A surrogate-motherhood arrangement is one in which a woman agrees to bear a child for a commissioning couple. She carries the child through pregnancy and subsequently surrenders the child to the commissioning couple. There are two sorts of surrogate motherhood: genetic and gestational. Here, McLachlan and Swales discuss these two types. They further argue that commercial surrogate-motherhood contracts should be legally enforceable, despite the vociferous and prevalent opposition to them. Also, they argue that they do not involve the commodification of children, nor in other ways are they contrary to the interests of the children concerned. Here, they also present a case, which is developed in response to criticisms of arguments they have made before in defense of commercial surrogate motherhood, particularly those criticisms made by Elizabeth Anderson, who is probably the most influential, eloquent, and forceful opponent of commercial surrogate motherhood or, as it is sometimes called, "contract pregnancy."

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