates to develop a jurisprudence for the benefit of all member states, international courts will not see the disputing parties as their sole audience, or resolution of the particular dispute as their sole task. As explained below, the broader orientation of judicial settlement may not appeal to states for certain categories of disputes.

In contrast to the broad perspective of a representative bench elected by the international community, Léon Bourgeois identified a class of disputes for which all states—"big or small"—would find it "essential" to take a more "active part" in "choosing their judges" by selecting arbitration and, thus, narrowing the tribunal's orientation to focus on the interests of the disputing parties. According to Bourgeois, states would choose this path for "controversies of a political nature," which he defined in 1907 as including "all cases of a peculiar gravity." Somewhat later, Elihu Root indicated that judicial settlement might prove impossible for issues either not governed by international law, or governed by principles so broad that their application essentially required the exercise of discretion and political judgment. Likewise, when addressing the Advisory Committee of

272. See Abi-Saab, supra note 51, at 929-30; Abi-Saab, supra note 239, at 7; Charney, supra note 53, at 126; Dupuy, supra note 220, at 801-05; Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 114-15; Reisman, supra note 269, at 52.

273. See Caron, supra note 79, at 27-28 (predicting that if international courts emphasized progressive development of the law instead of the correct resolution of particular disputes, the enthusiasm of "some states" to appear before them would decrease).

274. Scott, supra note 53, at 425; Scott, The Organization of International Justice, supra note 255, at 64-65; Mr. Scott's Report of Oct. 16, 1907, supra note 146, at 114; Scott Memorandum, supra note 79, at 32 (emphasis added).

275. See Brierly, supra note 108, at 229 (indicating that disputing parties will choose arbitration when they "desire to subordinate questions of pure law" to the demands of the particular case); Charney, supra note 53, at 126 (opining that states "may have the perception" that ad hoc tribunals "will focus on the . . . interests of the parties before them"). See also Circular Note of the Secretary General, supra note 239, at 935 (recognizing that a "more restricted tribunal, on the constitution of which parties have decided by common accord, may more fully enjoy their confidence than a tribunal of fifteen judges, representing juridical systems from all over the world").

276. Scott, supra note 53, at 425; Scott, The Organization of International Justice, supra note 255, at 64-65; Mr. Scott's Report of Oct. 16, 1907, supra note 146, at 114; Scott Memorandum, supra note 79, at 32. See also Scott Letter, supra note 252, at 3.

277. Thus, in a 1915 letter to Professor Lassa Oppenheim, Root asserted:

There can be no court without a law to guide it. Otherwise the judges would be irresponsible sovereigns. There can be no police force without the judgments of a court to enforce. Otherwise the police force would be the agent of an irresponsible majority re-
Jurists in 1920, Bourgeois echoed the sentiment that the existence of “precise” and “defined” legal norms might represent a condition precedent for judicial settlement by permanent courts. Far from controversial, the views of Bourgeois and Root reflected prominent strands in contemporaneous work on the distinction between “legal” and “political” disputes. They also coincide with the assessments of producing all sovereigns to vassalage and destroying national independence. At the basis of all reform . . . lies an agreement upon certain, definite, specific rules of national conduct, very general and very rudimentary at first but capable of being enlarged by continual additions.

278. See Meeting of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra note 149, at 231 (address by M. Léon Bourgeois).

279. For example, several writers of that era defined political disputes to include controversies of particular importance to the disputing states. Lauterpacht, supra note 95, at 139-42, 168; Ralston, Athens to Locarno, supra note 53, at 35-36 (quoting Thomas W. Balch, XXI Revue Générale de Droit International Public 181 (1914)); 1 John Westlake, International Law 302-04 (2d ed. 1910); Robert Yorke Hedges, Justiciable Disputes, 22 Am. J. Int’l L. 560, 561 (1928).

Other writers defined political disputes to include controversies not governed by established principles of international law. Hyde, supra note 57, § 559 at 112-13; Lauterpacht, supra note 95, at 7, 51; Westlake, supra, at 358; Charles G. Fenwick, The Distinction Between Legal and Political Questions, 18 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 44, 46 (1924); Hedges, supra note 88, at 119. This would include situations where the principles were so broad or so hotly contested as to require tribunals to exercise a substantial degree of political judgment and discretion in rendering their awards. Westlake, supra, at 363; Fenwick, supra, at 46.

