Globalization and Law: Law Beyond the State

Ralf Michaels

I. Introduction

If globalization is the main paradigm of our time, then a chapter on globalization and law could also be entitled, simply, the law of our time. Few, if any, areas of law are not—at least potentially—fundamentally impacted by globalization. In reality, of course, the impact of globalization on legal thought has, so far, been more limited. That has various reasons. A first reason is that globalization, although (or perhaps because) it is generally accepted as the new paradigm of society, has remained a remarkably vague concept in general discourse. The fundamental debates over globalization of the 1990s more or less petered out, without leading to a clear consensus. A second reason is that legal thought has so far reacted to globalization not with a true paradigm shift but instead by more and more inapt attempts to adapt the methodological nationalism that has provided its paradigm for the last two hundred years or so. The same can still be said about much of social theory, which also remains within such a state paradigm. Globalization has not, yet, led to a true paradigm shift.

A third reason, finally, is that globalization poses interdisciplinary challenges, and interdisciplinarity in law and globalization is still surprisingly lacking. On the one hand, many of the conceptual and theoretical discussions of globalization ignore or downplay the law as an important factors (beyond an occasional nod to international law). A widespread understanding of globalization distinguishes three aspects: economics, culture, politics. Law, in the words, is absent. In legal thinking, on the other hand, globalization is ofteneither purely absent (where discussions are purely doctrinal) or appears as a simple idea of internationalization that somehow influences the law. On the other hand, legal theory and doctrine have, until recently, often operated with oversimplified concepts of globalization.¹

This suggests what this chapter needs to accomplish. In the second section, I try to clarify the concept of globalization by introducing three different types of concept: globalization as reality, as theory, and as ideology. This discussion, just as the rest of the

¹ The most impressive theory of legal globalization, and one that has influenced the thinking behind this chapter, is W Twining, General Jurisprudence—Understanding Law from a Global Perspective (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2009); summarized in part in W Twining, The Implications of ‘Globalisation’ for Law as a Discipline in A Halpin, V Roeben (eds.) Theorising the Global Legal Order. Oxford: Hart) 39-59.
chapter, remains necessarily abstract in two ways. First, it remains abstract from particular areas in which globalization and law meet—human rights, international economic law, family law, etc. Such areas are used as mere examples. The reason is that globalization is not confined to these areas of the law; it permeates all of law and thus matters everywhere. Second, the chapter remains abstract from specific theories. Globalization is not a single theory or even a cluster of theories. Rather, it is the emerging paradigm underlying all current theories of both state and law. Instead of presenting individual theories of globalization, I present what all of them have in common.

In the third section, I discuss what I consider the core theme of globalization—the transformation of the state, both empirically and theoretically. The state has long provided the tacit framework for our thinking in both social and legal theory. If, as I argue, globalization overcomes this focus, then a discussion of the transformation it brings with it must put the state at its centre. My analysis therefore follows along the traditional three elements of the state—territory, citizenship, and government and shows how each of them is transformed.

The fourth section, finally, suggests a theory of globalization and law, called transnational law. This may look like a legal, not a social theory, so some methodological points should be made here. Although I begin by explaining globalization and then focus more on the law, in this chapter, social and legal theory are not strictly kept apart. This amalgamation performs one main thesis of the chapter. Globalization, I argue, is not an external development that comes at the law from the outside. Rather, globalization and law mutually shape each other—today’s globalization is as much a product of a law as it influences the law. A proper theory of globalization must include the law; a proper theory of the law must have a better idea of globalization. Moreover, just as globalization challenges the distinction between the state and society, so it challenges the distinction between social and legal theory. Legal theories must necessarily not just be influenced by social theory; they must become social theories.²

II. Three Types of Globalization

There is no universally accepted definition of globalization, and so this chapter will not offer one. But that does not mean that no clarity can be achieved. Closer analysis of the debates suggests that three different types of concept of globalization must be distinguished. I call these three types globalization as reality, globalization as ideology, and globalization as theory. Inside each type, fruitful debates can be had. Between the types, however, such debates are less useful because the types are largely independent of each other. All three types are relevant for the law, and I will discuss implications for the law in each segment. However, I suggest that the last one—globalization as theory—is the most important for legal thought, because paradigm shifts happen neither in reality nor in ideology but in our ways of understanding the world.

