Event Title

Making Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Violations of Executive Order 12,291

Presenter Information

Peter Raven-Hansen

Location

Duke Law School

Start Date

28-1-1983 11:15 AM

End Date

28-1-1983 12:15 PM

Description

When, f at all, should courts make agencies follow the President's "personal" policies declared in non-statutory executive orders? Professor Raven-Hansen here seeks an answer by making the case for general judicial enforceability of Executive Order No. 12,291, which requires regulatory impact analysis of major rules. He concludes that a non-statutory executive order which is not mere housekeeping can bind agencies under the principle that they must follow their own rules, but that the committal of enforcement to executive discretion is often a serious obstacle to judicial enforceability. Whether such discretion bars judicial review altogether or only narrows the scope of review, however, depends upon the efficacy of executive enforcement and its compatibility with judicial enforcement.

Comments

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Related Paper II

Peter Raven-Hansen, Making Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Violations of Executive Order 12,291, 1983 Duke Law Journal 285-353 (1983)

Available at: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/dlj/vol32/iss2/3


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Jan 28th, 11:15 AM Jan 28th, 12:15 PM

Making Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review of Agency Violations of Executive Order 12,291

Duke Law School

When, f at all, should courts make agencies follow the President's "personal" policies declared in non-statutory executive orders? Professor Raven-Hansen here seeks an answer by making the case for general judicial enforceability of Executive Order No. 12,291, which requires regulatory impact analysis of major rules. He concludes that a non-statutory executive order which is not mere housekeeping can bind agencies under the principle that they must follow their own rules, but that the committal of enforcement to executive discretion is often a serious obstacle to judicial enforceability. Whether such discretion bars judicial review altogether or only narrows the scope of review, however, depends upon the efficacy of executive enforcement and its compatibility with judicial enforcement.