While they used similar criteria to identify the “political” dimensions of inter-state disputes, one should bear in mind that Bourgeois and his contemporaries often applied those labels to support different theories. For example, most writers of that era regarded “political” disputes as non-justiciable. Lauterpacht, supra note 95, at 4; Fenwick, supra, at 44; Mr. Scott’s Address of Aug. 1, 1907, supra note 154, at 88. That view has become discredited in the technical sense that (1) all disputes among states have a political element, and (2) international courts can issue legal opinions in cases having strong political overtones. Lauterpacht, supra note 95, at 153, 169-72; Merrill, supra note 220, at 167-170; Gray & Kingsbury, supra note 2, at 102. See also Malanczuk, supra note 167, at 302. On the other hand, that view remains valid in the more practical sense that legal opinions may not address the political elements of controversies, with the result that they may not bring the parties to closure. Merrill, supra note 220, at 170-71, 178.

Unlike many of his contemporaries, Bourgeois seems to have assumed that disputes with strong political components might be justiciable, but that the parties would consent more readily to adjudication in an arbitral forum. Cf. Westlake, supra, at 368 (explaining that “some questions of politics and honour” might be suitable for arbitration “where the questions are not of vital importance, and where the arbitrators are carefully chosen with a view to the special nature of the difference”).

Professor Louis Sohn later advanced the hypothesis that states would submit “political” disputes to arbitration and “legal” disputes to judicial settlement. Sohn, supra note 137, at 33-40. In so doing, he seems to have gone much farther than Bourgeois. Whereas Bourgeois seems to have contemplated arbitration of legal disputes having strong political overtones, Sohn predicted that states would arbitrate claims based on interests having absolutely no foundation in
today’s leading writers regarding the situations in which states may favor arbitration over judicial settlement.\textsuperscript{280}

Thus, building on the insights of its architects, one may say that centralized judicial settlement possesses the capacity to make case law an important factor in the consistent and progressive development international law. Building on the same insights, however, one may also predict that judicial settlement will hold less appeal for states in disputes involving high stakes, matters of political principle, or broad legal standards subject to a controversial range of application. In these situations, the desire to maximize control over political choices or to emphasize local interests can lead states to prefer arbitration, even if it undermines the development of international law.

IV. INVESTMENT TREATY DISPUTES: TESTING THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT

Building on Part III, one may use the insights developed in that section to explain the otherwise puzzling reluctance of states to embrace judicial settlement in the context of investment treaty disputes. Though some might object to the exercise on the grounds that investment treaty arbitration falls within a procedural framework designed for international commercial arbitration,\textsuperscript{281} one must recall that investment treaties also include a substantive component negotiated by states, embodied in treaties among states, and designed to regulate their exercise of sovereign powers.\textsuperscript{282} Thus, in substance, most in-

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{280} See Reisman, supra note 269, at 52 (emphasizing that arbitration provides states with a “significant degree of control over the composition of the tribunal” and asserting that “for certain sensitive cases, the assurance of this control over the tribunal’s membership is an important factor in the decision to accede to arbitration”). Cf. MERRILLS, supra note 220, at 319 (explaining that that adjudication becomes attractive “where there is broad agreement about the relevant law,” but that it becomes “totally unsuitable for disputes in which there is fundamental disagreement about what the law is, or should be”).


\textsuperscript{282} See Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1381, 1389-90 (2003). See also McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 6-7; VAN HARTEN, supra note 250, at 6;
vestment treaty arbitrations resemble classic inter-state disputes because they encompass claims against states involving their sovereign activities and the application of public international law.

According to some, investment treaty arbitrations do not just resemble but, in fact, constitute traditional inter-state disputes because the treaties create no substantive rights for investors, but simply invest them with the procedural capacity to enforce the obligations owed to their home states. While the author does not subscribe to that view, the point remains that one can draw fair comparisons between the substance of investment treaty disputes and the substance of traditional inter-state disputes. Given the resemblance and the tendency of states to treat the two categories as functional equivalents, examination of state practice regarding investment disputes may prove useful in testing and reinforcing the insights developed in Part III.