² See R Cotterell, Law, Culture and Society. Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory (Hampshire: Ashgate 2007).
A. Globalization as Reality

Globalization refers, first and foremost, to developments in the real world that are, in some way, global. Many such developments are well-known. Some concern the relations between states, in particular the growing interdependence.\(^3\) — the increase in global trade and global markets (made possible in part through liberalization of trade), global communication (due in large part to the internet), global travel and global migration, global networks (from online gamers to terrorists), global environmental destruction and climate change, increased hybridity of cultures and societies, increased influence of US values and culture on the rest of the world. All of these developments are undoubtedly real— even though their extent is sometimes overestimated (for example, most consumption is still domestic). But the question is whether all these events amount to something categorically new that we should call globalization.

In response to these concerns, the most helpful analytics of globalization is still one proposed by David Held et al in the late 1990s.\(^4\) They suggest that globalization is characterized by four elements. The first three of these concerns global transactions, and in particular their **extensity, intensity, and velocity**. Extensity describes the stretching of activities across borders and distances. Intensity describes the magnitude of interconnectedness inherent in these transactions. Velocity describes how these transactions have gained in speed—if a letter from Europe to the United States used to take a week, and a fax ten minutes, an e-mail, today, arrives instantly. The fourth factor concerns what Held et al. sometimes call **impact** and sometimes the **enmeshment between the global and the local**—the idea that local events can have global consequences, and that on the other hand global developments materialize locally, often with considerable variations. In this reading, there have been globalizations before our time, but ours is the first that scores high on all four of these factors. The increase of global transactions creates new challenges for legal transactions. The fourth, the enmeshment between the global and the local, is reflected in the law in the increasingly blurred lines between domestic and international law.

This analytics makes it possible to avoid a number of errors about globalization. First, globalization is not a mere transfer of issues from a local to a supranational sphere, which could be accompanied by a move from domestic to supranational law (as is the case in the European Union, but not really on an international level). Nor does it seem sufficient to think of the local and the global as distinct spheres that may interconnect—a relation well known in law as the relation between domestic law and international law, to be discussed later. Instead, what we find is that the local and the global mutually constitute each other— Boaventura de Sousa Santos speaks, helpfully, of “globalized

---


localism” and “localized globalism”. Global commerce relies, to a large extent, on local laws and domestic enforcement mechanisms—its globalism is localized. Human rights movements, on the other hand, attempt to achieve local policy changes by forming networks—their localism is globalized.

Second, globalization is not merely uniformization. Although increased communication and competition may sometimes lead towards uniformity—of culture, of policies, and of laws—such uniformity always remains partial. In response to ideas of an “end of history”, scholars have found that there are sustainable “varieties of capitalism” in different capitalist countries. The same appears to be true in law—different countries can still have different laws, and this may even be beneficial. Even where laws look the same formally, their actual application often differs significantly. The same is true for theses of an “americanization” of law. Even if it is the case that US law has been enormously influential in the world—in contract drafting, in commercial law, in constitutional law—this does not, necessarily, create uniformity American culture and law in turn have become more diverse—the English language and Caucasian ethnicity, once clearly dominant, are giving way to an ever more hybridized culture.

Third, we can meaningfully compare our current globalization to earlier globalizations. We know that many current developments—internationalization, liberalization, universalization, and westernization—are not new and therefore not sufficient for a definition of globalization as a new phenomenon. Indeed, trade volumes for example have only recently reached the same volume as they had before the First World War. However, this is a problem only if we think that globalization describes only our current period and are unwilling to use the title for comparable developments in the past—in particular the 19th century.

B. Globalization as Theory

Even if the empirics were universally accepted, we would still find different interpretations of these empirics, especially as they relate to law. This leads to a second use of the term globalization—globalization as theory. Several theories of globalization exist. What they have in common is a shift away from the paradigm that has dominated both social and legal thought over the last two hundred years: methodological


8 JA Scholte, Globalization—A Critical Introduction (St. Martin’s Press, 2000) 44-46. For Scholte, the only truly new development is deterritorialization. Ibid. at 46-50.

nationalism. Methodological nationalism describes an approach in social theory that takes the nation state as an assumption. Wimmer and Schiller distinguish, helpfully, three modes in which methodological nationalism occurs.\textsuperscript{10} First, they argue, social theories of modernity have largely ignored that modernity—rationalization, the transcendence of ethnic, religious and (to some extent) economic differences—took place not just within the nation state; these theories also went along with a persisting ideological nationalism that must thus be viewed as a constitutive element of modernity, not its opponent. Second, social theory has naturalized the nation state and thereby made it the framework of its analysis of society, rather than its object. Third, and finally, the analytical focus of social science and theory have been restrained by the boundaries of the nation state. With regard to the later mode, we can speak of the state as container of social processes.\textsuperscript{11}

