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<title>Duke Law Scholarship Repository</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2013 Duke Law All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu</link>
<description>Recent documents in Duke Law Scholarship Repository</description>
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<lastBuildDate>Wed, 19 Jun 2013 01:35:56 PDT</lastBuildDate>
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<title>In the Absences of Scrutiny: Narratives of Probable Cause</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3078</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 18 Jun 2013 16:34:37 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>This Article reports on a set of roughly thirty interviews with federal magistrate judges. The focus of the interviews was the impact of the Supreme Court case, United States v. Leon, on the behavior of magistrate judges. Leon, famously, put in place the "good faith" exception for faulty warrants that were obtained by the officers in good faith. The insertion of this exception diminished significantly the incentive for defendants to challenge problematic warrant grants. That effect, in turn, could have diminished the incentive for magistrate judge scrutiny of the warrants at the front end of the process. We do not find any indication of diminished scrutiny. What we do find, however, is a highly ritualized and formalistic process for the evaluation of warrants where calculations of probabilities are viewed through a legalistic rather than a pragmatic lens.</p>

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<author>Mitu Gulati et al.</author>


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<title>Note From the Editor</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/alr/vol29/iss2/6</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 18 Jun 2013 13:23:17 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Nick Passarello</author>


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<title>Note From the Editor</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/alr/vol29/iss1/7</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 18 Jun 2013 13:23:08 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Jennie Morawetz</author>


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<title>Note From the Editor</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/alr/vol28/iss2/6</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 18 Jun 2013 13:22:56 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Jennie Morawetz</author>


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<title>Note From the Editor</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/alr/vol28/iss1/10</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 18 Jun 2013 13:22:47 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Jonathan Ross</author>


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<title>Note From the Editor</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/alr/vol27/iss2/6</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 18 Jun 2013 13:22:34 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Jonathan Ross</author>


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<title>Note From the Editor</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/alr/vol27/iss1/7</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 18 Jun 2013 13:22:23 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Angelo Suozzi</author>


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<title>Note From the Editor</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/alr/vol26/iss2/7</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 18 Jun 2013 11:03:10 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Angelo Suozzi</author>


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<title>They Were Meant for Each Other: Professor Edward Cooper and the Rules Enabling Act</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3077</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2013 16:37:17 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Mark R. Kravitz et al.</author>


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<title>Intellectual Property Policy Online: A Young Person&apos;s Guide</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3076</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 17 Jun 2013 16:37:14 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>This is an edited version of a presentation to the "Intellectual Property Online" panel at the Harvard Conference on the Internet and Society, May 28-31, 1996. The panel was a reminder of both the importance of intellectual property and the dangers of legal insularity. Of approximately 400 panel attendees, 90% were not lawyers. Accordingly, the remarks that follow are an attempt to lay out the basics of intellectual property policy in a straighforward and non-technical manner. In other words, this is what non-lawyers should know (and what a number of government lawyers seem to have forgotten) about intellectual property policy on the Internet. The legal analysis which underlies this discussion is set out in the Appendix.</p>

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<author>James Boyle</author>


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<title>Dissent, Diversity, and Democracy: Heather Gerken and the Contingent Imperative of Minority Rule</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3075</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 14 Jun 2013 16:33:43 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Guy-Uriel Charles</author>


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<title>Constitutionalism, Rights, and International Law: The Glenister Decision</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djcil/vol23/iss2/5</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 14 Jun 2013 09:55:27 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Edwin Cameron</author>


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<title>Rebels, Negligent Support, and State Accountability: Holding States Accountable for the Human Rights Violations of Non-State Actors</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djcil/vol23/iss2/4</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 14 Jun 2013 09:55:25 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>This Note discusses a crucial problem in the law of state accountability for human rights abuses. Specifically, it analyzes the difficulty of attaching liability when a state "negligently supports" a group that it should reasonably expect to commit human rights abuses. This note shows that the current legal framework governing attribution stems from a myopic focus on non-state actors "acting" like arms of the state. Indeed, the current tests require that the state have an extraordinarily high level of control over the non-state actors before liability can attach. This requirement not only creates perverse incentives for states to acquire less control over the nonstate groups they fund, but it also makes the goal of state responsibility illusory.</p>

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<author>Graham Cronogue</author>


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<title>Religion: Individual Expression or Intertwined with Culture? Free Exercise Jurisprudence in the United States and Great Britain </title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djcil/vol23/iss2/3</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 14 Jun 2013 09:55:23 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Johanna R. Collins-Wood</author>