When discussing investment disputes, one should recall that most of the roughly 2,500 investment treaties entail bilateral arrangements between capital-exporting states and capital importing states. To

Brower, supra note 163; Bernardo M. Cremades & David J.A. Cairns, The Brave New World of Global Arbitration, 2 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 173, 183 (2002); Franck, supra note 140, at 69.

283. See Zachary Docuglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 2003 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151, 185 (recognizing that one cannot treat the liabilities imposed by investment tribunals as mere civil or private wrongs because the obligations stem from treaty provisions, and proposing to treat investment disputes as a sub-system of state responsibility, which shares many of the rules contained in the inter-state system of state responsibility). One should, however, recognize that the resemblance to inter-state disputes does not extend to the narrow category of investment claims brought under the so-called “umbrella clauses” of certain treaties, which arguably empower investors to bring treaty claims for what would otherwise constitute mere contractual disputes. See R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 1008 (2005); McLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 92, 111, 115-17; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 498-99; NOAH RUBINS & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 234-40 (2005).


285. See Douglas, supra note 283, at 153, 163.

promote the flow of capital from “North” to “South,” these treaties provide substantive and procedural safeguards against harmful measures directed at foreign investors by the governments of host states. Substantively, most investment treaties prohibit: (1) expropriation of investments without compensation based on market value; (2) discrimination in the form of treating foreign investors less favorably than local investors (national treatment) or investors from third states (MFN treatment); and (3) denials of “fair and equitable treatment.” Though less common worldwide, U.S. and Canadian treaties also emphasize the restriction of “performance requirements,” which force investments to serve the interests of host states, for example by exporting a percentage of products or by achieving a certain level of domestic content. Procedurally, most investment treaties secure these obligations by empowering investors to bring claims for alleged treaty violations before ad hoc arbitral tribunals formed under...
the ICSID Convention, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

As should be manifest to informed observers, investment treaty arbitration thus proceeds under a system redolent of the PCA. Like the PCA, the ICSID system essentially comprises a list of arbitrators, a small secretariat that provides registry services to ad hoc tribunals, and a set of procedural rules. Like the PCA during its sea-

292. Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 288, art. 27(1)(a); Dutch Model BIT, supra note 288, art. 9; German Model BIT, supra note 288, art. 11 (Model I); U.K. Model BIT, supra note 288, art. 8 [Preferred]; United States Model BIT, supra note 288, art. 24(3)(a). See also LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 768; RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 283, at 193 n.19; SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 251; TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, at 471; Douglas, supra note 283, at 157; Franck, supra note 250, at 1541; Franck, supra note 140, at 54.

The “ICSID Convention” means the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention], which creates a mechanism for the arbitration of investment disputes brought against a state party by nationals of another state party.

293. Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 288, art. 27(1)(b); U.K. Model BIT, supra note 288, art. 8(2)(a) [Alternative]; United States Model BIT, supra note 288, art. 24(3)(b). See also TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, at 472; Douglas, supra note 283, at 157.

The ICSID Additional Facility Rules provide a mechanism by which the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes can administer arbitrations that fall outside the scope of the ICSID Convention because either the state party to the dispute or the investor’s home state has not ratified the ICSID Convention. See Int’l Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disps. [ICSID], Additional Facility Rules, art. 2(a), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/AdditionalFacilityRules.jsp; LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 803; VAN HARTEN, supra note 250, at 35.

294. Canadian Model FIPA, supra note 288, art. 27(1)(c); U.K. Model BIT, supra note 288, art. 8(2)(c) [Alternative]; United States Model BIT, supra note 288, art. 24(3)(c). See also RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 283, at 193 n.19; TWEEDDALE & TWEEDDALE, supra note 14, at 471; Douglas, supra note 283, at 158; Franck, supra note 250, at 1541; Franck, supra note 140, at 54.