Regardless of whether or not such methodological nationalism has dominated the social sciences\textsuperscript{12} it seems clear that it has been predominant in legal debates. Here, methodological nationalism translates into what is called the Westphalian Model—the idea that the state presents the ultimate point of reference for both domestic and international law. In this model, all domestic law is the law within one state, whereas in international law, the only actors are states, and the supranational institutions that states have set up. We can see the prevalence of this model in all legal disciplines. Discussions in public law assume the existence of one government (unitary or not). Private law has been nationalized—not just formally, as codes (in civil law countries), but also in our understanding of it.\textsuperscript{13} Even law that is not national law is understood within such methodological nationalism. Thus, international law, understood as law between states, perpetuates the idea of the state as the only relevant reference point. Even where law is moved to the supranational level—as is the case for the law of the European union—it remains caught in the perspective of the state.\textsuperscript{14} More, even where non-state law is described as law, the concept of law used is typically borrowed from the model of state law.\textsuperscript{15} Conflicts between legal systems are, in such a perspective, viewed as an exception; the dominant solution in private international law is to allocate international transactions to one state.

\textsuperscript{10}\textsuperscript{10} A Wimmer and N Glick Schiller, 'Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and the Social Sciences' (2002) 2 Global Networks 301.


\textsuperscript{12}\textsuperscript{12} For doubts, see Daniel Chernilo, ‘Social Theory’s Methodological Nationalism: Myth and Reality’ (2006) 9 European Journal of Social Theory 9 5.

\textsuperscript{13}\textsuperscript{13} See N Jansen & R Michaels (eds), \textit{Beyond the State? Rethinking Private Law} (Mohr Siebeck 2008).


Globalization as theory explicitly rejects such a nationalism and seeks for new ways to theorize both society and law. There is no space in this chapter to address all of these theories, or even only those that are of relevance for the law. Halliday and Osinsky, who explicitly draw on Held’s four factors, distinguish four such interpretations that are, at the same time, models of social theory. The first model is world polity, the idea of global convergence. Such convergence encompasses the law, which converges either formally, through increased international and supranational law, or informally, through diffusion of laws and best practices. The second model is what they call world system analysis—the idea of hegemonic states and actors that prevent the development of global norms. In law, we saw this for a long time as the imposition of American laws and institutions on the world, be it in commercial law, or in public international law. Their third model is postcolonial globalism, the insight into the power imbalances between powerful and less powerful countries. Its consequence is that law is perceived as neutral and objective in the North, which creates and enforces it, while it often looks fragmented and oppressive for actors in the South. The fourth model, finally, is law and development, the analysis of law reform in developing countries, influenced (and often imposed) by developed countries.

C. Globalization as Ideology

A third understanding of globalization, finally, is yet distinct from the first and the second one. Understood as an ideology, globalization and its flipside, anti-globalization are political projects, or ideal, perhaps utopian (or dystopian) views of how the world could be. Globalization as ideology comes in a number of related variants. One variant is that of a world community (or a global village, or cosmopolitanism) in which everyone is connected with everyone. That world would be more homogenized and uniform, resting less on parochial views and instead on values common to humanity. Individuals would no longer be citizens of individual countries but instead citizens of the world—globalization ascosmopolitanism. In law, we find this reflected in ideas of a world law and a world court that were popular in the beginning of the twentieth century and have more recently become popular again. Another variant of globalization as ideology is neoliberalization: the idea that markets should emancipate from states and their regulation and thereby lead to more freedom and more prosperity. The new lex mercatoria in particular is a legal ideal expressing this idea. This is linked to the idea of individualization—in the same way in which the state loses its regulatory appeal, so it is argued, the individual agent is strengthened.


Globalization as ideology is of course closely related to globalization as reality and as theory. Not only are ideologies formulated in light of existing empirics and theory. Moreover, both the ever-closer world community and the rise of neoliberalism are often presented as inevitable consequences from the state of the world as it is today. This is so, interestingly, both among proponents and opponents of these ideologies. But it seems fair to say that such necessitarianism is false, or at least too simplistic. This is so not only because the future can never be predicted with accuracy (this is, if anything, even more true today than it ever has been, because of the increased velocity of globalization.) Moreover, such necessitarianism ignores two things. One is the array of alternative developments that are possible, both theoretically and practically—alternative globalizations, alternative constellations. The other is the degree to which globalization is not just a force of nature but a construct of human agency—even if that agency is decentralized and plural—and thus also, to a large extent, of law.

This does not mean that we need to reject globalization as ideology. Quite to the contrary, if it is true that we need to rethink radically the role and shape of law in our changing society, then we need such ideologies as a normative guidance. What we should reject, by contrast, is the conflating of ideology and empirics.

