Helfer challenges the conventional wisdom that the delegation of authority to the International Labor Organization (ILO) involves only modest sovereignty costs. Heifer explains that the ILO has increasingly exercised the authority to monitor compliance with unratified labor treaties and recommendations, and that the exercise of this authority has significant effects. He further notes that this type of monitoring authority is not confined to the ILO, but in fact exists in several other international institutions and issue areas. The case of the ILO therefore suggests that some important delegations arise and thrive outside of the formal channels of authority. This makes it essential for scholars to look beyond treaty texts and institutional design features to consider how power is actually exercised within international organizations and how the costs and benefits of international delegations change over time.
Laurence R. Helfer,
Monitoring Compliance with Unratified Treaties: The ILO Experience,
71 Law and Contemporary Problems
Available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol71/iss1/8