295. See COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 28, at 60 (drawing a loose comparison between the PCA and ICSID in the sense that both encompass mechanisms designed to facilitate arbitration and conciliation).


son of popularity, ICSID has represented a center of gravity for arbitration of claims against states at the end of one century and the beginning of the next. Just as states continued to arbitrate substantial numbers of disputes outside the PCA framework even during its season of popularity, investors continue to bring a substantial minority of claims outside the ICSID framework. Just as the growing number of PCA arbitrations raised concerns about the inability of ad hoc tribunals to promote the consistent development of international law, the recent proliferation of investment treaty claims before ad hoc tribunals has unveiled a similar lack of consistency and called

298. See ICSID Convention, supra note 292, arts. 36-55. See also Vandevelde, BIT Program, supra note 296, at 258 n.388; Vandevelde, Reassessing Hickenlooper, supra note 296, at 164 n.233.

299. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.


301. HUDSON, supra note 52, at 7; ROSENNE’S THE WORLD COURT, supra note 53, at 7.


303. See supra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.

forth a literature that questions the legitimacy of a legal process marked by conflicting outcomes in similar cases. Just as a popular movement sought a permanent international tribunal to avoid the vicissitudes of ad hoc arbitration before the PCA, a rich vein of scholarship now encourages the inauguration of an appellate body or other permanent court to reduce the heterogeneity of outcomes in investment treaty disputes. At first and second glance, the congruence between past and present seems almost startling.

Despite the robust sense of déjà vu, the lines of experience maintain their parallel orientation only until the critical endpoint, where they diverge along remarkably different vectors. Whereas the arbi-


tration of disputes among states crept slowly but surely along a path towards judicial settlement, investment treaty disputes appear unlikely to follow that course. In fact, surveys conducted by ICSID\textsuperscript{308} and the OECD\textsuperscript{309} reveal that states have little interest in pursuing a single permanent appellate body for investment treaty arbitration. Thus, despite commentary recommending judicial settlement as the foundation for consistent development of international investment law, states seem content to forego that route even if it means the perpetuation of conflicting decisions and a commensurate sacrifice of legitimacy.

While it may seem puzzling in light of history and foolish in light of the lost opportunity for development of coherent jurisprudence in a field that craves certainty,\textsuperscript{310} the reluctance to embrace judicial settlement of investment disputes might not have surprised Léon Bourgeois and his contemporaries. As explained above, they predicted that states would continue to prefer arbitration for disputes having strong political dimensions.\textsuperscript{311} Applying the criteria suggested by Bourgeois and his contemporaries, one can easily identify the strong political elements embedded in most investment disputes. Many claims put hundreds of millions of dollars in controversy.\textsuperscript{312} Some claims essentially threaten to bankrupt states following periods of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{308} See ICSID, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations 4 (May 12, 2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/052505-sgmanual.pdf (referring to a discussion paper that raised the possibility of establishing an appellate mechanism, but explaining that most members of ICSID’s Administrative Council regarded the undertaking as “premature”). \textit{See also} Gantz, \textit{Appellate Mechanism}, supra note 307, at 40 (describing the status of ICSID’s proposal as “subsequently recanted and now in limbo”).
\bibitem{309} See OECD, \textit{Improving the System}, supra note 281, paras. 3, 28, 56 (referring to discussions within the OECD’s Investment Committee regarding the advantages and disadvantages of establishing an appellate mechanism, but explaining that consultations “produced no consensus”).
\bibitem{311} \textit{See supra} notes 256, 274-80 and accompanying text.
\bibitem{312} Franck, \textit{Empirically Evaluating Claims}, supra note 300, at 57-58; Salacuse, supra note 16, at 141-42. \textit{See also} LEW ET AL., supra note 3, at 763 (explaining that investment disputes often place “remarkable” amounts in controversy); Susan D. Franck, \textit{Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design}, 92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 165 (2007) (referring to a “litigation explosion” involving “billions of dollars”).
\end{thebibliography}
economic and political turmoil. Nearly all involve points of principle that have long supplied the foundation for conflict and discord from Carlos Calvo, to Cordell Hull, to the New International Economic Order.