III. Law Beyond the State

For all three concepts of globalization—reality, theory, ideology—the role of the state is central. This is so especially with regard to law, because the state is so central to our contemporary thinking. Thus, it seems appropriate to look in more detail at how the elements of the state have traditionally been constitutive of the law, and how their transformation under the impact of globalization has effects on the law as well.

Much debate in the 1990s was dedicated to the question whether globalisation caused the state to decline, or not. For some time, decline seemed more plausible in view of the rise of non-state actors like multinational enterprises (MNEs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), regulatory competition and the ensuing limitations on state’s policy discretion, the rise of neoliberalism. Soon, this literature of the decline of the state spurred as counter debate that emphasized either that states had remained strong, or that they had even been strengthened by globalization.

That dichotomy of decline and stability was unsatisfactory for a variety of reasons. First, looking at “the” state as an abstraction from real states has always been a problem, especially so in international law. It becomes more of a problem in discussions of globalization’s impacts. Whatever we understand globalization to mean, its effects on countries like the United States or China are undoubtedly different from those on Somalia or Andorra, and so on.

19 See, eg, RM Unger, Free Trade Reimagined: The World Division of Labor and the Method of Economics (Princeton, Princeton University Press 2010).

20 Held et al (n 4) 3-7 speak, parallely, of hyperglobalizers and globalization skeptics.
Second, asking what impact globalization has on states implies that globalization is an external factor. The question thus ignores the extent to which states (in large part through their law) are among the institutions that create and shape globalization. The same is true for many discussions of law and globalization: law is viewed as a recipient of globalization, although law is also one of the most important shapers of globalization. For example, international trade does not occur prior to state regulation; rather, liberalized trade regulations and treaties (first and foremost the WTO) have made it possible. Similarly, the internet is not external to the state and never has been; it was established with strong support by the US government; its functioning today is guaranteed by a myriad of legal regulations.

Third, the dichotomy of decline/strengthening is much too crude. It makes more sense to speak of transformation of the state—and then to analyse the particular characteristics of this transformation. Of course, transformation is nothing new: the states have always, since their inception, been transformed constantly. What may be new is the specifically global character of current transformations. One such aspect is the so-called “disaggregation” of the state: the insight that states are not unitary actors but combine a multitude of institutions and actors which may deal with internationalization and globalization in different ways. Another aspect is the increased number of informal networks in which states now regulate. A third aspect is the increased regulatory competition that puts pressure on states’ abilities to maintain their welfare systems.

With these caveats out of the way, some general findings can nonetheless be described. Although all states undergo different transformations, generalities can be described, using the traditional elements of the state. Traditionally, we understand the state to be constituted by three elements: a territory, a population, and an administrative structure. The transformation of the state under conditions of globalization can most fruitfully be described as a transformation of these three elements.

---


25 G Jellinek, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (Berlin, Häring 3rd ed 1914) 394-434. These three elements, supplemented by a fourth (the capacity to enter into relations with other states) are codified in Art. 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (signed at Montevideo Dec 26, 1933; entered into force December 26, 1934).
A. Territory

We assume that a state’s laws apply only within its borders—and that, similarly, no other state’s laws apply here. This is unproblematic as long as domestic transactions are at stake. But it has even been true, by and large, for questions of public and private international law. In public international law, the idea of territorial integrity and exclusive jurisdiction remains strong—even though it allows for exceptions, and even though the idea of territoriality has been enhanced to include intraterritorial effects of conduct that took place elsewhere. For example, it is now almost universally accepted that a state has jurisdiction over antitrust violations that have an effect on the state’s markets, even if the conduct leading to the violation took place elsewhere. Enforcement actions by the state are, traditionally confined by a state’s borders. Similarly, territoriality has traditionally played a great role for private international law (or conflict of laws), even though it does not govern absolutely. Thus, the jurisdiction of courts is mostly based on territorial connections like the defendant’s domicile, or the place of a tort, etc. Territoriality also governs questions of applicable law: the law applicable to a tort, for example, has traditionally been the place where the tort occurred. Such territoriality has never been exclusive, however. Not infrequently, the applicable law is determined on the basis of non-territorial connecting factors like the parties’ nationality.

This great importance of territoriality for the law is not a coincidence. Rather, it reflects the great importance that territoriality has, traditionally, had for sovereignty. Territorial integrity and sovereignty are perhaps the most important characteristics of a state. Now, globalization challenges this importance of territoriality in a number of ways. First, globalization often makes geographical distances less relevant. Not only has travel become much easier, and accessible to large numbers of people. More importantly, improved means of communication—most importantly the internet—have made such travel far less necessary in many cases. The same document can now be edited at various places at the same time. Global production chains are made possible.26 And social interaction has undergone a qualitative change.27 Second, for the same reason, state borders have become less important—and less effective. Previously, it may have been possible to keep unwanted information out by simply closing borders and censoring the press. Today, given the global character of the internet, and the omnipresence of blogs and twitters, this has become much harder.

