Abstract
Krawiec compares the egg market to sperm market to illustrate the extent to which public-interest rhetoric enables private wealth transfers in the egg market. She also illuminates why such rhetoric is so effective, playing on deeply held societal norms. In addition, she provides an overview of the oocyte business, highlighting issues relating to recruitment, compensation, controversy, retrieval, and risk. She does the same for the sperm business. Furthermore, she discusses the anticompetitive behavior in the egg market and argues that the horizontal price-fixing embodied in the American Society for Reproductive Medicine's pricing guidelines violates the Sherman Act. Lastly, she concludes that market forces, rather than collusive industry agreement, must be allowed to determine the proper mix of altruism and monetary payment that ultimately constitutes total egg donor compensation.
Citation
Kimberly D. Krawiec,
Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-Fixing in the Gamete Market,
72 Law and Contemporary Problems
59-90
(Summer 2009)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol72/iss3/5