Despite the temptation to regard some of the underlying debates as ancient history, the fact remains that today’s investment disputes continue to raise fundamental points of principle because their legal framework emerged from the crucible of existential (and sometimes unresolved) conflicts about decolonization, industrialization, socialist

313. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 309-11 (2008). See also VAN HARTEN, supra note 250, at 7 (explaining that a single award against the Czech Republic roughly equalled the state’s entire health-care budget); Salacuse, supra note 16, at 142 (explaining that investment treaty awards may prove “onerous” in relation to the budgets and financial resources of developing states). Even when successful, the defense of investment treaty claims can place serious pressure of the national budgets of many states. See VAN HARTEN, supra note 250, at 123 n.13 (indicating that the cost of defending a single claim consumed roughly half of the respondent state’s annual budget for the department of justice). See also Salacuse, supra note 16, at 145-46. According to one study, states should expect to pay for the defense of unsuccessful claims because tribunals generally decline to shift the costs of legal representation in investment treaty disputes. See Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims, supra note 300, at 69 (concluding that tribunals declined to shift responsibility for legal fees in forty-one out of fifty-four awards).

314. Many standard works emphasize the intensity of debates, which began in the nineteenth century and continued through much of the twentieth century, concerning the existence and scope of customary international law rules governing the protection of foreign investments. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 250, at 7, 204, 216-17; RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 283, at 153-71. See also BISHOP ET AL., supra note 283, at 2-6.

315. Argentine jurist and diplomat Carlos Calvo articulated the doctrine that foreign investors should enjoy no right to better treatment than their local counterparts. See BISHOP ET AL., supra note 283, at 3; KINNEAR ET AL., supra note 250, Gen. Section at 24; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 8, at 474; SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 38 & n.9; VAN HARTEN, supra note 250, at 17 & n.28. See also Amos S. Hershey, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 26 (1907). Despite strong opposition from capital-exporting states, the Calvo Doctrine attracted widespread support throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia. BISHOP ET AL., supra note 283, at 3; SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 38.

316. The so-called “Hull Doctrine” emerged from a famous exchange of letters, in which U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull asserted, and his Mexican counterpart rejected, the proposition that international law requires “prompt, adequate, and effective” compensation for the nationalization of foreign investment property. RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 283, at 158; SORNARAJAH, supra note 288, at 38 & n.8; VAN HARTEN, supra note 250, at 91 & n.120.

revolution, nationalism, racism, protection of the environment, the rise of multinational corporations, and the emergence of non-governmental organizations as direct participants in the international legal process.\textsuperscript{318} Furthermore, even among the inner core of capital-exporting states, the recent Dubai ports fiasco suggests the capacity of foreign investment to stir powerful emotions more likely to demand political solutions than consistent application of universal rules.\textsuperscript{319} Viewed in this light, investment disputes tend to entail the gravity thought to infuse controversies with a strong political dimension.\textsuperscript{320}

Turning to a second hallmark of political disputes, one should observe that many principles of international investment law lack a clear, detailed, and universally accepted content.\textsuperscript{321} For example, as recently as 1964, the United States Supreme Court implied that it could not identify a prohibition on uncompensated takings of investment property under customary international law.\textsuperscript{322} More recently, a
series of negotiations for multilateral treaties on foreign investment have collapsed without reaching agreement, including serious efforts by OECD members, WTO members, and states within the Americas. Thus, from the multilateral perspective, doubt and controversy remain the emblems most associated with discussions regarding the international legal obligations of states with respect to foreign investment.


323. McLachlan et al., supra note 250, at 219; Sornarajah, supra note 288, at 3, 291-92, 297; Van Harten, supra note 250, at 21-22; Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?, 34 Int’l L. 1033, 1048-49 (2000). According to one observer, the failure of negotiations within the OECD “illustrates that even developed states may disagree on . . . the law of foreign investment.” Sornarajah, supra note 288, at 32.

324. Sornarajah, supra note 288, at 28, 32, 36, 73; Van Harten, supra note 250, at 22-23. See also Gantz, Appellate Mechanism, supra note 307, at 71. Although the WTO system includes an Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, that instrument deals only with the narrow issue of investment measures that may disrupt trade in goods (i.e., a limited range of performance requirements). Sornarajah, supra note 288, at 2-3 n.2, 303; Van Harten, supra note 250, at 21 n.55.

325. See Gantz, Appellate Mechanism, supra note 307, at 46-47 & n.31 (noting that problems have led to suspension of negotiations regarding the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, describing the prospects of their conclusion as “increasingly remote,” and opining that extension of the agreement to investment “is even more remote”); Michael D. Goldhaber, Wanted: A World Investment Court, Am. Law., Summer 2004 (Focus Europe), available at http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/invest-mentcourt04.html (referring to the stalled negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas).