This has posed challenges for the law’s territorial character. The law has reacted in different ways.28 A first reaction is a declined emphasis on territorial boundaries.


Newer theories of sovereignty and of jurisdiction replace territoriality with a state’s interests—a state is, more and more, entitled to regulate even extraterritorially when the regulated conduct concerns a justified interest. This has meant that large and powerful countries like the United States have begun to apply their laws more and more extraterritorially, or to pass laws directly with a view to changing policies elsewhere, for example on minimum wage, press freedom, and the prosecution of religious groups. A second reaction is enhanced international cooperation to regulate trans-border transactions. Such cooperation makes sure that rights acquired in one country will be recognized in other countries; it thereby provides necessary stability to trade. A third reaction is, ironically, a reestablished emphasis on territorial boundaries. Somewhat counter intuitively, judges have begun to justify territorial approaches to the law precisely with the increase in transborder transactions. In such arguments, borders change their character. They may once have been real physical delimitations between countries; now they have become formal entities to delimit application of the law.

Two issues are important. First, territoriality may have become less central, but it has by no means become irrelevant. Access to water, as one of the main challenges for our overpopulated globe, still requires territorial connections; the internet cannot provide us with water. Distances between large cities with airports may now be bridged easily; small outposts are still hard to reach. Fights over territorial boundaries—military, but also legal—remain regular news topics. Sometimes such fights concern clearly important territories, like the ongoing disputes between Israel and Palestinians over territorial authority in Israel and Palestine. Sometimes they concern seemingly irrelevant territories like the uninhibited Senkaku Tiaoyutai Islands, which are heavily disputed between China and Japan.

The last example demonstrates something else. The reason such islands are disputed often lie not in their immediate usefulness, but rather in legal implications of sovereign authority, in particular a state’s ability to claim sovereignty over the sea around the island. This leads to the second important issue: the role and importance of territory remain, to a large extent, a function of the law. The internet is deterritorialized not only because of its technology but also because of how it is (or is not) legally regulated. If states resist this deterritorialization, they still have means to avoid it as the example of China shows.

B. Population / Citizenship

The second traditional element of the state is its population. The romantic idealisation of the modern nation state even suggests that the population, understood as an imagined community (a people, a nation) is prior, logically and historically, to the state—first there was the German people, then there was the German state. In reality, the order is often


reversed, as Benedict Anderson has shown: the nation state, once it is established, defines its own people.\(^{31}\) To stay with the German example, there was long the chance that Austria would become part of the newly founded German empire; once it was not, it was also clear that the German people would be defined as excluding the Austrians.

The latter shows already the extent to which citizenship is a function not (at least not primarily) of culture or ethnicity, but instead of the law. The designation of citizenship is, traditionally, left to each state (though international law limits states’ discretion to deprive their nationals of citizenship). However, once citizenship is thus established, it creates certain rights and obligations vis-à-vis the state. Rights include in particular civil rights (for example elections); obligations include in particular military service. Altogether, citizenship both assumes and creates, traditionally, a bond of allegiance, and defines the most important part of an individual’s identity.

Globalization has an impact on this allegiance and identity as well. A first impact concerns the sharp increase in global migration. Migration takes place both amongst the rich and well-educated and the poor. As a consequence, in many countries, large parts of the population are of foreign nationality. The law is an enabler of such migration—by making immigration easy for highly coveted high achievers, but also by regulating immigration. And the law draws consequences from the increasingly multinational character of its populations. First, most countries have made access to citizenship easier—at least for desirable highly qualified individuals. National identity thus turns from a matter of fate to a matter of choice, shifting also the basis for obligations of allegiance.\(^{32}\) Second, multiple nationality is gaining more and more acceptance—the old idea that one could only serve one master is giving way to a recognition of multiple national allegiances. Third, more and more constitutional rights are granted to foreigners and citizens alike. Using Marshall’s triad of rights as civil, political, and social rights,\(^{33}\) we can see that more and more civil and social rights are extended to foreign citizens. In the European Union, even the core political right of taking part in elections is now sometimes granted to members of other EU countries, at least for local elections. As a consequence, the relative importance of national citizenship declines.\(^{34}\)

Another impact of globalization concerns non-state identities. Together with the transformation of the state, we find a growing importance of multiple identities and allegiances of which national identity is only one. Pierre may identify not only as a Frenchman but also as a business consultant, a vegetarian, a conservative, a catholic, a member of a chess club, a Berber, etc. It is inexact (as is sometimes done) to suggest that


such a plurality of identities is a novelty of globalization. Historically, however, all such identities were considered to be transcended by the national identity. Or, put differently: the national identity served to enable all these identities – e pluribus unum. What globalization increases is the degree to which such identities can be experienced in a transnational fashion. Business consultants now work in multinational firms. Conservatives form international alliances. Chess players meet online to play with counterparts around the world. Ethnic groups are able to communicate around the globe. By their transnational status these identities transcend the state which remains, relatively, localized. States often recognize such non-state identities through their law with multiculturalism and legal pluralism, but these are topics that will be dealt with in the next section.