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<title>Misplaced Boldness: The Avoidance of Substance in the International Court of Justice’s Kosovo Opinion</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djcil/vol23/iss2/2</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 14 Jun 2013 09:55:21 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>The International Court of Justice's Kosovo Advisory Opinion is a masterpiece of avoidance. The Court has lived to run another day, and one can only admire the judges' skill in arriving at the vacant place between difficult and clashing conclusions of substance. Still, in the wake of the Opinion, questions inevitably arise: Of what use is this document? Has it advanced a project of justice, or of law? The Opinion has done something, though not, perhaps, what it purports to do. To understand it, we must engage this cautious, crimped document in its full context—or rather, we must understand the ways in which the Opinion itself comprehensively avoids any engagement with context. Its caution and its crimped nature are themselves features illuminating the self-image, role, and limited value of the Court.</p>
<p>This Article argues that in the Kosovo Opinion, the International Court of Justice assiduously asserted its own jurisdictional, interpretative, and institutional prerogatives, at the cost of avoiding the momentous questions about secession and self-determination with which the Court was so clearly confronted. These two outcomes are related: The avoidance of substance and the assertion of prerogative were achieved by the selfsame maneuvers of definition and interpretation. Faced with a choice between emphasizing its own authority and actually engaging the question, the Court chose to invest in itself—but it did not, in turn, use that investment to any substantive end. The Opinion exhibits a misplaced boldness, advancing its procedural agenda but saying—almost literally—nothing in the process.</p>
<p>This Article also considers what a bolder Opinion might have looked like, by comparing the Opinion to the Canadian Supreme Court's seminal Reference re Secession of Quebec. This comparative exercise helps us to understand why questions of self-determination are easier to avoid than to decide—why it is hard even to talk about them in coherent and productive terms, and thus why one must feel sympathy for the seemingly impossible task facing the ICJ—but also to see that another, bolder language is in fact possible.</p>

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<author>Timothy William Waters</author>


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<title>Extraterritoriality and Extranationality: A Comparative Study</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djcil/vol23/iss2/1</link>
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<pubDate>Fri, 14 Jun 2013 09:55:20 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>International lawyers are familiar with the concept of extraterritoriality the application of one country's laws to persons, conduct, or relationships outside of that country. Yet the transborder application of law is not limited to international cases. In many states, the presence of indigenous peoples, often within defined borders, creates an analogous puzzle. This Article begins a comparative study of foreign- and native-affairs law by examining the application of domestic laws to foreign facts ("extraterritoriality") and to indigenous peoples, often called "nations" ("extranationality"). Using a distinctive double-comparative perspective, this Article analyzes extraterritoriality and extranationality across three countries: the United States, Canada, and Australia.</p>
<p>Part I addresses the treatment of extraterritoriality across these three countries. Part II does the same for extranationality. These comparative law analyses pay special attention to the sources of the legal regimes and to the similarities and differences among the three countries' approaches. But comparative law is not only a tool to evaluate extraterritoriality and extranationality separately; it is also a tool to compare approaches toward foreign affairs with approaches toward indigenous peoples—here embodied in a presumption against extraterritoriality and a presumption in favor of extranationality. Part III takes up this task, focusing on sovereignty, separation of powers, and due process in the context of these rules. Finally, Part IV identifies practical lessons drawn from the manifold approaches to these related issues. In sum, this Article launches a new double-comparative enterprise and, in the process, offers policy proposals derived from the study of the American, Canadian, and Australian approaches to extraterritoriality and extranationality.</p>

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<author>Zachary D. Clopton</author>


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<title>Transforming Property Into Speech</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3074</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 12 Jun 2013 16:31:41 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Joseph Blocher</author>


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<title>Constitutionalizing Local Politics</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3073</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 12 Jun 2013 16:31:40 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Joseph Blocher et al.</author>


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<title>Algorithms and Speech</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3072</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 12 Jun 2013 16:31:38 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
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	<p>One of the central questions in free speech jurisprudence is what activities the First Amendment encompasses. This Article considers that question in the context of an area of increasing importance – algorithm-based decisions. I begin by looking to broadly accepted legal sources, which for the First Amendment means primarily Supreme Court jurisprudence. That jurisprudence provides for very broad First Amendment coverage, and the Court has reinforced that breadth in recent cases. Under the Court’s jurisprudence the First Amendment (and the heightened scrutiny it entails) would apply to many algorithm-based decisions, specifically those entailing substantive communications. We could of course adopt a limiting conception of the First Amendment, but any nonarbitrary exclusion of algorithm-based decisions would require major changes in the Court’s jurisprudence. I believe that First Amendment coverage of algorithm-based decisions is too small a step to justify such changes. But insofar as we are concerned about the expansiveness of First Amendment coverage, we may want to limit it in two areas of genuine uncertainty: editorial decisions that are neither obvious nor communicated to the reader, and laws that single out speakers but do not regulate their speech. Even with those limitations, however, an enormous and growing amount of activity will be subject to heightened scrutiny absent a fundamental reorientation of First Amendment jurisprudence.</p>

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<author>Stuart M. Benjamin</author>


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<title>Note From the Editor</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/alr/vol26/iss1/5</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 12 Jun 2013 09:31:10 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Kelly Taylor</author>


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<title>Note From the Editor</title>
<link>http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/alr/vol25/iss2/6</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 12 Jun 2013 09:25:23 PDT</pubDate>
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<author>Kelly Taylor</author>


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