326. See Sornarajah, supra note 288, at 1 (“Few areas of international law attract as much controversy as the law relating to foreign investment.”).

327. See McLachlan et al., supra note 250, at 17 (“States have entered into investment treaties precisely in order to remedy perceived gaps . . . in the protection afforded by customary international law in the field of the treatment of aliens.”); Salacuse, supra note 286, at 659-60 (describing the absence of generally accepted principles under customary international law, the failure to conclude multilateral treaties, and the consequent reliance on bilateral treaties to establish substantive rules for the protection of foreign investment).
lateral treaties on broadly similar terms, those instruments express many commitments at such a high level of indeterminacy, and the rules of treaty interpretation provide so little concrete guidance, that they leave unresolved the essentially political tasks of specifying obligations and, thus, allocating potentially tremendous risks between foreign investors and their host states. Because investment treaties thus tend to delay the allocation of obligations and risks until the point of adjudication, they inevitably require tribunals to exercise substantial amounts of discretion and political judgment.

Bearing in mind the issues in controversy and the tasks assigned to tribunals, the reluctance of states to embrace judicial settlement of investment disputes begins to make sense. Because investment disputes raise grave issues and because they require tribunals to exercise discretion in allocating tremendous risks, they teem with the political elements that Bourgeois predicted would make judicial settlement an unappealing option for states. Furthermore, in acting as Bourgeois predicted by rebuffing calls for judicial settlement of investment disputes, states have tacitly reinforced his views on its functions and limits under public international law: while states appreciate the value of judicial settlement in promoting the consistent and progressive development of international law, they may assign greater value to arbitration’s capacity to focus on the immediate needs of parties locked in disputes over grave issues or the discretionary allocation of valuable rights.


329. See Bishop et al., supra note 283, at 1, 8; McLachlan et al., supra note 250, at 5; Redfern & Hunter, supra note 8, at 489; Rubins & Kinsella, supra note 283, at 192; Shaw, supra note 53, at 747-48; Sornarajah, supra note 288, at 217; Douglas, supra note 283, at 159; Franck, supra note 250, at 1529; Franck, supra note 140, at 86; Schwebel, supra note 53, at 365.


331. McLachlan et al., supra note 250, at 68.

332. See id. at 203 (“[T]he appearance of virtual unanimity . . ., which is gleaned from a comparison of the language of the multitude of treaties, masks an absence of any kind of settled agreement over content.”).

333. See Van Harten, supra note 250, at 122.
CONCLUSION

Most observers have examined the relationship between arbitration and judicial settlement from the perspective of international commercial disputes among private parties. In that context, they have emphasized the celebrated shift from judicial settlement to arbitration. Unfortunately, the predominance of that narrative has eclipsed an important countertrend. For disputes among states involving their sovereign activities and the application of public international law, one may document a conscious shift from arbitration to judicial settlement. By contrasting these two phenomena and by introducing the development of state practice with respect to investment disputes, one emerges with a more refined understanding of the functions and limits of arbitration and judicial settlement under private and public international law.

For international commercial disputes among private parties, arbitration promotes neutrality by guaranteeing access to dispute settlement on a level playing field, familiar and suitable for use by all parties. However, because arbitration depends on the consent of the disputing parties, it remains vulnerable to sabotage, with the result that judicial settlement continues to play a vital role in providing assistance at the junctures most likely to witness procedural collapse. In other words, judicial settlement provides the coercion that guarantees the integrity of the arbitral process.

For inter-state disputes involving sovereign activities and the application of public international law, states often favor judicial settlement because it promotes the consistent development of international law. However, the emphasis on systematic development of jurisprudence means that judicial settlement may not address or resolve the political dimensions of cases involving grave issues or the discretionary allocation of valuable rights. As suggested by the architects of judicial settlement and reinforced by state practice, states may prefer to limit the range of interests brought to bear on the decision of such matters by selecting arbitration—even if that means sacrificing stability, coherence, and certainty in development of the law.

334. See MERRILLS, supra note 220, at 170-71, 178-79 (emphasizing that legal opinions may not address the political elements of controversies, with the result that they may not bring the parties to closure).