C. Government

The third element of the state, finally, is a government, or a functioning administration. This means, first, that the state, through its government, has the power to lay down binding rules as laws that do not require the specific consent of the governed. It means, secondly, that the state, and only the state, is entitled to enforce its laws—it has the monopoly of violence.

It is important to understand the contingency of this dual monopoly of lawmaking and of enforcement—especially because it is often misrepresented in globalization literature. First, the monopoly is a historical, not an analytical finding. The monopoly is an achievement of the modern state, not a characteristic of every conceivable state. The monopoly did not exist in the Middle Ages, when multiple institutions competed. It did not exist in Germany and Austria after World War II, or in Iraq after the Iraq war, because the occupying powers retained considerable rights.

Second, and importantly, the monopoly does not mean that state laws are the only binding rules in society. It has always been known that lots of non-state institutions are able to make binding rules and to have them enforced through the state’s courts or through arbitration. What the monopoly implies, here, is merely that such powers of non-state institutions acquire their legally binding force only from delegation or recognition by the state. The state is not the only lawmaker, but it is the only institution that is free to determine whose rules should be recognized as law.

What, then, does globalization change in this picture? A first important development comes from the increased global interdependence of states mentioned earlier. We find more and more delegation of lawmaking powers to supranational institutions, be they global (like the United Nations) or regional (like the European Union). We find more and more cooperation between nations, either formal through treaties and executive agreements, or informal through ad hoc international consultations. Sovereignty is thus shared. A state no longer holds absolute discretion on lawmaking. However, such cooperation does not necessarily limit a state’s effectiveness. Quite to the contrary, multinational cooperation often seems necessary to deal with transnational issues. Properly, one speaks not of a decline of sovereignty but of the “new
sovereignty”. Much is contested here; especially in the United States, a large number of scholars and policymakers tries to protect maximum US self-determination as provided for in the Constitution against such shared sovereignty. Regardless of whether such a defense is normatively attractive, what is striking from a methodological perspective is how it is based in methodological nationalism: the values of the national constitution are taken as a necessary starting point of the discussion, so the outcome—a prioritization of national over transnational lawmaking—is almost a logical necessity.

A second important and much-discussed consequence concerns the importance of non-state norms. Some such norms are religious, as in the question whether Islamic and Jewish divorces should be recognized in England or Canada. Some such norms are based in ethnicity, such as the question whether we should be more lenient with wifebeaters who come from cultures where beating one’s wife is common. Some such norms are economic, such as the alleged privately created law governing relations between global businesses, the so-called new lex mercatoria. The state accounts for such rules, typically, without recognizing them as law. One such mode is incorporation—the transformation of non-state law into state law, as happened with much of canon law in the emergence of the civil law. Another is deference—the transformation of non-state law into facts for the purpose of adjudication, which is what happens traditionally with commercial customs, but also quite often with customary norms of non-state communities. A third one is delegation—the transformation of Non-State Law into subordinated law, whereby the rules of non-state communities are simultaneously recognized and subordinated to the laws of the state. Calls that non-state rules have to be recognized as law, for purposes of conflict of laws, have so far largely been rejected.

It has become fashionable to refer to the new state of the law as global legal pluralism. This implies, frequently, the suggestion that social realities require us to extend our often exclusive focus on state law and call other things law as well: subnational, national, supranational (international) and non-state law. Such categories are

References:


helpful, but they have obvious limits. One such limit is, analytically, that the categorisation still defines every type of legal order by how it relates to the state: subnational law stands below the state; supranational law stands above it, non-state law stands beside it. Instead of overcoming the state paradigm of law, thus, the categorization not only depends on that paradigm, it even expands it by fitting even normative orders into it that were not traditionally its part. Second, and relatedly some of the categories are not very useful. Non-state law, for example, is a category that must group together such diverse phenomena as the new lex mercatoria (to be discussed later), Islamic law, and corporate standards of conduct. It is hard to see what holds these laws together, and distinguishes them from state law, other than the fact that they are not state law. Third, theories of global legal pluralism often mesh empirical findings (a lot of rules worldwide are not state laws) with theoretical conceptions (we need to theorize all of these as laws) and ideological positions (we have to grant greater deference to non-state orders, though how much exactly often remains unclear). Altogether, although the phenomena described under the heading of global legal pluralism are immensely relevant, their treatment as legal pluralism seems to be of limited use.\(^{39}\)

One theoretical challenge, however, emerges without doubt. Traditionally, it was possible to treat a legal system as internally coherent and ultimately founded in some highest rule. In legal theory, Hans Kelsen referred to this highest rule (which for him was a hypothetical one) as basic norm (Grundnorm); HLA Hart, in his sociologically inspired theory, called it a rule of recognition.\(^ {40}\) Today’s world with its overlapping laws and claims to regulatory authority, with is forum shopping and regulatory conflicts, cannot so easily be framed as such a system. This does not mean that the old theories, established for the state (and grounded in methodological nationalism) have become useless. It has been suggested, not without plausibility, that the relation between EU law and the law of individual member states can be conceived of as the relation between two separate rules of recognition.\(^ {41}\) But it seems clear that the state’s dual monopoly can no longer be maintained on either empirical or theoretical grounds. New theories of law will be needed.

### IV. Transnational Law

It is too early to say whether a new paradigm will replace the methodological nationalism that has shaped our thinking about law over the last centuries, and if so, what this new paradigm might look like. A candidate exists, however, in what is called transnational law. Transnational law, as a theory of law beyond the state, is attractive in particular from the perspective of social theory, because it attempts to combine both doctrine and theory,

---


and both law and social reality. In other words, it promises to fulfill the requirement named in the beginning for an understanding of law and globalization, namely an approach that views both as deeply interrelated.

The concept of transnational law was phrased originally around the middle of the last century, by Philip Jessup. Jessup used the term to describe a body of law “to include all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories” This was, in other words, an understanding of law defined not by its sources or its form but by its object, a functional concept. Although formulated prior to discussions about globalization, it thus proved useful under conditions of globalization. This is so because the very boundaries that transnational law tries to transcend—those between public and private law, but also those between international and domestic law—are precisely those boundaries that are closely tied to the nation state and have therefore become questionable. An additional boundary was not discussed by Jessup but has become prominent and important under globalization, too—the boundary between (formal) law and non-law. This boundary is of particular importance from the perspective of social theory, because its decline requires us to redefine the relation between law and society. I will discuss these boundaries, and their transformation, in turn

A. Domestic/International Law

It was described earlier how the distinction between domestic and international law was representative for the Westphalian model and thus for a methodological nationalism in legal theory and doctrine. In their classical conceptions, international and domestic law dealt with different problems and would thus rarely overlap: international law dealt with the international relations between states; domestic law dealt with relations between the state and the individual (public law) or between individuals (private law).

This dichotomy was always fragile, but it was broken up in the twentieth century. International law, on the one hand, came to include non-state actors, in particular Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations. Moreover, international law began to focus more on individuals—in human rights law on the one hand, in international criminal law on the other. In this way, international law came to reach into what had previously been considered internal matters of sovereign states, and began to break up the idea of absolute state sovereignty. Domestic law, on the other hand, has had to internationalize, the more it has been confronted with situations that cannot be located clearly within one state.

As defined by their objects, then, international and domestic law are no longer as distinct as they once were. Today, this is a direct consequence of globalization and the decline of the “state as container.” Nonetheless, international and domestic law remain formally distinct, and a theory of transnational law that ignores this formal distinction would have to be deficient.

---


43 See P Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Legal Pluralism’ (2010 1 Transnational Legal Theory 141.)
B. Public/Private

A second distinction that is challenged by transnational law is the one between public and private law. Public law is the law that governs relations between the state and the individual; private law governs relations between individuals. In some way, this distinction exists in all domestic legal systems, though it has different meanings in different legal systems and is less relevant in some (like English law) than in others (like French law). This public/private distinction had been challenged already in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It appeared to replicate a liberal conception of society, in which neatly distinguished public and private spheres existed, and in which the public (the state) and the private (the market, the family, society) would not interfere with each other. In social theory, antiliberal critique of several variants (feminist, critical, deconstructionist, etc.) proclaimed a collapse of the distinction and emphasized the public relevance of the seemingly private spheres of economic and personal relations. In legal theory, similarly, the collapse of the public/private distinction was proclaimed, as well as the public character of private law. The idea behind this argument is this: even private law depends, for its enforcement, on the state and its institutions. Insofar as private plaintiffs enforce their private rights, therefore, they borrow sovereignty from the state.

It should be clear, then, that the critique of the public/private distinction is not specific to globalization; it is a general element of antiliberal critique. Globalization, however, challenges the public/private distinction in particular ways. The most important of these has to do, again, with the overcoming of methodological nationalism: Once the state loses its privileged position, public law (as the law that governs the state’s relations with private parties) loses its special position as well. Traditional regulatory functions of the state are performed by private actors. The state, on the other hand, sees itself in competition with other states and private parties in a global market for investors; it starts to resemble private actors.


46 For a more nuanced overview of the multiple meanings, see J Weintraub, The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction, in J Weintraub and Krishan Kumar, Public and Private in Thought and Practice—Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

This becomes clear in several constellations. The most obvious one may be the proclaimed confluence of public and private international law. Another of these emerges in international investment law, which often pairs states and investors on opposing ends. Here, both parties have asymmetrical powers (the state has sovereignty, the investor has assets), and it is not clear, in terms of either power or law, which is superior.

Another area in which the relations become unclear is party autonomy in private international law. Increasingly, the law applicable to contracts is determined by party choice rather than governmental interests; furthermore, commercial parties frequently delegate their disputes to arbitrators instead of state courts. As a result, several of the state’s core functions—lawmaking, adjudication—are, in effect, privatized. What remains for the state is to recognize the results of such choices and to enforce choice-of-law clauses and arbitral awards. In some ways, therefore, such party choice turns the traditional hierarchy between state and parties on its head. This could be viewed as a consequence of a decline of the state, as described before. But it must be recalled (again) that this growing party autonomy is in effect a creation by the state and its laws.

It is important to see that the international/domestic distinction and the public/private distinction are transformed simultaneously, with perhaps surprising results. Within the state paradigm it was possible to say that all private law is public law because the state has the power (and discretion) to enforce it. This is true, however, only for domestic law. With only little exaggeration, therefore, we can say that all international law is private law. And indeed, we see such developments. In the same way in which societal institutions (like markets and families) become transnational while states remain local, so private law is becoming denationalized, while public law remains local. The proclaimed lex mercatoria, the alleged autonomous law of international markets, is the most prominent example. In reality, such a reconstitution of the public/private distinction as the domestic/international distinction is nothing new: private law was for most of its history understood as transnational, whereas public law was always tied to the state.

C. Law/Society

A third distinction is highlighted especially in newer theories of transnational law—that between (formal) law and Society and its norms. This distinction has long been

---


important for legal theory and practice, for various reasons: only laws are considered binding; only decisions on law have the force of precedent; questions of law are allocated to judges whereas questions of fact can sometimes be decided by juries, etc. As a consequence, what counts as law was long based, at least in principle, on the basis of formal criteria—we speak of legal positivism. This is so although the distinction was never clear-cut: the common law, for example, is thought to emerge from custom. But what makes it law is its recognition by the state. Nor was the distinction ever all-encompassing; it was always clear that individuals are restrained not only by law but by multiple other norms.

Now, globalization challenges this distinction. The reason is not merely, as is sometimes proclaimed, a decline in the importance of the state as regulator. If anything, official laws have become more important than they were in the past: the state regulates more and more affairs. Instead, the distinction begins to collapse because the criteria used in legal positivism to define what should count as law are becoming questionable. Legal positivism requires an unquestioned starting point—a constitution, a sovereign people—and this starting point is, in almost all variants, tied to the state. Once we overcome our methodological nationalism, we are required to justify this very starting point. Moreover, we become aware that the starting point itself is a creation of the law, not just its precursor.

The result is that we must understand law and society as being mutually constitutive: law is created by and in society, but law also creates society in the way in which we find it. Empirically, this may not be a novelty. But such mutual constitution now becomes also theoretically unavoidable. This is so because, after the end of methodological nationalism, the state can no longer be distinguished, analytically and theoretically, from society. It becomes a specific practice within which norms, whether we call them legal or otherwise, is negotiated.

In a sense I have come full circle. I began the chapter describing globalization as a vague and broad concept. I end with presenting transnational law as an equally vague and broad concept. This parallel vagueness is, of course, no coincidence. At the same time, it may be viewed as unsatisfactory. Transnational law does not seem very helpful: If transnational law encompasses all legal (and non-legal!) rules, it may be thought to lose any distinguishing potential. If everything is transnational law, nothing really is. In this sense, the suggestion made in this chapter is much more cautious. Transnational law is not a theory, just as globalization is not a theory. If anything, transnational law is a description of what we find empirically as law beyond the state, and a theoretical conceptualization of law after the breakdown of methodological nationalism. Transnational law describes a starting point, not an endpoint, of thinking about law. Most of the actual work of translating globalization into law, and vice versa, still remains to be done.